

Jain Philosophy Historical Outline interprets the fundamentals of Jain philosophy from the viewpoint of their historical genesis and development and shows that the incipient stage of the Jain thought-complex agreed totally with the Pythagorean approach to philosophy which was based on observed realities and was quite in harmony with the existing socio-political conditions of the time of Lord Mahāvīra while the sophisticated stage marked by the *a priori* doctrines and dogmas it had generated in course of its development and by the traditionally floating ideas in regard to the belief in a eternal moral order in the universe, the law of *karma*, ignorance as the cause of bondage and knowledge as that of liberation, the efficacy of meditation, and so forth, was a persistent juxtaposition in the evolutionary stages of the former. Since no system of Indian philosophy allows a purely isolated treatment a comparative study of all the philosophical systems has been made here to determine the real nature of the Jain standpoint with more emphasis on the original dynamism of Jainism which had contributed to the growth of various natural sciences, including those of biology and astronomy, on the total rejection of the concept of a supernatural agent in the form of God, on the theories of valid knowledge and on the unique logical system based on the principles of relativity.

Prof. Narendra Nath Bhattacharyya teaches in the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture, University of Calcutta. Though religious history is his *forte* he works at ease in diverse branches of ancient Indian history and civilization.

Jain Philosophy

Historical Outline

Jain Philosophy

Historical Outline

N N Bhattacharyya



Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers Pvt Ltd

ISBN 81-215-0887-8
Second revised edition 1999

© 1999, **Bhattacharyya**, Narendra Nath

All rights reserved including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher.

Typeset, printed and published by
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
Post Box 5715, 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 110 055

*Dedicated as a mark of
devotion and reverence to the holy name of
Lord Mahāvīra who inspired men to fight against
oppression and exploitation, disease and death,
cruelty and caste, anger and pride,
deceit and greed*

Contents

<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	ix
<i>Preface to the First Edition</i>	xi
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION 1

The Jains as they are	1
Researches on Jainism	7
Literary Sources	37
Archaeological Sources Architecture and Sculpture	48
Archaeological Sources The Epigraphs	55
Pāṇva and Mahāvīra	61
Ecclesiastical History	64

CHAPTER TWO

THE INCIPIENT STAGE 76

The Prehistory of Jainism	76
The Historical Background	79
Material Basis of the Great Intellectual Movement	83
The Conflicts in the History of Indian Thought	87
Contemporary Philosophical Schools	89
Pūrāṇa Kassapa	94
Pakudha Kaccāyana	96
Makkhali Gosāla	98
Sañjaya Belatthiputta	101
Ajita Kesakambalin	103
Social Experiences of Mahāvīra	104
The Social Basis of Jain Ethics	107

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOPHISTICATED STAGE 113

Jainism and Indian Philosophical Tradition	113
--	-----

Jain Atheism	118
Jain Logic	132
Scientific Enquiries Cosmology	144
Scientific Enquiries Classification of Jīva	149
Scientific Enquiries Biology, Physiology, etc	152
Scientific Enquiries Diseases and Medicines	158
Scientific Enquiries Astronomy	159
Scientific Enquiries Atomism	161
Jain Cosmography	163
The Unfounded Speculations and their Ethical Considerations	168
The Nine Fundamentals and the Doctrine of Karma	169
Classification of Karma and the Gunasthānas	176
A Review of the Jain Metaphysics	178
Theory of Knowledge	182
Psychological Ingredients	184
The Non-Absolutist Standpoint	186

CHAPTER FOUR

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

190

Jainism and Vedic Tradition	190
Jainism and Buddhism	194
Jainism and Ajivikism	199
Jainism and Materialism	202
Jainism and Sāmkhya	204
Jainism and Yoga	211
Jainism and Mīmāṃsā	213
Jainism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	216
Jainism and Vedānta	219
A Subjectwise Comparative Study of the Systems	222

<i>Appendix</i>	230
<i>Bibliography</i>	244
<i>Index</i>	252

Preface to the Second Edition

In the present edition some changes and additions have been made. The Bibliography has been updated and a special Appendix added. My purpose in the earlier edition was to find out the social basis of the Jain thought complex and to establish that primitive Jainism was unencumbered by the artificial impediments of philosophical idealism and that there was a constant conflict within the system itself between the empiric formulations of the earlier tradition and *a priori* doctrines and dogmas it had generated in the course of its development. The result was that the kernel was devoured by the accretions and the original dynamism which had contributed to the growth of physical, chemical, biological, mathematical and astronomical sciences with a total rejection of the concept of a supernatural agent in the form of God and the unique logical system based on the principles of relativity was lost and replaced by such views regarding the life and the universe as were not probably desired by the founders of the system.

One may not agree with this approach of mine, but I find no reason to depart from the premises I had outlined and conclusions drawn from them, though I admit that in their presentation I had given some undue emphasis on certain features or did not analyse them rightly. For example, my earlier insistence on the anti-Vedic character of Jainism, as also of Buddhism and contemporary systems, does not seem tenable on further scrutiny. To stigmatize the Brāhmanas as social and intellectual villains was also unhistorical and prejudiced. Though Jainism and Buddhism had some structural differences with Vedism and its sectarian offshoots, from the viewpoint of religio-philosophical terms and concepts the basic similarity underlying all these systems cannot be overlooked or ignored. The logical, epistemological and metaphysical terms and concepts, as those pertaining to the functional aspects of religious life and philosophical speculations in India seem to originate from one primary source and these were subsequently adapted in all the religio-philosophical systems with necessary modifications. There are other points which require reconsideration. Such changes in perception

have been occasionally indicated, in this volume. But no basic change has been done except adding some extra matter.

I like to put on record what a great loss has taken place in the field of Prākṛta and Jain studies owing to the sad demise of Prof. Jagadish Chandra Jain in 1994. When the first edition of the book came out he showered immense praise upon it for its novelty of approach in a Bombay journal. This book was responsible for cementing our friendship for ever. My another esteemed friend Prof. Deviprasad Chattopadhyaya, who had convinced me through prolonged discussions about the material basis of the Jain ideas and at the same time advised me not to ignore the traditional scholars in the field of Jain studies, is also no more. Here I avail myself of the opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude to him. This new edition has been possible at the behest of my friend Sri Devendra Jain of Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers who does not, however, care for my thanks.

N N BHATTACHARYA

Jonaghat
P.O. Chinsurah 712 101
West Bengal

Preface to the First Edition

The aim of the present work is to interpret the fundamentals of Jain philosophy from the viewpoint of their historical genesis and development and in terms of their functional role in the field of Indian thought. I believe in the Pythagorean definition of philosophy which is 'contemplation, study and knowledge of nature'. It is the science of the general laws of being (i.e., nature and society), human thinking and the process of knowledge. At the earlier stages of human history philosophy arose as a science embracing the sum-total of man's knowledge of the objective world and of himself. Later on, individual sciences branched out from philosophy with the gradual development of human knowledge at different directions, and accordingly philosophy was singled out as an independent science for elaborating a general view of the world and for studying its general elements and laws, out of the need for a rational method of thinking. This ultimately resulted in the polarisation of philosophy into two diametrically opposed trends, materialism and idealism, and the struggle between the two, revealing the ideological interests of different social classes, characterised the entire history of philosophy as one of its main driving forces. Elaboration of the specific problems of philosophy led to the singling out of its various aspects as more or less independent and at times sharply delineated divisions. These are ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, psychology and so on.

This historical process held good also in the case of the development of the Indian thought. In each of the Indian systems there was an inherent conflict in the ideological sphere and the dominant forces of the conflict determined the ultimate nature of the system, whether it would remain materialistic or plunge into idealism. As a result of this, we find in the Indian philosophical arena the development of absolute materialism on the one hand represented by the Cārvāka system and that of absolute idealism on the other represented by the Advaita Vedānta, Mādhyaṃika and Yogācāra schools. In between these two extremes there are a number of systems which are basically materialistic but have eventu-

ally developed idealistic tendencies under different historical conditions. Of these systems the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vaiśbhāṣika and Sautrāntika have become overpowered by the spirit of idealism. The Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā, despite their idealistic accretions, have been able to maintain their original materialistic character. The same holds good also in the case of Jain philosophy which, notwithstanding its later idealistic tone and colour has been able to maintain its basic materialistic kernel. In this connection I like to draw the attention of my readers to the following observations of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi, one of the greatest Jain scholars of our times.

Indian philosophical systems fall under two main classes: some of them are realistic (*vāstavavādin*) and others idealistic (*avāstavavādin*, illusoristic). Those who view the gross (*sthūla*) world, i.e., the world apprehended by empirical (*laukika*) organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), to be as real as the subtle (*sūkṣma*) world, i.e., the world apprehended by the transcendental (*lokottara*) organs of knowledge, that is to say, those which maintain that there is no difference between the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth, that all truth is of the same kind though differing in degree, that all objects revealed (*bhāṣita*) through whatever organ of knowledge are equally real even if this revelation (*bhāṣa*) be relatively full of meagre, clear or vague, and that even real objects are capable of being expressed in words (*vāñī-prakāśya*) are realistic systems. They may also be called positivistic (*vidhimukha*) systems or systems talking in terms of 'it is thus' and 'it is so' (*īdamutthamvādin*, *evamvādin*). They include the Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems, the Vaiśbhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism, the Madhvite school of Vedānta, etc.

Those which view the external (*bāhya*), perceptible (*dṛśya*) world to be unreal (*mithyā*) and the internal (*āntarika*) one alone to be ultimately real (*parama-satya*) that is to say, those which, having classified truth into the empirical and the absolute, the apparent (*sāmurtika*) and the real (*vāstavika*), treat as unreal everything that is apprehended by the empirical organs of knowledge and is expressed in words—are idealistic systems. They may be called negativistic (*nisedhamukha*) systems or systems talking in terms of 'it is not so' (*anevamvādin*). The Śūnyavāda and Vyjñānavāda schools of Buddhism, the Śaṅkarite school of Vedānta, etc., are systems of this type.

Its basic attitude of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) notwithstanding, the Jain standpoint is absolutely realistic (*ekāntah vāstavavādin*) in nature. For according to it too, the objective truth (*bhāva satyatva*) revealed through sense-perception (technically called *matijñāna*) etc., is on a par with that revealed through transcendental intuition (technically called *kevala-jñāna*), that is to say, the two types of truth may differ as to their quantity but not as to their quality and nature. Sense-perception, etc., reveal a few substances (*dravya*) and a limited number of their modes (*pariyāya*) while transcendental intuition reveals the totality of substances and the totality of their modes, but the two do so in precisely the same manner and with precisely the same sort of validity. Thus even though the Jain system grants that certain extremely subtle objects (*sūkṣmatama bhāva*) are incapable of description (*anirvacanīya*) it insists that the objects capable of description (*nirvacanīya*) are nevertheless real. This however is not the case with Śūnyavāda, Śamkarite Vedānta etc." (*ASILM*, 1-2)

Although the realistic nature of the Jain standpoint has remained unaltered in essence, the idealistic accretions which it eventually developed, like other systems, as is revealed by the observation of Pandit Sukhlalji, which I have just quoted, remains to be explained. Jainism is basically an ethical religion which elaborates a moral of behaviour showing what is worth striving for, what is good, what gives meaning to life. Early Jain metaphysicians wanted to find the common origin of the diverse phenomena of nature, in nature itself. Hence their approach was naturally materialistic. They did not run in the mad quest of a God for explaining the mysteries of life and universe. They depended on logic and reason. Their contribution to the growth of physical, chemical, astronomical and biological sciences was immense. But just as in Greece, after Aristotle, the term metaphysics lost its original meaning, and its subject matter came to be identified with speculative philosophy as against the pre-Socratic naturalism of the Ionian physicists, so also most of the Indian systems, when they received a good deal of sophistication in the hands of educated elite class, viz., the Brāhmanas, set to themselves the impossible task of prying into the transcendental being above and behind the physical universe, of explaining the concrete realities of existence in the light of a hypothetical absolute. It was not the way to truth, but to dream not to knowledge, but to illusion. One should not fail to notice in this connection that

although Buddhism and Jainism, in the earlier stages of their growth, rejected Brahmanical supremacy, the Brāhmana converts of these new creeds of the masses, because of their educational advantages, came to take the lead, and by introducing their traditional terminologies overshadowed not only the spirit of the original teachings but confused the whole thing by establishing a standard of judgement, the very existence of which was not proved and could not be proved. Just as God was included in the Aristotelian category of substance, so also the *a priori* doctrine of *karma* was introduced in the Indian systems which put an end to all scientific enquiries.

¹ India, to say very frankly, the speculation about the origin of things was done mostly by the Brāhmanas whose very existence as leaders of society were dependent upon the maintenance of religious rituals and ceremonies. The Upanisads contain fragmentary records of a spirit of enquiry into the origin of things, but it was mostly confined to the priestly class itself, although some Ksatriyas appear also to have participated in it. In their hand, this spirit of enquiry, instead of challenging the authority of the Vedic religion and of its ministers, the all-powerful Brāhmanas, constructed a speculative system which stabilised the decayed structure. The *brahman* of Upanisads is a purely *a priori* assumption—an unverifiable hypothesis—which inevitably blocked the way to empiricism. The challenge to priestly supremacy only came from Buddhism and Jainism which gave rise to a non-priestly class. The founders of these systems were not Brāhmanas, *and not even Ksatriyas*. This assertion may evoke sentimental criticism, but historically it is a fact. They were simple tribesmen. The Buddha came from the Śākya tribe and Mahāvīra from the Jñātrikas. These tribes had nothing to do with the Ksatriyas. Many times the Buddha is mentioned as Visala which indicates his humble origin. It is only at a later period, probably due to the influence of the Brāhmana converts into Buddhism and Jainism, that a better pedigree was claimed for the masters, and that is why they came to be treated as Ksatriyas.

In the second part of this work I have insisted on the socio-economic background which was responsible for the rise of Buddhism and Jainism and tried to present the original form of Jainism as a natural development of the spirit of man, freed from primitive ignorance and unencumbered by artificial impediments of the

a priori doctrines and dogma of metaphysics. The Buddha and Mahāvīra had to face the dual requirement of their age. On the one hand we come across the rise of new social forces and on the other the break-up of the existing way of life, the complete annihilation of traditional social norms and values. The bulk of the surplus product of social labour was accumulated in the possession of the ruling class, and the priestly class also had its share in the form of offerings and sacrifices. The rise of cities, the expansion of trade and the development of manufacturing industries gave birth to new social classes which attacked the spiritual domination of the priesthood. At the same time, with the change in the technique of production, the ancient tribal systems were getting disintegrated, the traditional moral values were getting trampled and undermined and people were experiencing immense bloodshed and massacre as the precondition of the consolidation of state power. The Buddha and Mahāvīra saw before their very eyes complete extermination of their own kinsmen by the expanding state-powers of Kosala and Magadha. It is against this background that I have tried to trace the historical rise of Buddhism and Jainism. These problems had to be faced by the Buddha and Mahāvīra. On the one hand they had to evaluate the liberating potentialities of the new social forces and on the other they had to offer to the oppressed a solution of the crisis, something which would give meaning to life. Accordingly, it has been asserted that this stupendous socio-political transformation evidently laid down the basis of the early Jain-Buddhist ideas and offered the specific conditions to which their ingredients can be successfully traced. Owing to the paucity of materials the task is extremely difficult, but not altogether impossible.

At its incipient stage Jainism as an ethical religion wanted to solve the crisis of a particular age. But the earlier Jain thinkers felt that mere appeal to human morality would be of no value unless their doctrines were logically defended. Their substantial contribution to this field was the introduction of a dialectic logic. It was later condemned by Śaṅkara as 'an unsettling style of reasoning'. Really it could unsettle all the settled facts. The Jain philosophers subjected the conceptions of absoluteness, unity and eternity to their 'unsettling style of reasoning'. Once the absoluteness of the standard of truth is disputed, the whole airy structure of doctrines and dogmas, reared upon that foundation, necessarily collapses. At its

incipient stage Jain philosophy represented the knowledge of nature, acquired through contemplation, observation and investigation of the phenomena of nature itself. Its enquiry about the origin of the universe started not from the *terra incognita* of the hypothetical First Principle, but from the tangible and knowable concrete. It revealed the eternalness of nature, having no place for a creator.

Coming to the sophisticated stage of Jain philosophy, which I have discussed in the third part of this work, we find a different picture. Here we come across a conflict within the system itself, a conflict between the empiric ideas of the earlier tradition and the *apriory* ideas, and it was the latter which triumphed finally. To empirical perception was added transcendental perception and this opened the door for idealism. The very concept of philosophy (*darsana*) changed its significance. The earlier empirical basis of philosophy is clearly found in the expression *darsana* which literally means the *act of perception*, derived from the root *dis*, to *to see*. But the true meaning and significance of the word *darsana* was changed arbitrarily. It was argued that perception should not be physical, it must be intuitional for the direct realisation of the Self which is conducive to liberation, *moksa*. Accordingly *darsana-sāstra* (science of perception) came to be defined as *moksa-sāstra* (science of liberation from worldly fetters). Not only the Jains, but the followers of other quasi-materialistic systems, the Sāṃkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, etc., who came more or less near to a mechanistic conception of nature, could not liberate themselves from this new-fangled definition of philosophy. There developed the elaborate form of logic which so successfully fettered human spirit to the prejudice of the ideal of releasing individual souls from the bondage of the physical existence. The cause of this change in approach and outlook, which is not the characteristic of the Jains alone, was dependent on many conditions. To me it appears that such ideas were inherent in the Upanisadic idealism and that they had a very easy revival in the so-called Brahmanical systems. In the case of the Jains it was probably due to the Brāhmaṇa converts who came with certain predetermined thought-structures which they further developed within the Jain framework and these were not deliberately discarded. Moreover, within the general thought structure, which is basically determined by the material mode of existence, there

exists the distinct possibility of ideas developing according to their own peculiar qualities. This process of change may culminate in a final qualitative transformation of the original ideas.

In view of what I have said above it follows that no system of Indian philosophy allows any purely isolated treatment, and that is why in the concluding part of this work I have made a comparative study of all the Indian philosophical systems to determine the real nature of the Jain standpoint. The development of each system being largely conditioned by its inter-connections and contradictions with others, it can be properly understood only by constantly referring to the others. This was understood even by the ancient philosophers who took care to learn the views of all the others and did not come to any conclusion before considering thoroughly what others had to say and how their points could be met. This spirit led to the formation of a method of philosophical discussion which should be started with the statement of opponent's case as the prior view and followed by its refutation, establishment of the philosopher's own position and conclusion. Moreover, in their sophisticated stages, all the systems, excepting the Cārvākas, fostered some common *a priori* ideas like the belief in an eternal moral order in the universe, the law of *karma*, ignorance as the cause of bondage and knowledge of liberation, need of continued meditation on truth, self-control to remove passions, and so on.

This unusually big Preface is not the summary of the contents of this book. It is rather a reflection of my own impression resulting from the study of Jainism and allied systems, what I have really felt after completing this work. Here the philosophical contents of Jainism have been faithfully enumerated and analysed with a sense of historical enquiry. This book demands of the readers no previous acquaintance with the subject. Pedantic terminologies have been deliberately avoided. Now it is for my readers to judge how far I have been successful in this attempt. I crave in the indulgence of my sympathetic readers for the mistakes and blemishes that must have crept into this book. In writing this book I have been immensely helped by the earlier works on this subject which have been mentioned in the introductory portion and also in the Bibliography. I am grateful to my esteemed friend Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya who has drawn my attention to the works of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi. My friend Sri Satinath Mukherjee has helped me

in many ways which I should acknowledge. To my wife Manjula I am indebted for patient cooperation and very much else besides. My thanks are also due to Sri Devendra Jain for the sincere interest he has taken in publishing this work.

N N BHATTACHARYA

Calcutta University
15 December 1975

Abbreviations

ABORI	<i>Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute</i>
ABS	<i>Ācārya Bhikṣu Smṛtigrantha</i>
AEO	<i>Archives d'Etudes Orientales</i>
AGR	<i>Ātmānanda Grantha Ratnamālā</i>
ĀGS	<i>Āgamodaya Samiti</i>
AG Sam	<i>Āgama Samgraha</i>
AKM	<i>Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i>
Anu	<i>Anuyogadārā</i>
AO	<i>Acta Orientalia</i>
ARASI	<i>Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India</i>
BDCRI	<i>Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute</i>
BG	<i>Bombay Gazetteer</i>
BI	<i>Bibliotheca Indica</i>
BV	<i>Bhṛgavṛtti on the Yogasūtras</i>
CHI	<i>Cambridge History of India</i>
CII	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum</i>
DHB	<i>Dacca History of Bengal</i>
Digha	<i>Dighanikāya</i>
DKCV	<i>Das Kapital Centenary Volume</i>
DLJP	<i>Devchand Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhāra</i>
DS	<i>Dravyasamgraha of Nemicaṇḍra</i>
EC	<i>Epigraphia Carnatica</i>
EI	<i>Epigraphia Indica</i>
ERE	<i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</i>
GASI	<i>Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana</i>
GOS	<i>Gaekwad's Oriental Series</i>
IHQ	<i>Indian Historical Quarterly</i>
Ind Alt	<i>Indische Alterthumskunde of C Lassen</i>
Ind Ant	<i>Indian Antiquary</i>
IS	<i>Indische Studien</i>
JA	<i>Jain Antiquary</i>
JA	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
JAOS	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
JBBRAS	<i>Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>

<i>JBHS</i>	<i>Journal of the Bombay Historical Society</i>
<i>JBORS</i>	<i>Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society</i>
<i>JIH</i>	<i>Journal of Indian History</i>
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
<i>JUB</i>	<i>Journal of the University of Bombay</i>
<i>KSB</i>	<i>Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu</i>
<i>MAR</i>	<i>Mysore Archaeological Report</i>
<i>MASI</i>	<i>Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India</i>
<i>MBA</i>	<i>Memoirs of the Berlin Academy</i>
<i>Mbh</i>	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
<i>MCDG</i>	<i>Mānikacandra Digambara Granthamālā</i>
<i>MS</i>	<i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i>
<i>NIA</i>	<i>New Indian Antiquary</i>
<i>NIRASI</i>	<i>New Imperial Review of the Archaeological Survey of India</i>
<i>NS</i>	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i>
<i>NSB</i>	<i>Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya</i>
<i>NSP</i>	<i>Nirnaya Sāgara Press</i>
<i>NV</i>	<i>Nyāyavindu of Dharmakīrti</i>
<i>NVT</i>	<i>Nyāyavatāra of Siddhasena Divākara</i>
<i>PKM</i>	<i>Prameya Kamala-mārtanda</i>
<i>PMV</i>	<i>Pramāṇavārtika of Dharmakīrti</i>
<i>PNTL</i>	<i>Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokāṅkāra of Deva Suri</i>
<i>PSM</i>	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya on Dinnāga</i>
<i>PTSMS</i>	<i>Pañcāstikāyasamayāsāra</i>
<i>RDSI</i>	<i>Rivista Degli Studi Orientali</i>
<i>RV</i>	<i>Rgveda</i>
<i>Samav</i>	<i>Samavāya</i>
<i>SBE</i>	<i>Sacred Books of the East</i>
<i>SBJ</i>	<i>Sacred Books of the Jains</i>
<i>SDS</i>	<i>Sarvadarsanasamgraha</i>
<i>SDSC</i>	<i>Saddarsanasamuccaya</i>
<i>SE</i>	<i>Struggle for Empire</i>
<i>SII</i>	<i>South Indian Inscriptions</i>
<i>SK</i>	<i>Sāmkhyakārikā</i>
<i>SLV</i>	<i>Slokavārtika</i>
<i>SPB</i>	<i>Sāmkhyaṣravacanabhāṣya</i>
<i>SPS</i>	<i>Sāmkhyaṣravacanasūtra</i>
<i>SSV</i>	<i>Sāmkhyasūtra and Vṛtti</i>
<i>Sum. Vil.</i>	<i>Sumangalavilāsinī</i>
<i>Sūya</i>	<i>Sūyagada</i>

<i>SYDM</i>	<i>Syādvādamāṇyaṇī</i> with Hemādri's commentary
<i>TBH</i>	<i>Tārābhāṣa</i> of Keśavamiśra
<i>TCHR</i>	<i>Transactions of the Congress for the History of Religion</i>
<i>TRD</i>	<i>Tārārahasya-dīpikā</i>
<i>TTDS</i>	<i>Tattvārthādhigamasūtra</i>
<i>TVS</i>	<i>Tattvavaisārādī</i>
<i>Uttara</i>	<i>Uttarādhyaṇasūtra</i>
<i>UVas</i>	<i>Uvāsagadasāo</i>
<i>VB</i>	<i>Vyāsabhāṣya</i>
<i>Viy</i>	<i>Viyāhapaññatti</i>
<i>VMP</i>	<i>Vardhamānapurāna</i>
<i>VS</i>	<i>Vaisesika-sūtrabhāṣya</i>
<i>WZKM</i>	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i>
<i>YV</i>	<i>Yogavārtika</i>
<i>YVS</i>	<i>Yāsovijaya Series</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i>

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

THE JAINS AS THEY ARE

The Jain community¹ forming about 0.048 per cent of the total population of India, is spread all over the country with the Digambara majority in south and the Śvetāmbara in the north. More than 40 per cent of the total Jain population are found in Gujarat and Maharashtra, nearly 25 per cent in Rajasthan and about 15 per cent in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The rest are scattered over other parts of India. It is interesting to note that there are no Jains among the indigenous inhabitants of Bengal and Bihar where Jainism had its origin. The community being composed mainly of traders and merchants is essentially urban in character and therefore has got a fairly high percentage of literacy.

The Digambara Jains are divided into five sub-sects—Bīsapanthī, Terapanthī, Tāranapanthī (Samaiyāpanthī), Gumānapanthī, and Totāpanthī, and the Śvetāmbaras into three—Mūrtipūjaka (Pūjerā, Derāvāsī), Sthānakavāsī (Dhūndiyā, Bistolā, Sādhumārgī) and Terapanthī. Also there are further subdivisions in each of these sub-sects. The major sects themselves are subdivided into smaller groups like the *saṃghas* and *ganās* in the south and into *kulas* and *sākhās*, and later on, in *gaṇachas* in the north. It is said that during the tenth century Uddyotana started 84 *gaṇachas* through his disciples. Most of these *gaṇachas* have become extinct in course of time and some new ones like the Tapā, Kharatara, Añcala, etc., have come into existence. The Siddharabasti Pillar inscription of AD 1398 records the tradition that Arhadbali split the Mūlasaṃgha Kundakundānvaya into four branches, namely, Sena, Nandi, Deva and Simha. The earliest mention of the Mūlasaṃgha and Kundakundānvaya is met with in the copperplate grants of the fifth century AD. Records of the subsequent period show that the *saṃghas*, *ganās*, *gaṇachas*, *baṭas*, and *sākhās* of monks had grown into a very large number by AD 1000. Subsequent epigraphs record the names of the following orders

Mūla-samgha, Nandi-samgha, Namilūra-samgha or Mayaūra-samgha, Kiṭṭura-samgha, Kollātura-samgha, Nandi-gana, Deśi-gana, Dramila-gana, Kānūra-gana, Pustaka-gaccha or Sarasvati-gaccha, Vakra-gaccha, Tagarila-gaccha, Manditāla-gaccha, Inguleśvara-bali, Pana-soge-bali, etc.²

Although original Jainism was theoretically opposed to the caste system, the Jains in course of their long history had developed a type of caste-society. The exact number of the Jain castes is not however, available. Traditionally there are 84 castes, but the lists of their names found from different sources, do not tally with one another. The Jain castes are endogamous and a few of them are common to both the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. Though there are numerous castes no prominent position is assigned to any of them, not even to the Jain Brāhmanas. But in practice we find some castes claiming superiority over others and this feeling is obviously due to differences in economic position, moral standards, social practices, customs and manners. Thus, castes following lower occupations are generally regarded as low. Those who do not allow widow-marriage looked down upon to those who allow, and in this way restrictions have grown as regards inter-dining, inter-marriage and other social practices. Of the important Jain castes reference may be made to the Agravāla, Osavāla, Srimālī, Porāvāda, Khandelavālā, Paravāra, Humbada (Hummada), Śetavāla (Saitavāla), Caturtha, Bogāra, Upādhyāya, and others.³

The Jain attitude towards women is marked by patriarchal influence, but here the narrowness of the Caste-Hindu patriarchal order is absent. Some Jain scriptures however regard women as the lamps that burn on the road that leads to the gate of hell. The Digambaras even do not admit women into the order. Child-marriage was the order of the day until a few years ago, probably due to Hindu influence. The eight forms of Hindu marriage are recognised, but only Prājāpatya form is encouraged. One must marry a girl who is of one's own caste. But the girl must belong to a different *gotra* or patrilineal group. The patriarchal structure of the Jain society naturally discourages the *pratiloma* (a man's right to marry a woman of a higher caste than that of his own) system of marriage. The exact number of *gotras* prevailing in the Jain community is not definitely known. Traditionally there are 84 *gotras*, but we have nearly 150 *gotra*-names from different Jain texts. Cross-cousin marriage is neither allowed nor practised by the Jains of northern

India, but in the Deccan and Karnataka it is usually encouraged. Among the Karnataka Jains matrilineal marriage is also allowed. This shows that the institution of Jain marriage has been influenced by local customs. The dowry system is widely and very strongly prevalent among the Jains. Marriage is usually considered as a permanent union, but under specific conditions it can be dissolved and the bride is free to marry again. There are also provisions for widow-remarriage. Divorce is recognised among certain castes. But all these are looked down upon by those who claim to belong to the supposed higher castes. Once polygamy was widely practised.⁴

The development of the aforesaid patriarchal feelings was evidently due to the consolidation of the economic power in the hands of the males which happened almost all over the world under certain historical conditions. Hence we cannot blame the Jains for their patriarchal attitude towards women. However, Jain tradition itself shows that subordination of women was not an original and essential feature of Jainism. The *Kalpasiitra* says that 3,000 females achieved liberation under Neminātha and as many as 20,000 under Pārśvanātha, while in the time of Mahāvīra the number of *sādhvīs* and *śrāvikās* rose to 36,000 and 3,18,000 respectively. A large number of women in the history of the Jains distinguished themselves as teachers and preachers. Mallī, although a woman, rose to the status of Tirthamkara. In social life, despite patriarchal restrictions, unmarried women are entitled to maintenance out of the family property. The *strīdhana* (whatever is received at the time of marriage by the bride) entirely belongs to the wife. In the absence of sons, daughters are entitled to inherit their paternal wealth. On the death of a person without a son his widow becomes absolute master of his property. Further, she takes the husband's share even if there be a son, which shows the basic difference between the Hindu law and the Jain law. Jain patriarchal system did not therefore prove so dangerous to women as did Hindu patriarchy. The Jain scriptures are in favour of female education. A woman is expected to know 64 arts. To remain unmarried throughout her whole life is not a matter of disgrace to a Jain woman.⁵

Basically an atheistic religion which discards even the idea of a Supreme Being, Jainism, in the course of its long history, however, has developed a system of extensive worship. The beings who are supposed to have attained the ideal of *jina* are styled *paramesthins* or

'the supreme ones' There are five such beings—*siddha*, *arhat* (Tirthamkara), *ācārya*, *upādhyāya*, and *sādhu*—collectively called *Pañca-paramēṣṭhīn*—who are objects of worship The *yaksas* and the *sāsanadevalās* attending on the Tirthamkaras are also worshipped They are pre-Vedic deities whose cults were naturally revived in this anti-Vedic system Besides, the Jains have a pantheon of their own, consisting of the *bhavanapati* (residential), *vyantara* (peripatetic), *jyotiṣka* (stellar) and *vaimānika* (heavenly) gods They also worship some Hindu gods like Ganeśa, Skanda, Bhairava, Hanumān and others of non-Vedic origin Various forms of Mother-goddesses and village deities, and also sacred animals, trees, places and the like, are worshipped Every caste and family has its own caste and family deity The purpose of worship among the Jains is very different from that among the others Since the object of worship—a god, a divine being or a Tirthamkara—is not endowed with the act of creation and regulation of the world, the question of asking favours does not arise Hence the purpose of worship is to pay due homage to a being who is supposed to be the ideal ⁶

Four types of worship are prevalent among the Jains—*nāma*, i.e., uttering or hearing the name of the object of worship, *sthāpana*, i.e., worshipping the material representation like picture, image, statue, etc., *dravya* i.e., worshipping the souls that are destined to be the Tirthamkaras in the future, and *bhāva*, i.e., worshipping the person in his actual nature The idol-worshippers are known as Manduramārgī and the non-idol-worshippers are termed Sādumārgī The places of worship are generally temples with an open porch (*mandapa*), a closed hall or assembly (*sabhāmandapa*) and an inner shrine (*garbhagrha*) in which the idol is kept Upāśrayas or buildings for monks and nuns are used by the Sthānakavāsīs as places of worship, while the Tāranapanthīs, the followers of a non-idolatrous subset of the Digambaras worship scriptures in buildings called Caityālayas In the Digambara temples the priest is always a Jain, but in the Śvetāmbara temples he may be a Hindu also The temples are usually very neat and clean ⁷

The Jains undertake fasts for self-purification and perform festivals to commemorate the important events of the past The most important fast is known as Paryūsana or Dasalakṣaṇa-parva which takes place, according to the Digambaras, from the fifth to the fourteenth day of the bright half of the month of Bhādr̥a, and according to the Śvetāmbaras, from the twelfth day of the dark half of Śr̥āvana

to the fifth day of the bright half of Bhādra. Besides, there are other fasts and festivals like Siddhacakra-pūjā, Astānhika, Mahāvīra-jayantī, Virasāsana-jayantī, Śrutapañcamī, Dīpāvalī, Raksā-bandhana, Akṣaya-truṭyā, and others. In addition to all these, the Śvetāmbaras observe a number of special days of abstinence. The bathing of Gommateśvara at Śravana Belgolā is one of the rare festivals of the Digambaras. Throughout India the Jains have numerous *tīrthas* or places of pilgrimage, the important ones being Sammetaśikhara (the Paresnath Hill in the Hazaribagh district), Pāvāpura (Patna district), Girnāra (group of hills in Kathiawar), Śatruñjaya Hills (in Kathiawar), Mount Abu (in Rajasthan, famous for the Dilwara temples), Śravana Belgolā (Hassan district, Karnataka), etc.⁸

According to the Digambaras, a *śrāvaka* or a layman has to pass through 53 ceremonies, right from his conception up to his death, while the Śvetāmbaras observe 16 such ceremonies. These are not, however, practised in a uniform manner. The life of a Jain is marked by observances of ethical disciplines. The ascetic's life is regarded as a continuation of householder's life and as such the rules of conduct are exactly the same for both, laymen and ascetics, thus fostering an intimate relationship between the two main divisions of the community. The difference is that the ascetics are to observe the ethical codes more strictly and elaborately. The vows are divided into two categories, *anuvratas* or small vows and *mahāvratas* or great vows, the former for the householders and the latter for ascetics. It is enjoined upon a householder to abstain from *samkalpī-himsā* or intentional violence but not from accidental (*gṛhārambhī*), occupational (*udyamī*) and protective (*virodhī*) violence. But one who has renounced the life of a householder must avoid all the four kinds of *himsās* mentioned above. The Jains do not take food which involves the killing of animals. Along with flesh, wine and all kinds of intoxicants, even honey, are prohibited.⁹

Ancient sacred texts of the Jains were written in Ardhamāgadhī. Later on, many Jain works were written in Sanskrit. The contribution of the Jains to the growth and development of literature in regional languages was also immense. The Jains alone utilised different local languages, besides Sanskrit, Prākṛta and Apabhraṃśa, for their religious propaganda as well as for preservation of knowledge, as a result of which regional languages like Hindi, Gujarati, Kannada, Tamil, Telugu and others were really enriched. In the

field of architecture, although the Jains did not develop a distinct style of their own, yet it must be said to their credit that they had produced numerous fine specimens in different parts of the country. The marbles at Mount Abu in Rajasthan, the Rānapur temple in Mewar, the Pārśvanātha temple at Khajuraho, the temple at Lakkundi in Karnataka, etc., may be referred to this connection. Nice specimens of Jain sculptures, especially the statues of the Tīrthamkaras, are found all over India. The most remarkable of the Jain statues are the celebrated colossi of southern India, situated respectively at Śravana Belagolā in Mysore and at Kārakala and Venūra in south Kanara.

It is one of the six daily duties of the Jain layman to show compassion to all living beings and to help the needy. Four kinds of gifts are to be offered to the distressed—food (*āhāra*), protection (*abhaya*), medicine (*ausadha*), and learning (*sāstra*) irrespective of religion, caste or creed. Jain inscriptions refer to the fact that the provision of medicine along with food and learning was made in the *mathas*. In order to serve these purposes the Jains have built numerous *dharmasālās* and *piṇjarāpolas* and established hospitals and educational institutions and also libraries or *granthabhāndāras* in different parts of the country. It is said from some quarters that since the Jains insist solely upon the doctrine of *karma* according to which a man's prosperity and distress depend on the activities of his past life, they think it unnecessary to contribute to the humanitarian causes. But this idea is absolutely wrong. The heart of Jainism is not really 'empty'. Such misconceptions are largely due to the fact that the Jain charitable institutions are not sufficiently modernised.¹⁰

The history of Jainism is a history of long struggle. It made its way into the religious life of India having overcome the tremendous pressure of its rival creed Buddhism. A few rival creeds showed bitter hostility to the Jains, even by destroying idols and cult-objects and converting their temples into those of their own. In south India they were persecuted by the Viraśaivas and in the north by the Muslims. Despite all these, the Jains have managed to maintain their existence as a distinct and influential community. Of the many reasons, attributed to the survival of the Jain community, the following may be taken into account. The royal patronage which Jainism received, even from some non-Jain rulers, during the ancient and medieval periods, in different parts of the country, especially in

Karnataka, Guj-rat and Rajasthan, has undoubtedly helped the Jain community for its survival Secondly, since the Jains mostly belong to the commercial class, their economic influence upon society could not be ignored, even by rulers hostile to their creed Thirdly, after the Muslim conquest, the Jains earned the goodwill of the Hindus, and the latter that of the former, and this evidently added new strength to the community And lastly, thanks to the rigid conservatism of the Jains their important religious doctrines have remained unaltered up to this day and the excellent organisation of the community, the strict disciplinary measures like ex-communication for breach of the rules of conduct etc , have become the strongest safeguard of the Jains "It is evident that the lay part of the community were not regarded as outsiders or only as friends and patrons of the order, as seems to have been the case in early Buddhism, their position was, from the beginning well defined by religious duties and privileges, the bond which united them to the order of monks was an effective one it cannot be doubted that this close union between laymen and monks brought about by the similarity of their religious duties, differing not in kind but in degree, had enabled Jainism to avoid fundamental changes within, and to resist dangers from without for more than two thousand years, while Buddhism, being less exacting as regards the laymen, underwent the most extraordinary evolutions and finally disappeared in the country of its origin"¹¹

RESEARCHES ON JAINISM

In the beginning of the present century the French orientalist, A Guerinot undertook the first systematic survey of all the available printed books and articles on Jainism published up to his time in European languages in his *Essai de Bibliographie Jaina* (1906) and *Repertoire d'Epigraphie Jaina* (1908) from which we learn that as early as in 1807 three descriptive report on the Jains, based on personal observations, were collected and published by Major Colin Mackenzie in the ninth volume of the *Asiatic Researches* which also contained a well-researched paper by H T Colebrooke under the title 'Observations on the Sect of the Jains' Colebrooke's paper was based on Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* and Bhadrabāhu's *Kalpasūtra* He made use of both in a selective manner only and was far from editing or translating them completely, and twenty years

had to pass until the first edited Jain text was published¹² In Edward Moor's *The Hindu Pantheon* (1810) the Jains were described as a sect of the Buddhists or the Vaisnavas and some imperfect accounts of their tenets, rivalry with the Brāhmanas, temples and icons, armorial and forehead marks etc., were provided¹³ H H Wilson's *Sketches of the Religious Sects of the Hindus* which originally appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth volumes of the *Asiatic Researches* (1814-15)¹⁴ represented the most important treatment of the subject at that time The first book which had 'the Jains' in its title was W Franklin's *Researches of the Tenets of the Jeynes and Boodhists* which was published in 1827 In the same year he also published an article in the first volume of the *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*¹⁵ Wilson's *Descriptive Catalogue of the Mackenzie Collection* (1828) dealt with 44 south Indian Jain manuscripts that had come to the East India Company in London

J Stevenson, whose English translation of the *Kalpasūtra* (1848) has already been mentioned, was the first European scholar to deal with the canonical Prakṛta Weber's edition of Dhaneśvara's *Satruñjayamāhātmya* came out in 1858 with a detailed preface which was followed by Lassen's 'Sketch of Jainism' (1861)¹⁶ It goes, however, to the credit of Weber to install the study of Jainism on a solid platform His epoch-making *Über ein Fragment der Bhagavati*, etc., came out in 1866-67¹⁷ It was followed by his treatise *Über die heiligen Schriften der Jaina* (1883-85)¹⁸ which was based upon the Jain manuscripts acquired by the Royal Library of Berlin (1873-78) and his descriptive catalogue of the same, published in two big volumes (1888-92), contained elaborate analyses, very useful to the study of philology, literature, history and religion The manuscripts thus described by Weber came to Berlin owing to an agreement between Georg Buhler and the Department of Public Instruction at Bombay which had commissioned him and other scholars in their service with the careful examination of private collections and the purchase of manuscripts at government costs Buhler was allowed to acquire manuscripts even for foreign libraries provided they were doubles The manuscripts thus collected were catalogued in the *Reports* of Bhandarkar,¹⁹ Paterson,²⁰ Jacobi, Klatt and Leumann,²¹ Pulle²² and others²³ The first collection of the canonical writings Agama Samgraha was printed between 1875 and 1885 in Calcutta, Bombay, Benares and Allahabad These went to Europe through the efforts of Ray Dhanapati Simha Bahadur of Azimganj

(Murshidabad, Bengal) Jain studies of Buhler and Weber inspired some German scholars to work seriously on Jainism, especially on the Jain texts ²¹

Hermann Jacobi, under the shadow of Buhler's influence, edited the *Kalpasūtra* of Bhadrabāhu (1879) and later made a translation of it (*SBE*, XXII, 1884) which was qualitatively different from the earlier one made by Stevenson in regard to merit. His introduction to the *Kalpasūtra* came to be regarded as fundamental for all further research. He also edited the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (1882) and the *Pansitaparvan* of Hemacandra (1883). Warren's edition of the *Niravāhah* was published in 1879 with introduction, analysis and glossary in Dutch. Leumann, who was the pupil of Weber, edited the *Uvavāya* (*Aupapātukasūtra*) in 1883 with notes and glossary. It was Leumann who brought to our notice the importance of the Prākṛta commentarial literature, the *Nijjutis* and *Cunnis*, which according to him was "indispensable for the exploitation of the Jain literature of several centuries." He began to work on these texts since 1892, not on the basis of the prints but on that of the manuscripts collected by him. His *Avasyaka-Erzählungen* was not, however, continued after the publication of the first series. By 1900, he prepared *Übersicht über die Āvasyaka-Literatur* for publication on the basis of manuscript-materials collected by him²² for the purpose of laying bare the different layers of an extensive scholastic literature. By this great work he was much ahead of his time. Unfortunately, printing of this work was stopped when the fourteenth form had been composed. It was not until 1934 that this great work came to light, thanks to the endeavour of W. Schubring. Another unpublished work on bio-bibliographical materials of Jainism, J. Klatt's *Onomasticon*²³ should be mentioned in this connection. Eight volumes from his own hand in alphabetical order contained what was within his reach to collect data concerning Jain authors and works. His unfortunate demise prevented the publication of this work estimated to fill some 1100 pages in print. After his death Weber and Leumann published in 1892, its 55 pages under the title 'Specimen of a literary-biographical Onomasticon by Dr. Klatt'. The *Uvāsagadasāo* in the original Prākṛta with the Sanskrit commentary of Abhayadeva and an English translation with notes was edited by A. F. R. Hoernle (Calcutta, 1885-88).

The canonical texts and their commentaries were written in Prākṛta dialects and it was not until a later period that the Jains—

the Śvetāmbaras from the eighth century and the Digambaras somewhat earlier—used Sanskrit for commentaries and other learned works.²⁷ From the tenth century onwards there was a tradition to the Apabhramśa dialects. The edition of the canonical texts did not, however, go on methodically. R. Pischel hoped that continued Jain research in Europe should have led to the origin of a Jain or Prākṛta Text Society as a counterpart of the well known Pāli Text Society.²⁸ But Pischel's ideas materialised half a century later in 1953. The Āgamodaya Samiti which was founded at Mehsana in 1915, however, came forward to publish most works of the Śvetāmbara canon and many more non-canonical texts. Other Jain organisations followed suit.²⁹ As a result of all these efforts when much about the Jain texts was known, attempts were also made to make a historical survey of the origin and development of both of the canonical and non-canonical literature of the Jains. The ground for preparing a well-documented history of Jain literature was prepared by Buhler,³⁰ Jacobi³¹ and Hoernle.³² U N Barodia's *History and Literature of Jainism* (Bombay, 1909) was also a pioneering work in this field. The most authoritative treatment was to be found in Maurice Winternitz's *Geschichte der Indischen Literatur*³³ in which all the Jain texts and the results of the scholarly studies on them were arranged systematically in an historical sequence and assessed in an analytical and at the same time critical perspective. The canonical texts were also exhaustively dealt with in W. Schubring's *Die Lehre der Jainas*³⁴ and in H R. Kapadia's *A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas*.³⁵

As we have stated earlier, various editions of the Jain canonical texts along with their commentaries were published in India by different organisations. Among these the Āgama Samgraha and Āgamodaya editions of the Āṅga texts are listed below because they are better known.³⁶ We have already had the occasion to refer to Jacobi's edition (1882) and translation of the *Āyāra* (*Ācārāṅga*). The Bambhaceram section (Rules for the Holy Life) was re-edited by W. Schubring in 1910 and translated in German by him in 1926.³⁷ The *Sūyagada* (*Sūtrakṛta* or *Sūcīkṛta*) was translated into English by Jacobi in 1895. Its seven chapters were translated into German by Schubring in his *Worte Mahāvīras*.³⁸ The *Viyāhapannati* (*Vyākhyāprajñapti* or *Bhagavatisūtra*) was first studied by Weber in 1865–66. Portions of this text were translated into German by W. Schubring.³⁹ A Gujarati rendering was made by Bechardas in 1927.

On the *Nāyādharmakathā* (*Jñātādharmakathā*) two important research works were made in German respectively by Pauli Steinthal (1881) and W. Huttemann (1907) ⁴⁰ Mention has already been made of Hoernle's English translation of the *Uvāsagadasāo* (1888). The *Antagadadasāo* and *Anuttaravavāryadasāo* were translated into English by L. D. Barnett in 1907. The *Pañhavāgaranāṁ* was specially studied by Amulya Chandra Sen ⁴¹ Among the Uvāṅgas (Upāṅgas), the *Uvavārya* (*Aupapāṅkasūtra*) was edited with extensive summary of contents, text and glossary by E. Leumann (Leipzig, 1883) ⁴² The *Rāyapasenaiyya* ⁴³ was also exhaustively treated by him on the basis of its contents in the same year ⁴⁴ The contents of the *Surapannatti* were dealt with by Weber, ⁴⁵ Thibaut ⁴⁶ and Shamasastri ⁴⁷ while the *Jambuddivapannatti* was extensively used by Wilibald Kiefel in his *Kosmographie der Inder*, Bonn, 1920. The *Nirayāvākāo* was edited by S. Warren (Amsterdam 1879) ⁴⁸ Other texts of the Uvāṅga category, including also those mentioned above, were published in the Āgama Samgraha and Āgamodaya series. The *Vivarana* was edited with introduction, glossary, notes and appendices by P. L. Vaidya (Poona, 1932). Five among the ten works of the Painna category—*Causarana*, *Bhattaparinṇā*, *Samthāra*, *Āurapaccakkhāna*, and *Mahāpaccakkhāna*—were specially studied by Kurt von Kamptz ⁴⁹ There are five more Painna texts—*Tandulaveyāliya*, *Camdaviyjhaya*, *Devindattihava*, *Ganuvijjā*, and *Viratthaya*—which have been published by the Āgamodaya and other organisations. Among the texts of the Cheyasutta category, the eighth section of the *Āyāradasāo* is known as the *Kalpasūtra* of Bhadrabāhu which, as we have seen above, was edited (1879) and translated (1882) by Jacobi. The old genuine *Kalpasūtra* is *Kappa* also known as *Brhat Kalpasūtra* which was edited with the text, interpretation, summary of contents of glossary in 1905 by Schubring ⁵⁰ who also edited the *Vavahāra* and the *Nisīha* ⁵¹ The *Mahānisīha* was also edited by Schubring (1918). The *Pañcakappa*, now non-existent, was substituted by the *Jyakappa* of Jinabhadra which was edited with extracts from Siddhasena's *Cūru* by Leumann in 1892 ⁵² Among the Mūlasuttas, the *Uttaragghāyā* or *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra* was edited by Jarl Charpentier (1922) and translated into English by Jacobi (1895) ⁵³ The *Dasaveyāliya* was edited and translated in German by Leumann along with the *Nijjuttu* in 1892 ⁵⁴ The study of the *Āvassaya* (which has come down only in conjunction with the *Nijjuttu*) by Leumann has already been referred to. The *Pinda-nijjuttu* and the *Ogha-nijjuttu*

were published by the Indian concerns along with their commentaries (1918-19) This also holds good in the case of the *Nandi* and *Anuogadārā* The *Isbhāṣyam* was edited by Schubring in 1942⁵⁵ and the *Angavijjā* by Punyavijaya⁵⁶

Leumann in his study of the *Nijjuttis* suggested that they were the earliest commentaries which were closely interwoven with the *Sūtras* or even supplanted the latter At a later date, these *Nijjuttis* were extended to form exhaustive commentaries in *Prākṛta* (*Bhāṣyas* and *Cūrnis*) These in their turn formed the foundation for the Sanskrit commentaries (*Tikās*, *Vrtus*, *Avacūrnis*) which were compiled between the eleventh and twelfth centuries⁵⁷ Jacobi held that an older form of Jain Maharashtra appeared in the *Cūrnis*, *Kathānakas* and *Āvaśyaka* narratives and that the language of the verses differed from that of the prose⁵⁸ He had also reproduced the most interesting tales from the commentaries⁵⁹ The legend of the *jīna* Pārśva was edited and translated by Jarl Charpentier from Devendra Ganin's commentary⁶⁰ The adoption of the popular Buddhist, Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical themes, legends of the epics and the *Purāṇas*, in the Jain sacred writings and commentaries was pointed out by Fick, Jacobi, Holtzmann, Pavolini, Charpentier, Meyer, Seidenstucker, Hertel, and others The *Prākṛta* epic *Paumacariya* by Vimala Sūri which probably served as a model for all the later adaptations of the Rāma legend among the Jains was edited by Jacobi in 1914 Jināsena's *Harvamsa Purāṇa*, based on the *Muhābhārata*, was edited by Darbari Lal⁶¹ The *Trisaṣṭilaksana Mahāpurāṇa* by Jināsena and Gunabhadra was studied by Glassenapp⁶² on the edition of the text and its Hindi translation by Lalaram Jain The *Satruñjaya Māhātmya* was studied as early as in 1858 by Weber It was subsequently translated in 1901 with appendices by J Burgess⁶³ Canto I of Hemacandra's *Trisaṣṭilākhāpuruṣacanta* (Bhavnagar, 1906-13) was translated by Amulyacharan Vidyabhushan with notes and introduction by B D Jain (1925)⁶⁴ Mention has already been made of Jacobi's edition of Hemacandra's *Pansastaparvan* (1891) extracts of which were translated into German by J Hertel (1908)⁶⁵ The *cantras* which describe the life of the individual *jīnas* were mostly edited and a few translated into European and modern Indian languages Many works belonging to this category were also composed in the Apabhramśa An analysis of the *Pārsvanāthacanta* of Bhavadeva Sūri was given by Bloomfield (1919) who also suggested numerous parallels from Indian and world literature⁶⁶ Among the works

belonging to the semi-historical Prabandha category the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* of Merutunga was edited by R C Dinanatha (1888) ⁶⁷ Prabhacandra's *Prabhāvākāśa* by H M Sharma (1908) and Jinaprabha's *Tīrthakalpa* by D R Bhandarkar and K N Sahityabhushan (1923) Among the religious novels the *Tarangalolā* was translated into German by E Leumann (1921) Haribhadra's *Samarasccakahā* was edited (1908, 1926) by H Jacobi with the text and an introduction containing a summary of the work Siddharṣi's *Upamitibhava-prapañcākaṭhā* was edited by Paterson and Jacobi (1899-1914) ⁶⁸ The latter also edited Dhanavāla's Apabhramśa work *Bhavsattakahā* (1918) It was also edited by C D Dalal which was completed with introduction, notes, glossary, etc., by P D Gune (1923) The Malayasundarī legends were especially studied by Hertel (1919), whose interest was also on the works of the Campu category ⁶⁹ The Kathānakas or religious short stories especially evoked much interest among the European scholars The *Kālakācāryakathānaka* was edited and translated by Jacobi (1880), ⁷⁰ the *Uttamakumāracaṇṭra* (ed and trans) by Weber (1884), ⁷¹ the *Pāpabuddhi-Dharmabuddhi* (ed and Italian trans) by E Loarini (1884), ⁷² the *Campakasresthī* (analysis) by Weber in 1883 and (ed and Eng trans) by Hertel (1911), ⁷³ the *Aghatakumāra* (German trans) by Charlotte Krause (1922), *Ratnacūda* (German trans by Hertel), etc Among other Jain narrative works, the *Samyakvakaumudī* was edited by Weber (1889), *Kathākosa* translated and edited (1897-98) by F L Pullé, ⁷⁴ *Ārādhana-kathā-kosa* by C H Tawney (1895), *Antarakathāsamgraha*, partly translated into Italian, translated by Hertel (1920) deserve special mention The vast Stotra literature and collections of didactic poems were published in India by various organisations ⁷⁵ Among these the *Bhaktāmara*, *Mandira* and *Sobhana* Stotras were edited and translated into German by Jacobi (1878) ⁷⁶ and the *Rasabhapañcāśikā* by Klatt (1879) ⁷⁷ The *Uvaśamālā* of Dharmadāsa, a didactic poem in 540 Prakṛta stanzas, was edited by L P Tessitori in 1912 ⁷⁸ The *Subhāsitaratnasamdhā* was edited and translated by R Schmidt and J Hertel (1905, 1907) ⁷⁹ Amitagatī's polemical *Dharmaparīkṣā* was studied by N Mirnov (1903) ⁸⁰ Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra* was originally edited and translated in parts into German by Windisch (1874) ⁸¹ and into Italian by F Belloni-Filippi (1908) ⁸² Somaprabha's *Kumāra-pālāpratibodha* was edited and translated by L Alsdorf (1929) ⁸³

Among the doctrinal and philosophical works, there were 83 treatises by the great Digambara author Kundakunda (who is also cited

with esteem by the Śvetāmbaras) of which only seven are known Kundakunda wrote only in Prakṛta. His *Pañcatthīyasāra* (*Pañcāstikāya-sāra* or the Five Cosmic Constituents) was edited in 1920 by A. Chakravartinayanar with philosophical and historical introduction, translation, notes and an original commentary in English.⁸⁴ This work is together with *Pavayanasāra* (*Pravacanasāra*, a text composed in Prakṛta *gāthās* on dogmatics, psychology and ethics) and *Samayasāra*, a trilogy (*Prābhṛtatraya* or *Nātakatraya*) Umāsvāmin's (who is called Umāsvāti by the Śvetāmbaras) *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* (the Manual for the understanding of the True Nature of Things) which is recognised as one of the most authoritative works on logic, psychology, cosmography, ontology and ethics by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras was first edited with the commentary (together with a few minor works of Umāsvāmī in the appendices) by Vakil Keshavlal Premchand Mody in 1903–05 (*Bib. Ind.*). It was translated into German in 1906 by Jacobi⁸⁵ and in English with introduction, notes and commentary by J. L. Jaini in 1920.⁸⁶ Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra*, which forms a part of the *Dvātrimsad-Dvātrimsikā* and is a fundamental work on Jain logic was edited in 1909 with commentary and an English translation by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana.⁸⁷ Samantabhadra (8th century) wrote a commentary on Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārtha*. The introduction to this commentary is known as *Āptamīmāṃsā* which was edited in the Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā Series (1905, 1910) and treated in Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic*. His second work *Yuktyānusāsana* was also edited in the same series. Akalankadeva also made a commentary on the *Tattvārtha* entitled *Tattvārtharājavārttika* and composed several logical treatises under the titles *Nyāyavimścaya*, *Laghyastraya* and *Svarūpasambodhana* which were all edited in the Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā and Mānikachandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā series. Vidyānanda's *Astasahasrī*, a commentary on Akalanka's *Astasatī* (a com. on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*), *Tattvārthaslokavārttika* (a com. on Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārtha*), *Āptapariksā*, *Patrapariksā*, *Pramāṇanirṇaya* and *Pramāṇapariksā* were all edited and published between 1914 and 1918 in the Gandhinatharanga and Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā series of Bombay. Mānikyanandin's *Pariksāmukhasūtra* and Śubhacandra's *Jñānārṇava* or *Yogaśāradīpādīkāra* were published respectively in the Sanātana (1905) and Rāyacandra (1907) Jaina Granthamālā series. Haribhadra's *Yogavindu* and *Yogadrśīsamuccaya* (ed. L. Sualì, 1911–12) and *Dharmavindu* (ed. and Italian trans. by

the same 1908)⁸⁸ were written from a pure Jain point of view. This also holds good in the case of his *Śrāvaka-prajñāpū* (ed. K.P. Mody, Bombay, 1905) which is a systematic treatise of the Jain religion for lay adherents. But in his celebrated *Saddarśanasamuccaya*⁸⁹ in which most Indian philosophies have been discussed he revealed an astonishingly impartial attitude which is also reflected in his *Lokātattvanirṇaya*⁹⁰. He also proved his unbiasedness by writing a commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* of the Buddhist Dinnāga.⁹¹ Nemicandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha* and *Gommatasāra* were edited with introduction, English translation, notes and commentary by S.C. Ghoshal⁹² (1917 and 1927). Śānti Suri's *Jīvaucāra* was edited and translated into French in 1902 by Guérinot.⁹³

We have thus dealt with the publications of the editions and translations of the Jain texts up to the 1920s. We have already had the occasion to refer to the bibliographies of Guérinot and C.L. Jain. The 'Jaina Granthāvalī' published by the Śvetāmbara Jain conference in 1908 was also a descriptive bibliography so far as the texts were concerned. But a modern standard was not reached until 1944 when Velankar's *Jinaratnakosa* appeared. Jain literary researches received further impetus by the compilations of the catalogues of private libraries, collections of Pattāvalis, Prasastis, biographies, etc., and the publication of the *Abhidhānarājendra* (Ratlam, 1913-25)—a Sanskrit encyclopaedia in seven volumes whose Prākṛta catchwords were taken from the canonical and scholastic literature of the Śvetāmbaras by Vijayarājendra Suri. Among other lexical works, a glossary of the canon in three languages was prepared by Muni Ratnacandra in five volumes (Indaur, 1923-32) under the title *Illustrated Ardha-Māgadhi Dictionary*. Pandit Haragovind Das Sheth's *Pāṇi-Sadda-Mahārnava, A Complete Prākṛta Hindi Dictionary* (1928) dealt with all forms of Prākṛta. Precise data of places as well as large supplements given in this volume contributed immensely to the cause of historical research. Among the earlier periodicals we should like to mention *Anekānt*, *Jain Antiquary*, *Jain Hitaisi*, etc., in which the literature and history of Jainism were discussed by both Jain and non-Jain scholars. Other journals devoted to Indological researches also contained valuable articles on Jainism. Nearest related to the periodicals were the *Granthamālā* series, of which we have already had the occasion to refer. In many cases they represented a very remarkable file including rare and significant works provided with a scholarly introduction. The

Yāśovijaya Jain Granthamālā, apparently the oldest of the Jain series, was started in 1904 which was followed by Ātmānanda Grantharatnamālā (1911) Āgamodaya Samiti (1915), Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhāra, Mānikacandra Jaina Granthamālā (1915), Śrī Rāyacandra Jaina Śāstra Granthamālā (1916), Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā (1917), etc The Digambara enthusiasts started the Sacred Books of the Jainas series since 1917 from Arrah in Bihar Among subsequent enterprises mention may be made of the Singhi Jain Granthamālā series (1933), which started publishing Śvetāmbara works under the editorship of Muni Jinavijaya, and the Jñānapīṭha Mūrtudevī Jaina Granthamālā ⁹⁴

We have already had the occasion to refer to Jacobi's introduction to the *Kalpasūtra* (Leipzig, 1879) and also to the introduction of his English translation of the Jain Sūtras (Oxford, 1884)⁹⁵ which served as the foundation for all the future studies on Jainism In many of his stray articles also he had tried to present various aspects of Jainism in an historical outline ⁹⁶ Ram Chandra Basu's *Jainism and its Founder* which came out from Calcutta in 1886 was an elaborate treatment on the life and historicity of Rśabhanātha and also of Mahāvīra and his immediate predecessors A new horizon in the field of Jain studies was opened with the publication in 1887 Buhler's *Über die Sekte der Jainas*,⁹⁷ a lecture dealing with the tenets, mythology, philosophy and ritual of the Jains delivered in Germany after he returned from India A wider theoretical dimension was revealed in A Bastian's *Kosmogonien und Theogonien indischen Religionphilosophen besonders der Jaina* (Berlin, 1892) which contained a detailed account of the theory of the origin of the world and the hierarchy of deities according to the Jain standpoint F O Schrader was the first to make a comparative study of various religious and philosophical school current in the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra (363 schools according to the Jain texts divided under four groups of Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayāvāda 62 according to the Buddhist texts divided into two broad categories of Pūrvānta and Aparānta Kalpikas) and of their contemporary teachers such as Pūrana, Pakudha, Ajita, Sañjaya, Gośāla, and others in his *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas* (Strassburg, 1902)

Benarsi Dass's *A Lecture on Jainism* (Agra, 1902)⁹⁸ was done from a typical Indian Jain viewpoint with the professed aim of clearing the misconception and misunderstandings by which the earlier studies

of Jainism were characterised. Early European scholars, even belonging to the rank of Weber who made serious studies in Jain literature, held that Jainism was an offshoot of Buddhism. Others thought that it was a form of Hinduism. Although Jacobi conclusively established the separate identity of Jainism, the misunderstandings did not cease to exist.⁹⁹ Benarsi Dass dealt with the causes of the misconceptions and asserted that Jainism was neither a product of Brahmanism nor of Buddhism, made an historical survey of Jainism on the basis of texts and inscriptions, initiated a comparative philosophical study with references to other Indian systems and threw light on the tenets of Jain *ratnatraya*, eleven *pratimās*, *dasa-lakṣaṇa-dharma* and twelve *anupreksās*. He also tried to explain why the Jain monks were naked and why the Jains worshipped naked images. A B Latthe's *An Introduction to Jainism* (Bombay, 1905) was one of the remarkable earlier attempts to present Jainism in its totality in an historical outline. Manik Chand Jain's *Life of Mahāvīra* (Allahabad, 1908) was also a serious historical study dealing with the historicity of Mahāvīra, sources of information, mythological stories, his family relations, activities and basic teachings in a chronological sequence. We have already had the occasion to refer to U N Barodia's *History and Literature of Jainism* (Bombay, 1909). A functional study of the surviving Jainism was made by Sinclair Stevenson in her *Notes on Modern Jainism* (Oxford, 1910) in which the distinctive characteristics of the Śvetāmbara, Digambara and Sthānakavāsī sects had been discussed with reference to their modern practices. Among the philosophical works, M L Jhavery's *The First Principles of Jain Philosophy* (London, 1910) was a pioneering work in which the Jain cosmic theories, the *asthākāya* and *anasthākāya* substances, logic, epistemology and other metaphysical intricacies were discussed. This work contained a learned introduction by L D Barnett.¹⁰⁰ Comparative studies in the philosophical aspects of Buddhism and Jainism were initiated by Bohn¹⁰¹ and Leumann.¹⁰²

A F Rudolf Hoernle in the appendix of the second part of his *Uvāsagadasāo* (1888–90) dealt with the interesting career of Gośāla Mankhaliputta, the leader of the Ājīvika sect. A more detailed account of the history and doctrines of the Ājīvikas was presented by him in his celebrated article published in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.¹⁰³ J Charpentier (1910) made a thorough study of the Lesyā theory of the Jains and came to the conclusion that the theory owed its origin to the Ājīvikas.¹⁰⁴ Charpentier's view was ac-

cepted by most later scholars F O Schrader in his study of Indian philosophy of the time of the Buddha and Mahāvira (1902, the original German title mentioned above) had also dealt with Gośāla and his doctrines A Govindacharya Svamin in his article 'A Note on Ājīvikas'¹⁰⁵ (1912) demonstrated that the Ājīvikas were neither Buddhists nor Jains but that they were a distinct religious community D R Bhandarkar in his 'Ājīvikas'¹⁰⁶ refuted the views of Kern and Buhler who suggested that the Ājīvikas were a Vaisnava sect K B Pathak in an article of the same title¹⁰⁷ said that the Ājīvikas were well-known to the Jain authors of the later Cālukya and Yādava periods as a sect of the Buddhist *bhikkhus* who lived solely or chiefly on *kāñjī* After Hoernle, the most important research on the Ājīvikas was done by B M Barua (1920–21)¹⁰⁸ He made a distinction of three periods The pre-Makkhali period, according to him, was characterised by the rise of a religious order of wandering mendicants who called themselves Ājīvikas and probably belonged to the Vaikhāṇasa order of the hermits The second or the Makkhali period was characterised by the elevation of the Ājīvika religion into a philosophy of life at the hands of Makkhali Gośāla The third or the post-Makkhali period was characterised by the further development of Ājīvika religion and absorption of the Ājīvikas into the Digambara Jain, the Śaivite and other sects Barua had also given an account of the influence of the Ājīvika religion and philosophy on Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism Facts about the Ājīvikas were also found in A C Sen's *Schools and Sects* (1931) The most authoritative work on the Ājīvikas was A L Basham's *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas* (London, 1951) in which various historical problems pertaining to the study of this sect were exhaustively treated with all references from literature and epigraphs including materials from the south¹⁰⁹ What Basham was able to prove was that Gośāla inherited a special line of thought from his predecessors which he shared along with his contemporaries, especially with Pūrana Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccāyana, who also belonged to the same creed Basham's second achievement was to reconstruct the original Ājīvika line of thought on the basis of scattered fragments of passages found in the Buddhist, Jain and South Indian texts

Umrao Simha Tank's *Jain Historical Studies* (Delhi, 1914) contained descriptive accounts of the careers of prominent Jains and famous events of Jain history Sinclair Stevenson's *Heart of Jainism* (Oxford, 1915) had proved to be a very important authoritative,

thought-provoking and controversial work. It dealt with the life of Mahāvīra, his predecessors and disciples, history of the Jain community, the nine categories of fundamental truths, *karma* and the path to liberation, the life story of a Jain, the layman and his religious life, the ascetic, the end of the road, worship and religious customs, and mythology, architecture and literature. The last chapter of this book under the title 'Empty Heart of Jainism' evoked strong resentment among the Jains.¹¹⁰ H. Warren's *Jainism in Western Garb* (Arrah, 1916) was based on the notes of talks and lectures by Virchand R. Gandhi dealing with the Jain approach to the solutions of the problems of modern life. It throws light on the Jain view of the universe, man as he actually is, man as he may become, the end and the means to achieve it. J. L. Jaini's *Outlines of Jainism* (Cambridge, 1916 with a preliminary note by F. W. Thomas and index by H. Warren) described Jainism in broad outlines on the basis of the original texts with special emphasis on the doctrines, ethics and metaphysics. *The Jaina Law* (Arrah, 1916) was also a pioneering work which became the source-book of the Jain legal treatises published subsequently. C. R. Jain's *The Practical Path* (Arrah, 1917) was mainly a philosophical treatise dealing with the methods of Jain philosophy, the *tattvas*, the nature of *karma*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā*, *mokṣa*, stages on the path and *dharma* in practice, also containing appendices and glossary. A monumental contribution of this period to the study of Jainism was P. C. Nahar and K. C. Ghosh's *An Epitome of Jainism, being a Critical Study of its Metaphysics, Ethics and History, etc., in Relation to Modern Thought* (Calcutta, 1917). Its contents are as follows: Introduction, Jainism its philosophy and religion, predicaments by pre-eminence, knowledge and its forms, epistemology and logic, *pratyakṣa* is really *parokṣa*, the Jain theory of formal logic, the Jain logic and the *nayas*, the doctrine of *syādvāda*, Śāṅkara and *syādvāda*, examination of Śāṅkara, the doctrine of unity in difference, the universe as a self-existent unit, theories of evolution, the Sāṅkhya philosophy, causation and compound evolution, god, soul, the *karma* phenomenology, chainity and the law of *karma*, belief in rebirth, rebirth and *karma-saṃvara*, *karma-saṃvara* and *audaṅka-saṃvara*, free-will and fatalism, will and individuality, causality in the moral world, classification of *karmas*, from metaphysics to ethics, the conceptions of virtue and vice, on *punya* and its fruitions, *pāpa*, vice or sin, *āsrava* or influx, *bandha* or bondage, *saṃvara* or stoppage, *nirjarā* or dissipation, *mokṣa* or emancipation,

gunasthānas, Jain church, Jain festivals, Jain places of pilgrimage, Jain literature, Jain art and architecture, and appendices ¹¹¹

A J Montgomery's *Religions of the Past and Present* (London, 1918) contained a short but very useful addendum on Jainism by Franklin Edgerton B L Garr's *Sāmāyika or a Way of Equanimity* (Arrah, 1918) dealt with the origin of the concept, its meaning and object, dissension of the subject from the ideal or internal (*niscari*) point of view, a succinct account of the *Āvasyakasūtra*, blemishes (*doṣas*) to be avoided, the texts on Sāmāyika, how to perform it, the eleven *pratimās* and twelve vows C R Jain's *What is Jainism* (Arrah, 1919) dealt with the ethics, philosophical background, mythology and rituals of the Jains, while his *Key to the Knowledge* (Arrah, 1919) was a study of creation, god, redemption, yoga, trinity, *siddhāntas*, the coming of Messiah, reincarnation and other topics from a Jain viewpoint His *Peep behind the Veil of Karma* (Arrah, 1920) should also be mentioned in this connection M Bloomfield's *The Life and Stories of the Jain Saviour Pārśvanātha* (Baltimore, 1919) contained a first hand research on the non-canonical sources in which the legends of Pārśva were collected and interpreted from the vast Prākṛta narrative literature and also from the Jain Purāṇas and other canonical works B C Law's 'Influence of the Five Heretical Teachers on Jainism and Buddhism' (1919)¹¹² attempted to trace the origins of certain Buddhist and Jain concepts to the doctrines expounded by Pūrana Kassapa, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Ajita Keśakambalī, Saṅjaya Belatthiputta, and Gośāla Mankhaliputta His *Historical Gleanings* (Calcutta, 1922) dealt with the interactions of Buddhism and Jainism, especially with reference to well-known individuals belonging to the earlier creeds of both the sects H Warren's self-explanatory *Jainism not Atheism* came out from Arrah in 1920 ¹¹³ P C Bagchi's 'Animistic Elements in Jainism',¹¹⁴ dealt with the primitive ethical background of the doctrine of non-injury while his 'Primitive Elements of Jainism'¹¹⁵ was an anthropological and linguistic approach to the philosophy, religious rites, superstitions and mythology of the Jains

B M Barua's *A History of the Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1921) was a very significant contribution to the field of Jain studies The first part of the chapter on Jainism in this work dealt with the background of the philosophy of Mahāvīra under such topics as aim and scope, review of modern studies in Jainism, lack of historical method, acknowledgement of debts to the Jain scholars, a

general reflection on Indian life in the time of Mahāvīra and Buddha, the bearing of political history upon the progress of thought and development of language, uninterrupted growth of Sanskrit, the origins of pessimism, the problem of misery and other ethical problems. In the second part a short account of the life of Mahāvīra was given with special emphasis on how he developed his own philosophical and ethical points of view in agreement and contrast with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. In this connection he had taken into account the career of Pārśva and his teachings demonstrating especially in which sense Pārśva might be called the precursor of Mahāvīra. According to Barua, Kīriyām or Kriyāvāda was the original name of what was later known as Jainism and Nigantha was the name of an order which was originally represented by Pārśva who was a mere religious teacher in contrast with Mahāvīra who was a religious philosopher whose philosophic predecessor was Gośāla. The third part was a comparative study of Gośāla, Mahāvīra and Buddha in which light was thrown on Buddha's interpretation and criticism of pre-Jain and contemporary philosophers from the standpoint of his own ethics, the fundamental categories and maxim of Mahāvīra's ethics, modification of Buddha's interpretation of his predecessor's fundamental ethical thesis and of Mahāvīra's interpretation of pre-Jain philosophies, difference between the views of Mahāvīra and Buddha, and the correlation of Niyativāda and Kriyāvāda. In the fourth part Jain metaphysics—the substances, the problems of knowledge, epistemology and logic—was treated and the transition from a biological to a psychological or from a physical to an ethical standpoint was highlighted. It was also suggested that Gośāla's determinism did not exclude the notion of the freedom of the will nor did Mahāvīra's dynamism altogether set aside the role of fate.

In A B Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism* (Oxford, 1921) Jain logic was handled in connection with the doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Jain legends as to the origin of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Jain theories of cognition and perception, Bhadrabāhu's ten-membered syllogism, the Jain attitude towards reality, symbolism of Jain mythology, Jain atomism and sound theory, and the Jain attitude towards theism were discussed. Satish Chandra Vidya-bhusana's *History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1921),¹¹⁶ dealt with the Jain logical works of Bhadrabāhu, Umāsvāmin, Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Haribhadra, Gunaratna, and

others¹¹⁷ The first volume of S N Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1922) contained a very scholarly assessment of Jain philosophy under the following topics. the origin of Jainism, two sects of Jainism, the canonical and other literature of the Jains, some general characteristics of the Jains, life of Mahāvīra, the fundamental ideas of Jain ontology, the doctrine of relative pluralism (*anekāntavāda*), the doctrine of *nayas*, the doctrine of *syādvāda*, knowledge, its value for us, theory of perception, non-perception knowledge, knowledge as revelation, the *jīvas*, the *karma* theory, *karma*, *āsrava* and *nijarā*, *puṅgava dharma*, *adharmā*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, and *samaya*, Jain cosmography, Jain yoga, Jain atheism, and *mokṣa* or liberation Almost all the aspects mentioned above were treated by S Radhakrishnan in the first volume of his *Indian Philosophy* (London, 1927) under the title 'Pluralistic Realism of the Jains' But while Dasgupta's study was mainly historical in nature seeking to explain various trends in an historical perspective, Radhakrishnan's study was basically interpretative The following topics were discussed in his work Jainism, life of Vardhamāna, division between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, Jain literature, relation to Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, logic, five kinds of knowledge, *nayas* and their divisions, *saptavibhāgi*, criticism of views, soul, body and mind, metaphysics, substance and quality, *jīva* and *aīva*, *dharma* and *adharmā*, time, matter, atomic theory, *karma*, *leśyās*, *jīva* and their kinds, ethics, human freedom, ethics of Buddhism and Jainism compared, caste, *saṅgha*, attitude towards God, religion, *nirvāṇa*, and critical estimate of Jain philosophy C Krause's *An Introduction to Jain Ethics* (Bhavnagar, 1929) and *Heritage of the Last Arhat* (Bhavnagar, 1930) dealt with the fundamental principles of Jainism, aspects of Jain philosophy, the Jain way to salvation, the *pratimās* or the stages of householder's life and other features associated with Jain concept of morality According to Krause, "Jainism does not terrify its followers by the terrors of *karma*, nor does it make them languish in unhealthy, effeminate fatalism, as many people think all Oriental religions do but on the contrary, it trains the individual to become true hero on the battlefield of self-conquest

The combined form of M S Ramaswami Ayyangar's 'South Indian Jainism' and B Seshagiri Rao's 'Andhra Karnataka Jainism' was published under the title *Studies in South Indian Jainism* (Madras, 1922)¹¹⁸ The former was based mainly on literary materials in

which it was stated that Jainism in the Tamil region had a vigorous survival till the seventh century AD, that its antiquity might be traced to the pre-Mauryan times and that its decline was due to the rise of Śaiva Nāyanārs, the conversion of the Pāndya and Pallava kings to other creeds and the persecution which the Jains had to face in the hands of the Śaivas and Vaiṣnavas. It contained the following chapters: Early History of the Jain Sect, Jain Migration to the South, Spread of Jainism in the Tamil Land, Period of the Nāyanārs and the Ālvārs, Modern Jainism, Jains in Tamil Literature, and The Sangama Age. The latter contained three elaborate chapters: The Evidence of Tradition, Epigraphia Jainica, and Jainism in Andhra-Kaṇnataka Literary Tradition. The first volume of the *Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge, 1922) contained a chapter on Jainism written by Jarl Charpenier under the title 'The History of the Jains', the contents of which were as follows: Jainism, its relation to Brahmanism and Buddhism, the Tīrthamkaras or prophets, Pārśva and Mahāvīra, Mahāvīra's rivals—Gośāla and Jamālī, the Jain Church after the death of Mahāvīra, the great schism, Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, settlements in western India, organisation of the religious and lay communities, and the blanks in Jain ecclesiastical history.¹¹⁹ M B Jhaveri's *Historical Facts about Jainism* (Bombay, 1925) was basically intended to remove certain misconceptions about Jainism current among the scholars and historians, as well as among the common people. It dealt with the functional role of Jainism even in the present day, various Jain organisations and benevolent institutions, the contribution of the Jains to public welfare and many allied aspects. H V Glasenapp's *Der Jainismus eine indische Erlösungsreligion* (Berlin, 1925) was a lucid exposition of the history and doctrines of the Jains, the importance of which has not been minimised even today.¹²⁰ H Bhattacharyya's *Divinity in Jainism* (Madras, 1925) attempted to interpret the basic conception of the *jīnas* or the Tīrthamkaras and various *sāsanadevatās* and other categories of deities, constituting the Jain pantheon, and define their reciprocal relation. He tried to show that although in the true sense Jainism does not attribute the creation of universe to God, it cannot be labelled as atheistic, because it believes in numerous gods and religious practices associated with them. But the Jain gods are in reality emancipated souls or idealised beings. C R Jain's *Jain Law* (Madras, 1926) was the second major work on this topic after the work of J L Jaini mentioned above.¹²¹ A Guérinot's *La religion*

diaina (Paris, 1926) was a comprehensive account of the history and doctrines of the Jains, and most reliable for the author's life-long association with the study of Jainism.¹²² In A C Sen's *School and Sects in Jain Literature* (Calcutta, 1931) different philosophical schools of the time of Mahāvīra—as many as 363 arranged in four groups—and the sects like those of the Ājīvikas were treated along with the various schisms which had taken place from time to time in the history of Jainism and contributed to the rise of various sects and subjects on the basis of literary materials.¹²³ C J Shah's *Jainism in North India, 800 BC—AD 526* (London, 1932) was a purely historical study based on literary and epigraphic sources which started with a critical assessment of the historicity of the earlier Tīrthamkaras, threw light on the life and ministry of Mahāvīra and the history of Jain church after his demise and gave a detailed account of the expansion of Jainism in Mathura, Ujjayini and other parts of northern India.¹²⁴ Walther Schubring's *Die Lehre der Jainas*¹²⁵ was a major contribution to the study of Jainism which was first published in 1934 in the Grundriss Series. Its first chapter contained a short history of Jain research. The second—An Historical Sketch of Jainism—had the following topics: heroic legends, Pāśa, Mahāvīra, Gośāla, Goyāma and Suhamma, early Jain church, *jina* statues, schism, early literature, Digambaras, Śvetāmbaras, Sthānakavāsī, and other sects. The third was on the Canon dealing respectively with the Puvvas, Sections, Commentaries, Angas, Uvargas, Pannas, Cheyasuttas, Nandi and Anuogadārā, Mūlasuttas, and Angabāhīras. The fourth, Cosmology, contained fundamental facts, units, atom, bodies, physiology, soul, cognition, *naya*, *nikkheva*, *siyā*, *kevala*-cognition, spiritual function, *karman*, binding, realisation, kinds of *karman*, ejection, life, kinds concluded, and reincarnation. The fifth, Cosmography, described the world and its shape, beings, lower world, centre world, Jambuddiva, periods, oceans and ring-continents, gods and stars, upper world and its gods, and Isipabbhārā. The sixth chapter, Renunciation, dealt with the community of the monks, their ranks, outfits, daily life, study, begging tour, asceticism, confession and atonement, lay folk and death. The last chapter under the title Victory dealt with such topics as similes, human character, influence (*anhava*) and stoppage (*samvara*), lay vows, monastic vows, control, ethics, reflections, resistance, right conduct, asceticism, meditation, miracles and magic, conditions of *karma*, *gunatthāna* and *sehi*, annihilation, Kevalin and Siddha. B C

Law's *Mahāvira, His Life and Teachings* (London, 1937) was based on Prākṛta and Pāli sources. Law, however, refused to hold that the 22 Tīrthamkaras who preceded Pārśva and Mahāvira were historical persons. B A Saletore's *Medieval Jainism with Special Reference to the Vijayanagara Empire* (Bombay, 1938) dealt with Jainism from a non-religious standpoint. The conspicuous part played by all sections of the people—kings, feudatories, nobles, priests, citizens and women—was described with the aid of historical records. It attempted to establish the connecting link in the history of the pre-Vijayanagara and Vijayanagara Jainism with the great Vijayanagara House. And so far as the religion itself was concerned, the author noted that far from being a bundle of metaphysical beliefs, it was a faith that added a large measure to the material prosperity of the land. The book contained the following chapters: Preliminary Remarks, Royal Benevolence, Princely Patronage, Jain Men of Action, Women as Defenders of the Faith, Popular Support, Critical Times, Vijayanagara's Pledge, State Aid to Jainism, Jainism in the Provincial Courts, Anekāntavāda in the Empire, and Jaina Celebrities in the Vijayanagara Empire.

Saletore's work marked a significant advancement in the field of the study of south Indian Jainism when viewed against the backdrop of the earlier studies of Ramaswami Ayyangar and Seshagiri Rao. Studies on south Indian Jainism were further facilitated with the publication of S R Sharma's *Jainism and Karnataka Culture* (Dharwar, 1940) and A Chakravarti's *Jain Literature in Tamil* (Arrah, 1941).^{12b} K P Jain's *Some Historical Jain Kings and Heroes* (Delhi, 1941) and B C Law's *India as depicted in the Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism* (London, 1941) were important contributions to the study of the socio-political life on the basis of the Jain sources. D C Dasgupta's *Jain System of Education* (Calcutta, 1942) dealt with various institutions, foundations, monastic education, teacher-student relationship, curriculum for study, method of teaching, libraries or *bhāṇḍāras* and other allied features. H V Glasenapp's *Karma in Jaina Philosophy* (Bombay, 1942), which was translated into English by B Fifford, contained a lucid exposition of the Jain definition of *karma*, its eight main divisions and 148 subdivisions, its *ghāṭṭṛyā* and *aghāṭṛyā* forms, *karmic-matter* and *karmic-body*, the process of the influx of *karma*, the methods of the stoppage of the influx and of purging off the stored *karmas* leading to *mokṣa* or salvation. We have already had the occasion to refer to

H R Kapadia's *History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas* (Bombay, 1941) His next work *Jain Religion and Literature* (Lahore, 1944) also proved to be of importance in the field of Jain studies M B Jhaveri's *Comparative and Critical Study of the Mantrasāstra* (Ahmedabad, 1944) was an exceptional work because it was devoted to the study of Jain Tantrism Needless to say that Tantrism in the form of the Mother Goddess cult, magical rites like the *sat-karmas*, curative spells, incantations, efficacy of *mantra* etc , are also met with in Jainism U P Shah's 'A Peep into the Early History of Tantra in Jain Literature', published in the *Bhārata Kaumudī*, II (Allahabad, 1947) should also be mentioned in this connection, Satkari Mookherjee's *Jain Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (Calcutta, 1944) was a critical study of the Anekāntavāda, the pluralistic realism, which brought a qualitative change in the Jain philosophical studies Hermann Jacobi's stray articles on different aspects of Jainism were collected and edited by Jinavijaya Muni and these were published under the title *Studies in Jainism* in 1946 from Ahmedabad Among other important publications of the 1940s, Beni Prasad's *World Problems and Jain Ethics* (Lahore, 1945), Bool Chand's *Jain Cultural Studies* (Benares, 1946), and Lord Mahāvira *A Study in Historical Perspective* (Benares, 1948), J C Jain's *Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons* (Bombay, 1947), and K K Handiqui's *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture* (Sholapur, 1949) deserve special mention J C Jain's *Life in Ancient India* was not directly connected with the study of religion, but the varied information on social life as were collected and arranged subjectwise under numerous sub-headings from the printed texts and unpublished manuscripts made it so valuable for the purpose of social studies that its reference was hardly omitted in any work of ancient Indian social history

In view of what we have seen above it is clear that, apart from some European and non-Jain Indian scholars, it was the enthusiastic Jain intelligentsia that took the leading part in the revival and renovation of the Jain studies in a modern sense They also felt the need of making the members of their community acquainted with the basic principles of their creed, its manners, customs and rituals, and this led them to write books on Jainism in Indian languages As a result, a good number books were published in Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Kannada and even in Bengali Some of the works published in the regional languages were very serious and thought-pro-

voking, such as Sukhlalji Sanghvi's *Jaina Samskr̥ti k̥a H̥rdaya* which was regarded as a fundamental work indispensable for a clear understanding of the essential spirit of Jainism. So far as the Hindi works were concerned, many of them pertained to the study of Jain epigraphs,¹²⁷ literature,¹²⁸ historical biography,¹²⁹ dynastic history,¹³⁰ historical sketch,¹³¹ religious tenets¹³² holy places, sociological assessment, sacraments,¹³³ etc. Besides there were also numerous works on the history, customs and rituals of various Jain sects and castes published under organisational patronage.¹³⁴ A good number of books were written on the marriage system and the ideals of Jain marriage.¹³⁵ N D Yajnika wrote on Jain marriage in Gujarati (1904).¹³⁶ Among other Jain works in Gujarati mention may be made of *Jaina Svetāmbara Directory* (Bombay, 1909), *Śrī Saurāstra Viśa Śrīmālīna Jñātino Dhāro* (Bombay, 1910) C M Dalal's *Poravāda Vanikona Itihāsa* (Bombay, 1922), *Vidhūpakṣa (Añcala) Gacchīya Mhoti Patāvālī* (Ahmedabad, 1928), *Akhilā Bhāratavarṣīya Śrī Jaina Muni Sammelana Nirnaya* (Ahmedabad, 1934), etc. The most outstanding publication in Gujarati was M D Desai's *Jaina Sāhityāno Samkṣipta Itihāsa* (A Short History of Jain Literature, Bombay, 1933).¹³⁷ In Marathi most works were on Jain castes and customs. P L Vaidya's *Jaina Dharmaṇi Vāṇmaya* (Nagpur, 1948) was, however, an important work on Jain religion and literature. The Kannada classics were themselves important sources of Jain history. The texts which were edited till the fifties were Aggala's *Candra-prabhāpurāṇam* (ed S G Narasimhachar and M A. Ramanuja Iyengar, Mysore, 1912), Nayasena's *Dharmāmṛta* (ed A Venkatarao and H Sesha Iyengar, Madras, 1929), Gunavarma II's *Puṣpadanta Purāṇam* (ed A. Venkata Rao and H Sesha Iyengar, Mysore, 1933), Nāgavarma's *Kāvyaśālokaṇa* (ed H R Ramaswamy Iyengar, Mysore, 1939), Karnapārya's *Nemināthapurāṇam* (ed H Sesha Iyengar, Madras, 1940), and Hastumallī's *Pūrvapurāṇam* (ed K.G Kundnagar, Korbhapur, 1943). Other texts and works on Jainism in Kannada will be mentioned later.

Bool Chand's *Jainism in Indian History* (Varanasi, 1951) was basically a historical sketch with emphasis on its functional role in different walks of Indian life through the ages. Two works on Jain philosophy published during the fifties deserve special mention. Nathmal Tatua's *Studies in Jain Philosophy* (Varanasi, 1951) and M L Mehta's *Outlines of Jain Philosophy* (Bangalore, 1954). Charlotte Krause's *Ancient Jaina Hymns* brought out in the Scindia Oriental

Series (Ujjain, 1952), was a well edited inspiring collection with great academic utility sufficiently capable of evoking interest in Jainism among the non-Jain readers. A good number of Jain regional history were published in the 1950s. Among them P C Raychaudhuri's *Jainism in Bihar* (Patna, 1956) and P B Desai's *Jainism in South India* (Sholapur, 1957) deserve special mention. S B Deo's *History of Jain Monachism from Inscriptions and Literature* (Poona, 1956) was a comprehensive work on this subject. V A Sangave's *Jaina Community, a Social Survey* (Bombay, 1959) brought a new dimension in the field of Jain studies. Primarily based on extensive field-study, rather the first of its kind, the varied contents of this work should be noted in greater detail. The first chapter of this work dealt with the Jaina population in regard to general distribution, age distribution, sex composition, fertility and longevity, proportion of married, unmarried and widowed persons, proportion of literacy in the community and nineteen appendices containing statements, graphs and diagrams pertaining to various aspects of population study done from a strictly sociological point of view. The second chapter dealt with the religious divisions in the Jain community in which light was thrown on early history of the Jain religion, the great schism, the two main sects, the major and minor subjects, use of sections and subsections and attempts of reconciliation. The third was on social divisions dealing with caste, class and social stratifications with eleven appendices on various Jain castes, subcastes, *gotras* and dynasties. The fourth dealt with marriage, its object, normality, forms, qualification of parties to the union, age, choice of partners, preliminaries and ceremonies, consummation, polygyny, dissolution of wedlock and the position of women. The fifth was on Jain ethics and miscellaneous customs and manners. Besides an introductory, it dealt with the meaning of Jainism, fundamental principles of Jainism, philosophy, the theory of *karma*, *moksa-mārga* or way to salvation, ethics, criticism of Jain ethics, worship, festivals and fasts, superstitions, *samskāras*, *tīrthakṣetras* or places of pilgrimage, occupations and professions, food and drink, dress and ornaments, language and literature and Jain institutions. The sixth under the title 'The Working Model', dealt with names and surnames, occupations and professions, sects and subsects, *gotra*, *saṅgha*, *gana*, *gaṇaccha*, and *sākhā*, castes and subcastes, population and distribution of castes, interrelations of castes, hierarchical organisation of castes, caste panchayatas, caste

feasts, Jain and Hindu castes, rules of endogamy and exogamy, castes and charitable institutions, choice of occupations, caste and education, religious sanction to castes, institution of Bhaṭṭāraka, origin of castes, Jains in ascetic stage, religious disabilities, widow remarriage, polygyny, number of criminals, castes and social reform, castes and temples, family deity, migration of families, distinguished personalities in families, family organisation inter-marriages, Jain festivals, Jain rites, Jain *samskāras*, Jain language, sacred thread, Jain priests, Jain fasts, death ceremonies, religious education, worship of Hindu deities, problem of widows and Jain culture. The seventh under the title 'Retrospect' dealt with the historical background, achievements of the Jains, reasons for the survival of the Jains, causes of decline of Jainism and present problems and the way out. A copy of the questionnaire which was extensively distributed for the collection of data was also incorporated in the volume.

S B Deo's *Jain Monastic Jurisprudence* (Benares, 1960) was undoubtedly more critical and historical in nature than the earlier works on Jain law. In his earlier work (1956) Deo dealt with the origin, development and functions of the Jain monastic institutions in an historical perspective on the basis of literature and inscription, and the present work should be regarded as its supplement. The Jain doctrines offer a unique scope to the study of human mind and its activities. In fact the Jain concept of *karma* as an extraneous material principle soiling the *jīva* through its influx or *āsrava*, reminds one of the stimulus-response theory, of the fact that the pure and stainless human mind is conditioned by the external forces of *karma* matters and that what we call mental action or reaction is not the essential feature of mind itself. It has a close bearing on modern psychological theories. Although the study of Jain psychology was initiated by Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan, it was in T G Kalghatgi's *Some Problems in Jain Psychology* (Dharwar, 1961) a fuller exposition on this subject along with its technical intricacies was presented. One of the major works published from Calcutta in 1961 was Sukhlalji Sanghvi's *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics* which was the English rendering of the Introduction and Philosophical Notes of his celebrated edition of Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* which was published in 1939 in the *Singhī Jaina Granthamālā*. Since Sukhlalji was against writing anything except in Gujarati and Hindi, such an important contribu-

tion to Indian philosophy was hitherto unavailable to the English-knowing readers. The Introduction was translated into English by Indukala Jhaveri, while the Philosophical Notes by K. K. Dikshit who selected and arranged them in such a manner under the advice and guidance of Sukhlalji as could serve the purpose of an independent book on Indian philosophy. The English title was suggested by Sukhlalji himself. The Introduction comprised the following chapters: The nature of Jaina Standpoint, The Unchanging Character of Jaina Standpoint, The Sphere of Application of an Organ of Knowledge, The Total Extent of the Knowable Sphere, and Anekāntavāda—the Principal Jain Contribution to Indian Logic. The first chapter of the Philosophical Notes entitled 'On Problems of Knowledge in General' deals with the following aspects: Is cognition self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory? The logical tradition of defining *pramāṇa*, Validity of cognition—Is it intrinsic or extrinsic? The effect of a *pramāṇa*, Is memory a *pramāṇa*? Is continuous cognition a *pramāṇa*? Is recognition a *pramāṇa*? And the Jain classification of knowledge. The second 'On Problems of Perception' has the following: The nature of perception in general, the nature of indeterminate perception, the nature of sense-organs, the nature of *manas*, the nature of *ātman* and the mode of its revelation, the Buddhist definition of perception, the Mīmāṃsā definition of perception, and the Sāṅkhya definition of perception. The third, 'On Problems of Inference' dealt with the nature of inference and the history of its treatment in Indian logic, whether *tarka* is a *pramāṇa*, the nature of *vyāpti*, the number and steps in an inference-for-others, the aspects of the nature of a probans, the types of probans, whether effect alone or cause also is a proper probans and some allied problems, the nature of *pakṣa*, the nature of *drśtānta*, the nature of pseudo-probans, and the nature of pseudo-*drśtānta*. The fourth, 'On Metaphysical Problems' deals with the object of a *pramāṇa*, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *parvāya*, and the criterion of reality. A translation of Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* was made by Satkari Mookherjee and Nathmal Tatia under the title *Critique of Knowledge* which was published by the Jain Cultural Research Society, Benares.

Jainism like all other religious systems of ancient India insists on yoga as the means of disciplining of the body and mind, and consequently on salvation. This aspect was touched by most authors. R. P. Chanda and U. P. Shah went to the extent of identifying a Mohenjo-

darō statuette with the prototype of a Jain yogi but comprehensive survey of yogic theories and practices as found in the Jain texts and the Jain images was made in R. Williams's *Jain Yoga* (London, 1963) Upendra Thakur's *Studies in Jainism and Buddhism in Mithila* (Varanasi, 1964) contained two chapters on Jainism. The first under the title *Rise and Growth of Jainism*, besides its introductory, dealt with Vaisali, the birth-place of Mahāvīra, contemporary socio-religious condition, the age of logical disputation, an historical survey of royal patronage to Jainism and Jain antiquities from the Mithila region. The second dealt with the last phase of Jainism in Mithila. J. P. Jain's *The Jain Sources of the History of Ancient India* (Delhi, 1964) was an evaluation of the historical worth of the Jain sources of Indian history during the epoch-making millennium of 100 BC to AD 900. In this book the author has fixed the dates of the Mahāvīra Era, the Earlier Śāka Era and the Śāka Era, as well as the dates of important Jain authors and literary works, and thus cleared much of the fog in relation to Indian chronology, both political and cultural. H. Bhattacharyya's *The Jain Prayer* (Calcutta, 1964) was an interpretative exposition of the Jain approach to divinity while J. C. Sikdar's *Studies in the Bhagavatisūtra* (Muzaffarpur, 1964) was a critical analysis of a significant work of the Āṅga category revealing its linguistic, historical, religious and philosophical implications. J. C. Jain's Hindi work *Jaina Āgama Sāhitya men Bhāratiya Samāja* (Varanasi, 1965) was mostly based on his early English work on the social life of ancient India as found in the Jain canonical literature. K. C. Sogani's *Ethical Doctrines of Jainism* (Sholapur, 1967) and D. Bhargava's *Jain Ethics* (Delhi, 1968) were both systematic studies of the ethical principles of Jainism in which the *rationale* of Jain ethics was explained in terms of the other Indian systems as well. M. L. Mehta's *Jain Culture* (Varanasi, 1969) presented a complete picture of various aspects of Jainism, its functional role in different walks of Indian life and its contribution to the development of Indian civilisation with emphasis on the special Jain viewpoint and approach testifying its distinctiveness.

Ratna Shriyan's *A Critical Study of the Mahāpurāṇa of Puṣpadanta* (Ahmedabad, 1970) was a fundamental contribution to the study of native and rare words found in this and other Apabhraṃśa works of Puṣpadanta. M. L. Mehta and K. R. Chandra's *Dictionary of Prakṛta Proper Names* (2 vols., Ahmedabad, 1970-72), done in imitation of Malalasekera's work on Pāli proper names was also an important

contribution J C Jain's Hindi work *Prākṛta Jaina Kathā Sāhitya* (Ahmedabad, 1971) was a study of Jain narrative literature which formed the nucleus of his subsequent bigger work in English to be dealt with later K.K. Dikshit's *Jain Ontology* (Ahmedabad, 1971) masterly dealt with the Jain views on the questions concerning the origin, inner nature and purpose of the universe, its substance and quality, possibilities and realities, with a novelty in approach B C Jain's *Jainism in Buddhist Literature* (Nagpur, 1972) began with the historical background of Jainism with emphasis on the antiquity of the Śramana cult, Jainism and its literature and Buddhism and its literature Then on the suggestivity of the Buddhist sources and details from the Jain sources it dealt with Jain philosophy, ethics and monachism Epistemology was treated in two sections under the titles *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* and *parokṣa-pramāṇa* and *Anekāntavāda* under the sections dealing respectively with the nature of reality, theory of Nayavāda and theory of Syādvāda A good number of Jain texts were published in the seventies by the L D Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad Prominent among them were *Nemināthacarṇu* (ed in two parts, M C Modi and H C Bhayani, 1970-71), *Adhyātmavindu* (Mitranandavijaya and N J Shah, 1972), *Sanatkumāracarṇu* (H C Bhayani and M C Modi, 1974), etc

R B Prasad Singh's *Jainism in Early Medieval Karnataka* (Delhi, 1973) dealt with the importance of the study of Karnataka Jainism, its sources, idol-worship and Tantrism among the Karnataka Jains, their religious rituals and practices and the origin and development of Jain monachism in Karnataka Besides detailed analysis of literary and epigraphic sources the work provided a fresh insight into the subject At the same time the social, economic and organisational aspects of Jainism were adequately studied It should be mentioned in this connection that so far as the Karnataka Jainism is concerned there is no dearth of source materials, both archaeological and literary ¹³⁰ We have already had the occasion to refer to the Kannada classics edited and published till 1950 Among subsequent publications mention may be made of Ācanna's *Vardhamāna-purāṇam* (ed Mariyappa Bhatta, Madras, 1952), Śāntinātha's *Sukumāracarita* (ed T S Shamrao and D L Narasimhachar, Shimoga, 1954), Bandhuvārma's *Jivasambodhana* (ed H Sesha Iyengar, Madras, 1955), Pārśvapaṇḍita's *Pārśvanāthapurāṇam* (ed S Bommarasa Pandita, Mysore, 1956), Ranna's *Ajitanāthapurāṇanīlakam* (ed D Javaregauda and H Devirappa, Mysore, 1959), Nemicandra's

Nemināthapurāna (ed B S Kulkarni, Dharwad, 1968), Śivakotyācārya's *Vaddārādhana* (ed D L Narasimhachar, Mysore, 1972), Bandhuvarma's *Harivamsābhyudaya* (ed B S Sannaya, Mysore, 1974), Nāgavarma II's *Vardhamānapurānam* (ed B S Sannaya, Mysore, 1974), Nāgacandra's *Mallināthapurānam* (ed B B Hendi, Dharwar, 1974), Bāhubali's *Dharmanāthapurānam* (ed N Basavaradhya, Mysore, 1975), Cāvundarāya's *Tnsaṣṭilaksanamahāpurānam* (ed B S Kulkarni, Dharwar, 1975), Nāgacandra's *Rāmacandraantapurānam* (ed R C Hiremath, New Delhi, 1975), Pampa's *Ādipurānam* (ed L Basavaraju, Mysore, 1976), Mahābala's *Nemināthapurānam* (ed B S Sannaya, Mysore, 1977), and Mangarasa's *Nemiyimesasaṅgeṭi* (ed B B Mahishawadi, Dharwar, 1979) Works on Kannada literature also throw light on Jainism in Karnataka ¹³⁹ Specific works on Jainism were also made in Kannada ¹⁴⁰

R C Dwivedi's edition of a volume entitled *Contribution of Jainism to Indian Culture* (Varanasi, 1973) was a collection of papers on various aspects of Jainism presented at a seminar held by the department of Sanskrit in the Udaipur University The papers were on contribution to culture, contribution to heritage, evolution of *Sanatkumāracaṇṭa*, Apabhramśa passages in the pre-tenth century Śvetāmbara Prākṛta-Sanskrit works, contribution to poetics, contribution to Sanskrit *alamkāra*, contribution to poetry, contribution of Apabhramśa to Indian languages, contribution of Prākṛta and Apabhramśa to modern Indo-Aryan languages, *Mahāparājayī* a Jain allegorical play, contribution to south Indian literature, *ahimsā* of Lord Mahāvira (there were five papers on *ahimsā*), Syādvāda, contribution to Indian philosophy, Jain concept of space Jain contribution to the development of Buddhism, concept of Jain mysticism, Jain ethical theories, defining the *pramāṇa*, ancient Jain art of Madhya Pradesh, Jain school of mathematicians, concept of energy in Jain literature, contribution of Jainism to chemical knowledge, Jainism in Karnataka, Jain writers and the social cultural history of medieval Rajasthan, Jainism in Mithila, Jain castes and their *gotras* in Rajasthan, and an account of trade and shipping in Prākṛta literature These were all written by eminent scholars of Jainism Muni Uttam Kamal Jain's *Jaina Sects and Schools* (Delhi, 1975) was an important addition to Jain historical works in which an attempt was made to systematise the traditions in regard to various splits within the Jain church and the emergence of different sects and schools which were all independently treated with reference to the

legends or facts of their origins, their doctrinal and ritualistic peculiarities, list of teachers, distributions and allied topics Madhu Sen's *Cultural Study of the Nisītha Cūrna* (Delhi, 1975) was also very important for the purpose of historical study in which the contents of a source-book were analysed and documented so that the social historian could use it with profit

It should be pointed out in this connection that most work on Jainism followed a stereotyped approach, one differing from the other only in regard to the details In the case of philosophical studies, however, there was scope for interpretations and creative speculations, which was further facilitated by the publication of the English rendering of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi's new commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra* (by K K. Dikshit, Ahmedabad, 1974), in which the interpretations of the ancient commentators were reviewed and the doctrines reinterpreted R Singh's *Jain Conception of Omniscience* (Ahmedabad, 1974) was also an important contribution The term 'omniscience' was attributed to God by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, but the Jains who did not believe in an omniscient God understand it in a different sense as essential characteristics of the Tirthamkaras who were all-knowers and far above the gods The Jain concept of knowledge also was discussed in this work in connection with the doctrine of the omniscience N G Shah's edited volume under the title *Jain Philosophical Tracts* (Ahmedabad, 1974) contained articles of learned scholars on different aspects of Jain philosophy D Malvania's Hindi work *Jain Darśan kā Ādikāl* (Ahmedabad, 1980) dealt with the growth of the early Jain ideas while B K. Matilal's *Central Philosophy of Jainism* (Ahmedabad, 1981) was a critical study of the Anekāntavāda from a very sophisticated philosophical point of view in which, apart from the traditional approach of other philosophical schools of India to it, allied western concepts were brought in to explain its intricacies Among other works fundamental to the study of Jain philosophy mention should be made of D Malvania and N J Shah's (ed.) *Studies in Indian Philosophy* (Pandit Sukhlalji commemoration volume, Ahmedabad, 1981), and S M Desai's *Haribhadra's Yoga Works and Psychosynthesis* (Ahmedabad, 1983) Y J Padmarajah's *A Comparative Study of the Jain Theories of Reality and Knowledge* and Puspa Bothra's *Jaina Theory of Perception* dealt with almost identical topics, though the latter had special orientation to a particular aspect of the traditional five aspects of knowledge Both of these authors were keen to describe

the process as to how the original Jain theories of knowledge came at par with those of other branches of Indian philosophy. It should be noted in this connection that the original meaning and significance of the *pratyaksa* and the *paroksa* as found in the earlier texts of Jainism became completely reversed in the latter logical treatises.

Collet Caillat's *Atonements in Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks* (Ahmedabad, 1975) was an indepth study of Jain texts in which besides the usual account of the penances, the conceptual aspects behind the expiation of lapses were dealt with. Another work of the same author done in collaboration with R. Kumar was on Jain Cosmology. T. K. Tukol's *Sallekhana is not Suicide* (Ahmedabad, 1976) was an opinion-oriented study of a Justice who was torn between the letter of the law and the legitimacy of a convention rooted in the culture and conscience of individuals and caught between his personal religion and profession. His conclusion was, however, the same as the title of his work. A detailed treatment of his subject was subsequently made by S. Settar in his *Inviting Death* (Dharwar, 1986). Mainly based on archaeological sources it was divided into three big sections—Religious Backdrop for Ritual Experiments, Voluntary Termination of Life, Philosophy and Practice, and Art of Commemorating the Dead. In the first section the religious history of Śīavana Belgola was traced with the death as its focal point which began with the ritual-death of a great monk and the events which followed characterising the progress of Jain ideas and institutions in a given space and time, analysing the interconnections between the spiritual values and religious life, the link between the clergy and the laity, the role of the temples and monasteries, the interaction between the envious sects, and the impact of all these on the fortunes of those who were seeking death. The second section attempted to answer several questions connected with ritual-death. What was meant by ritual death? How could death be invited? Who would aspire to die, for what reasons, and following which of the recommended canons? What were the big names in the history of death? What factors led the advocates of death to postpone and avoid it? How did society take such action over a period of time? In the third section, the *musdhi*-memorials erected in honour of those who accepted ritual-death were studied for the first time. Their format, their locale, the pattern of their grouping, the rituals associated with the commemoration, the significance of the term

given to them, their variety, etc., were discussed. The *nisidhi*-memorials were previously studied neither by the art-historians nor by the socio-religious historians. This work thus explored a virgin field. It contained 64 drawings and 49 plates.

One of the important publications of 1977 was *Mahāvīra and His Teachings*, ed. A N Upadhye et al. (Bombay). J C Jain's *Vasudeva-hindī: An Authentic Jaina Version of the Brhathkathā* (Ahmedabad, 1977) was a remarkable contribution to the study of Jain narrative literature. Of other valuable works on Jainism published in the seventies mention may be made of K K Dikshit's *Early Jainism* (Ahmedabad, 1978) and G C Pande's *Sramana Tradition: Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture* (Ahmedabad, 1978). Two edited volumes published in 1978 should also be mentioned in this connection. These were U P Shah's *Treasures of Jaina Bhāṇḍāras* and K K Chandra's *Prākṛta Studies*, both published from Ahmedabad, the latter being the proceedings of a seminar. A K Chatterjee's *Comprehensive History of Jainism* (2 vols., Calcutta, 1978–84, sec. rev. edn., New Delhi, 1999) dealt with the history and literature of Jainism from the earliest to the medieval period. Chatterjee had put forward in these volumes some interesting theories in regard to the dating of Jain literature. Reference should also be made in this connection to K C Lalwani's modernised English translation of the *Bhagavati Sūtra* (4 vols., Calcutta, 1980). L M Joshi's *Facets of Jaina Religiousness in Comparative Light* (Ahmedabad, 1981) revealed a new approach to the understanding of certain aspects of Jainism. R Vijailakshmy's *A Study of Cīvakaśāntāmanī* (Ahmedabad, 1981) was on the Tamil epic of that name which was of Jain inspiration. Previously Chakravarti gave an account of this epic, but a more comprehensive treatment was met with in Vijailakshmy's work. J C Jain's *Prākṛta Narrative Literature: Origin and Growth* (New Delhi, 1981) was an elaborate study spanning over 2000 years from the sixth century BC to fifteenth century AD which gave a vivid account of tales discussing the use of social, religious, magical bird and journey motifs, representing the realistic life with social, cultural and socio-economic conditions of the common people, delineating their commercial and educational activities and their objects and nature of worship, gods and goddesses, rituals and practices, festivals and ceremonies, etc. The linguistic aspects of this work showed that the Jain writers had given a new twist to the literature by introducing new ideas. Suzuko Ohira's *A Study of the Tattvārthasūtra with*

Bhāṣya (Ahmedabad, 1982) was an addition to the study and interpretation of this most important source-book of Jain doctrines and marked a distinct modern stage in the continuity of the commentarial tradition developed in space and time *Jainism and Prakṛta in Ancient and Medieval India* (New Delhi, 1994), a collection of essays in honour of Prof J C Jain, edited by the present author, consisting of 34 scholarly articles contributed by specialists in various fields of Prakṛta and Jain studies, should also be mentioned in this connection

LITERARY SOURCES

Besides the Jain canonical writings and their commentaries, which are indispensable for the study of Jainism, the Brahmanical and Buddhist texts also offer many clues to the understanding of its history and doctrines. The Buddhist texts frequently mention Nigantha Nātaputta as an opponent of Buddha and refer to the essentials of Jain doctrines, although in a distorted way. We have already referred to the work by B C Jain in which the Jain materials are carefully collected from the vast ocean of Buddhist literature.¹⁴¹ Unfortunately, no such attempt has yet been made in the field of Brahmanical literature although in the philosophical texts of Brahmanism Jain doctrines have been treated with great importance and there are many stray references to the Jains and Jainism in the epics and Purāṇas as also in the literary and technical works.

Both the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras hold that the original canon of the Jains consisted of twelve Angas, but the Digambaras regard the Śvetāmbara canon as wholly spurious. According to the Jain tradition, during the reign of Candragupta Maurya, about the end of the fourth century BC there was a great famine in Magadha as a result of which a large number of young Jain monks migrated towards the south under the leadership of Bhadrabāhu, the celebrated *ganadhara*, while the more elderly ones remained in Magadha under the leadership of Sthūlabhadra. It was during the leadership of the latter that some scriptural texts, the twelve Angas, were compiled in a special assembly summoned at Pāṭaliputra. Mahāvīra's teachings were first compiled in fourteen texts, called the Pūrvas, meaning the earlier books which are lost. But the Śvetāmbaras believe that the Pūrvas were incorporated in the now lost *Ditthuvāya*, the twelfth Anga. The tradition of these Pūrva texts

has obviously created a problem which cannot be very easily solved Schubring¹¹² after a critical analysis of the existing Jain texts came to the conclusion that the so-called fourteen Pūrvas might have consisted of traditions handed down orally from teacher to pupil, that some part of this oral tradition might have been compiled by Sthūlabhadra in the Pāṭaliputra Council and that the Council of Valabhī under Devardhī which took place sometime between the fifth and the sixth centuries AD made use of the current oral traditions as well as such texts as might have been already reduced to writing. Texts like the *Nandī* and the *Anuogadārā* divide the substance of Jain teachings into Aṅgapavittṭha and Anangapavittṭha or Angabāhira. The roots of the latter are sometimes traced to the lost Pūrvas. Texts other than the Angas are sometimes placed in the Angabāhira group. The scriptures compiled by the Council of Valabhī (fifth-sixth centuries AD) are generally known as Āgama or Siddhānta divided into groups such as the Angas, Uvngas, Painnas, Cheyasuttas, Mūlasuttas, and two special texts known as *Nandī* and *Anuogadārā*. The language of the Śvetāmbara canon is called Ardhamāgadhī Prākṛta or Jaina Prākṛta or even Ārsa Prākṛta.¹¹³

The first Anga, *Āyāra* (*Ācāra*) deals with the rules of ascetic life. It is divided into two parts, the second part being of a later origin. The subjects in chs I-VI and VIII are *ahimsā*, the avoidance of weakness and relapsing and endurance in hardships. The IXth or the last chapter offers a vivid sketch of Mahāvīra's early career.¹¹⁴ The second Anga is known as *Sūyagada* (wrongly Sanskritised as *Sūtrakṛta*) which deals with the heretical, i.e., non-Jain views, elaborate descriptions of hells and tortures therein, descriptions of forms of life and of their origin as 'told in older ages', discussions on guilt, accumulated either consciously or unconsciously, etc.¹¹⁵ The third Anga, i.e., *Thāna* (*Sthāna*) is a list of dogmatic topics, cases or possibilities, each grouped under ten items.¹¹⁶ *Samavāya* or the fourth Anga is a supplement of and a continuation of *Thāna*. In one of its appendices, the *Samavāya* deals with the nature of the twelve Angas, in another with the qualities of beings, while in a third the dates of the spiritual and temporal heroes.¹¹⁷ The *Viyāhapannatti* (*Vyākhyāprajñapti*, also known as *Bhagavatī*) contains a picture of Mahāvīra's character and activities. It is a proclamation of explanations given by Mahāvīra as answers to individual questions asked by disciples and by far in most cases directed to

Goyāma¹⁴⁸ The *Nāyādharmakahāo* (*Jñātādharmakathā*, not *Jñatr*) consists of didactic tales, 19 in number. The second part of this work deals with the fate of a nun who was reborn as the goddess Kālī.¹⁴⁹ The *Uvāsagadasāo* (*Upāsakadasā*) is concerned with the pious laymen in Mahāvīra's time. Here an interesting account of Mahāvīra's rivalry with Gośāla is also given.¹⁵⁰ The *Antagadadasāo* (*Antahkrd-dasā*) contains legends dating from the time of Ariththanemi and deals with individuals who put end to existence.¹⁵¹ Likewise the *Anuttarovavāyadasāo* (*Anuttarapa-pādikadasā*) deals with legends of persons who were reborn in uppermost heavens.¹⁵² The *Panhāvāgaranāim* (*Prasnavyākaranāni*) describes the good and bad effects respectively of observing and not observing the vows. The title means questions and explanations but it is justified neither by the contents nor by the survey given.¹⁵³ The eleventh Anga *Vivāgasūya* (*Vipākasruta*) describes the consequences of *harma* which generally are expected to be evil ones.¹⁵⁴ The last of twelfth Anga *Dutthivāya* (*Drstivāda*) is now entirely lost.

Of the twelve Uvargas, the *Uvavāya* is divided into two parts, the first of which describes the preparations made for the approach of Mahāvīra and the sermon he was going to deliver before King Kuniya, while the second part with reincarnation and salvation as the reward for certain actions. The *Rāyapasenaiyya* is concerned with the question of soul put by a king named Paesi to the monk Keśin. The *Jivajīvābhigama* consists of the classification of various kinds of animate and inanimate objects. The *Pannavanā* also deals with the classification of living beings. The *Sūrapannatti* is chiefly concerned with the activities and effects of the sun. It may be called a scientific treatise. Likewise the *Jambuddivapannatti* is a cosmographical work in which we have a description of the Jambuddiva, the centre of the physical universe. The *Candapannatti* which is identical in all available manuscripts with the *Sūrapannatti* is an astronomical work. In the *Nirayāvahyāo* we came across the Jain version of the Kuniya or Ajātasatru legends which is important for the reconstruction of the history of the Haryanka dynasty of Magadha. The *Kappāvadamsivāo* is a story of conversion of Pauma and his liberation. The *Pupphiyāo* describes four stories showing the results of good or bad actions. The *Pupphaculiāo* and the *Vanhidasāo* also deal with similar subjects.¹⁵⁵

The Pannas or Prakīrnas are another class of religious literature consisting of ten works. Of these the *Causarana* contains hymns,

etc., in honour of the four viz., *arhats*, *siddhas*, *sādhus* and *dharma*. It is said to have been composed by one Virabhadra. The *Bhattacharinnā* deals with the ritual for the renunciation of food. The *Samhāra* is concerned with the rituals for the dead. The *Ārapaccakkhāna* is meant for the renunciation of all that is evil by persons who are going to die. The *Mahāpaccakkhāna* or the Greater Renunciation is another text of confession. The *Candavijhaya* is a text of monastic discipline. The *Ganuvijjā* deals with the ascertaining of auspicious and inauspicious days, periods, etc. The *Tandulaveyaliya* deals with food and drink, embryology, the human stages of life, the duration of life, measures of capacity and of time. The *Devundatthaya* deals with the Bhavanavāsī, Vānamantra, Joisiya and Vemāniya kings and gods as to their seats, duration of their lives and faculties, etc. The tenth text, the *Viratthaya* is a *stotra* of Mahāvīra. Two other texts the *Tiṭhogaṇi* and the *Ārāhanāpadāgā* are also said to belong to the Painna group.¹⁵⁶ These two deal with the general teachings of Jainism.

The Cheyasuttas are six in number. Of these the *Āyāradasāo* deals with the monastic life in general, the offences against the vows, stages of laymanship, stages of monkhood, etc. The *Vavahāra* contains a collection of what is permitted and proper for monks and what is not. The subject matter of the *Nisīha* and the *Mahānisīha* is prescription of penances for the breach of rules of daily life, the confession of the transgression of rules of conduct, expiation, evil consequences of sinful deeds, etc. The *Pamcakkappa*, now lost and replaced by the *Jiyakappa*, attributed to Jinabhadra who was the teacher of the celebrated scholar Haribhadra of the eighth century, also deals with the rules of monastic life. The *Kappa* (*Kalpasūtra*) attributed to Bhadrabāhu, is the oldest and genuine Cheyasutta. But what is now regarded as *Bhadrabāhu Kalpasūtra* is a combination of three different works—the *Jinacanta* dealing with the lives of the Tīrthamkaras, the *Sthavirāvalī* (*Therāvalī*) dealing with the schools, sub-schools and teachers and the *Sāmācārī* (*Sāmāyārī*) dealing with the rules observed by the ascetics during the rain-retreat—composed at different times. Two other texts, the *Pindaniryukti* (*Pindaniryutti*) and the *Oghaniryukti* (*Oghaniryutti*) are sometimes included in the Cheyasutta group.¹⁵⁷

The Mūlasuttas are four in number. Of these, the *Uttarayjhāyā* (*Uttarādhyayanasūtra*) consists of 36 chapters, composed at different times, is said to have been spoken by Mahāvīra himself. It

appears that the work derived its name from a group of apparently younger chapters following (*uttara*) the older ones. The *Dasaveyā-lyā* said to have been composed by Sejjambhava, deals with monastic life in general, the six forms of living beings and their non-violation, the five vows, the pure and impure aims, the allowed and forbidden kinds of speech, the devotion to right conduct, etc. The *Āvassayanijyutti* is a *gāthā* work taking its name from the six *āvassaya*, i.e., the formulae to be recited daily. It is combined with the *niryukti* of Bhadrabāhu and deals with instructions on religious rules that should be invariably observed. The *Pindanijyutti*, attributed to Bhadrabāhu, is a treatise on food. It also deals with the mistakes made by the almsgiver and those made by receiver.¹⁴⁸

Of individual and ungrouped works the *Nandī* and the *Anuogadārā* are elaborate encyclopaedias of all matters concerning Jain dogmatics.¹⁴⁹ The authorship of the former is attributed to Devardhī. Besides, there are some supplementary texts like the *Isibhāṣiyām* dealing with sentences of certain *ṛsis* concerning moral subjects, the *Angacūṭiyā* and *Vyāhacūṭiyā* dealing with praises of moral values under the garb of legends and the *Angaviyā* dealing with various subjects of material importance.¹⁵⁰

Many of the aforesaid works were composed before AD 750. The commentarial texts of the Śvetāmbaras are also vast and the oldest among them are the *niryuktis*. These were written in Prākṛta and were further developed into the *bhāṣyas* and *cūṛnis*, which again gave rise to *līkās*, *vivaranas*, *vṛttis*, and *avacūṛnis* in Sanskrit. Of the important writers of the *bhāṣyas* may be mentioned Samghadāsa, Jinadāsa and Siddhasena. It is said that Bhadrabāhu had written *niryuktis* on ten texts, but it appears that there were more than one author of this name. Of other important commentators on the Śvetāmbara canon mention should be made of Haribhadra (8th century), Śīlānka (9th century), Śāntisūri, Devendra Ganin, Abhayadeva (10th–11th centuries), Hemacandra (12th century) and Malayagiri (14th century). We shall later have the occasion to refer to the works of these commentators and those of others.

Although the Digambaras, as we have already remarked, regard the Śvetāmbara canon as wholly spurious, they have some authoritative scriptures of their own, described as Four Vedas and divided into four classes of Prathamānuyoga, Karanānuyoga, Dravyānuyoga and Caranānuyoga. The *Pavayanasāra*, *Pamcatthukāya*, etc., of Kundakunda (1st century), the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvā-

min, the *Mūlācāra* and *Trṇvācāra* of Vattakera (1st-3rd centuries), the *Padmapurāṇa* of Ravisena (7th century), the *Āptamīmāṃsā* and the *Ratnakaranda-srāvakācāra* of Samantabhadra (8th century), *Harivamsapurāṇa* of Jinasena (8th century), the *Trisastilaksanamahāpurāṇa* of another Jinasena and his pupil Gunabhadra, etc., are regarded by the Digambaras as their sacred texts. In the south the Digambaras cultivated both Prakṛta and Sanskrit. Of other Digambara writers we may refer to Svāmī Kārttukeya, author of the *Dvādasānupreksā* and Yativṛṣabha who made a comprehensive survey of Jain cosmography in his *Tiloyapannattī* and also the famous leaders like Puspadanta, Bhūtabali and Gunadhara to whom we owe the *Siddhānta Granthas* as well as the Sanskrit writers Samantabhadra, Pūjyapāda, Akalanka, Mānatunga, and others.¹⁶¹

Haribhadra, the eighth century writer, of whom we have already occasion to refer, was the earliest Sanskrit commentator of the canon, and his contributions to Jain logic are outstanding. In his *Saddarsanasamuccaya* he has given a brilliant exposition of the different systems of philosophy of the day. His *Samaravaccakahā* is also an important contribution to Jain doctrines.¹⁶² Of the other writers belonging to the eighth century besides those mentioned above, mention may be made of Bappabhatti, Śobhana, Dhanapāla and Devabhadra. Śobhana's *Tirthesastuti* or *Caturvimsaṣṭastuti* and Dhanapāla's *Pāryalacchu* are indeed significant works. Akalanka, whose date had been a matter of controversy,¹⁶³ was a great logician whose famous works are *Rājavārtuka* and *Astasatī*. Jain logic was further enriched by Vidyānanda, Mānikyanandī and Prabhācandra.¹⁶⁴ The Rāstrakūta king Amoghavarṣa was a devout Jain who composed a *Prasnottaramāhikā* (catechism) on Jain ethics. Of the Jain works of the ninth and tenth centuries reference must be made to the famous commentaries *Dhavalā* and *Jayadhavalā*, composed by Virasena and Jinasena, the *Tattvārthasāra* and *Purusārthasiddhyupāya* of Amitacandra, the celebrated commentator on Kundakunda's works, and the philosophical compendiums of Nemicaṇḍia.

From the eighth century onwards, the Jain writers adopted Apabhramsa as their language of religious expression. The first Jain writer to use Apabhramsa in *dohā* metre (couplets of varying measure) was Joindu of the sixth century whose *Paramappapayāsu* and *Jogasāru* deserve special mention in this connection.¹⁶⁵ The *Pāhuda-dohā* of Rāmasimha Muni, *Sāvayadhammadohā* of Devasena¹⁶⁶ and *Vaivāgyasāra* of Suprabhācārya¹⁶⁷ are some of the best examples of

dohā works in Jain literature. These are, however, late works. The Jain writers also used Apabhramśa in the epic poems mostly dealing with the lives of 63 supermen called *salākā-purusas*. The earliest of these works are the *Harivamsapurāna* and *Paumacaru*¹⁶⁸ of Svayambhū, Jain *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* respectively. Puspadanta's *Mahāpurāna*, *Jasaharacaru* and *Nayakumāracaru* are classics in the field of Apabhramśa literature.¹⁶⁹ Of other Apabhramśa works, reference must be made to Kanakamāra's *Karakanducaru*,¹⁷⁰ Haribhadra's *Neminādacaru*,¹⁷¹ Dhāhila's *Paumasincaru*, and Padmakīrti's *Pāsanāthacaru*, etc.

Some other important Jain works in Prākṛta and Sanskrit composed before the tenth century are Asaga's *Vardhamānacanta*, Dhanañjaya's *Rāghava-Pāṇḍavīya* or *Dvīsandhāna*, Dharmadāsa's *Uvaśamālā*,¹⁷² Jinasena's *Pārsuvābhyudaya*,¹⁷³ Kanakasena's *Yasodharacantā*, Maheśvara Suri's *Jñānapañcamikathā*, Mānatunga's *Bhaktāmarastotra*,¹⁷⁴ Nandisena's *Ajitasāntistava*, etc.

From the tenth century onwards the Jains adopted the epic style for presenting their saints and heroes. In Sanskrit, the Svetāmbara version of Kanakasena's *Yasodharacantā* was made by Mānikya Suri (11th century). The best work of this type is Hemacandra's (12th century) *Trisastisalākāpurusacanta* describing in ten cantos the lives of 63 Jain saints. His *Pañcīstaparvan* which deals with the lives of the oldest Jain teachers is a supplement to the above work. He also wrote for lexical works of which the *Abhidhāna Cintāmaṇi* is widely celebrated. The *Neminīrvāna* of Vāgbhata, dealing with the life of Neminātha, also belongs to this period. In Sanskrit *kāvya* literature, the Jain contributions are Odeyadeva Vādibhasimha's *Kṣatracūdāmaṇi*, Abhayadeva's *Jayantavijaya*, Devaprabha Suri's *Pāṇḍavacantā*, Amaraçandra's *Bālābhārata*, Abhayacandra's *Padmānanda*, Udayaprabha Suri's *Dharmābhyudaya*, etc.¹⁷⁵ The Jain writers also contributed to the historical *kāvya* literature.

Of the Prākṛta works composed between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries AD the *Mahāvīracanta* of Guṇacandra, composed about AD 1082, is really unique.¹⁷⁶ Another work of the same name was written by Devendra Gaṇin in AD 1085. Amitagatī's compendium of Jain philosophy called *Pañcasamgraha*, and Kanakasena Vādirāja's works on logic like *Pramāṇasamgraha*, *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, etc., as well as the dramas of Rāmacandra and Hastimalla show the extent of Jain contribution to different branches of literary activities. The life of Rśabha is described by Vardhamāna in his

Ādināthacantra composed in AD 1103. Of other *cantra* works, Devacandra's *Sāntināthacantra* (1103), Śānti Suri's *Prthivīcandracantra* (1108), Devabhadra's *Pārsvanāthacantra* (1150), Somaprabha's *Sumatnāthacantra* (1150), Maladhārī Hemacandra's *Nemināthacantra* (c 1100), Śrīcandra's *Munisuvratasvāmīcantra* (1135), another Śrīcandra's *Sanatkumāracantra* (1157), Haribhadra's *Mallināthacantra* (twelfth century), etc., deserve special mention. Somaprabha's *Kumārāpāla-pratibodha* contains a dialogue between the Cālukya king Kumārāpāla and his teacher Hemacandra on Jain precepts.¹⁷⁷ The *Ullāsikkamathaya* of Jinavalla and *Ajitasāntihaya* of Viraganin are *stotras* in Prākṛta in glorification of Ajita, the second Tīrthamkara, and Śānti, the sixteenth, respectively. These belong to the twelfth century. The *Sadbhāsanīrṃta-pārsvajñastavana* by Dharmavardhana, written about AD 1200, is in six languages, viz. Sanskrit, Mahāraṣṭrī, Māgadhī, Saurasenī, Paisācī, and Apabhraṃsa. Rāmasarman composed *stavakas* in Saurasenī, Māgadhī and Apabhraṃsa which also belong to the same category.¹⁷⁸ Of the didactic poems in Prākṛta with a pronounced Jain bias reference may be made to Jayakīrti's *Śilovaesamālā* and Muniçandra's *Gāthākoṣa* (twelfth century). Important contributions to Jain doctrines in Prākṛta are Jinacandra Ganin's *Navapaya*, written about AD 1015 with a Sanskrit commentary, and *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*¹⁷⁹ a treatise on nine fundamental truths of Jainism. Another significant work of the eleventh century is the *Jivavyāra* by Śānti Suri which deal with the nature of being grouped in various classes. Abhayadeva (AD 1064) wrote commentaries on the nine Angas, while Śānti Suri and Devendraganin (eleventh century) wrote exhaustive commentaries on the *Uttarādhyayana*. In AD 1113 Maladhārī Hemacandra Suri wrote *Bhavabhāvana* in 531 *gāthās*. Devendra Suri wrote in the thirteenth century the first five *Karma-granthis* which describes in detail the entire doctrine of *karma*.

Of other works, Mahāsena's *Pradyumnacantra*, Surācārya and Maladhārī Hemacandra's *Nemināthacantra*-s, Vādirāja, Bhavadeva and Māṇikyacandra's *Pārsvanāthacantra*-s, Vikīrama's *Nemidūta*, Maladhārī Devaprabha's *Mrgāvatīcantra*, Jinesvara's *Kathākoṣa*, Śrīcandra's *Purāṇasāra*, Āsadha's *Sāgāra-dharmāmṛta* and Anāgāru-dharmāmṛta, Guṇacandra's *Mahāvīracantra*, Dhaneśvara's *Surasundarīcantra* etc., are important. These were all composed between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. Some of them are written in Sanskrit. The greatest Jain writer of the twelfth century was the famous

Hemacandra who bore the title *Kalkāla-Sarvajña*. His Sanskrit works have been mentioned above. He also composed a number of Prākṛta works including *Kumārapālacarita*¹⁸⁰ which was written mainly to illustrate the rules of Prākṛta grammar.

During the period between AD 1000 and 1300 important works in Apabhramśa were done by the Jains, most of them narrating the lives of the Jain teachers or heroes or the tales bearing on Jain religion. Of the Apabhramśa works on Jainism, composed during this period, reference must be made to the *Pajjunnakahā* of Simha narrating in fifteen cantos the life of Pradyumna Kumāra, the *Kathāhosa* of Śrīcandra (not the one referred to above) containing 53 religious tales, the *Pārsvapurāṇa* of Padmakīrti describing in 18 *sandhus* of life of Pārśva, the *Sukumāracarita* of Śrīdhara describing the story of Sukumāra who became a Jain monk, the *Sudarsanacarita* of Nayanandī the didactic poem *Kalāsavarūpakulakam* of Jinadatta Suri,¹⁸¹ the *Nemināthacarita*s of Haribhadra¹⁸² and Lakṣmanadeva, the *Yogasāra* of Yogīcandra Muni, the *Vairāgyasāra* of Suprabhācārya, the *Chakhammoṃvaesa* of Amarakīrtigaṇi, the *Anuvayarayanapaṭi* of Lakṣmana, the *Sañjamamañjari* of Mahesara Suri,¹⁸³ etc.

From the fourteenth century onwards the Jain writers adopted regional languages instead of Prākṛta and Apabhramśa. The use of Sanskrit was, however, continued. Kīrtirāja's *Neminātha Mahākāvya*,¹⁸⁴ which narrates the life of Neminātha in 12 cantos, is one of the best specimens of the Sanskrit epic literature of the fifteenth century. Historical *kāvya*s were also written by the Jains. Nayaṇandra's *Hammīrakāvya*¹⁸⁵ dealing with the heroic deeds of Caḥamāna Hammīra may be referred to in this connection. Somacaritragāṇi's *Gurugunaratnākara* (1485)¹⁸⁶ describing the life of Lakṣmīsaragaṇi of Tapāgaccha is a work of considerable importance for Gujarat history. Sarvānanda's *Gagadūcarita*¹⁸⁷ is likewise a historical *kāvya* in praise of a Jain layman who helped his countrymen during the Gujarat famine of 1256-57. Among the devotional poems of the Jains composed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may be mentioned Jinaprabha Suri's *Caturvimsatī-jinastuti* and several other hymns and Munisundara Suri's *Jinastotraratnakosa*. The Jains also undertook the patterns of the *dūtakāvya* literature to serve religious purpose. Merutunga's *Meghadūta* is an example of Jain *dūtakāvya*s which describes the life of Neminātha in four cantos. In Sanskrit prose the Jain writers had written numerous stories

to illustrate the tenets of their faith. The *Campakasresthikathānaka*,¹⁸⁸ *Pālagopālakathānaka*, *Samyaktvakaumudī*, etc., are Jain collections of didactic tales, purely propagandist in nature. The first two works were composed by Jinakīrti Somacandra, a pupil of Ratnaśekhara of Tapāgaccha, composed in 1448 the *Kathāmahodadhī* which is a collection of 126 Jain stories. Merutunga's *Mahāpurusacarita* is a prose romance which gives an account of some Jain saints. The Jain writers also employed *campus* and *prabandhas* for religious propaganda.

The emphasis on *Prākṛta* and *Apabhraṃśa* proves that the Jain writers wanted to make their views accessible to the common people. This again accounts for the immense Jain contribution to the regional languages of India. In Tamil, the earliest Jain works are Tiruthakkathevar's *Jivakacintāmanī* and Konguvelir's *Perunkathai*. The works of Tamil poet Vāmanācāryar may also be referred to in this connection. Like other religions Jainism also claims the writers of *Tolkāppiyam* and *Kural* among its adherents. Other famous works like the *Silappadhikāram*, *Nilakeṣi*, *Yasodharākāvya*, etc., have bearing on Jainism. These works belong to a period when Jainism was flourishing in the Tamil country, and this must be anterior to the seventh century AD. From the seventh century onwards Vaisnavism and Śaivism succeeded in eliminating Jain influences from Tamil literature.

Jain influence contributed a glorious chapter to Kannada literature. The earliest Kannada work *Voddha-arāḍhanā* (eighth century) has a professedly Jain background and its author Śivakotyācārya was a devout Jain. Nripatunga's *Kavirājamārga*, a work on poetics, mentions a number of Jain writers, but their works are lost. Of the ninth century Kannada works on Jain subjects, Gunavarman's *Nemināthapurāṇa* is the most important. In AD 941 Pampa, one of the three 'gems' of Kannada literature, composed *Ādipurāṇa* which describes in beautiful language the life of Rśabha, the first Tīrthamkara. Ponna, the second of the 'gems' who was Pampa's contemporary, composed *Sāntipurāṇa*, the life-story of the sixteenth Tīrthamkara. The third Ranna wrote *Ajṇapurāṇa* (AD 993) which deals with the second Tīrthamkara. Cāvunda Rāya, a contemporary of the aforesaid 'gems', composed a *Purāṇa* after his name in which he gave a comprehensive history of the 24 Tīrthamkaras. Nāgacandra or Pampa II of the twelfth century wrote *Mallināthapurāṇa*, the biography of the nineteenth Tīrthamkara, and a Jain version of the

Rāmāyana with the title *Rāmacandracantapurāna*, popularly known as the *Pampa-Rāmāyana*. Important among other Kannada Jain writers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were Janna, author of a *Purāna* on the life of the fourteenth Tīrthamkara, Gunavarma II who wrote the *Puṣpadantapurāna* on the life of the ninth Tīrthamkara, Karnapārya who was the author of *Nemināthapurāna* and Ācanna and Kamalabhava who wrote on the twenty-fourth and sixteenth Tīrthamkaras respectively. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there was marked decline of Jain writings in Kannada. The *Purānas*, however, continued to appear. Madhura, Mangarāsa and Śāntukīrī wrote *Purānas* on the lives of Dharmanātha, Nemi-Jineśa and Śāntinātha respectively. Bhāskara, Bommarasa and Kotesvara wrote poems on the life-story of Jivandhara, a pious Jain king.

Next to Kannada, the Gujarati language served as the most effective vehicle for the propagation of Jain teachings and ideals. The earliest available specimens of old Gujarati, viz., the *Bharatesvara Bāhubalighora* (AD 1170) of Vajrasena and its expanded version, the *Bharatesvara Bāhubalnāsa* (AD 1185) of Śālibhadra describe a great mythical war, at the end of which the victor Bāhubali understands the futility of worldly actions and resorts to asceticism. The *Candanabālārāsa* (AD 1201) of Asiga, the *Jambūsūvāmīcarīya* (AD 1210) of Dharma and the *Gayasukumālarāsa* (AD 1250) of Delhana deal with Jain mythology while other *rāsas* like the *Revantagrī* (AD 1232) of Vijayasena, *Ābu* (AD 1233) of Pālhana and *Pethada* (AD 1300) of the writer of the same name eulogize the holy places. Works like *Buddhīrāsa* (AD 1200), *Jīvadayārāsa* (AD 1201), *Saptakṣetrīrāsa* (AD 1271), etc., composed by Śālibhadra, Asiga and others are purely religious and didactic in character. Besides the *rāsa* literature, old Gujarati contains compositions known as *bārahmāsā* (cf. *bāramāsyā* of Bengali literature), *mātrkā* and *uvāhala* and most of these writings are of Jain origin. During the second half of the fourteenth century Nemicaṇḍra Bhāṇḍārī composed 160 *gāthās* on Jain faith upon which two prose commentaries in early Gujarati dating between 1550 and 1560 have been found. The Jain writers had a very great place in the development of Gujarati literature in its different aspects. The great Hemacandra was an inhabitant of Gujarat, and he collected over 100 couplets in the Apabhramśa of his time (twelfth century) which are claimed by Hindi and Marwari and also by Gujarati as specimens of their earliest poems. Unfortunately, in

early Hindi and Marwari, Jain works are rare. This also holds good in the case of Marathi.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOURCES ARCHITECTURE AND SCULPTURE

The patterns of Jain art, relics of Jain sculptures and monuments, their structural characteristics, variety of styles and geographical distribution, immensely help us to understand the historical process through which Jainism manifested itself from its tribal core and ultimately acquired a universal character. The earliest specimen of Jain art is supposed to be a highly polished torso of a *jina* image from Lohanipur near Patna which have been claimed to belong to the Mauryan¹⁸⁹ age, and it is interesting to note that stylistically it is analogous to the mutilated red stone statuette from Mohenjodaro,¹⁹⁰ thus indicating the continuity of Indian art style. The Harappan style is also found on a bronze statue of Pārśvanātha belonging to the first century BC which is now in the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay. Its findspot is unknown.¹⁹¹ The Jain caves at Udayagiri and Khandagiri near Bhuvaneshwar in Orissa, going back to the time of Khāravela (first century BC), are not laid out on definite and regular plan, but located at convenient places according to the physical configuration of the rock. Many of the caves contain a number of sculptured friezes and panels. The Manchapurī cave relief in Udayagiri and Anantagumphā reliefs in Khandagiri are marked by poor workmanship. The long friezes of the Rāṅgumphā and Ganesagumphā came out much later. The reliefs follow mythological narratives with Jain affiliation on which nothing, however, can definitely be stated at our present state of knowledge. To the first century BC we may assign the Pabhosa caves, near Allahabad, dedicated for the use of the Kāśyapīya Arhats, i.e., the followers of Mahāvīra.¹⁹²

From the first century onwards Mathura became the centre of Jain artistic activities. We have here the ruins of a Jain shrine dating back to the pre-Christian period and a large number of inscriptions engraved on the images of the *jinas*, votive tablets and arches, etc. The Kankālī Tilā yielded a variety of Jain specimens, including railing pillars with reliefs of demigods and goddesses and a few sculptures containing scenes from the lives of Tīrthamkaras. A few specimens like the Āmohini relief, the Lonasobhika-*āyāgapata* (Tablet of Homage), the Kankālī Tilā-*āyāgapata*, etc., probably be-

longing to the pre-Kaṇiṣka decades, show traces of heavy physicality, emphasising the stature of the main figure by raising its height and grading the subsidiary figures accordingly. But this style gradually changed: at best the Jain figures of the last quarter of the first and second century show that the heaviness of form was partly replaced by introducing new elements. Almost all the seated Tīrthamkara figures in the Mathura Museum, which can be dated on the basis of their pedestal inscriptions in the Kuṣāna period, show below their seat a wheel of law, palced on a pillar in the centre, flanked on either side by numbers of devotees with a lion at each end.¹⁹³ In the Kuṣāna period the Jains seem to have worshipped, besides their usual symbols, images of gods and goddesses. Of other specimens of the Kuṣāna period, mention may be made of a headless image of Sarasvatī of the year 54 of the Kaṇiṣka era belonging to the Lucknow Museum collection, a partly broken inscribed pedestal, dated in the year 79 on which probably stood the 18th *jīna* Aranātha, as is indicated by his distinctive symbol, an image entitled Ādi or Rśabha in its pedestal inscription dated in year 84 of Kaṇiṣka, a sculptured panel of the year 95 representing the Jain ascetic Kanha which contains on its top section four *jīnas*, and a broken frieze showing on the obverse the animal-faced Naigamesa (Harinegamesa).

The Junagarh inscription of the grandson of Jayadāman, belonging to the second century AD, mentions words distinctly suggestive of Jain dogma. This inscribed slab is found in a cave, one of a group of about twenty monastic cells arranged in three lines, near the town. On the basis of this inscription it may be suggested that at least in the second century AD the caves were in the hands of the Jains.¹⁹⁴ Of nearly the same date may be the caves found at Dhank in which sculptures of Rśabha, Pārśva, Mahāvīra and others have been definitely identified.

A few Jain bronzes from Chausa near Buxar in Bihar seem to belong to the first-second centuries of the Christian era. They are characterised by crude workmanship but valuable for showing the continuity and extent of influence of the Mathura school.¹⁹⁵ Particular interest attaches to a standing bronze of Rśabhanātha. To the same period may be assigned on palaeolithic ground the Son-Bhāndārā cave of Rajgir¹⁹⁶ which contains a standing figure of Sambhavanātha, which of course belong to a later period. The Vaibhāra hill temple of the same place contains a seated figure of

Neminātha head much mutilated, with a fragmentary inscription in Gupta characters and with two small *jinas* seated below in Padmāsana on the two sides of a standing figure¹⁹⁷ Three standing figures of the Tirthamkaras in other niches, which seem to belong to the fourth century, have been compared by Shah with a few standing Gawalior sculptures. Indeed the one from Besnagar, a standing *jina* image of the Gupta period, may be referred to in this connection. Another Gawalior specimen is an inscribed figure of Pārśvanātha, dated c. 106¹⁹⁸. Some beautiful specimens of Jain sculpture of the Gupta age are preserved in different local museums. The Mathura museum preserves a nice torso of a standing *jina* with two attendants and two seated images of Rsabhanātha. The Baroda museum preserves a good number of Akota findings which include a wonderfully executed standing bronze image of Rsabhanātha, assigned to c. AD 450 and also the images of Jivantasvāmī, Sarasvatī and others belonging to a later date. The Sarnath museum preserved a figure of Ajitanātha, belonging to the Gupta period, which is now in the Bharata Kalā Bhavana museum of the Banaras University. Likewise the Lucknow museum preserves a good number of Jain sculptures assigned to the Gupta period. A few Jain images of the later Gupta period are found in a temple within the Deogarh fort, Jhansi district. At Paharpur in North Bengal is found the figure of a *jina* and also a copperplate, dated c. 159, i.e., AD 478 which describes the existence of a Jain monastery in that region.¹⁹⁹ The Kahaum pillar inscription of Skandagupta dated c. 141, i.e., AD 460–61 is placed on a sculptured column containing five standing naked figures of the Tirthamkaras, Ādinātha, Śāntinātha, Neminātha, Pārśvanātha, and Mahāvīra—in the niches.²⁰⁰

Of the Jain sculptures belonging to the sixth century we may refer to the five bronzes from Vallabhi.²⁰¹ The Khandagiri caves at Bhuvaneswar, referred to above, contain some standing and seated *jina* images of the later Gupta and early medieval periods. The Satgharā cave contains on its rear wall two rows of carvings, the upper one representing the first seven of the Tirthamkaras and the lower consisting of seven female figures guarded by Ganeśa. Another section of the same cave contains two rows of figures, the upper showing 24 Tirthamkaras and the lower, 24 female figures, the *sāsanadevatās*. Important Jain paintings have been discovered at Sittannavasal near Tanjore and some of them belong to a time around AD 600 or a little later. The paintings are on the ceilings,

capitals, and upper parts of the pillars of a rock-cut Jain temple ²⁰² Quite a large number of Jain bronzes ranging from sixth to eleventh centuries AD have been obtained in Akota hoard. From Vasantagarh, old Sirohi State in Western India, is found a beautiful bronze figure of Rsabhanātha with an inscription on its pedestal giving the date Samvat 744, i.e., AD 687. Another similar bronze without inscription and a few smaller ones from the same site also belong to this period ²⁰³. To the eighth century belong the large Mahudī (Baroda) bronze ²⁰⁴ and also two smaller bronzes from the same place, two metal sculptures in the Simandhara temple (Ahmedabad), the stone sculpture of Pārśvanātha at Charupa (north Gujarat), three standing bronze figures at Bhinmal (Marwar) and a group of rock-carvings at Dhank (Saurashtra). A fourfold image of Sambhavanātha, mentioned above, from the Sonbhāndārā cave of Rajgir and a figure of Ādinātha from a ruined brick shrine at Vaibhāra hill of the same place also belong to the same period. To the ninth century belong Rohtak figure of Pārśvanātha, a few more sculptures from Rajgir, the Padmāvatī and a few other specimen from Nalanda and the rock-carvings of the Navamuni, Bārabhuji and Trisūla caves of Orissa ²⁰⁵.

Of the Jain caves of the post-Gupta period reference may be made to one at Badami ²⁰⁶ and another at Aihole, both assignable to the middle of the seventh century AD. The most notable group of Jain caves are to be found at Ellora among the northern horn of the ridge, although they are not earlier than AD 800. The best known Jain cave temple is the so-called Indra Sabhā ²⁰⁷ which is cut out of solid rock. In its courtyard, there is on the right a figure of an elephant and on the left a monolithic column surmounted by a quadruple image of a Tirthamkara. In the centre of the court there is a square *mandapa* and beyond it the passage leading to the lower hall of the temple. At the left end of the passage there are two big images of Śāntunātha, and at the right the stairway leading to the upper hall of the temple. The walls of the upper hall are divided into compartments and filled with sculptured figures of the *jinas*.

Of the Jain temples, the one of Meguti at Aihole, erected in Śaka 556 (AD 634) by Ravikīrti during the reign of the Calukyan king Pulakeśin II is specially important from the structural point of view. Two small Jain shrines at Than in Saurashtra, belonging to the post-Gupta period also deserve special mention, ²⁰⁸ the structural style of which had been imitated by a number of later temples like the one

of Paṭṭaṇi Devī at Pithora near Bharhut. The goddess enshrined in the latter is Ambikā with other *yakṣmīs* carved on her three sides.²⁰⁹ The Mahāvīra temple at Osia in Rajasthan which was originally constructed in the reign of Vatsarāja of the Pratihāra dynasty, has an open porch, a closed hall and a sanctum. "One of its outstanding features are the pillars of the porch as they represent the post-Gupta order in its ripe state."²¹⁰ The courtyard of the temple contains a row of subsidiary shrines erected at a later time. The Makrabai temple near Mahoba in Uttar Pradesh, constructed evidently before AD 1000, contains three cells, one at the back of the *mandapa* and two respectively at the north and the south of it, and figures of the *jinas* on the lintel.²¹¹ The much mutilated Ghantai temple at Khajuraho is also a unique specimen of Jain architecture which was built during the period under review. Of other Jain temples at Khajuraho, one that of Pārśvanātha, probably belonging to the period between AD 950 and 1050, is about sixty-two feet in length and half of that in breadth, the outside walls of which are adorned with numerous bands of mouldings and with three horizontal rows of sculptured statues.²¹² The Jain temples at Khajuraho, about six in number, differ very little from the Brahmanical ones situated therein. The rock-out reliefs of Navamuni and Bārabhuji caves of Orissa belong to c. 8th–9th centuries, and the standing *jinas* near Udyota-Kesari's cave were carved in c. 11th century. A few interesting Jain sculptures of the medieval period have been found from the districts of Mayurbhanj and Puri. Of these an image of Ambikā and that of Rsabhanātha and Mahāvīra in one stela are preserved in the British Museum, while another, a standing bronze of Ādinātha, in the Indian Museum, Calcutta.

In south India the chief centre of Jainism was Śravana Belgolā, famous for its legendary connections with Bhadrabāhu and Candragupta, where numerous Jain shrines were constructed in medieval and later times. The ordinary temples which contain only the image of a *jina* are known as Basti, while a specially arranged kind consisting of cloisters around an open courtyard with a colossal statue is called Betta, a remarkable example of which is found on the summit of a hill at Śravana Belgolā. The topmost section of the granite hill is fashioned into a gigantic statue (57 ft. high) of Gommateśvara, the son of the first *jina* Rsabhanātha who resigned his kingdom to become an ascetic. The saint is represented as practising austerity, undisturbed by the serpents about his feet, the

ant-hills rising to his thighs and the growing creeper that has already reached his shoulders. This huge sculpture was carved under the orders of Cāmunda Rāya about AD 983.²¹³ The other similar colossal statues of Gommaṭa are known, one at Karkal, 41½ feet high, erected in AD 1432 and another at Venūr, 35 feet high, which was set up in AD 1604.

Some of the Jain temples at Deogarh fort, Jhansi district, which date from the tenth century AD contain, besides the images of the *jinas*, well-known figures of Jain mythology including those of the Kṣetrapālas and *yaksas*. Most famous of all are the temples on Mount Abu, the Dilwara group of which consists of four large temples. Of them the two most important ones are in certain respects unrivalled anywhere in India, the older of which was built in AD 1031 by Vimala Sāha and other, completed in AD 1230 by Tejahpāla and Vāstupāla. Both of the temples, constructed entirely of white marble, are similar in plan, relatively plain on the exterior but amazingly rich in interior decoration, each standing in a rectangular walled area, surrounded by recesses with numerous statues. The central structure is a cell, containing a statue of a *jina*, with a pyramidal roof, and connected with this is a closed hall. In front of the hall is an extensive open portico adorned with free standing columns. The temples display some of the finest examples of Jain sculpture, chiefly from the viewpoint of their exquisite delicacy of carving.²¹⁴

Of other interesting Jain temples of the medieval period mention must be made of the shrines at Kumbharia in north Gujarat belonging to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Digambara Kīrtistambha at Chitor which was built in AD 1100 and repaired in 1430, the temples near Indore which were mostly built by later Paramāras of Malwa in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Kumārapāla temples on the Tāranga Hill, north Gujarat and at Jalor, about 80 miles south of Jodhpur, the temple at Sarotrā in north Gujarat which contains 52 cells in the courtyard, the Varavan shrine in the Thar district of Sindh, the beautifully carved fane at Mirpur between Abu and Sirohi, the Caumukha temple at Ranakpur in the Godvād district, etc.²¹⁵ Other interesting Jain temples and towers are to be found at Paresnath, Chittorgarh and Gwalior. Jaipur and Bikaner in Rajasthan possess some Digambara remains, while Jaisalmer has a group of Śvetāmbara temples. The site of Budhi Canderi is rich in Jain sculptures comparable in style

to those of Deogarh fort and Sironi in central India. In Khandesh, Digambara Jain vestiges are found at Erandol and Cahardi. Digambara temples exist at Miri and Ghotan in the Ahmednagar district, while in the Nasik district are a few Jain caves. The temple city of Śātruñjaya in Saurashtra is considered specially sacred to Rsabha, the first Tīrthamkara. The temples are said to be over five hundred, grouped in separate enclosures, generally containing one principal temple with other smaller ones. Some of the temples are believed to be as old as the eleventh century, while the majority range from around AD 1500 to the present time. The hill of Gīrnar, not far from Junagadh, contains a group of Jain temples, some sixteen in number. Of these the largest and perhaps also the oldest is the Neminātha temple. An inscription upon it records that it was repaired in AD 1278, and hence its original erection must have been considerably earlier than this date.²¹⁶

The temples mentioned above contain elaborate sculptured ornamentations and cult images of the *jinas*. The medieval *jina* images hailing from different parts of India reflect a formal stereotyped character, but the attendant figures are displayed in various ways. Of the important medieval images we may refer to the seated Rsabhanātha from Srāvastī which shows a number of miniature seated Jains on the rectangular *prabhāvalī* in four rows; to the standing figures of Ajitanātha and Candraprabha, both from Deogarh, to the very well-carved seated image of Śāntinātha in the collection of the Fyzabad Museum, and to the image of Rsabhanātha found at Surkhor in the Dinajpur district of Bengal. Other Jain sculptures from Bengal included a figure of Śāntinātha from Ujanī in the Baidwan district, figures of Pārśvanātha from Bahulara, Harmashra, Deulbhira and Sidhesvara in the Bankura district and a bronze figure of Ambikā from Nalgora as also a stone sculpture of Ādinātha from Ghatesvara in the 24-Parganas.

The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the zenith of Jain prosperity which manifested itself into the formation of the cities of temples. But under the shadow of Islam, most of the Jain temples were converted into mosques. "By removing the principal cell and its porch from the centre of the court, and building up the entrances of the cells that surround it, a courtyard was at once obtained, surrounded by a double colonnade, which always was the typical form of a mosque. Still one essential feature was wanting—a more important side towards Macca this they easily obtained by

removing the smaller pillars from that side, and re-erecting in their place the larger pillars of the porch, with their dome in the centre, and if there were two smaller domes, by placing one of them at each end ²¹⁷

ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOURCES THE EPIGRAPHS

According to the *Kalpasūtra*²¹⁸ the oldest region frequented by the Jain monks comprised Anga-Magadha to the East, Kauśāmbī to the South, Sthunā to the West and Kunālā to the North. The original centre was evidently Anga-Magadha whence the monks dispersed in different directions, and hence the early history of Jainism had rightly been connected by the Jain authorities with the history of Magadha. In Hemacandra's *Pansustaparvan*²¹⁹ it is stated that 60 years after the death of Mahāvira, King Udāyin of Magadha was murdered by Nanda who established a new dynastic line. The Mauryan kings from Candragupta to Aśoka, as well as Kunālā and Samprati, the son and grandson of the latter, also appear in Hemacandra's list. According to the traditions recorded in the later Jain texts, the Mauryan king Candragupta gave up his royal power in favour of his son and became a Jain monk and a follower of the celebrated Bhadrabāhu and finally put an end to his life by fasting at Śravana Belgolā in Karnataka. Interestingly enough, from an inscription found at the same place, dedicated to the memory of Ācārya Prabhācandra, we learn that Bhadrabāhu had predicted a famine to occur in Ujjayinī, whereupon the whole *saṃgha* moved to the South,²²⁰ while other inscriptions found in the same region²²¹ clearly state that Candragupta was a disciple of Bhadrabāhu and that he survived his teacher by twelve years which were spent in penance on the hill, and then died there himself. The oldest of these inscriptions may be assigned to the sixth century AD. One point, which must be taken into account in this connection, is that this tradition of migration is emphasised in Jain literature, and the archaeological findings of Rice and Narasimhachar support it. Fleet, however, holds a different view.²²² He says that although the migration itself seems to be historical, it was conducted by another Bhadrabāhu who became the head of the order 492 years after Mahāvira according to an ancient list of the Digambaras²²³ and that instead of Candragupta we have to think of Guptigupta as being the pupil of this second Bhadrabāhu.

The earliest epigraphic reference to the Jains under the name Nigantha is found in the Aśokan inscriptions.²²⁴ In the fourteenth year of his reign, Aśoka appointed officials to watch over the life of different religious communities, and of them he said in the second part of the Seventh Pillar Edict which he issued in the 29th year of his reign "My Censors of the Law of Piety, too, are occupied with various objects of the (royal) favour, affecting both ascetics and householders, and are likewise occupied with all denominations. I have arranged, also, that they should be occupied with the affairs of the Buddhist clergy, as well as among the Brāhmanas and the Ājivikas, the Niganthas and, in fact various denominations." As in the still earlier writings of the Buddhist canon, the name Nigantha was exclusively applied to the followers of Mahāvira, we can certainly conclude that they were of no small importance at the time of Asoka. According to the tradition preserved in Hemacandra's *Pañcīkṣapāraṇa*,²²⁵ Aśoka's grandson Samprati, who resided at Ujjayinī, dedicated himself to the cause of Jainism and sent missionaries to the Andhra and Dramila countries in south India. This king is said to have been converted by Suhasin, the celebrated pupil of Sthūlabhadra. But inscriptional evidence is wholly lacking in this respect.

However, a century afterwards, i.e., in the first century B.C. we have the Hāthigumphā inscription of Khāravela, king of Kalinga found at Khandagiri near Bhuvanēśwar. The larger inscription which is much mutilated contains an account of the life of Khāravela from his childhood to the thirteenth year of his reign. It begins with an appeal to the *arhat* and *siddha*, which corresponds to the beginning of the fivefold form of homage still used among the Jains, and mentions the building of temples in honour of the *arhat* as well as an image of the first *jina*, which was carried away by the Nanda king. The record shows that Khāravela invaded Magadha and brought back the statue of the Kalinga *jina* taken away by the hostile king and that he provided shelters for Jain monks at the Relic Depository of the *arhats* on the Kumārī (Udayagiri) hill, erected many pillars and repaired old temples. The revised reading, however, does not mention the Kalinga *jina* statue. The second and the smaller inscription states that Khāravela's wife caused a cave to be prepared for the ascetics of Kalinga who believed in the *arhats*. The meaning of these inscriptions, which were formerly believed to be Buddhist, was first made clear by Bhagavanlal Indraji.

who recognised the true names of the King Khāravela and his predecessors pointed out that Khāravela and his wife were patrons of Jainism ²²⁶

From the beginning of the Christian era Mathura became one of the strongest centres of Jainism. The earliest inscription from Mathura, assigned to the first century BC by Indrajī, tells of the erection of a small temple in honour of the *arhat* Vardhamāna and also of the dedication of seats for the teachers—a cistern and a stone table. This temple, the inscription says, stood by the side of one built by a guild of tradesmen. The ruins of a Jain stupa as well as two temples have been excavated in the mound called Kankālī Tīlā. A second century inscription found therein says that the stupa was built by the gods, indicating its legendary antiquity. Such inscriptions suggest that the Jains had erected stupas since long, as also the canon refers to them (*thūva*). The stupas upon which the figures of the *arhats* were erected were supposed to have been the work of gods suggesting that they had been standing since time immemorial. A characteristic production of the Jains of Mathura was the *āyāgapata* or 'tablet of homage'. These were sculptured tablets containing inscriptions. A large number of dedicatory inscriptions of the Kusāna age from Mathura have come to light. They are all on the pedestals of statues. In many of them the dedicators gave not only their own names, but also those of the religious teachers to whose communities they belonged. The teachers were of two classes—*vācaka* or ordinary teachers and *ganin* or head of a school. The names of the schools to which the teachers belonged are also specified in the inscriptions. The larger groups were called *ganas*, and their subdivisions, *kulas* and *sākhās*. Exactly the same division into *gana*, *kula* and *sākhā* is found in the *Kalpasūtra*. The discoveries made at Mathura prove by the nakedness of the sculptured figures that the schism of the order into the Digambara and Śvetāmbara dates from as early as the first century AD. Besides the inscriptions show that in the first and second centuries the tradition of the 24 Tirthankaras with their distinctive emblems and attributes was firmly established, that an order of the nuns was in existence and that some canonical works were already composed by that time ²²⁷

Unfortunately in other parts of north India Jain epigraphic materials are not so abundant as in the case of Mathura. However at Pabhosa, near Allahabad, there are two caves, bearing inscriptions in Śunga characters, recording their dedication by one Āśādhasena

from Ahicchatra for the use of the Kāśyapīya *arhats*, the *gotra* to which Mahāvīra belonged, thus showing that the followers of Pārśvanātha at that time might have belonged to a separate monastic organisation.²²⁸ The Junagarh inscription of the grandson of Jayadāman, belonging to the second century AD, refers to those who have obtained Kevalajñāna and conquered death and old age, and other words distinctively suggestive of Jain dogma.²²⁹ The Son-Bhāndāra cave Rajgir in characters of the first or second century AD refers to one Muni Vairadeva, who died in the 584th year of Mahāvīra's demise as jewel among the teachers who caused the excavation of two caves for the Jain ascetics with images of *jnas* installed therein.²³⁰ A ruined temple on the Vaibhāra hill in the same region contains a seated figure of Neminātha with a fragmentary inscription in Gupta characters, referring probably to Candragupta II.²³¹ There are two inscriptions belonging to the reign of Kumāragupta, one at Mathura (AD 432) speaking of the dedication of a Jain image by a lady and the other at Udayagiri in Malwa (GF 106, 1 e, AD 425–26) recording the erection of a statue of Pārśvanātha by a private individual at the mouth of a cave.²³² The Kahaum Stone Pillar inscription of Skandagupta (GF 141 1 e, AD 460–61) records that a certain Madra set up five stone images of Ādikarṣas or Tirthamkaras at the village of Kakubha, 1 e, Kahaum in Gorakhpur district.²³³ The Paharpur Copperplates of GF 159 (AD 478) record the donation of some land by a private individual for the maintenance of worship at the Jain vihara at Vata Gohāli, headed by the pupils of Guhanandin of the Pañcastūpanikāya of Banaras, which probably occupied the site of the great temple unearthed at Paharpur.²³⁴

From epigraphic evidence it appears that the Gangā kings of Mysore were patrons of Jainism. There is a tradition that the Jain saint Simhanandī gave a kingdom to Kangunivarmā, the founder of the Ganga line.²³⁵ In a damaged copperplate grant of Śivamāra I, we find support of this tradition.²³⁶ The Udayendiran grant of King Hasumalla, dated c AD 920, affirms that the Ganga lineage obtained increase through the greatness of Simhanandī.²³⁷ The Kudlur plates of King Mārasimha dated Śaka 884 (AD 963) confirm the above.²³⁸ The Humcca Pañcavati stone inscription dated 1077, while tracing the spiritual descent of Jain *gurus*, connects Simhanandī with the creation of the Ganga kingdom.²³⁹ But the most interesting account of Simhanandī's achievements is given in

a stone inscription found near the Siddheśvara temple on Kallūrgudda, Shimoga-hobli, Mysore, which is dated AD 1122,²⁴⁰ and also in another record dated AD 1129.²⁴¹ From the above inscriptions we learn that the region around the city of Perur was a strong centre of Jainism and that the destruction of a *silā-stambha*, an Aśokan Pillar according to Saletore,²⁴² by Kongunivarmā symbolises the conquest of Jainism over the existing Buddhism in that region. A copperplate grant found in the ruined *bastī* at Nonamangala, assigned by Rice to c AD 370, dated in the 13th regnal year of Tandangala Mādhava, records the grant of Kumārapura village for an *arhat* temple made at the instance of Ācārya Vīradeva.²⁴³ The Nonamangala copperplate grant of Avinīta, issued in his first regnal year, assigned to c AD 425, by Rice, shows his patronage to the cause of Jainism.²⁴⁴ That King Durvinīta, son and successor of King Avinīta, was a devout Jain is proved by later epigraphic records. We have already referred to Sivamāra's copperplate hearing testimony of his Jain leaning. The Devarahalli plates of Sripurusa,²⁴⁵ the Āñjaneya temple inscription of Duggamāra,²⁴⁶ and many other epigraphic records show that kings of the Ganga line offered gifts to Jain monks and erected temples.

Some of the Kadamba kings were also patrons of Jainism as is proved by their inscriptions. A copperplate grant dated in the 80th year of Kākusthavarmā (who ruled towards the close of the fourth century AD) opens with an invocation to Jinendra and closes with reference to Rsabha.²⁴⁷ Grants of his grandson Mrgeśavarmā (fifth century AD) relate his donations to the cause of Jain religion and also the existence of the Jain sects like the Śvetāpatas, the Nirgranthas and the Kurcakas.²⁴⁸ A copperplate grant of his son Ravivarmā indicates that he also maintained his father's tradition.²⁴⁹ Two grants of Ravivarmā's son Harivarmā show his leanings to the Kūrcaka sect.²⁵⁰ An inscription of the last prominent Kadamba ruler Devavarmā shows that he granted a specified field in Siddhakedāra to the Jain sect of the Yāpanīyas.²⁵¹

A later stone inscription dated AD 1129 connects the Rāstrakūta king Dantidurga with the Jain scholar Akalankadeva.²⁵² An incomplete copperplate dated AD 807 states that Stambha or Kambha, the elder brother of Govinda III, granted the village of Vadanaguppe to the Jains.²⁵³ King Amoghavarasa was a devout Jain and a disciple of Jinasena. His son Kṛṣṇa II made a grant to a *basadi* at Mulgund.²⁵⁴ An inscription of his brother Nityavarsa found in a ruined temple at

Dānavulapādu, Cuddapah district, narrates that the king caused the pedestal to be made for the bathing ceremony of the god Śāntinātha.²⁵⁵ The Gandhavārana-bastī inscription at Śravana Belgolā and the Kāmagondamanahallī stone inscription at Sirataluk state that King Indra IV, died by the Jain method of *sallekhanā* at Śravana Belgolā in AD 982.²⁵⁶ The Western Cālukyas showed the same liberal attitude towards Jainism which the Gangas, the Kadambas and the Rāstrakūtas had shown, as is proved by the inscriptions of Vinayāditya Satyāśraya, Vijayāditya,²⁵⁷ Jayasimha III,²⁵⁸ Someśvara I,²⁵⁹ Vikramāditya VI,²⁶⁰ and others. Later on the torch of Jainism was carried by a number of Hoysala kings as is demonstrated in their inscriptions.²⁶¹ Some of the Eastern Cālukyas were patrons of Jainism. Three records of Ammaṭṭa II speak of Jainism as a very popular religion in the tenth century. An inscription at Rāmatirtham near Vizianagram indicates that Jainism continued to flourish till the beginning of the eleventh century, and that the Rāmatirtham hill was regarded as a place of pilgrimage by the Jains since early days.

Epigraphic as well as literary evidence suggests that from the eighth century onwards Jainism was patronized by the Cāpas and Pratihāras in the north. From about this period to the end of the thirteenth century, attempts were made even by the feudatories of the Karnataka monarchs to popularise Jainism, and we have numerous inscriptions in its support. Here we may refer to the inscriptions of the Ganga feudatories of the Paṇḍi family, of the Rāstrakūta feudatory Cākṛāja, the Cellapātaka noble Lokāditya, the Śāntara lords, the Kongālvās, the Cangālvās, the Śilāhāras of Karhād, the Rattas of Saundattī, the nobles of Nāgarakhanda, the Yādava noble Kūcīrāja, etc.²⁶² Similarly individuals of wealth and fame contributed immensely to the cause of Jainism, and in this connection we may especially refer to the celebrated Cāmunda Rāya. From the inscriptions at the side of the colossal statue of Gommatā at Śravana Belgolā we learn that it was Cāmunda Rāya, the famous minister of Rājamalla, who was responsible for making the statue. The date must have been about AD 983.²⁶³ Another inscription, found at the same place, composed by the Jain poet Sujanottamsa of Boppana and dating about AD 1180, tells something of the character ascribed to Gommatā, relates how Cāmunda Rāya came to have the image made and describes its wonderful character.²⁶⁴

Important light on the Jaina *ganas*, *sanghas*, *sākhās* and *gacchas* and also on the celebrated teachers have been thrown by the inscriptions. By the eighth century AD various *gacchas* originated in the north with the traditional 84 disciples of Uddyotana who, according to the *Kharataragacchapattīvālī* flourished 550 years after Devardhi.²⁶⁵ The Gandhāri inscription on the back of a metal image of Ādinātha, dated vs 937 (AD 880), although mentions Uddyotana and his two disciples, does not, however, refer to the *gacchas*.²⁶⁶ But other inscriptions, specially of the south refer to Addakali, Deśika Gana, Hottage, Mesapasana, Nandī, Pogala, Pogari, Pulikal, Pustaka, Sārasvata, Tagarigal, Tintrinika, and Vakra *gacchas*. Of the *ganas* mentioned in the inscriptions we may refer to Balagara, Balatkara, Deśiya, Deva, Dramila, Eregittur, Kalor, Kavaruri, Nandī, Pogariya, Punthagavrsamūla, Sarasvatī, Sena, Śruta, Tavula, and Valahari, while for the *sanghas* we have Deva, Dramila Mūla, Nandī, Navilur, Simha, Nirgrantha, Sena, Śramana, Śvetāpata and Yāpaniya. Names of more than 300 *acāryas* or teachers and of the groups or sects to which they belonged and in many cases glimpses of their activities are recorded in the inscriptions and these are indeed very helpful for a basic understanding of Jain activities in different parts of the country.

PĀRSVA AND MAHĀVĪRA

Historical Jainism begins with Pārśvanātha the twenty-third Tīrthamkara in the line of Jain spiritual teachers. The strongest argument to prove his historical existence has been put forward by Jacobi who has shown that a Buddhist *sūtra* mistakenly attributes to Mahāvīra the doctrines of Pārśva.²⁶⁷ Such a mistake could not have taken place unless Pārśva actually had his own followers existing at the time. The historicity of Pārśva has also been confirmed by internal evidence of the Jain canon itself in which we come across the account of his disciple Keśi, stories of disputation among the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra, cases of conversion from the creed of the former to that of the latter, and so on. Moreover, there are indications that the parents of Mahāvīra were the followers of Pārśva's creed.

Very few facts of Pārśva's life are, however, known to us. According to the Jain accounts of his life he was born in the city of Banaras about 817 BC. His father was Aśvasena, probably a tribal chief, and

his mother's name was Vāmā. The legends of his birth and also those associated with the important events of his life connect him with snakes which later became his symbol. In his early years he was a brave warrior who defeated the Yavanas of Kalinga. He married Prabhābatī who was daughter of a king of Ayodhya. At the age of thirty he renounced the world and became an ascetic. He practised austerities for eighty-three days and after conquering temptation and fear and having established full control over his mind and body, received enlightenment on the eighty-fourth day under a Dhataki tree near Banaras. His mother and wife became his first disciples and gradually he received a large number of following. He preached his doctrines for seventy years. He lived for a full hundred years and died on Mount Sammeta Śikhara which lies on the Bengal-Bihar border.

Details of the doctrines preached by Pārśva are not very much known to us. So far as the ethical aspects of his doctrines are concerned, we know that he made four vows binding on the members of his community: not to take life, not to lie, not to steal, and not to own property. To these Mahāvīra added a fifth—not to indulge in sensual pleasures—and this shows how his teachings were based upon those of his illustrious predecessor. In Jain scriptures the origin of many important Jain notions has been traced to the doctrines of Pārśva. The dialogue between Keśi and Goyāma²¹⁸ unmistakably points out that in spite of some minor differences, the doctrines of Mahāvīra were in close agreement with those of Pārśva.

Mahāvīra was born in a suburb of Vaiśālī called Kundagrāma, now known as Vasukunda. He belonged to the Nāya (Nāta in Pāli and Jñātr in Sanskrit) tribe of which his father Siddhārtha was a chief. His mother Trisalā came from the Licchavis. She was the sister of Cetaka who was a head of a tribal confederacy. According to the Jain legends while she was pregnant Trisalā had fourteen or sixteen dreams from which it was understood that the child would be either a Cakravartī (universal monarch) or a Tīrthamkara. Another set of legends states that Mahāvīra was originally conceived into the womb of Brāhmana lady called Devanandā, who was the wife of one Rśabhadatta, but the god Indra, thinking that the would-be Tīrthamkara should belong to a noble family, got his embryo transferred from the womb of Devanandā to that of Trisalā through his agent Harinegamesī (= Naigamesa). The traditional date of Mahāvīra's birth is 599 BC. Modern scholars want to fix this

date in 539 B.C.

His original name was Vardhamāna (i.e., the increasing),²⁶⁹ but he was also known as Nāya or Nātaputta, Kāsava, Vesālīya, Vedehadinna, Śāsanānāyaka, Buddha, and so on. His more popular name Mahāvīra is said to have been bestowed on him by the gods. His early career was marked by innumerable good deeds. As a boy he excelled all his companions in strength and physical endurance and also in beauty of mind and body. According to the Digambara tradition, from his boyhood he maintained a strict and disciplined life avoiding sensual pleasure and even marriage. Even when a child of eight, Mahāvīra took the twelve vows prescribed for a Jain laymen. The Śvetāmbara tradition on the other hand says that Mahāvīra married a lady called Yaśodā belonging to the Kaundinya *gotra* and had a daughter called Anujā (Anojjā) or Priyadarśanā. She was married to a son of his sister, Jamālī, who became one of his followers. This Jamālī was the originator of the first schism in the church history of Jainism. Mahāvīra had a granddaughter who was known as Śesavatī or Yaśovatī.

At the age of thirty after the death of his parents, Mahāvīra became a monk, for which he received permission of his elder brother Nandivardhana. After having a formal initiation, he gave up every thing he possessed, including valuable robes and ornaments, and began to wander from place to place, never staying for longer than a single night in a village or for more than five nights in a town. Thirteen months after he abandoned his clothing. During the period of his meditation and austerities, he received in many places ill-treatment from unfriendly peoples. In the second year of his monkhood Mahāvīra met Gośāla Mankhaliputta, and they lived together for six years. Then came a breach between the two on doctrinal points. Gośāla went his own way, proclaimed himself a *jina* and lived in Śrāvastī as the third pontiff of the Ājīvikas. The two met again sixteen years later and had a hot debate between them. Gośāla died about 484 B.C. when Ajātaśatru launched an invasion against the Vajjians.

For twelve years Mahāvīra wandered from place to place in quest of truth and at last, after this long period of austerity, achieved omniscience under a *sāla* tree on the bank of the river Rjupālīkā near a village called Jṛmbhikāgrāma. He felt the need of preaching to the common people what he had achieved through austerity and meditation. The Jain legends give the names of different rulers

Mahāvīra visited and tell how Cetaka, the president of the great tribal confederacy of the east, became a patron of his order, and Kunika, king of Magadha, gave him the most cordial welcome. In Kauśāmbī he was received with great honour by its King Sthānika. He used to wander for eight months of the year and spend four months of the rainy seasons in some famous towns of eastern India. According to the Jain tradition at first he went to Asthikagrāma, then spent three rainy seasons in Campā and Prstucampā, twelve rainy seasons at Vaiśālī and its suburb Vāṇiyagrāma, fourteen at Rājagṛha, six in Mithilā, two in Bradrikā and the remaining four of the 42 years on his itinerancy respectively, at Ālabhikā, Puntabhūmi, Śrāvastī and Pāvāpurī.

Mahāvīra passed away in 468 BC at the age of 72 in a place called Majjhima Pāvā, modern Pāvāpurī in the Patna district. Then he was residing in the house of its ruler Hastipāla. There he delivered the fifty-five lectures explaining the results of *karma* and recited thirty-six unasked questions. Then feeling that his end was drawing nigh, he sat reverently with clasped hands and crossed knees and just as the morning dawned, he attained *nirvāṇa*. The republican tribes who were his kinsmen and devotees instituted an illumination in honour of this great hero. "Since the light of intelligence is gone let us make an illumination of material matter," they said.²⁷⁰

ECCLÉSIASTICAL HISTORY

While dealing with the Jain epigraphs, we have seen that they incidentally refer to various branches, schools and families of the Jain community from which we learn the names of teachers who under different titles acted as spiritual leaders of these subdivisions, and of the monks and nuns who practised austerities under their leadership. The inscriptions also mention the names of the vast number of pious lay people, both male and female, including kings and nobles who supported the Jain church by providing the monks and nuns with their requirements. But so far as the total history of Jainism is concerned, we get only a bare outline from the inscriptions and nothing more. Jarl Charpentier is quite correct when he says "while we possess materials which enable us to construct a fairly clear biography of the prophet, and while we have at least such information concerning the events which preceded and were contemporary with the beginning of the great separation between

Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras the following period is almost totally devoid of any historical record. And this is not the only blank in Jain ecclesiastical history. Scarcely more is known concerning the fate of the Jain church during the early centuries of our era down to the time of the great council of Valabhī, in the fifth or at the beginning of the sixth century AD, when the canon was written down in its present form.²⁷¹

After the death of Mahāvīra, the leadership of all the four orders of Jain community—monks, nuns, laymen and lay women—fell on his disciple Indrabhūti Gautama who was the head of the Jain church for a period of twelve years. He was succeeded by Sudharman who also held office for another twelve years. The oldest list of these 'tribal heads' (*ganadharas*) is found in the *Kalpasūtra* which begins with Sudharman and ends with the thirty-third patriarch Śāndilya or Skandila. In most of the cases their names and *gotras* are given, but there is also an expanded list from the sixth, Bhadrabāhu to the fourteenth, Vajrasena, which adds more details viz., the disciples of each patriarch and of the sects and branches (*gana*, *kula* and *sākhā*) originating with them.²⁷² We have also later lists of teachers (*gurvāvali*, *pattāvali*) of different sects (*gacchas*, etc.) which give a summary account from Mahāvīra down to the founder of the sect in question, and then a more detailed one of the line of descent from the latter downwards, and with particulars of subsequent heads of the sect called Śrīpūjya. These lists are useful so far as the later and regional history of Jainism is concerned.

Sudharman was succeeded by Jambusvāmī who led the community for twenty-four years. Subsequent leaders were Prabhava, Sayambhava, Yaśobhadra, Sambhūtavijaya, and Bhadrabāhu. Tradition makes Bhadrabāhu a contemporary of Candragupta Maurya during whose leadership a great famine took place, as a result of which a part of the community, numbering twelve thousand, went with him to the south of India where the famine had not penetrated. The other part, also numbering twelve thousand, remained in Magadha under the leadership of Sthūlabhadra. The latter, who was interested in preserving the canonical literature, convened a council at Pāṭaliputra which collected the Anga texts, eleven in number. The twelfth Anga containing fourteen Pūrva texts, was found missing, but Sthūlabhadra was able to supply it from memory. (Historically, however, all of the Angas, as we have

them in their present form, were not compiled in the Pāṭaliputra council) The famine over, Bhadrabāhu returned with his party but he refused to accept the proceedings of the Pāṭaliputra council as valid A wholehearted agreement on such a question as the canon of their scriptures thus became impossible Bhadrabāhu also raised the famous clothes-versus-nudity question, since he found that the home-keeping group had adopted some form of clothing Although the actual schism did not take place until two more centuries had passed, the basis of the order was considerably shaken by all such incidents

After Sthūlabhadra the Jain church was led respectively by Mahāgiri, Suhasan, Sushita, Supratibuddha, Indradinna, Dinna-suri, Simhagiri, Vajravāmin and Vajrasena It was during the patriarchy of Vajrasena that the great schism resulting in the official separation of the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, took place Jain traditions, however, record eight schisms, the first of which took place as early as the days of Mahāvīra under the leadership of his own son-in-law, Jamālī ²⁷⁵ The second was caused by Gośāla (but actually he did not belong to the creed), the third by Āsādha Ācārya, the fourth by Āśvamitra, the fifth by Ganga, the sixth by Rohagupta and the seventh by Gostha, but these were of minor importance in the history of the Jain church But the last schism ²⁷¹ which was based on seven main tenets in which the Digambaras were opposed to the Śvetāmbaras resulted in a sharp division in the church, each section claiming greater authenticity than the other The points on which emphasis is laid by the Digambaras are that the Tīrthamkaras must be represented as nude and with downcast eyes, that women cannot attain *mokṣa*, that the Kevalajñānins require no food, that Mahāvīra was never married, that the compiled canonical works are not valid since they are man-made, that the ascetics must be entirely nude and that the *ācāryas* after Jambu Svāmi do not represent the entire community The immediate cause of this split is not known, but there are grounds to believe that there had always been two parties in the community Two modes of monastic life known as *Jinakalpa* and *Sthavirakalpa* were surviving side by side which were mutually opposed to each other The enmity was nourished for a long time, but suddenly, probably on minor issues, it burst open By the end of the first century AD the division was finalised

After the Śvetāmbara-Digambara split the integration of the Jain church became rather loose giving rise to regional leaderships The

split caused a separation not only among the monks but also in the ranks of the laity. The major sects were further subdivided into smaller groups. One of the important events in the later history of the Jain church was the Second Council at Valabhi, held at the beginning of the sixth century AD, under the guidance of Devardhī in which some of the Jain canonical works took their present shape. In this Council the earlier commentaries also were recast and amplified. After Vajrasena the church was led by the following patriarchs: Puṣyagiri, Phalgumitra, Dhanagiri, Śivabhūti, Bhadra, Naksatra, Raksa, Nāga, Jehila, Viṣṇu, Kālaka, Sampalita, Bhadra (J), Vṛddha, Saṃghapālita, Hastin, Dharma (J), and Śāṇḍilya.

REFERENCES

- 1 For details see Sangave, *JCSS*
- 2 Buhler, *ISJ*, pp 78–9, *EC*, II, no 254, H L Jain in *SI*, pp 431–2
- 3 For their regional distribution see Crooke, *TGNWPO*, I, pp 14 ff, II, p 422, III pp 12–13, 225, 386 IV, pp 97–9, 109–110 Enthoven, *TGB*, I, p 303, II, pp 23, 33, 34, 83, 426, III, pp 438, 442, Russell, *TCCPI*, II, pp 136–39, 142–43, 147–48, 154–57, III pp 12 ff Nanjundayya and Iyer, *MTC*, II, pp 402–03, Thurston, *CTSI*, II, pp 426 ff Hassan, *CTND*, I, pp 265 ff, and also *BC*, IX 1, pp 97 ff XVI, pp 45 ff XVII, p 99, XXI, p 103, XXIII 117, et seq. for structural and functional survey see Sangave, *JCSS*, pp 64–136
- 4 Trivarnikācāri XI, K P Jain, in *IHQ*, IV, pp 148 ff, J C Jain, *IAI*, pp 155 ff, C R Jain, *JL*, pp 42 ff, Upadhye in *JA*, p 61, Sangave, *JCSS*, pp 137–77
- 5 *KSB*, VII, Barodia, *HIJ*, p 40, C R Jain, *JL*, pp 47, 80–81, 89–91, Jaini, *JL*, pp 35–37, 50–52, 116–17, Kapadia in *JUB*, VIII, pp 201–02
- 6 Buhler, *ISJ*, pp 66–71, Jaini, *BOJ*, pp 3–15, Stevenson, *NMJ*, pp 93–95
- 7 Stevenson, *NMJ*, pp 92 ff, *HJ*, p 285, Russell, *TCCPI*, I, pp 227–29
- 8 Stevenson in *IRI* V, pp 875–78
- 9 *SBJ*, IV, pp 25 ff
- 10 *BC*, IV, pp 114–15, *JBBRAS*, X, p 237, Jhavery, *HJF*, pp 17–18
- 11 Jacobi in *IRI*, VII, p 470
- 12 Hemacandra's *Abhidhanacintāmaṇi* was edited by Bohlingk and Rieu with a German translation in 1847 Bhadrabāhu's *Kalpasiṭra* along with another text called *Navatattvaṇṇa*, came out in 1848 with the English rendering by J Stevenson
- 13 Moor also published two papers on Jainism in the *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register* (vol IX, 1820 and vol XVII, 1824) respectively under the titles 'Bombay and Western India' and 'The Jainas'
- 14 Published in book form in 1846
- 15 This volume also contained two articles under the same title 'On the Sarwacs or Jains' written respectively by Delamaine and Buchanan Hamilton Colebrooke's study of Jainism was reviewed by Wilson
- 16 *Indische Altertumskunde*, IV, 755–87
- 17 It was first published in two parts in *Abhandlungen Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1865–66
- 18 *Indische Studien*, XVI–XVII, Eng trans, H W Smyth in *Ind Ant*, XVII–XXI, 1888–92
- 19 *Report* for 1882–83, Bombay, 1884,

- for 1883-84, Bombay, 1887
- 20 *Report*, I-IV, for 1882-92 in *Journal of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Society*, vols XVI-XVIII (all in extra number), *Report*, V, for 1892-95, Bombay, 1896, VI, for 1895-98, Bombay, 1899
 - 21 *ZDMG* XXXIII, 478 ff 693 ff, XI V, 454 ff, XLVII, 308 ff
 - 22 L. Pulte, *Catalogo die manoscritti giainici*, 1894
 - 23 'An Alphabetical List of Jain MSS belonging to the Govt in the Oriental Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' in *Journal and Proceedings of the ASB*, IV 1908, 407-40, A Gueniot, 'Notes de Bibliographie Jains in *Journal Asiatique*, XIV, 1909, 47-148 S D Gupta, *A Collection of Sanskrit Prakrit and Hindi Works in the Jaina Siddhanta Bhavana*, Arrah, 1919 C D Dalal, *A Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Jain Bhandars of Jesalmere* (ed with introduction, indexes and notes on unpublished works and their authors by L B Gandhi), COS XXI Baroda, 1923 Hira Lal, *Catalogue of the Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts published under the Order of the Govt of C P and Berar* Nagpur 1926 H D Velankar, *Descriptive Catalogue of the Mss in the Bombay branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (III-IV) Jain and Vernacular Literatures*, Bombay, 1930 H R Kapadia, *Descriptive Catalogue of the Mss of the Bhandarkar Institute* 1935 etc
 - 24 Ernst Windisch's study of the researches on Indian philology and literature (1917-21) contained an assessment of researches in this line Information on Jain studies in Italian upto 1911 is contained in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, V, 219-71 See also C L Jain's *Jaina Bibliography*, Calcutta 1945
 - 25 *ZDMG*, XLV-XLVI
 - 26 Onomastics means the science of the origins and forms of words especially as used in a specialised field, also applied in the case of proper names of persons or places It is from Greek *onomastikos*, in French it is *onomazein* (from *onoma*, i e , name)
 - 27 Jain Sanskrit was of three kinds, simple Sanskrit, sophisticated Sanskrit in the *kāvya* style and Sanskrit mixed with Prakritisms See M Bloomfield, 'Some Aspects of Jain Sanskrit in *Festschrift Winternagel*, 1923, 220 ff
 - 28 It is interesting to note that Jacobi's edition of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* was published by the Pali Text Society
 - 29 Learned societies such as the Jaina Dharma Prakāśa Sabhā in Bhavnagar, the Jaina Vidyā Prasāraka Varga in Palitana the Jaina Jñāna Prasāraka Varga in Bombay, the Jaina Vidyasālā in Ahmedabad, Jain Sūtra Bātisi in Hyderabad, Śrī Sūtrāgama Prakāśaka Samiti in Gurgaon, etc contributed a lot to the publication of Jain texts Jain saints like Vijaya Dharma Suri and wealthy persons such as Devchand Lalbhai Jhaveri, Bhagavat Mansukhai and others also associated themselves with the publication of the Jain texts Cf *infra*
 - 30 *Wiener Zeitschrift*, I-IV, 1887-90 Reference has already been made to Weber's *Sacred Literature of the Jains*, translated into English by H W Smyth in *Ind Ant* XVII-XXI
 - 31 Intro to the *Kaṭhasūtra*, 14 ff *SB* XXII XLV and *ZDMG*, XXVIII 1 ff
 - 32 Intro to his trans of the *Uvuvagada sāo* and also in *Proc of the ASB* 1898, 39 ff
 - 33 Vol II, part II, Leipzig, 1920 Eng trans Calcutta, 1933, 424-595 Its adaptation, *The Jamas in the History of Indian Literature* was edited by Jinavijaya Muni, Ahmedabad, 1946
 - 34 Published in 1934 in the *Grundriss* series Eng trans, *The Doctrine of the Jamas*, by Wolfgang Bewrlen, Indian

- edition, Delhi, 1962, 73–125
- 35 Bombay, 1947
- 36 *Āyāra* (AG 1916), *Śiyagada* (AS 1881, AG 1917), *Thīna* (AS 1880, AG 1918–19), *Samavīya* (AS 1880, AG 1918) *Viyāhapannali* (AG 1918–21), *Nāyā dhammakahāo* (AS 1877, AG 1919), *Uvāsagadasao* (AG 1920, revised, ed., P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1930, Schubring, 1931), *Antagadadasao* (AG 1920, rev. ed. with intro., gloss notes and app. by P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1932) *Amullaravavūdasao* (same as above), *Pañhavāgaranāim* (AG 1919) and *Vivāgasūya* (AS 1875, AG 1820) ed. with intro and notes by P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1933
- 37 W. Schubring *Worte Mahāvīras*, Göttingen, 1926 66–121
- 38 For a critical study of the *Śiyagada* see Ghatage in *IHQ*, XII, 270–81
- 39 *Die Jains* (in *Religions geschichtliches Lesebuch* von A. Bertholet) Tübingen, 1927
- 40 P. Steinthal, *Specimen der Nāyā dhammakahā*, Berlin, 1881, W. Huttemann, *Die Jñatī-Erzählungen im sechsten Anga der kanons der Jainen*, Strassburg 1907
- 41 A. C. Sen, A Critical Introduction to the *Pañhavāgaranāim* (thesis), Hamburg, 1936
- 42 AS 1880, AG 1916, portions trans. (Ger.) by Schubring in *Die Jains*
- 43 AS 1880 AG 1925
- 44 *Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conference* Leiden, 1883, III (2), 490 ff
- 45 *Indische Studien*, X, 1863, 254 ff
- 46 *JASB*, XL 107 ff
- 47 *QJM*, XV, 138–47, XVI, 201–12
- 48 Cf. Jacobi in *ZDMG*, XXXIV 178 ff
- 49 *Über die vom Sterbefasten handelnden älteren Pāṇina des Jaina Kanons* Hamburg, 1929
- 50 *Das Kalpasūtra*, Leipzig, 1905, Eng. trans., May S. Burgess, *Ind Ant* XXXIX, 257 ff
- 51 *Vavahāra-und Nisīha sūtra*, Leipzig, 1918 Nagari retranscription along with Gujarati trans. by J. J. Doshi, 1925
- 52 Also edited by Muni Jinavijaya, 1926.
- 53 *SBE*, LXV Also ed. by Muni Sri Jayantivijaya, Agra, 1923–27
- 54 *ZDMG*, XLVI, 581–663, trans. by Schubring, Ahmedabad, 1932, M. V. Patwardhan *The Dasaveyāhya A Study* Sangli, 1933–36, cf. I. Alsdorf in *Indian Linguistics*, XVI, 21–8, Ghatage in *JBORS*, 1953, 432–39
- 55 *Nachr. Got. Ges. d. Wiss.*, 1942, 489–576 1952, 21–52 (with a Sanskrit *chāyā*)
- 56 Vol. I, Prakrit Text Society, Varanasi, 1957
- 57 *ZDMG*, XLVI 1892, 556 ff
- 58 *Über das Prakrit in der Erzählungs Literatur der Jains* RSO, II, Rome 1909 231 ff
- 59 *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mahārasi*, Leipzig, 1886 Eng. trans. by J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*, London, 1909
- 60 *ZDMG*, LXIX, 1915, 321–59
- 61 Manikachandra Digambara Granthamala, XXXII–XXXIII An analysis of this work was given by R. L. Mitra in his *Notices of Sanskrit Mss.*, VI, 1882, 74–97
- 62 *Festgabe Jacobs*, 331 ff
- 63 *Ind Ant*, XXX, 239 ff, 288 ff
- 64 Punjab Sanskrit Series no. 8
- 65 *Erzählungen aus Hemacandras Parīkṣitaparvan*, Leipzig, 1908
- 66 M. Bloomfield, *The Life and Stories of the Jaina Seivour Pāravanātha* Baltimore, 1919
- 67 Eng. trans. by C. H. Tawney, Calcutta, 1901
- 68 German trans. of Books I–III was made by W. Kirtel Leipzig, 1924 Italian trans. by A. Ballini in *Giornale della società Asiatica Italiana*, 1904–11, XVII–XIX, XXI–XXIV
- 69 Kuppaswami Sastri, ed., *Gadyacintāmani* (1902), *Kṣatracūdamanī* (1903) and *Jivandharā* (1905), Hiralal Hamtaraj, *Mrgāvācāntara* (1909) *Mahipālācāntara* (1909) and Mānikya Suri's *Yasodharacāntara* (1910)

- Gopinatha Rao, Vādirāja's *Yasodharacaritra* (1912), Raje Vijay, *Surasundaricanam* (1915), etc The *Yasasīlaka* and *Tīlakaṃaṇḍari* were ed in the *Kāvyaṃālā* series (1901-03)
- 70 ZDMG, XXXIV, 247-318, XXXV, 675 ff Leumann in ZDMG, XXXVII, 493 ff
- 71 Cf Hertel in *Festsache Jacobi*, 135 ff
- 72 *Giornale della società Asiatica Italiana*, III, 34-127
- 73 ZDMG, LXV, 1911, 1-51, 425-70, German trans by the same 1922
- 74 Cf Zachariae in *Kleine Schriften*, 65 ff
- 75 *Kāvyaṃālā* edn, 1890, Yaśovijaya Granthamālā, 1905, etc
- 76 *Ind Stud*, XIV, 959 ff, 376 ff ZDMG, XXXII, 509 ff
- 77 ZDMG, XXXIII, 445 ff
- 78 *Giornale della società Asiatica Italiana*, XXV, 167-297
- 79 ZDMG, XLIX LXI
- 80 *Die Dharmapariśā des Amitagati*, Leipzig 1903, cf R Pischel in ZDMG, LVIII, 1904, 363 ff
- 81 ZDMG, XXVIII, 185-262
- 82 *Giornale della società Asiatica Italiana* XXI, 123 ff
- 83 Alsdorf's *Apabhramsa Studien*, Leipzig, 1937 is fundamental for the study of later Jain literature Among the Apabhramsa Jain works the following may be noted *Sanatkumara-cantam* (ed., Jacobi, 1921), *Kīlasvarupa-kulakam* (L B Gandhi, 1927), *Vairāgyasāra* (Velankar, ABORI, 1928, 272-80), *Jasaharacarū* (P L Vaidya, 1931), *Saṃjamaṇḍari* (P D Gune, ABORI, I, 157-66), *Pāhuda-dohā* (H L Jain 1933), *Nayakumāracarū* (H L Jain, 1933), *Karakanda-carū* (H L Jain, 1934), *Paramapayāsu* (A N Upadhye, 1937), *Yogasāra* (A N Upadhye, 1937) *Mahāpurāṇa* of Puspadanta (P L Vaidya, 1937-41), *Paumacarū* of Svayambhū (H C Bhayani, 1953) etc
- 84 Also edited by Pavolini in *Giornale*, XIV, 1901 1-40
- 85 ZDMG, LX, 287 ff, 512 ff
- 86 *Sacred Books of the Jains*, vol II, Arrah The *Prasamaratiprakarana*, ascribed to Umāsvāmi, published in the appendix to K P Mody's edn of the *Tattvārtha*, was ed with a com and trans into Italian by A Ballini in *Giornale*, XXV, 1912, 117 ff XXIX, 1918-20, 61 ff Pūjyapāda Devanandin's commentary on Umāsvāmin's work *Sarvārthasiddhi* was published from Kolhapur in 1904, cf Jacobi in ZDMG, LX, 1906, 290
- 87 Siddhasena's *Sammatīlarkasūtra* was ed with Abhayadeva's com *Tattva bodhinī* in Yaśovijaya Jain Granthamālā no 13
- 88 *Giornale*, XXI, 223 ff
- 89 Ed by F L Pullee in *Giornale*, I 1888 47 ff, VIII 1895, 159 ff IX 1896 1 ff ed with Gunaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* by L Suali in *Bib Ind*, 1905 ff
- 90 Ed and trans into Italian by L Suali in *Giornale*, XVIII, 1905, 263 ff
- 91 N D Mirnov in *Festsache Garbe*, 37 ff
- 92 *Sacred Books of the Jains*, I V, VI, Arrah
- 93 *Journal Asiatique*, XIX, 231 ff
- 94 See E Hultsch in *Ind Ant*, XXXIX, 1910, 228, Jacobi in *Archiv für Religionsgeschichte*, XIII, 1910, 615 ff XVIII, 1915, 275-76
- 95 *SBF*, XXII
- 96 Cf 'On Mahāvīra and His Predecessors' in *Ind Ant*, IX, 1880, 158-63 It deals with the history of the Tirthankaras with special reference to Mahāvīra and his relation with Gośāla 'Some Aspects of Jainism' in *Jour Mahābodhi Society*, XII, 1914, 83-90 It demonstrates the independence of Jainism as a monastic religion and deals with the literature, religious and philosophical tenets and ethics of the Jains Among his other important articles mention should be made of 'On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jains'

- in *Trans Third Cong for the Hist of Rel II*, 59–66, Art. on Jainism in *ERE*, VII, 465 ff, in *Sitzungsberichte*, Berlin, 1929, 322 ff
- 97 Eng trans by J Burgess, *On the Indian Sect of the Jainas*, London, 1903
- 98 Jain Juhāsa Series, no I
- 99 In a broader sense and from an historical point of view Buddhism and Jainism cannot be dissociated from the entirety of the Hindu tradition. These were typical Hindu sects like many others of their kind, the only difference was that in course of time these two systems acquired new dimensions and a universal character
- 100 An important article published in 1910 was S C Vidyabhusana's 'Yasovijaya Ganī' in *Jour and Proc of the ASB*, VI, 465 ff which contained the life of Yasovijaya (1608–88), his works on logic and his criticism on logic as taught in Benares academies
- 101 'Die Religion des Jaina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus' in *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus* III, 113–40
- 102 Buddha und Mahāvira in *ibid*, IV (separate offprint, Munich, 1921)
- 103 I, 259 ff, see also Leumann in *Wiener Zeitschrift* III, 328–39
- 104 *Festschrift K F Johanson*, Goteborg, 1910, 20–38
- 105 *Ind Ant* XLI 1912, 296 ff
- 106 *Ibid*, 286–90
- 107 *Ibid*, 88 ff
- 108 *The Ājivikas History of their Religion and Philosophy*, pt I, Historical Summary, Calcutta, 1920, 'The Ājivikas' in *Journal of the Dept of Letters*, V (2), 1920, 1–80, A *History of the Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921
- 109 A thought-provoking review of this excellent work was made by W Schubring in *ZDMG*, CIV, 256–63
- 110 See J L Jaini, *A Review of the Heart of Jainism*, Ambala, 1925 O Pertold suggested that this chapter should be excluded from the book "I think this sentimental aspect is the least desirable in a modern religion which must go parallel with the fast development of sciences" *The Place and Importance of Jainism in the Comparative Science of Religions*, Bhavnagar, n.d., 21
- 111 Two important articles of this period dealing with the date of Lord Mahāvira should be mentioned in this connection, one by Jarl Charpenier in *Ind Ant*, XLIII, 1914, 118–23, 125–33, 167–78 and the other by S V Venkateswara in *JRAS*, 1917, 122–30
- 112 *Journal and Proc of the ASB*, XV, 123–36
- 113 Cf 'Atheism' (Jain) in *ERE*, II, 186–87, O Pertold, 'The Idea of God in Jainism and Buddhism in the Proceedings of the Tenth Indian Science Congress', Calcutta, 1924
- 114 Proceedings on the ASB, XVII, 1921
- 115 *Journal of the Dept of Letters*, 1921, 349–64
- 116 Vidyabhusana's *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, published in 1909, also dealt with the Jain logicians
- 117 Reference must also be made in this connection to the contribution of L Sualī who not only edited and translated into Italian numerous Jain philosophical treatises but also made a thought-provoking evaluation of Jain philosophy in his *Introduzione alla Studio della Filosofia Indiana*, Pavia, 1913
- 118 Reprinted in 1980 in two separate vols E Hultzsch's 'Die Digambaras von Mysore' in *ZDMG*, LXVIII, 1914, 695–700 should be mentioned in connection with southern Jainism Cf S K Aiyangar, *Some Contributions of South India to Indian Culture*, Calcutta, 1923, K P Jain, 'The Antiquity of Jainism in South India' in *Atmananda Centenary Commemoration vol*, 1936, B V Krishna Rao, 'Jainism in Andhradeśa' in *JAHRS*, XII, 185–96

- 119 From Cambridge another work came out in 1922, A J Sunavala's *Vijaya Dharma Surti, His Life and Work* with a prefatory note by F W Thomas
- 120 Gujarati trans, N J Paul, Bhavnagar, 1930
- 121 Among other works of C R Jain mention should be made of *Sanyāsa Dharma*, Delhi, 1926, *Key of Knowledge*, Allahabad, 1928, *Practical Dharma*, Allahabad, 1929, *Rsabha deva, The Founder of Jainism*, Allahabad, 1929, *Jain Penance*, Allahabad, 1930, *Householder's Dharma*, Bijnore, 1931, *Jain Culture*, Bijnore, 1934, *Change of Heart*, Delhi, 1939 J L Jain's *Bright Ones in Jainism* was published in 1926 from Allahabad
- 122 Critically reviewed by C Krause in *ZDMG*, LXXXIV, 192-202, Frauwallner in *Weimer Zeitschrift*, XXXVI, 336 ff
- 123 The Śvetāmbara Digambara split was discussed in most historical works on Jainism. See especially H Jacob's Digambaras in *I Rē*, IV, 704 and S Stevenson's Svetāmbara Sects in *LRI*, XII, 124, also K P Jain Svetāmbara and Digambara Sects in *Ind Ant*, LIX, 151-54, *Studies in Indology presented to P V Kane*, 1941, 228-37, P C Nahar in *Ind Ant* LVIII 167-68, LXI 121-26
- 124 Cf Bool Chand, Jainism in Kalinga Desa in *Acarya Dhruva Smāraka Grantha* 87-100 P L Paul, Jainism in Bengal in *Indian Culture*, III, 524-30 L A Phaladane, Light on Ancient Jain History in *Jain Gazette*, XXVIII, 186-90, K P Jain, Jainism under Muslim Rule in *New Indian Antiquary*, I 516-21
- 125 Eng trans by Wolfgang Beurlen, *The Doctrine of the Jinas* Delhi, 1962
- 126 For information on Jainism in Karnataka see also E P Rice, *History of Kanarese Literature*, London, 1921, S Srikantha Sastri, *Sources of the Karnataka History*, Mysore, 1940, R S Mugali, *The Heritage of Karnataka*, Bangalore, 1946
- 127 P C Nahar, *Jaina Lekha Samgraha*, 3 vols, Calcutta, 1928-29, K P Jain, *Prācīna Jaina Lekha Samgraha*, War dha, 1926, H L Jain, *Jaina Śīlālekha Samgraha*, Bombay, 1928, S C Diva kara, *Jaina Śāsana*, Benares, 1945, etc
- 128 Nathuram Premi, *Jaina Sūhitya aur Itihāsa*, Bombay, 1942, Jinavijaya, *Jaina Pustaka Prasasti Samgraha*, Bombay, 1943, K P Jain, *Hindī Jaina Sahitya kā Samkṣipta Itihāsa*, Benares, 1947
- 129 Cf K P Jain, *Bhagavan Mahāvira* Surat, 1924, etc
- 130 Cf Ramlalji, *Mahayana Vamsa Muk-tāvālī*, Bombay, 1910, etc
- 131 Cf K P Jain, *Samkṣipta Jaina Itihāsa* Surat, 1934 H L Jain, *Jaina Itihāsa kā Pūrva Pūthkā aur Hamārā Abhyut-thān*, Bombay, 1939 etc
- 132 Cf Kailash Chandra, *Jaina Dharma* Benares, 1946
- 133 K P Jain *Jaina Tirtha aur unki Yātrā*, Delhi, 1946 *Jaina Jāti ka Hrāsa aur Unnatī ke Upāya*, Aligarj, 1923, Anon, *Śrī Jaina Samskāra Vidhi* Bom bay, 1907 Śripalchandraji, *Jaina Sampradāya Śikṣā*, Benares, 1910 J K. Mukhtyar, *Jinapūjadhikāramīmāṃsa* Bombay, 1913, Sasui, *Sodasa Samskāra*, Calcutta 1924 Sita Prasad *Grhastha dharma* Bombay, 1930 Sphulinga, *Dessā Pūjadhikaru Viāra* Jabalpur, 1937
- 134 Among works of this category men- tion may be made of *Osavāla Jāti kā Itihāsa*, Osavala History Publishing House, Bhanpura, 1934 Jñana Sundarji, *Jaina Jāti Mahodaya*, Phalo-dhi, 1929, M G Kothari, *Jāti, Varna aur Vivāha*, Palitana, 1933 B L Jain, *Agravala Itihāsa*, Gujarati and Marathi
- 135 Phattelaji, *Jaina Vivāha Paddhati*, Bombay 1901, J N Mukhtyar *Vivāha kā Uddesya*, Bombay, 1916

- Vivāha Kṣetra Prākāśa*, Delhi, 1925, Savyasachi, *Jaina Dharma aur Vivahav Vivāha*, Delhi, 1931, P D Jain, *Vijāitya Vivāha Mīmāṃsā*, Calcutta, 1934, B T Kala, *Jaina Vivāha Paddhati aur Lokācāra*, Nandangaon, 1940
- 136 *Jaina Vivāha Vidhi*, Bhavnagar, 1904
- 137 His work on Jain poets, *Jaina Gurjara Kavio* was published from Bombay in 1926 A.P. Shah and G C Chowdhary's *Jain Sāhitya kī Brhad Itihāsa*, several vols, 1961 ff, J C Jain's *Prakṛt Sāhitya kī Itihāsa*, Varanasi, 1961, etc, should be mentioned in this connection
- 138 For archaeological sources see, *Epigraphia Carnatica*, ed by Lewis Rice, 12 vols, 1886-1904 Of these volumes vol II was entirely devoted to Sravana Belgola which was subsequently revised, enlarged and edited by R Narasimhachar (1923) and again in 1973 with an addition of 73 records by the Institute of Kannada Studies, University of Mysore *The Archaeological Survey of Mysore, Annual Reports* (Mysore Archaeological Series, 1886 ff) for the years 1906-09 (vol II), 1910 (vol III) and 1912 (vol IV) were revised under the title *A Study* by S Settar and published by the Dept of History and Archaeology, Karnataka University, Dharwar, 1976 There are also some Kannada works dealing with Jain inscriptions, M Cidanandamurti, *Kannada Sasanagala Samskṛta Adhyayana*, Mysore 1966, M M Kalaburgi, *Sāsana Vyāsāṅga*, Dharwar, 1974, *Dharwad Tāhukina Sāsana-gala*, Dharwar, 1976, etc
- 139 R S Muguli, *Kannada Sāhitya Carita*, Mysore, 1953, H M Nayak, ed., *Kannada Adhyayana Samstheya Kannada Sāhitya Carita*, Mysore, 1974-77, G S Shivarudrappa, ed., *Samagra Kannada Sāhitya Caritre*, Bangalore, 1974-78
- 140 Cf Annaraya Mirji, *Jaina Dharma*, Mysore, 1969, B V Sirur, *Sravana Belgola*, Dharwar, 1976, etc
- 141 B C Jain, *JBL*.
- 142 *DJ*, pp 73 ff
- 143 On the Canon and its history see Jacobi in the intro to his ed of *KSB*, pp 14 ff, and of the *SBE*, XXII, and XLV, Kapadia, *HCLJ*, Winternitz, *HIL*, II, pp 424-595
- 144 Ed Jacobi, 1882, Eng trans by the same, *SBE*, XXII, 1884, the first sec rev edn, ed Schubring, 1910 in *AKM*, XII, and trans in *WM*, pp 66-121
- 145 Eng trans by Jacobi in *SBE*, XLV, selected sections in German by Schubring in *WM*, ed, P L Vaidya, 1928, see Ghatage in *IHQ*, XII, pp 270-81
- 146 Ed in *Āg Sam*, III, 1880, with Sans and Prak Com, with Abhayadeva's com *ĀGS*, 1918-20
- 147 Ed in *Āg Sam*, IV, 1880, *ĀGS*, ed, 1918
- 148 Ed, *ĀGS*, 1918-21, 3 vols Weber in *MBA* (1865), pp 367-444 (1866), pp 155-352
- 149 Ed, *ĀGS*, 1916, cf P Steinthal and W Huemann in sec II
- 150 Ed and Eng trans, A F R Hoernle, *BI*, 1885-88, *ĀGS*, ed, 1920
- 151 Ed, *ĀGS*, 1920, Eng trans, Barnett, 1907
- 152 Ed, *ĀGS*, trans, Barnett, 1907
- 153 Ed, *ĀGS*, 1919, cf Weber in *IS*, XVI, pp 326 ff
- 154 Ed, *ĀGS*, 1920
- 155 The Uvargas were published, along with their commentaries, in *ĀGS* and *DLJP*; for studies in the Uvargas, see sec II
- 156 The *ĀGS* edn contains all the surviving Pannas, for studies in this branch of literature, see sec II
- 157 A defective trans of *KSB* by Stevenson appeared in 1848, critical ed by Jacobi (1879) and trans in *SBI*, XXII, for editions of and studies in other Cheyasutras, esp for those by Schubring, see sec II

- 158 The *Uttarādhyayana* was ed with critical notes and a com by J Charpenuer in *AI O*, XVIII (1922) and trans by Jacobi in *SBC*, XLV Other Mūlasūtras were ed and studied mainly by Leumann
- 159 Fd in *AGS*, 1924
- 160 For details about the Pannas, Cheyasūtras, Mūlasūtras and other texts see Schubring, *DJ*, pp 107 ff, Winternitz, *HIL*, II, pp 458 ff
- 161 Most of their works were published in *MCDG* and *DIIP* series See Buhler in *IA*, VII, pp 28 ff Guermot, *RD*, pp 81 ff, Charpenuer in *ZDMG* LXX, pp 219 ff, Klau in *IA*, XI, pp 245 ff, Jacobi's intro to *KSB*, pp 10 ff, Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp 164 ff
- 162 There are at least eight Hanbhadras See Muni Kalyānavijaya's intro of *Dharmasamgrahāni* Bombay, 1918 Jacobi's *Sanatkumāracarita*, VIII, *Samarāṅgacāhāṇī*, IV-XVIII Klau in *IA*, XI, pp 247 ff, Glasenapp, *DJ*, pp 107 ff
- 163 See Upadhye in *NIA*, II, pp 132 ff Saletoore in *JBHS*, VI, pp 10-33
- 164 Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp 164 ff
- 165 Ed, A.N. Upadhye, Bombay, 1937
- 166 Ed, H.L. Jain, 1932-33
- 167 Ed, H.D. Velankar in *ABORI*, 1928, pp 272-80
- 168 Fd, H.C. Bhayani, 1953
- 169 The first two ed by P.L. Vaidya (1931-41) while the third one by H.L. Jain 1933
- 170 Ed, H.L. Jain, 1934
- 171 Portion ed and pub by Jacobi, 1921
- 172 Ed by L.P. Tessitori in *GSAI*, XXV, 1912, pp 162-292
- 173 Its *Meghadūta* portion was trans into Eng by K.B. Pathak, 1894
- 174 Fd, with Gr trans by Jacobi in *JS* XIV, pp 359 ff
- 175 See Winternitz, *HIL*, II, pp 486 ff
- 176 Ghaughe in *ABORI*, XVI, pp 38 ff
- 177 Ed with intro etc by Muni Jinavijaya in *GOS*, XIV, 1920, and trans by Alsdorf, Hamburg, 1929
- 178 Ed, Gnerison in *IA*, LI, pp 13 ff, LII, pp 2 ff, LVI, pp 1 ff LVII, pp 21 ff
- 179 Ed with two coms in *AGR*, X, 1912
- 180 Ed, P.L. Vaidya, 1936 His *Desnāma mālā* was first ed with critical notes, glossary and a historical intro by M Banerjee, 1931 and P Ramanuja swami, 1938
- 181 Ed, L.B. Gandhi *GOS*, XXXVII, 1927
- 182 A section of this work was ed with notes by Jacobi, 1921
- 183 Fd P.D. Gune, *ABORI*, I, pp 157-66
- 184 Ed Hargobindas and Becharadas Bhavnagar, 1914
- 185 Fd, N.G. Kurtane, Bombay, 1879
- 186 Fd, Muni Indravijaya, Benares 1911
- 187 Ed, Buhler in *JS*
- 188 Text and trans J Hartel, *ZDMG* LXV, pp 1-51, 425-47
- 189 *JBORS*, XXIII, pp 130-32 pls I-IV
- 190 Marshall *MIC*, I, pl X, a-d
- 191 Shah, *SJA*, pp 8-9
- 192 *EJ*, II, p 243
- 193 Buhler, *ISJ* app Vogel, *MMC*, pp 41-43, 66-82
- 194 Shah, *SJA* p 13
- 195 Ibid
- 196 *ARASI*, 1905-06, pp 98, 166
- 197 Ibid, 1925-26, pp 125 ff
- 198 Shah, *SJA*, pp 14-15
- 199 *DHB*, I, p 410
- 200 Fleet *CJI*, III, p 66
- 201 Shah, *SJA*, p 16
- 202 Jouveau Dubreuil in *IA*, LII, pp 45-47
- 203 Shah, *SJA* pp 16-17
- 204 Sankalia in *RDCRI*, I, pp 185 ff
- 205 Shah, *SJA* pp 17-18
- 206 Brown, *IABH*, p 64
- 207 Fergusson, *HFEA*, II, pp 19 ff
- 208 Cousens, *SMTK*, pp 50 ff
- 209 Cunningham, *ASR*, IX, p 31
- 210 *ARASI*, 1925-26, p 15
- 211 Ibid
- 212 Fergusson, *HFEA*, II, p 50
- 213 *EC*, II, pp 10-23, trans 89, pl 1
- 214 Fergusson, *HFEA*, II, pp 36-44

- 215 Shah, *SJA*, pp 22-4
 216 Ferugusson, *HIEA*, II, pp 27-33
 217 *Ibid.*, p 69
 218 I p 51
 219 VI, pp 243 ff, VIII, pp 339 ff
 220 *IA*, III, pp 153-8, *FC*, II, pp 1 ff
 221 Rice, *MCI*, pp 2-10, Narasimha-
 char, *ISB*, pp 16 ff
 222 *IA*, XXI, pp 156 ff, *EI*, pp 22-4, 339
JRAS, 1909, p 23
 223 Bhandarkar, *Report*, p 124, Hoernle
 in *IA*, XX, pp 341-61, XXI, pp
 57-84
 224 *II*, II, p 274, *ZDMG*, XLVI, p 91
 225 *VI*, pp 89 ff
 226 Konow in *AO*, I, pp 14-42 Jayaswal
 in *JBORS*, III-IV Luder's *List*, 1345
 Barua in *IHQ*, XIV, pp 459-85
 227 Smith, *JSAM*, pp 10 ff, Buhler in
WZKM I, pp 165-80, II, 141-6, III,
 pp 293-40 IV, pp 169-73, pp 313-
 31, V, pp 53-63, 175-80
 228 *II*, II, p 243, B C Law in *MASI*, LX,
 pp 3, 12 ff, 20
 229 Sankalra, *AG*, pp 47-53
 230 *ARASI*, 1905-06 p 98
 231 *Ibid.*, 1925-26, pp 125 ff
 232 *CHI*, III, pp 258-60
 233 *Ibid.*, p 66
 234 *II*, XX pp 59 ff
 235 Saleore, *MJ*, p 10
 236 *MAR*, 1925, p 91
 237 *SI* p 387
 238 *MAR*, 1921, p 19
 239 *FC*, VII, p 139
 240 *Ibid.*, pp 6, 17, 21
 241 *Ibid.*, II, pp 25-6
 242 *MJ*, pp 15-16
 243 *EC*, X, pp 172-3
 244 *Ibid.*, pp 171-2
 245 *Ibid.*, IV, p 135
 246 *MAR*, 1923, pp 240-1
 247 *IA*, VI, p 27
 248 *Ibid.*, p 25, VII, pp 36-8
 249 *Ibid.*, VI, p 27
 250 *Ibid.*, pp 31-2
 251 *Ibid.*, VII, pp 34-5
 252 *EC*, II, pp 27 ff
 253 *MAR*, 1921, p 31, *FC*, II, p 8
 254 *JBRAS*, XXII, p 85
 255 Rangacharya, *TL*, I, p 289
 256 *EC*, II, p 63 XII, p 92
 257 *IA*, XII, p 112
 258 *EC*, VII, pp 95-6
 259 Rice, *MCI*, p 74
 260 *FC*, VII, pp 95-6
 261 For details of the inscriptions of the
 Hoysalas and other dynasties men-
 tioned above see Saleore, *MJ*, pp
 6-86
 262 *Ibid.* pp 86-100
 263 Narasimhachari, *EC*, II, pp 10-23
 trans p 89, nos 175-6, 179
 264 *IA*, XI, p 248
 265 *Ibid.*
 266 Nahar, *JLS*, III, p 164
 267 *SBF*, XLV, xx-xxx1
 268 *Uttarādhyayana*, XXIII
 269 Āyāra, *SBL*, XXII, p 192
 270 *Ibid.*, p 226
 271 *CHI*, I, p 151
 272 *SBL*, XXII, pp 286-95
 273 Glasenapp, *Dj*, pp 346-9
 274 Guerinot, *RD*, pp 48-62

CHAPTER TWO

The Incipient Stage

THE PREHISTORY OF JAINISM

The Jains believe that theirs is the oldest religion, the ideas and practices of which were developed in the hands of twenty-four Tīrthamkaras who are known by the following names—Rṣabhadeva or Ādinātha, Ajitanātha, Sambhavanātha, Abhinandana, Sumatinātha, Padmaprabha, Supārśvanātha, Candraprabha, Suvidhinātha, Śītanātha, Śreyāmsanātha, Vasupūjya, Vimalanātha, Anantanātha, Dharmanātha, Śāntinātha, Kunthunātha, Aranātha, Mallinātha, Munisuvrata, Naminātha, Neminātha or Aristanemi, Pārśvanātha, and Mahāvīra. According to the Jain belief, it was Rṣabhadeva, the first Tīrthamkara, who taught men seventy-two arts and women sixty-four, and also initiated them into the Jain way of life. His example was followed by other Tīrthamkaras. In the hands of the last two Tīrthamkaras, Pārśva and Mahāvīra, the traditional knowledge derived from their spiritual ancestors assumed new form and colour. None of them claimed to be the founder of any system. They were great reformers who modified the essentials of the existing religion evidently to meet the demand of their ages.

This tradition of twenty-four Tīrthamkaras must have a historical basis. A section of the modern scholars doubts about the historicity of the earlier Tīrthamkaras. The fantastic exaggeration by which the earlier Tīrthamkaras were characterised in Jain literature must have contributed to the growth of such suspicion. But to characterise them simply as mythical involves the risk of an over-simplified approach towards the problem. There is no reason to disbelieve in the historical probability of the existence of a 'succession of teachers'. Rather, from a critical study of the growth of Indian religio-philosophical ideas, we can come to the definite conclusions that outside the pale of Vedic culture and religion, especially in Eastern India, the pre-Vedic and non-Vedic ideas had a vigorous survival, that there were persons (among whom the earlier

Tirthankaras and the predecessors of the Buddha might have belonged), and institutions fighting for the cause of their survival and development and that some of the pre-Vedic ideas and practices were revived by the Buddha and Mahāvīra in the reformistic movements launched by them.

In 1934, R.P. Chanda, drew the attention of the scholars towards the pre-Vedic elements revived by the Buddha and Mahāvīra in their own religious systems. In many of his works he has also pointed out that the practices of meditation and disciplining of the body and mind, by which Buddhism and Jainism are characterised and which have later become the basis of yoga, are basically non-Vedic in character. As one of the sources of this understanding he has referred to the famous statuette from Mohenjo-daro which is laid out in yogic posture with half-shut eyes and also to the seals indicating the same practice. Long before Chanda, H. Jacobi came to the conclusion that 'the interest of Jainism to the student of religion consists in the fact that it goes back to a very early period, and to primitive currents of religious and metaphysical speculation which gave rise to the oldest Indian philosophies—Sāṃkhya and Yoga—and to Buddhism. It shares in the theoretical pessimism of these systems as also in their practical ideal—liberation. Life in the world, perpetuated by the transmigration of the soul, is essentially bad and painful, therefore it must be our aim to put an end to the cycle of births, and this will be accomplished when we come into the possession of right knowledge. In this general principle Jainism agrees with Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Buddhism, but they differ in their methods of realising it.'¹

More interesting is, however, the evidence furnished by the elaborate mythology of the Buddhists and the Jains. The gods and goddesses by which it is characterised have practically nothing to do with the Vedic pantheon. Although the names of some of the Vedic gods occur in the Buddhist and Jain lists of divinities, their character and attributes are quite different. They have been deprived of their original glamour and represented as ardent devotees of the Buddhas and the *jinas*. So far as other deities are concerned, we have some questions and doubts. Whence have they come? Where their origin is to be traced? How were they able to make their way into such basically atheistic religions as Buddhism or Jainism? The obvious answer is that they belonged to a pre-Vedic system and survived in the bright days of Vedic religion as the suppressed

divinities of the masses. With the growth of such anti-Vedic religions as Buddhism or Jainism, these suppressed deities came to the forefront once again, and they were given shelter and nourishment, for practical reasons, by the supporters of anti-Vedism. In this connection we may refer to the *yaksas*, *rāksasas* and *nāgas*, the pre-Vedic divinities,² whose cults were revived by the followers of Buddhism and Jainism.

Here we may take a very interesting example. In the epics and Purāṇas in which the Vedic religious and cultural traditions are zealously upheld, the *rāksasas* are depicted as terrible beings and dangerous enemies, regarded as the embodiment of all evil and treated with much opprobrium and insult. But the very term by which they were designated has a different significance. The root *rakṣa* from which the term *rāksasa* has been derived denotes a *protector*. Thus the *rāksasa* is one who protects. Were they the protectors of the indigenous beliefs, cults and rituals from the encroaching hands of an alien religious system? The facts about their material culture and social institutions, their religious beliefs and practices, their adherence to certain moral values and the favours and privileges they used to obtain from the non-Vedic Śiva and Devī, as we find in these texts, obviously lead us to such a conclusion. The most striking fact about their activities is that they were opposed to the sacrificial religion of the Vedas. In every case we find them destroying the Vedic sacrifices and creating havoc among their participants. They did not even hesitate to kill the sages. When Ghatotkaca, the son of Bhīma by a *rāksasī*, sacrificed his life in favour of the Pāṇḍavas in the Bhārata war, Kṛṣṇa, the friend, philosopher and guide of the Pāṇḍavas, did not hide his feeling of joy. He was so pleased and excited that he began to dance like an irresponsible person, although Ghatotkaca was the son of his friend. When Kṛṣṇa was questioned about this unseemly behaviour, he categorically replied that he was indeed happy because Ghatotkaca, though begotten by his friend, was basically a *rāksasa*, and as such was a great enemy of the Vedic way of life and of the sacrificial cult.³ It is therefore evident that such declared enemies must receive an honourable position in the anti-Vedic systems like Buddhism or Jainism.

The cult of the primitive Mother Goddesses was also revived in the Buddhist and Jain pantheon for the same reason.⁴ The popularity of these goddesses among the agricultural peoples and that of

the rituals by which they were characterised—the so-called primitive Tāntric undercurrent—was responsible for making their way into the disintegrating phase of Vedic religion and also into what is known as Purāṇic Hinduism. The Buddhist *tārādevīs* and other female divinities, the Jain *mātrkāś*, *vidyādevīs*, *śāśanadevatās*, *yoginīs* etc., all came from a primitive religious complex marked by the popular cult of the Female Principle. Although basically Buddhism or Jainism had nothing to do with the cult of the Female Principle, the reason of its acceptance by the Buddhists and Jains evidently lay in their functional role in the religious history of India.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The material mode of life of a people ordinarily provides the rationale for the type of deity and the manner of worship prevalent in a given society. The food-gathering economy provided the sole source of livelihood open to any human society during the major period of its early history. This period of gathering economy is called Palaeolithic or Old Stone age, the archaeological remains of which have been noticed in different parts of India. 'Before the adoption of agriculture and herding, when a precarious existence was eked out on the chase and edible fruits, roots and berries, the animal and vegetable species which formed his staple diet acquired a sacred character and significance. With this he endeavoured to establish efficacious relations through a prescribed ritual procedure performed by experts in carefully secluded sanctuaries set apart for the purpose in the awe-inspiring surroundings and conditions calculated to produce a sense of the numinous'.¹⁵ Very probably these peoples grasped the generative function of women, and sought magically to extend it to the animals and plants that nourished them. This has been proved by the plentiful discovery of palaeolithic female figurines in bone, ivory and stone with the maternal organs grossly exaggerated.

Nothing specific, however, can be said about the Palaeolithic and Neolithic Mother Goddess of India, simply because the data are much too meagre, but a study of the surviving tribal religions and of the tribal survivals as found in the Hindu religion in general naturally provides us with a clue to the understanding of the degree and extent of the Palaeolithic and Neolithic cults. The Neolithic cultures of India, though not corresponding to a fixed period of

time, at least in the economic sense, are so far indicated by the stone tools bearing unmistakable signs of polish found in many districts of India. The religious beliefs and practices of the food gatherers were modified according to the new social ideas introduced by the Neolithic revolution. Agricultural rituals were added to those connected with hunting. Burial of the dead was done with more pomp and social effort. The dead so reverently deposited to the earth and was probably brought in relation to the existing Mother Goddess cult, the Earth Mother thus becoming the guardian of the dead, connected alike with the corpse and the seed-corn beneath the earth.⁶

The discovery of copper and bronze brought the urban revolution which was initiated in the alluvial valleys of the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Indus about five thousand years ago, with the transformation of some river-side villages into cities. The Zhob and Kulli sites have furnished a fair number of terracotta figurines in which we recognise the earliest embodiment of Indian Mother Goddess. To some extent the Zhob and Kulli cultures appear to coincide with each other in certain phases of development and to overlap in their latest phases with the Harappan culture of the Indus Valley. Remains of Harappan settlements stretch from Makran coast to Kathiawar and northwards to the Himalayan foothills and what impresses the observer is the *complete uniformity* among the objects found in this vast area which implies the existence of a strong and centralised authority regulating the life and activities of the people over this extensive region.⁷

Marshall⁸ laid stress upon a common cultural bond between the Indus Valley and the West especially in the field of religion. Many of the living features of later Hindu religion and philosophy can also be traced directly to this pre-Vedic source, and in this connection we may refer to the principles of Tantrism, the philosophical Sāṃkhya, the practice of yoga, some ingredients of Buddhism and Jainism and the present day Śākism. The Mother Goddess figurines, scenes on seals and ritual objects, notably large stone *lingas* and *yonis* give glimpses of Tāntric survivals, of magic fertility rites that formed the basis of primitive Tantrism, and of personal deities arising out of them. In popular Hinduism *linga* and *yoni* (male and female organs) stand for Śiva and Devī, and the prototype of the former is found in seals unearthed at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. Provided with horns, on the head and in one instance surrounded

by animals, the three-faced male god, who is seated in the posture of *yogin* on several seals, may rightly be regarded as the prototype of the Indian god Śiva, the consort of the Mother Goddess. In later Śāktism as well as in the Sāmkhya, this male principle is nothing but a passive spectator. *Prakṛti* or Śakti, the Female Principle, is all in all. Referring to the anomalous position of the male principle in the Sāmkhya, Śāṅkara asked *kathaṇcodāsīnah puruṣarpradhānam pravartayet?* If creation is made possible by the union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, how is that the role of *puruṣa* is so insignificant? Or, if the *puruṣa* is so insignificant and indifferent, how is it that he takes so important a part in the affair of creation? This contradiction cannot be explained except by postulating a matriarchal i.e., very primitive origin of the Sāmkhya system.⁹ The dualistic Sāmkhya conception of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, especially the conception of material *prakṛti* as the cause of the universe has nothing to do with the Vedic conception of an immaterial *brahman* which was developed in the Upanisads and further elaborated in the Vedāntic speculations.

The Vedic tribes that subsequently came into prominence were not basically agriculturists. They lived predominantly on pastoralism, reckoning wealth in cows and horses. In fact, out of 10,462 verses of the *Rgveda*,¹⁰ only 25 refer to agriculture, and significantly enough, 22 out of the said 25 verses belong to the later portion of the *Rgveda*.¹¹ Side by side the importance attached to the possession of cattle is shown in numerous passages. The word *go* denoting the cow is used as one of the synonyms of *pṛthivī*, the earth. According to the *Nighantu*,¹² nine other terms were also used to denote the cow. Even in the *Rgveda*, the gods are invoked as offsprings of the cows,¹³ and the poets did not hesitate to compare their songs with the lowing of the cows¹⁴ or to designate the starry heaven after the term *gāvah*.¹⁵ "Again and again in the songs and invocations of the gods the prayer for cattle and horses occurs. Also the strife amongst hostile aboriginal inhabitants turns on the possession of cattle. Therefore, too, the old word for 'war' or 'battle' is originally desire for the cattle (*gavisti*). In most extravagant expressions, cows and bullocks are praised as the most precious possessions."¹⁶

The religion of the *Rgveda* is therefore patriarchal, a reflection of the society of the pastoral warriors. The pastoral tribes require greater courage and hardihood than the agricultural, and also an efficient leadership to protect the cattle. So the cult of the heroes and ancestors attains its highest degree of development among the

pastorals The herder in his nomadic life has to live under the scorching heat of the sun, the dreadful thunders, the devastating storms So his religion is mainly connected with the sky, in which astral and nature myths, often personified in secondary gods and godlings, make their appearance The Supreme Being of the pastoral religion is generally identified with the sky-god who rules over other deities like the headman of a patriarchal joint family This was also a new religion which was gradually adopted by the Vedic tribes in their pastoral stage of development But still they could not give up the religious practices of their pre-pastoral life In fact, they propitiated the deities of the pastoral religion with pre-pastoral rituals, of which animal sacrifice was obviously the most important Two of the *Rgvedic* hymns,¹⁷ later used to be recited in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifices, show the real nature of the early Vedic rituals The animal, to be killed, was identified with some deities It was anointed and then cut to pieces Its flesh was cooked and a limp was offered to fire Then it was eaten up by the participants of the sacrifice in the midst of such utterings as *āghu*, *yājyā*, *vasatkāra*.

The Vedic tribes found it hard to vanquish the existing non-Vedic tribes whom they used to call *datya*, *dānava*, *asura*, *pisāca*, *rāksasa*, *barbara*, *dasyu*, etc The contact with these non-Vedic peoples, living mainly on agriculture, brought some significant changes in the religious outlook of the Vedic tribes, traces of which are found in post-*Rgvedic* literature The purely pastoral economy of the Vedic tribes eventually declined, owing to their adoption of agriculture and some agricultural cults and rituals, but the patriarchal social organisation and patrilinear inheritance were retained These traits are historical realities which can be identified, traced and documented, and as an undifferentiated cultural complex originally stood in opposition to the existing one of the pre-Vedic root with which it was in constant conflict In course of time, however, a synthesis took place, some of the pre-Vedic elements gradually working their way into the practices of the dominant society A few of them were absorbed, while others were never legitimized by the sacred texts in spite of their prevalence Needless to say that Buddhism and Jainism drew much from them

The pastoral economy of the Vedic peoples, when supplemented by agriculture, created a condition of rapid class division The simple productive magics of the earlier age, which characterised the primitive Vedic *yajñas* and consisted of the performance

like the collective eating rituals enumerated above, became class oriented. With the change in the technique of production, although the pre-class tribal societies degenerated, magical practices did not die, but their purpose began to change. In the first stage the change was quantitative. To the old magical practices inherited from their hunting stage were added many rituals, mainly sexual in character, derived from the existing agricultural tribes. In the next stage the change was qualitative, as in class societies primitive magic transformed itself into the esoteric art of the ruling or privileged class. Now we have Grand Sacrifices, sponsored by the rich and ruling class and conducted by a formidable array of priests, divided into four groups. And with the growth of organised priesthood and mechanical sacerdotalism, the sacrifice of cattle became a senseless source of destruction of the cattle wealth. Cattle had to be killed on numerous occasions. The Āśvamedha sacrifice alone required as many as 600 bulls to be slaughtered.

The production of surplus prepared the ground for the rise of urban settlements. Trade was facilitated in which cattle served as the best means of exchange. The new condition did not encourage such senseless destruction of cattle wealth. In spite of a new religious set up, the old pre-pastoral rituals did not sink into oblivion, and the priestly class was not mentally ready to give up their traditional rituals. The Brahmanical religious practices did not suit the new condition. The Brahmanical attitude towards trade was not helpful. The real economic cause of the disintegration of tribal society, the rise of new social forces and economic classes and the growth of states on the ruins of the pre-class tribal equality did not escape the notice of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. They had to face the dual requirements of their age and had to act practically as the unconscious tools of history. On the one hand, they had to offer to the oppressed peoples of their times a suitable illusion of ancient tribal communism which was getting trampled and undermined in reality, and on the other, to boost up some of the progressive features of the already established class society in public life and rescue some of the beneficial aspects of tribal life in a class society.

MATERIAL BASIS OF THE GREAT INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT

A. L. Basham while dealing with the history of the Ājīvikas suggested that the doctrines of Gośāla, Pūrāṇa and Pakudha were aspects of a

single body of teaching.¹⁸ To us it, however, appears that this holds good in the case of all of their contemporaries, including the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Specifically their views may be different, but generically they belong to the same category. It was due to the fact that the Buddha, Mahāvīra and their contemporaries belonged to the same age and the same region and they responded and reacted, in their own ways, which were more or less similar, to the same stimuli arising out of the stupendous socio-political transformation which was taking place in eastern India in their time.

The Buddha and Mahāvīra were born in an age when the *janapadas* (tribal settlements) were developing into *mahā-janapadas* (bigger confederacies) leading to the rise of organised states. Already four *mahā-janapadas* became distinguished as powerful states, and the forces behind the subsequent Magadhan imperialism could be seen. Mahāvīra, as we have seen above, was known as *vesāhe* (Vaiśālīya).¹⁹ Vaiśālī was a tribal settlement belonging to a confederation of tribes collectively known by the name of the Vajjis. Mahāvīra's maternal uncle, Cetaka, was the leader of this Vajjian confederacy. The rise of Magadhan state power was really a natural threat to the survival of this Vajjian confederacy of tribes. The growth of Magadhan state power required annihilation of many a tribal settlement. Bimbisāra, the first powerful Magadhan king who was a senior contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, did not hesitate to annex the settlements of the Angas and the Kāśīs, while his son and successor Ajātaśatru launched a vigorous invasion against the Vajjian confederacy. The tremendous bloodshed and massacre caused by this invasion did not escape the notice of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. The Śākya tribe, to which the Buddha himself belonged, was annihilated by the Kośalan prince Vidudabha, and this happened before the very eyes of the Buddha.

The rise of class society and state power in eastern India in the sixth century B.C. through immense bloodshed and wholesale massacre was undoubtedly the culmination of a historical process. The cause of this rise should be attributed to the production of immense social surplus and its accumulation in the hands of a few. From the Upanisadic legends we come to know of the fact that kings like Janaka were able to spend many thousands, of cows for getting assurance of immortality from renowned teachers like Yājñavalkya and others. This shows the fantastic extent of social wealth that was accumulated in the hands of a few. This accumula-

tion of surplus could be caused only in two ways, either by forcible exploitation of labour or by a revolutionary change in the mode of production. R S Sharma believes that this change was due to the introduction of iron implements in the field of production.²⁰ So long as the mode of production cannot yield surplus, the integration of tribal society remains intact, but when a revolutionary change in that mode takes place, it also changes the existing social values and relations, giving rise to the growth of a non-productive privileged class. In order to look after the interest of this privileged class, laws are enacted, police and military systems are introduced—in other words, the conception of state becomes materialised. This did not escape the notice of the Buddha as is proved by his discourse on the origin of the state.²¹

The contemporaries of the Buddha and Mahāvīra were overwhelmed by the stupendous social transformation of the age, the collapse of the tribal institutions, the rise of new values ushered in by the state-power and the new forces of injustice and untruth—and they tried to understand the problems in their own way. Overwhelmed by bloodshed and massacre, Pūrāṇa and Pakudha thought that there was no difference between merit and demerit, between violence and non-violence. Ajita could not distinguish between the fool and the wise, for both were doomed to death, and Sañjaya preferred to keep himself silent since the deeply ingrained faiths behind the ideas were all uprooted. Gośāla, the leader of the Ājīvikas, became a fatalist who was forced to believe that human activity could do nothing to change the course of events. Everything appeared to him to have been determined by forces of fate or destiny. He died of despair and madness, pining in his delirium for the last drink (*carṃe pāṇe*), the last song (*carṃe geye*), the last dance (*carṃe natte*), and the last greetings (*carṃe añjalikamme*)—characteristics of simple undifferentiated tribal life. Thus from his death-bed he could only advise to his follower to play on the lute, quite consistent for a man who saw the whole world he stood for fallings to pieces before his very eyes.²²

It is against this background that the Buddha's sayings concerning human misery should be read. Overwhelmed by the stupendous social transformation and wholesale bloodshed of the times the Buddha said: 'I behold the rich in the world, of the goods which they have acquired, in their folly they give nothing to others, they eagerly heap riches together and further they go in their pursuit of

enjoyment. The king, although he may have conquered the kingdoms of the earth, although he may be ruler of all land this side the sea, up to the ocean's shore, would still insatiate, covet that which is beyond the sea. The princes, who rule kingdoms, rich in treasure and wealth, turn their greed against one another pandering insatiably to their desires. If these acts thus restlessly swimming in the stream of impermanence carried along by greed and carnal desire, who then can walk on earth in peace?'²³

We have already had the occasion to refer to the economic significance of the doctrines of *ahimsā*. But why the Buddha and Mahāvīra laid so much emphasis upon the complete acceptance of the doctrine of non-violence as a distinct way of life can be perfectly understood if the aforesaid facts of their age be taken into account. Although Mahāvīra differed from Gośāla and the Buddha in many respects, the ruthless form of exploitation and misery of his age roused in him the same feeling shared by his illustrious contemporaries. Like the Buddha, Mahāvīra also established the Samgha or 'community of the brethren' which was evidently modelled on the pattern of tribal democracies and meant to be the *ideal substitute for a vanished way of life*. How thoroughly the tribal model was imitated can be understood if we take into account the Jain rules relating to the procedure of entry into the Order, the internal administration of the Order, and the personal or private property within the Order. The head of the Jain Samgha was known as *ganadhara*, 'he who holds the tribe'. In building up his own Samgha on the model of pre-class society Mahāvīra, like the Buddha, took great care to see that the members therein would live a perfectly detached life, i.e., detached from the great historic transformation going on in the society at large, *whose course was obviously beyond their power to change*. This explains why Mahāvīra believed in action but the purpose of which was to get rid of all actions. Every action, according to him, produces *karma*, and thus entails on the doer the continuance of worldly existence. To get rid of all *karma* being the highest goal, what is therefore required is to annihilate the existing *karma* and to prevent the formation of new *karma*, technically speaking to stop the influx (*āsrava*) of *karma*, which is called *samvara* or the covering of the channels through which *karma* finds entrance into the soul. The true significance of this complex idea is not now difficult to understand. According to Mahāvīra, when a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance with the rules of right conduct,

the actions thus produced lasts but for a moment, and is then annihilated. As regards the Jain rules of right conduct, Mahāvīra followed his predecessor Pārśva who spoke of four *vratas*—not to kill, not to lie, not to steal, and not to be interested in worldly things like property—to which he added a fifth, viz, not to be indulged in sensual pleasure. The four rules of right conduct, prescribed by Pārśva, were simply the moral values of tribal society which were ruthlessly undermined in the age of the Buddha and Mahāvīra.

THE CONFLICTS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN THOUGHT

In view of what we have said above it has become quite clear that the origin of Buddhism and Jainism cannot be ascribed to any single cause, though the material milieu of their growth can be understood. The real cause of their rise evidently lay in the *conflicts*—political, economic, social, religious and intellectual—which had characterised the pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain history of India.

What was the nature of such conflicts, the ultimate culmination of which was manifested in Jainism and Buddhism in the form of a great qualitative change? As we have hinted above, in our known history of India, the first conflict was between the Vedic and non-Vedic elements, the former representing a predominantly pastoral culture, and the latter, a predominantly agricultural. These two streams had also their own *inner* conflicts. We have seen that in Vedic society there was a conflict between the pre-pastoral and the advanced pastoral ideas. The Nature-gods of the pastoral religion were propitiated with pre-pastoral rituals of their hunting stage which demanded senseless destruction of cattle wealth. But within the tribal set up the protestants were not successful. The results of the conflict with the non-Vedic elements have been mentioned above.

In the second stage, the conflict was between tribal disintegration and the rise of state power. The inherent tendency of pastoral economy is to establish the basis of state-power, since accumulation of wealth and surplus in the hands of few become quickened by cattle-raids and wars. The conquered non-Vedic tribes, though some of their cultural features were adopted by the conquerors, formed the exploited working class which led to a quick rise of class division. The principles of the newly evolved state powers had to come in a greater conflict with the pre-existing ones. The primitive

magicians on whose ritual performances rested the welfare of the tribe were organised into a solid priestly class and became a parallel institution in power and prestige. In many cases their power surpassed even that of the state. The simple rituals performed in the days of yore became complex, sophisticated and highly expensive with the growth of this organised priesthood. Thus, conflict between the priestly and royal power became inevitable.

At first the kings had to submit before the demands of the priestly class, but with the growth and consolidation of state power, for practical reasons, the ruling class thought it prudent to depend more on the wealth produced socially than on the magical powers of the Brāhmanas. The Upanisads contain evidence of this conflict. Here we find on the one hand the flattering glorification of the sacrificial cults, the supremacy of the *brahman*, and on the other, a consistent attempt, made mainly by the ruling class, to uphold the doctrine of one state, one god, one king. The *brahman* as the universal soul and its identification with *ātman*, the individual soul, paved the way for the idea of a Supreme Being, the personal deity in the devotional religions. In fact, monotheism was the fulfilment of a process that began as early as the days of tribal disintegration. The idea of a supreme god ruling over the universe was based solely upon the newfangled principle of absolute monarchy. In pre-class societies men had control over the gods, they believed that they could bring the forces of nature under their control by collective rituals and other performances. In class society this belief was shattered to pieces, the gods represented the ruling class, to be pleased only by propitiation and devotion, and monotheism was the logical consequence of this process. Side by side, the king was conceived as the human prototype of the Supreme Being of monotheism. This is frankly stated in the *Gītā*.

The impact of all these evidently fell on the doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism. We have said that at a critical stage of Indian history, when the free tribes were being ruthlessly exterminated by the expanding state powers the Buddha and Mahāvīra modelled their Samghas on the basic principles of tribal society in order to provide the peoples of their times with the *illusion* of a lost *reality*, of the dying tribal collective. But at the same time both of these great teachers had to face the *dual requirements* of their age, and this alone explains why a considerable number of the contemporary aristocrats and princes formed their front rank associates. That is why

Buddhism and Jainism had given moral support to the interests of the trading class and accepted the new social requirements in which debtors and slaves could not run away from their obligations, animals could no longer be killed indiscriminately and private property could not be appropriated. In early Buddhism and Jainism, it should be remembered, celibacy is stressed. The prohibitions on sexual relations outside marriage were due to the overwhelming demand of private property, to make sure of the ancestry of the child. In Brāhmanical religion the trading class was assigned the third place in society, but the Buddha's and Mahāvīra's attitude towards caste system raised their social status. Likewise their emphasis on the barrenness of the sacrificial religion saved the new economic classes from unnecessary expenditure.

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS

The aforesaid material conditions undoubtedly gave birth to a large mass of 'heretic' or 'heterodox' philosophy outside the pale of Brahmanism in the days of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Besides the Buddhist and Jain sources, we have to mention the Upanisads²¹ themselves and also the later *Māndūkyakārikā*²² and the Pāñcarātra texts like the *Ahīrbudhnya Samhitā*²³ as the available materials which refer to besides the atheists, pseudo-ascetics, Kāpālikas and followers of Brhaspati, those doctrinaires who proclaim *kāla* or Time, *svabhāva* or Nature, *niyati* or Fate, *yadrocchā* or Chance, *bhūtas* or Elements as also *prāṇa* or Life-force, *gunas* or Qualities, *disah* or Space, *manas* or Mind, *buddhi* or Intellect, and so forth as their First Principles. To some extent these doctrines correspond to what the rest of our sources, namely Buddhist and Jain, have to give us as the picture of the philosophical outlook of the age represented by the rise of Buddhism and Jainism.

Of other available sources for the period, the Buddhist texts refer to two major classes of intellectual movements: (1) those that speculate on the first beginnings of things (*Pubbanta-kappika*) and (2) those that speculate about the future goal of creation (*Aparānta-kappika*). The former was divided into 18 groups and latter into 44. Various scattered passages in the Jain canonical works like the *Sūyagada*, *Thāna*, *Āyāra*, *Bhagavati*, *Nandī*, etc., refer to four principal philosophical schools—*Kriyāvāda* (subdivided into 180 groups), *Akriyāvāda* (84 groups), *Ajñānavāda* (67 groups)

and Vinayavāda (32 groups),—as being known to Mahāvira, and therefore presumably, as being current in his day

In the first discourse in the *Dighanikāya*, i.e., in the *Brahmajālasutta*, occurs the classified list of the philosophical schools current in the days of the Buddha. The Pubbanta-kappika consisted of four kinds of Sassatavāda (Eternalists), four kinds of Ekaccasassatavāda (Partial Eternalists), four kinds of Antānantika (Limitists and Unlimitists), four kinds of Amarāvikkhepika (Evasive Disputants), and two kinds of Adhiccasaṃuppannika (Fortuitous Originists), while the Aparānta-kappika consisted of sixteen kinds of Saññivāda (Upholders of Conscious Soul after Death), eight kinds of Asaññivāda (Upholders of Unconscious Soul) eight kinds of Nevasaññināsaññivāda (Upholders of neither Conscious nor Unconscious Soul), seven kinds of Uccedavāda (Annihilationists) and five kinds of Ditthadhammanibbānavāda (Seekers of *nibbāna* in one Life) ²⁷ From the Buddhist point of view these doctrines are mentioned as wrong and misleading (*macchādutti*) and they are refuted by Buddhaghosa in his *Sumangalavilāsinī* and by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*

Four kinds of Sassatavāda, i.e., those who hold that the soul and the world exist eternally, are mentioned in the Buddhist texts. The *attā* (*ātman*) or soul continues for ever without any change. It is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nacca*), fixed (*dhruva*) and unchangeable (*aviparīnāmadhamma*) ²⁸ This doctrine had some bearing on the Sāṃkhya, since the latter also contains the idea of *purusa* as soul. The Buddhists were opposed to this doctrine because of their faith in momentariness and the denial of a permanent entity. The Ekaccasassatavāda or Partial Eternalism, which was also divided into four groups, holds that the body and the sense organs are impermanent while the mind or consciousness is permanent. It recalls the contents of the *Maitrī Upanisad* ²⁹ according to which the soul is pure (*suddha*), tranquil (*sānta*) and eternal (*sāsvata*) and the body is possessed of the reverse qualities. The speculations of the Antānantikas, also subdivided into four groups, are mainly cosmological in character, according to which (1) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape, (2) unlimited in extent and without any end, (3) limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise, and (4) neither limited nor unlimited. The Buddhist texts mention four kinds of Amarāvikkhepikas or evasive disputants

who declined to give any categorical answer to the questions relating to life and universe. This school corresponds to the Ajñānavāda of the Jain texts. Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, of whom mention will be made later, belonged to this line of thinking. The Adhiccasamuppanikas or Fortuitous Originists were divided into two groups. They believed that the world originated accidentally without any cause. They probably belonged to a group which was later characterised by the epithets Lokāyatika, Bārhaspatya, Cārvāka, etc. The doctrine of Ajita Keśakambalin has some bearing on this school, as we shall see later. These five schools, subdivided into eighteen groups, formed the Pubbanta-kappika.

Sixteen kinds of Saññivādins are mentioned in the Buddhist texts. According to this school, (1) the soul is material (*rūpi*), (2) non-material (*arūpi*), (3) both material and non-material, (4) neither material nor non-material, (5) limited, (6) unlimited, (7) both limited and unlimited, (8) neither limited nor unlimited, (9) conscious, (10) unconscious, (11) conscious of one object (*ekatta*), (12) conscious of many objects (*nānātta*), (13) limited in matter (*pañña*), (14) unlimited in matter, (15) limited in consciousness, and (16) unlimited in consciousness. According to the Asaññivādins, subdivided into eight groups, the soul remains unconscious after death, and it can be material, non-material, both material and non-material, neither material nor non-material and so forth. The Nevasaññināsaññivādins were also divided into eight groups and their views were based upon the combination of those upheld by the Saññivādins and Asaññivādins. The Ucchedavādins and Ditthadhammanibbānavādins belonged to a different category. The former was divided into seven subsects and latter into five. According to the former, there is no separate existence of soul which is same as the body itself and it becomes extinct after the extinction of the body. According to the latter, the soul attains perfection when it enjoys fully the pleasures of five senses, and hence the *summum bonum* of life is enjoyment of worldly pleasure. These five schools, subdivided into forty-four groups, formed the Aparānta-kappika.

The Jain texts mention 363 philosophical views which were current in the days of Mahāvīra. These views were grouped into four principal schools—Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavādā. 180 forms of the Kriyāvādins are mentioned in the Jain texts. Kriyāvāda is the doctrine according to which the soul acts and is

acted upon. The term *Kiriyam* or *Kriyāvāda*, with some reservations, also applies to the Jain doctrines. According to the *Sūyagade*³⁰ the followers of this doctrine maintain that misery is caused by oneself and not by any external agent. Liberation may be attained by knowledge and good conduct (*vyjācaramam pāmokkham*). Fools are unable to stop the influx of evil actions, but the wise can do so by abstaining from wrongdoing (*nakammanā kamma khavemti bālā, akammanā kamma khavemti dhīro*). The Buddha was not, however, ready to accept the view of the *Kriyāvādins* in general and of the Jains in particular that human suffering is not conditioned by or dependent upon external conditions.³¹

The Jain accounts elaborate *Akriyāvāda* into 84 varieties. *Akriyāvāda* is the doctrine of non-action which is virtually opposed to *Kiriyāvāda*. As Sudharman, the chief disciple of Mahāvīra, expounds his master's view,³² the *Akriyāvādins* teach the annihilation of good actions by denying the potentialities of *karma* in future existence. They believe that all human actions and endeavours are fruitless. Most of the philosophical schools mentioned in the Buddhist *Brahmajālasutta*, of which we have already occasion to refer, actively contribute to this doctrine of non-action. In the *Thāna*³³ Mahāvīra mentions eight classes of *Akriyāvādins*: (1) *Ekkavādins* or Monists, Theists and Monotheists, (2) *Anikkavādins* or Cosmogonists, (5) *Sāyavādins* or Sensualists, (6) *Samucchedavādins* or Annihilationists, (7) *Niyavādins* or Eternalists, and (8) *Nasanuparalokavādins* or Materialists. Śīlāṅka in his *Ācāranga Tikā*³⁴ mentions six types of *Akriyāvādins* the upholders of the doctrines of *kāla*, *īśvara*, *ātman*, *niyati*, *svabhāva*, and *yadrēchā* as the First Principles. The doctrines of Pūrāṇa Kassapa, Pakudha Kaccāyana and a few other contemporaries of Mahāvīra and the Buddha are in close agreement to the views upheld by the *Akriyāvādins*.

The *Ajñānavādins* of the Jain texts were sceptics or agnostics who refused to give categorical answer to the questions put to them. Mahāvīra's expression *Annāniya* or *Ajñānika* evidently refers to Sañjaya and his school.³⁵ This school corresponds to the *Amāṭvikkhepikas* or evasive disputants of the Buddhists. According to Mahāvīra, the *Ajñānavādins* pretend to be intelligent, but in reality they do not know the truth. As teachers they mislead their pupils, because they are unfamiliar with truth and have not got rid of perplexity and contradictions (*annāniyā te kusalāni samā, asamāhāniyā no vutthigacchannā, akoviyā āhu akoviyehim, ananuv-ittu*

musam vayanṭi)³⁶ 67 kinds of Ajñānavādins are mentioned in the Jain texts

32 kinds of Vinayavādins are mentioned in the Jain texts. It is very difficult to understand what Vinayavāda really was. Jacobi translated Vinayavāda as idolatry. In the Buddhist texts we find that the Buddha was asked many times whether he was a Vinayavādin. From the Jain definitions³⁷ it appears that the followers of this school believed in the practice of certain moral codes, probably, without knowing their real impact. Probably the aim of the Vinayavādins was to gain a better future existence by practising certain moral codes. It was not their aim to exterminate all *karma* or to stop the influx of new *karma* which Jainism taught. Corresponding to Mahāvira's Vinayavāda, we have the Buddhist expression *śīlabhata-parāmāsa*.

In view of what we have noticed above, we can form a fair idea about the philosophical views current in the days of the Buddha and Mahāvira. It is interesting to note that most of the schools mentioned in the Buddhist and Jain texts represent the idea originating from fear, helplessness and frustration. Most of the schools belonging to the Buddhist Pubbanta and Aparānta-kappikas correspond to the different groups of the Akriyāvādins mentioned in the Jain texts. They believed that all human actions and endeavours were fruitless. Others, like the Adiccasaṃuppannikas, failed to put any trust on the law of causation, the Ajñānavādins or Amrāvikkhepikas declined to give any categorical answer to the questions relating to life and universe. The followers of the various doctrines of non-action mainly speculated on what remained after the extermination of the mortal body. The extremists like the Ucchedavādins or Ditthadhammanibbānavādins of the Buddhist texts or the Sāyavādins or Saṃucchadavādins or Na-saṃti-paralokavādins of the Jain texts identified body with soul and sought the *summum bonum* of life in worldly pleasures, while others debated on the question of the existence of soul apart from body, whether it remained conscious or unconscious after death, whether it was material or non-material, and so on. All of these doctrines were directly or indirectly concerned with death and annihilation. This spirit of fear and frustration, by which these philosophical schools were characterised, had evidently a social basis, the origin of which must be sought in the stupendous socio-political transformation which was taking place in that time through immense bloodshed and wholesale massacre.

PŪRANA KASSAPA

Indeed the immense bloodshed and wholesale massacre, the senseless, unlawful and irrational activities by which the then public life was characterised compelled Pūrana Kassapa, a senior contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, to declare when he was asked about the advantage in the life of a recluse "To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks the houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, then would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms, and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the sense, in speaking truth, there is neither merit nor increase of merit."⁸

Who was this Pūrana Kassapa? The Buddhist records speak of him as a contemporary of the Buddha, an old experienced and venerable teacher, the head of a religious order, the founder of a school having a large following of disciples.⁹ In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* he is referred to also as a contemporary of King Ajātaśatru of Magadha.¹⁰ According to Buddhaghosa,¹¹ Pūrana was formerly a slave, the hundredth in the household of his master which accounts for his epithet Pūrana, who ran away from his master's house. In his flight his garments were stolen by the thieves and hence he used to travel naked. Such irresponsible comments are not worthy of serious consideration.

Other incidents of his life, as we have them in the Buddhist texts, are also coloured by prejudiced outlook. In the Buddhist *Mahāvastu*¹² his meeting with the Buddha is mentioned along with the fact that the people had little regard for him. In the Jain

*Bhagavatisūtra*⁴³ he has been described as a foolish ascetic Pūrana committed suicide. He drowned himself near Śrāvastī. The Buddhist texts describe this event contemptuously with a deliberate purpose to blacken his character.

Fragments of the doctrines of Pūrana which may be gleaned from different sources point to the fact that they contributed to a great extent to the growth of Ājīvikiśm. Pūrana believed in the doctrines of non-causation, and that is why later authorities like Ārya Śura wanted to characterise him as a Svabhāvavādin.⁴⁴ The *Sāmaññaphalasutta* regards him as a follower of the doctrine of non-action which is supported by Buddhaghosa.⁴⁵ In the Jain *Sūyagada* Pūrana is mentioned as an Akriyāvādin,⁴⁶ and Śīlanka, the commentator on the *Sūyagada*, finds in his doctrines some ingredients of the Sāmkhya. From the Buddhist texts we learn that according to Pūrana when one acts or causes others to act, it is not the soul that acts or causes others to act. The soul is nothing but a passive spectator. The social basis of this doctrine we have mentioned above, which also explains why Pūrana had to welcome an undesirable death.

In a passage of the *Anguttaranikāya*,⁴⁷ Ānanda ascribes part of Gośāla's doctrine to Pūrana. This had led A. L. Basham to establish a common origin of the doctrines of these two great teachers and the results of his investigation are indeed significant. In the *Samyuttanikāya*⁴⁸ the names of Makkhalī Gośāla and Pūrana Kassapa are significantly combined. In the *Anguttara* passage mentioned above, Pūrana is said to have maintained the doctrine of six classes of men which also belonged to Gośāla. Besides, Basham has drawn our attention to two significant sources, the Jain Tamil poem *Nilakeci* and Gunaratna's *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*. In former, Pūrana is clearly described as the leader of the Ājīvikas, who received *Nilakeci* and expounded his doctrines to her stating that Markalī (Makkhalī Gośāla) was the lord of the Ājīvikas. This shows that the Tamil Ājīvikas looked upon Pūrana as a great leader and second only to Markalī himself. Gunaratna in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* refers to Pūrana as the upholder of the doctrine of destiny which is characteristic of Ājīvika philosophy. Buddhaghosa, as we have mentioned above, insisted on the nakedness of Pūrana, which is also confirmed by the *Dvayāvadāna* where he is described as a *nirgrantha*. According to Basham, Pūrana who maintained a fatalistic doctrine with tendencies to nihilism came in contact with Makkhalī Gośāla, a

younger teacher with doctrines much the same as his own, and recognising his own eclipse, he left his heritage on Gośāla and ended his own life ⁴⁹

The story of Pūrana's suicide occurs in the *Dhammapada*-commentary⁵⁰ and the *Dvyaavadāna*.⁵¹ A Tibetan version of the story also exists ⁵² According to these accounts, the death of Pūrana took place at Śrāvastī, after a great miracle contest in which he was worsted by the Buddha His defeat was followed by a violent storm, and he committed suicide by drowning with a pot tied around his neck According to Basham, Pūrana thought of committing suicide when he realised that his sun was going to set He takes Pūrana's death as a case of ritual suicide and refers in this connection to the Jain custom according to which an ascetic voluntarily ends his own life when his faculties begin to fail ⁵³ But to us it appears that this sad end of Pūrana's career was inevitable He committed suicide simply because he could not adjust himself with the social changes which were happening before his very eyes The great storm which preceded Pūrana's death reminds us of the *Last Great Storm Cloud*, one of the eight finalities declared by Gośāla on the eve of his death In fact, this storm cloud was the symbol of the ruthless extermination of the existing moral values and social relation which swept away all his hopes and aspirations The *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, in which we come across the glimpses of his views, categorically suggests that he found no difference between good or bad deeds When he says that by slaying, maiming and torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed and tortured, a man commits no sin, there is no difficulty in understanding that the root of such comments lay in his personal experience of contemporary social life with which he could not adjust himself

PAKUDHA KACCĀYANA

The social experiences by which Pūrana's soul was constantly tormented and which rather forced him to commit suicide were also shared by his contemporary Pakudha Kaccāyana whose reactions were also similar According to Pakudha, a being is composed of seven elements which are neither created, nor moulded, are barren and fixed as a rock or a stone-pillar, do not produce anything, do not interact on one another, neither move nor change nor hinder one another so as to cause pain or pleasure Hence there

can be no killer or instigator of killing because, if a sword passes through a body of a being, it does not destroy it but only transforms one element into another. In the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* his views are described thus: "The following seven things, O king, are neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created, they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of them), steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. They move not, neither do they vary, they trench not one upon another, nor avail aught as to ease or pain or both. And what are the seven? The four elements—earth, water, fire and air—and ease and pain, and with life (*jīva*) as the seventh. So there is neither slayer of causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives any one of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances."⁵⁴

Nothing about Pakudha's career is known to us. Dr. Barua⁵⁵ identifies him with Kakudha or Kabandhi Kātyāyana of the *Prasna Upaniṣad*. The epithet Kakudha or Kabandhi denotes a hump which points to his physical deformity. Buddhaghosa⁵⁶ tells us that Pakudha avoided cold water. Even after excretion he did not perform a ritual ablution until he obtained hot water or rice gruel (*kañjya*). He also avoided crossing any stream, and if he had to do so, he atoned this breach of vow by making a mound of sand. Basham,⁵⁷ who wants to connect Pakudha with early history of the Ājīvikas, says that the *kañj* and the mound of sand suggest practices of the Ājīvikas. Some southern Ājīvikas used *kañj* as their regular food, while the heap of sand, paralleled by a heap of red powder, was part of the religious paraphernalia of an Ājīvika ascetic mentioned in the Jātaka.

Dr. Barua,⁵⁸ on the basis of his supposed identification with Kakudha or Kabandhi of the *Prasna Upaniṣad*, says that according to Pakudha the roots of all things were matter and soul. In the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, Pakudha's philosophy is described as the doctrine of seven categories (*satta-kāyavāda*) while in the Jain *Sūyagada*⁵⁹ as the doctrine of soul as a sixth (*ātma-sasthavāda*) which Śīlānka identifies with the doctrine of *Bhagavadgītā* as well as with the Sāṃkhya and some aspects of the Śaiva system. Dr. Barua thinks that in Pakudha's six or seven categories, considered as the permanent elements of thought and existence, one may trace a background of the Vaiśeṣika categories, and that, as regards the

broad outline of his philosophy, Pakudha may be described as the Empedokles of India. How far this claim is justified is difficult to say. However, according to Barua, Pakudha, like Empedokles, maintained that the elements of being are so distinct from one another that there can be no transition from the one into the other and that the four roots of all things are the four elements—earth, water, fire and air—which are in their nature permanent, devoid of any qualitative change. Over and above these four elements, Barua observes, Pakudha regards, just as the Greek philosopher has regarded the forces of love and hatred, pleasure and pain as two principles of change. How he has arrived at such a conclusion is difficult to understand since the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* categorically states that according to Pakudha the seven categories—earth, water, fire, air, pleasure, pain, and life—are eternal and immutable elements.

Basham⁶⁰ has shown that the *Maṅghamanikāya*⁶¹ incorporates with Pakudha's doctrine part of Gośāla's fatalist creed and one of the Chinese versions of the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*⁶² makes of Pakudha a determinist. The southern Ājīvikas held a theory of elements very similar to that of Pakudha. "The three chief Tamil sources, *Manimekalai*, *Nīlakaṇṭhi* and *Civañāna-cittiyār*, all declare that, according to Ājīvika doctrine, there are five immutable atomic elements (*anu* or *poruḥ*), earth, air, water, fire, and life (*uyir* or *cīvam*). *Manimekalai*, however, the oldest of these sources, adds 'but joy and sorrow, these two are atoms'. *Nīlakaṇṭhi* leaves the total of the elements at five, but *Civañāna-cittiyār* states, 'Our lord has declared to us the seven which we must consider, including these two which are joined with them, namely good and evil'. This is surely the seven-element theory of Pakudha Kaccāyana, with the more moral categories *puṇna* and *pāpa* substituted for the hedonistic *sukha* and *dukkha*"⁶³

MAKKHALI GOŚĀLA

There is evidently a substantial similarity between the views of Pūrāṇa and Pakudha, as we have seen above. Indeed, the brutal rise of state power and class society, the ruthless annihilation of the existing moral values and social relations, made them quite upset. That is why the former did not hesitate to say that by killing and plundering a man would commit no sin, and the latter frankly ad-

mitted that the act of killing - as nothing but transforming one element into another. The same feeling of disappointment was also shared by Makkhali Gośāla who was an influential contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. He was the founder of a sect which was distinguished as that of the Ājīvikas. This sect had a long and eventful career in the religious history of India. Thanks to the efforts of Hoernle, Barua and Basham, we are now in a position to have some positive knowledge about the history and doctrine of the Ājīvikas.

The main sources of information regarding Makkhali Gośāla and his doctrine are the Jain *Sūyagada*,⁶⁴ *Bhagavatisūtra*,⁶⁵ and *Aupapātika-sūtra*,⁶⁶ the Buddhist *Sāmaññaphalasutta*,⁶⁷ *Samyuttanikāya*,⁶⁸ (which ascribes the first portion of the *Sāmaññaphala* account of Gośāla's views *natthi hetu*, *natthi paccaya*, etc., to Pūrāṇa), *Anguttaranikāya*,⁶⁹ (which confounds Makkhali Gośāla apparently with Ajita Keśakambalin), *Mahāsaccakasutta*,⁷⁰ the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*,⁷¹ (where the doctrines of the six teachers are hopelessly mixed up), *Milindapañho*,⁷² *Mahābodhi Jātaka*,⁷³ etc.⁷⁴

Gośāla in the Pāli canon is mentioned as Makkhali Gośāla, but in the Jain scriptures his name is given as Gośāla Mankhaliputta. He was born in a poor family. His father was probably a *mankha*, i.e., an exhibitor of religious pictures and a bard. According to Jain tradition he was born in a cowshed, which accounts for his name Gośāla, in a village called Saravana. Before his meeting with Mahāvīra, he maintained himself by the profession of a *mankha*. According to Buddhaghosa, he was a runaway slave.

It is not known why and how this bard resorted to asceticism. In the third year of the ascetic life of Mahāvīra, Gośāla joined him and they lived together for six years. But then arose ideological differences and the mental gulf between the two could not be bridged. Gośāla left Mahāvīra and declared himself to be a Tirthamkara. He had made his headquarters at Śrāvastī in the workshop of a potter-woman called Hālāhālā. Like the Buddha and Mahāvīra he travelled from place to place, in towns and villages, preaching and gathering converts.

Sixteen years thereafter, the two teachers met once again and had hot exchange of words. Mahāvīra charged Gośāla for his treacherous behaviour as a disciple, and the same charge was labelled against Mahāvīra by Gośāla also. According to the Jain texts, Gośāla was a renegade disciple of Mahāvīra, although circumstantial evidence, for the lack of the Ājīvika scriptures, suggests otherwise.

Mahāvīra in the third year of his ascetic life was still a novice and it was natural for him to stay with a teacher Gośāla who was going to declare himself a Tirthamkara, and who was senior to Mahāvīra in age could stay for a long period of six years only with his disciple. There are also grounds to show that some of the ideas the practices of the Jains were due to Ājīvika influence. It appears that the main cause of the difference between Gośāla and Mahāvīra was the former's insistence upon the doctrines of *niyati* or Fate and *akriyā* or non-action to which Mahāvīra was not ready to contribute.

In fact Gośāla became a pure fatalist. The conclusions at which he arrived regarding life and universe are summed up as follows, though in a distorted way, in the Buddhist *Sāmaññaphalasutta* "There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings, they become sinful without cause or basis. Neither is there cause or basis for the purity of living beings, they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others (which can affect one's future births), no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess (which can affect one's destiny in this life). All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance, and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six classes (of existence). There is no question of bringing unripe *karma* to fruition, nor of exhausting *karma* already ripened by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or by charity. That cannot be done, *samsāra* is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow at its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there any excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise, alike will take their course and make an end of sorrow."⁷⁵

From the combined testimony of the Buddhist and Jain sources we learn that, according to Gośāla, all beings are subject to a fixed and unchangeable series of existence, each of which has its own unalterable characteristic. He denies the effects of action and energy, since he holds that every being is helpless, unable neither to help himself nor to others. This doctrine is described in the *Maṅghmanikāya*⁷⁶ as *ahetuka* (denying cause) and *akriyā* (denying the effects of action), while in the *Anguttaranikāya*⁷⁷ it is said to be a doctrine which denies the effect of deeds (*kamma*), activity (*kriyā*) and energy (*virīya*).

This extreme type of fatalism upheld by Gośāla was entirely due to his frustration, which was evidently caused by his contemporary social experience. Probably he could not understand the significance of the gigantic historic transformation of his age—the collapse of tribal institutions and the rise of new values ushered in by the rise of state power. In vain he hoped that the good old tribal days would return again. In the destruction of the Vajjians, the last of the important free tribes, he saw the doom of everything. Ajātaśatru's invasion against the Vajjians, and its probable effects, have significantly found expression in the list of eight finalities proclaimed by a Gośāla in his delirium. It was the *last great storm cloud* (*carṃe pokkhalasāṃvutte mahāmehe*) that swept away all the traditional values and social relations. This *great storm cloud* also occurs in connection with Pūrana Kassapa's unfortunate suicide. In this great battle the Vajjians were annihilated, and their leader Ceṭaka, the maternal uncle of Mahāvīra, being defeated, committed suicide by drowning.⁷⁸ From this great storm cloud even the Buddha could not keep himself aloof. He said repeatedly that so long as the Vajjians would strictly maintain their tribal characteristics and strictly adhere to the tribal values they could not be annihilated. In fact Ajātaśatru made desperate attempt to exterminate the Vajjians. Not only did he sow seeds of dissension among the Vajjians through his minister Vassakāra, he did not even hesitate to use the two most terrible weapons of his age, the Mahāśīlākantaka and the Rathamusala. In the list of the eight finalities of Gośāla we have surprising references to the cause of the war, the 'last sprinkling scent-elephant' (*carṃe seyaṇāe gandhahatthi*) and to the great weapon used, the last Battle with Mahāśīlākantaka (*carṃe mahāśīlākantae sangamē*). According to the Jain tradition the cause of the battle was a 'scent-sprinkling-elephant' of which King Bimbisāra made a gift to his younger son Vehella. It was demanded by Ajātaśatru, but Vehella refused and fled with this elephant, and took shelter under Ceṭaka. In any case, Gośāla understood what would be the ultimate consequence of the war, which would mean the end of everything, and that is why he pined in his delirium for the characteristics of simple undifferentiated tribal life, by which the rituals of his own religion were also marked.

SAÑJAYA BELATTHIPUTTA

"The fundamental principle of the Ājīvika philosophy," writes

Basham,⁷⁹ "was Fate, usually called *nyati*. Buddhist and Jain sources agree that Gośāla was a rigid determinist, who exalted *nyati* to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. For him belief in free will was a vulgar error. The strong, the forceful, and the courageous, like the weakling, the idle and the coward, were all completely subject to the one principle which determined all things."

A similar feeling though expressed in a different way, had characterised the philosophy of Sañjaya Belatthiputta whose views are summed up thus in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*. "If you ask me whether there is another world—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I do not say so. And I do not think it is thus or thus. And I do not think it is otherwise. And I do not deny it. And I do not say there neither is, nor is not, another world. And if you ask me about the beings produced by chance, or whether there is any fruit, any result of good or bad actions, or whether a man who has won the truth continues, or not, after death—to each or any of these questions, do I give the same reply."⁸⁰

Sañjaya is generally described as an agnostic (*ajñānavādī*), a sceptic unwilling to give any definite answer to the ultimate problems which were, according to him, indeterminable. In the *Sūyagada*⁸¹ the Ajñānavādīs are criticised as blind persons, who, having no vision of their own, misguide others. In the Buddhist texts Sañjaya has been criticised as an *amarāvikkhepika* (eel-wiggler).⁸² It appears that he is same as Sañjaya the wanderer who was the previous teacher of Sāriputta.⁸³ From the Buddhist accounts it is known that when Sāriputta, accompanied by Moggallāna and two hundred and fifty other disciples, left the school of Sañjaya and joined the order of the Buddha, Sañjaya became so angry that he began to vomit blood which caused his sudden death. Buddhaghosa informs us that a certain wanderer named Supriya was a disciple of Sañjaya Paribbājaka, i.e., Sañjaya the wanderer.⁸⁴

Although in the Buddhist and Jain texts the views of the Amarāvikkhepikas and Ajñānavādīs, those who declined to give categorical answers to the questions put to them, are severely criticised, it can be said with certainty that the method of Sañjaya's arguments was partly accepted by the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Both of them were unanimous in declaring that there are some mooted questions on which any opinion should not be given. But side by side it must be admitted that what we get from the *Sāmaññaphala-*

sutta as the philosophy of Sañjaya, was a philosophy of total mental chaos. It was an expression of futility, a typical product of the age he represented.

AJITA KESAKAMBALIN

Although regarded by the scholars as one of the ancient founders of materialism, Ajita Keśakambalin, like most of his contemporaries, was really a believer in the doctrine of non-action. "Like the other contemporaries of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, Ajita too, was taking a desperately gloomy view of human existence. He was no less a philosopher of futility and moral collapse than Pūrāṇa Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccāyana. Perfection in wisdom and conduct, claimed by certain recluses and Brāhmanas of his times, appeared to him only stupid self-deceptions. 'It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein.' For everything led to death, and beyond death there was nothing. Again, if modern parallels are at all permissible, what Ajita propounded was only a philosophy of graveyard. Even in the fragmentary passage attributed to him by the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, Ajita was obsessed with the image of death."⁸⁵

Barua regards Ajita as the Indian Epicurus.⁸⁶ But how much doubtful this claim should be may be shown if the following passage of the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, dealing with the philosophy of Ajita, can be taken into consideration. "There is no such thing, O King, as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father, nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brāhmanas who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly and who having understood and realised by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is made of four elements. When he dies, the earthly in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, on their bier as a fifth, take his dead body away, till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies, but there his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk,

when men say there is profit therein Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not ⁴⁸⁷

SOCIAL EXPERIENCES OF MAHĀVĪRA

The views attributed by the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* to Pūraṇa, Pakudha, Ajita and Sañjaya were expressions of a deep sense of frustration. Although their views were expressed in different ways with differences in metaphysical basis, the total implication was rather that of a cluster of amorphous philosophies shared indiscriminately by these philosophers, the dominant tone of which was a deep sense of frustration and human ineffectuality. This was the outcome of their social experiences, the stimuli of which these philosophers responded in their own ways.

One may be naturally tempted to ask, is there anything in the canonical writings of the Jains which throws light on the social experiences of Mahāvīra or on the social basis of the doctrines he preached? It is interesting to note that although volumes after volumes have been written on the spiritual contents of the Buddhist and Jain doctrines, practically nothing has been written on their social basis. Great scholars have overlooked the simplest things, things which lie under their noses. It is due to the fact that their vision has remained circumscribed by the dominant outlook of their own age and that of the age they have studied.

Even a casual glance over the pages of the Jain Sūtras will sufficiently demonstrate to what a great extent Mahāvīra's mind was tormented by the experiences of social injustice of his times. The *Āyara* begins with the statement that "the (living) world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruct, and without discrimination. In this world full of pain, suffering by their different acts, see the benighted ones cause great pain ⁴⁸⁸ Regarding the cravings for wealth and power, by which the social values were characterised, the Master says "He who longs for the qualities (by this term greed and carnal desire is meant), is overcome by great pain, and he is careless (For he thinks) I have to provide for a mother, for a father, for a sister, for a wife, for sons, for daughters, for a daughter-in-law, for my friends, for near and remote relations, for my acquaintances, for different kinds of property, profit, meals and clothes. *Longing for these objects, people are careless, suffer day and night, work in the night*

and the wrong time, desire wealth and treasures, commit injuries and violent acts, direct the mind again and again, upon these injurious doings ¹⁰⁰

This was the actual condition of the social life in the age of Mahāvira

The consequences of this accumulation of wealth, of the growth of private property, have not been overlooked by the great Master who says "Having acquired the wealth, employing bipeds and quadrupeds, gathering riches in the three ways, whatever his portions will be, small or great, he will desire to enjoy it. Then at one time, his manifold savings are a large treasure. Then at another time his heirs divide it, or those who are without a living steal it, or the king takes it away, or it is ruined in some way or other, or it is consumed by the conflagration of the house" ¹⁰¹ This reveals how thoroughly the characteristics of his contemporary society had been observed by the Master who said "Then, after a time, he falls in sickness those with whom he lives together, first grumble at him, and he afterwards grumbles at them. But they cannot help thee or protect thee, nor canst thou help them or protect them" ¹⁰² In the *Sūyagada*, the problem is stated more explicitly "*He who owns even a small property in living or lifeless things, or consent to others holding it, will not be delivered from misery*" ¹⁰³

There is no need of multiplying such examples by which the pages of the Jain Sūtras are filled. Those who are in the top of the social hierarchy, the ruling class often justify their craving of power in the name of public welfare, national prestige, etc. In the dialogue between Śakra and Nami, as we find it in the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, ⁹⁴ we have a nice expression of the conflict between the ideals of hierarchical society and state power on the one hand and those of the simple undifferentiated life on the other. The dialogue runs as follows

Śakra. Erect a wall, gates and battlements, dig a mote, construct *sataghnis* (an instrument for defending a town), then you will be a Ksatriya

Nami. Making Faith his fortress, Penance and Self-control the bolt (of its gate), Patience its strong wall, so that guarded in three ways it is impregnable, making Zeal his bow, its string Carefulness in walking (*iriyā*), and its top (where the string is fastened) Content, he should bind (this bow) with Truth, piercing with the arrow, Penance (the foe's) mail, *karman*—(in this way) a sage will be the victor in battle and get rid of the *samsāra*

Śakra Build palaces, excellent houses, and turrets, thus you will be a Ksatriya

Nami He who builds his house on the road, will certainly get into trouble, whenever he wants to go, there he may take up his lodgings

Śakra Punishing thieves and robbers, cut-purses and burglars, you should establish public safety, thus you will be a Ksatriya

Nami Men frequently apply punishment wrongly, the innocent are put in prison, and the perpetrator of the crime is set at liberty

Śakra O king, bring into subjection all princes who do not acknowledge you, thus you will be a true Kṣatriya

Nami Though a man should conquer thousands and thousands of valiant (foes) greater will be his victory if he conquers nobody but himself

Śakra Offer great sacrifices, feed Śramanas and Brāhmanas, give alms, enjoy yourself, and offer sacrifices, thus you will be a true Ksatriya

Nami Though a man should give, every month, thousands and thousands of cows, better will be he who controls himself, though he gives no alms

Śakra Multiply your gold and silver, your jewels and pearls, your copper, fine robes and carriages, and your treasury, then you will be a true Ksatriya

Nami If there were numberless mountains of gold and silver, as big as Kailāsa, they would not satisfy a greedy man, for his avidity is boundless like space ⁹⁴

In the aforesaid dialogue the ideals of the ruling and privileged class are beautifully stated. They wanted multiplication of their gold and silver for leading a life of pleasure and sensuality, they wanted to bring into subjection the neighbouring territories to give a show of their power, they wanted to erect walls, gates and battlements to prove that they should be in the helm of power for protecting their people, they wanted to build palaces and excellent houses in order to create a feeling of respect and admiration towards them among the peoples, and they wanted to punish thieves and robbers, cut-purses and burglars so that they might be considered as custodian of public safety. Side by side they were also interested in earning religious merit. They believed, as their modern counterparts do even today, that it could be earned by spending a fragmentary portion of their wealth in offering sacri-

fices, in feeding the Śramanas and the Brāhmaṇas and in giving alms. The rise of class society and state power on the ruins of tribal equality in the days of the Buddha and Mahāvīra gave rise to this new set of social values.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF JAIN ETHICS

We have elsewhere argued that the material cause of the disintegration of tribal society and the rise of the new social forces and economic classes did not escape the notice of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. They had to face the dual requirement of their age. That is why, on the one hand, they had to offer to the oppressed peoples of their times a suitable *illusion* of ancient tribal equality which was getting trampled and undermined in *reality* and, on the other hand, to boost up some of the progressive features of the already established class society in public life and rescue some of the beneficial aspects of tribal life in a class society. Both of these great teachers established the Saṃgha or 'community of brethren' which was evidently modelled on the pattern of tribal democracies and meant to be the ideal substitute for a vanished way of life. They took great care to see that the members of the order, the monks or nuns, would live a perfectly detached life, i.e., detached from the great historic transformation going on in the society at large.

How thoroughly the tribal model was imitated by Mahāvīra in building up the 'community of brethren' can be understood if we take into account the Jain rules relating to the procedure of entry into the order, the internal administration of the order and the role of personal or private property within the order. In fact, the Jain texts are burdened with the rules relating to life of the monks. From these rules, which are by nature very rigid, there is no difficulty in understanding that there was perfect communism among the members of the Jain order. Everything was managed democratically by the monks and there was no such thing as private property within the order. The Jain monks were forbidden (and even to this day they are) to have anything which they could call their own. This is the vow of *apangraha* originally enunciated by Pārśva. According to Mahāvīra, this should include not only the non-attachment to all sorts of property but also the non-attachment to all connected with the five organs of senses.⁹⁵ Even those things which the Jain monk always carried about himself as clothes, alms-bowl, broom, etc. were

not regarded as his property, but as things necessary for the exercise of religious duties (*dharmopakarana*)

"I shall become a Śramana who owns no house, no property, no sons, no cattle, who eats what others give him I shall commit no sinful action, Master, I renounce to accept anything that has not been given ' Having taken such vows (a mendicant) should not, on entering a village or scot-free town, etc , take himself or induce others to take, or allow others to take, what has not been given A mendicant should not take or appropriate any property viz , an umbrella or vessel or suck, etc of those monks together with whom he stays, without getting their permission ⁷⁶ What is got from the alms is to be distributed among others with necessary permission "A single mendicant, having collected alms for many, might, without consulting his fellow ascetics, give them to those whom he list, as this would be sinful, he should not do so Taking the food, he should go there (where his teacher etc are) and speak thus 'O long lived Śramana there are near or remote (spiritual) relations of mine a teacher, a sub-teacher, a religious guide, a Sthavira, a head of a Gana, a Ganadhara, a founder of a Gana, forsooth, I shall give it them ' The other may answer him 'Well now, indeed, O long-lived one, give such a portion!' As much as the other commands, thus much he should give, *if the other commands the whole, he should give the whole* ⁷⁷

Thus within the order the great Master could establish a rigid system which reminds one of the primitive system of distribution in tribal society The conception that the attainment of *moksa*, the supreme goal of life, cannot be accomplished without eschewing selfishness completely certainly reflects the ideals of ancient undifferentiated society which were ruthlessly trampled and undermined in the age of Mahāvira Complete selflessness is possible only by observing five great vows or *mahāvratas* which are laid down thus (1) non-violence (*ahimsā*), (2) truth (*satya*), (3) non-stealing (*asteya*), (4) celibacy (*brahmacarya*), and (5) non-possession (*aparigraha*) These were for the monks who had resolved to give up worldly pleasure for the cause of the uplifting of humanity But what could be done within the order, among the community of the monks, could not be done outside, i.e., among the greater section of the people It was impossible to change the course of historical transformation, to check the growth of uneven social development and state power, and to bring back the good old undifferentiated

life of the past once again. Class society, despite all its ugliness was a historical necessity, and what could Mahāvira do under such a condition was to lay emphasis on some of its progressive aspects and on the moral values cherished throughout the ages. That is why for the householders he laid down the *anuvratas* or lesser vows which were not so strict as the greater vows to be observed by the monks. But the vows are the same, differing only in extent and rigidity.

The first vow of the monks runs thus "I renounce all killing of living beings, whether subtle or gross, whether movable or immovable. Nor shall I myself kill living beings (nor cause others to do it, nor consent to it). As long as I live, I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice threefold way (i.e., acting, commanding, consenting, either in the past or in the present or in the future) in mind, body and speech. The second vow "I renounce all vices of lying speech (arising) from anger or greed or fear or mirth. I shall neither myself speak lies, nor cause others to speak lies, nor consent to the speaking of lies, by others. I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself from these sins in the thrice threefold way in mind, speech and body." The third vow "I renounce all taking of anything not given, either in a village, or a town or a wood, either of little or much, of small and great, of living or lifeless things. I shall neither take myself what is not given, nor cause others to take it, nor consent to their taking it." The fourth vow "I renounce all sexual pleasures, either with gods or men or animals. I shall not give way to sensuality, etc." (all as in the foregoing clauses). The fifth vow "I renounce all attachments, whether little or much, small or great, living or lifeless, neither shall I myself form such attachments, nor cause others to do so" (etc. as in the foregoing clauses) ⁹⁸

It is not expected that such rigidity as regards the vows, this complete abstinence from violence, worldly things, sensuality and attachment in speech, thought, behaviour and action can be followed by common persons, the householders. That is why, they are tutored to accept these five vows in theory, but so far as the practices are concerned the great vows are reduced for laymen to their abstaining (1) from gross offences against living beings, (2) from gross untruthfulness, (3) from gross appropriation, (4) from adultery, and (5) from greed. These have been specified in the *Uvāsagadasāo* in which the restrictions are mainly taken from agricultural and commercial activities. Gross offence against living

beings is understood by fettering, beating, wounding, overloading, and cruelty, especially with reference to domestic animals used in agriculture and trade. Likewise gross untruthfulness is understood by falsely accusing a person, by passing wrong judgements, by forgery, etc. Gross appropriation consists in receiving of, or dealing in, stolen goods, in theft and other illegal economic transactions, in using false weights and measures, in the adulteration of goods, etc. Gross sensuality consists in offences against matrimonial faith, adultery, harlotism, incest, etc. Gross greed, the abstinence of which is demanded in the fifth vow, is understood in terms of attachment to gold, cattle, estate, cart, carriages, jewellery etc. Surprisingly enough the restrictions to be followed by the householders, exceed in number to those to be followed by the monks, which is because of the larger diversity in civil life⁹⁹

These restrictions are really instructive which clearly demonstrate the social basis of Jain ethics. The ingredients of class society, as were observed by the great Master, are *himsā* (violence), *asatya* (untruthfulness), *adattādāna* (stealing), *abrahmacarya* (sensualism), *paṅgraha* (attachment), *krodha* (anger), *māna* (egoism), *māyā* (hypocrisy), *lobha* (greed), *rāga* (personal attachment), *dvesa* (hatred), *klesa* (quarrelsomeness), *abhyākhyāna* (scandals), *paśunya* (gossiping), *paraparivāda* (telling ill of others), *ratī-aratī* (sexuality), *māya-mṛsa* (sinful acts under the pretext of goodness) and *mūḥyā darsanasatya* (ascribing reality to unreal) and these are included in the category of *pāpa* (vice). Thus, the problem to which Mahāvīra was confronted directly was basically ethical, which arose out of the conflict of his own age. The doctrine of *karman*, by which the Jain philosophy is characterised, is the natural outcome of his urge to restore the undermined and trampled moral values in public life.

REFERENCES

- 1 *FRJ*, VII, p. 465
- 2 See Coomaraswamy, *Y*
- 3 *Mbh.*, VII 156 25-8. Kāshī Mohan Ganguly's Eng. tr., pp. 421-4
- 4 See my *HSR*, pp. 81-2, 89-92, 116-22, 140-4
- 5 James, *PR*, p. 174
- 6 Cf. Piggott, *PI*, p. 127
- 7 Child, *NLMAE*, pp. 197-203
- 8 Marshall, *MIC*, I, pp. 48 ff
- 9 For details see my *IMG*, pp. 267 ff, *HSR*, pp. 16 ff
- 10 I 23 15, II 7 21, II 14 11, IV 57 1-8, V 53 13, VI 6 4, VII 20 19, 22 6, 78 10, X 34 13, 48 7, 83 37, 94 13, 101 3-4, 117 7, 146 6
- 11 In the older portions of the *RV*, we have three words of agricultural significance: *Ūrdara* (II 14.11), *Dhānya* (V 53 13) and *Vapana* (VI 6 4). The

- verses of the fourth *mandala* (IV 57 1-8) are proved to be later interpolation See Hopkins in JAOS, XVII, p 85n
- 12 II 11
13 VI 50 11
14 VII 92 22, 106 1, IX 2 2 2, et seq
15 I 154 6, VII 96 1
16 Winternitz, *HIL*, I, pp 64-5
17 I, 162-3
18 *HDA*, p 18
19 *Uttara*, VI, 17
20 *DKCV*, pp 63 ff
21 *Digha*, III, 27
22 Chattopadhyaya, *L*, 523
23 Oldenberg, *B*, p 64
24 *Śvetāsvatara*, I 2, VI 1 ff *Maitrīyaṇī*, VI, 14 ff, VI, 20, VII, 8 ff
25 I, 7-9, II, 30-8
26 Ed, F O Schrader Madras, 1916, cf *ZDMG*, LXVIII, pp 101 ff
27 See Duu, *EMB*, pp 35 ff
28 Cf *Maṅgima* I 8 *Papañcasūdanī*, I, 71
29 II 34
30 I 12 11-22
31 Cf *Anguttara*, III, 440
32 *Sūya*, I 12 4
33 IV 4
34 Ed, *Dhanapau*, 14
35 *Sūya*, I 6 27 12 1 2, II 2 79, *Uttara*, XVIII 3
36 *Sūya*, I 12 2
37 *Sūya*, I 12 3-4, II 2 79, *Uttara*, XVIII 23
38 Rhys Davids, *DB*, I, pp 69-70
39 *Digha*, I 47
40 In the *Māṇḍapāñha*, he has been referred to, in accordance with the subject matter of the text itself, as a contemporary of King Milinda, but it has no historical basis
41 *Sum. Vil.*, I, 142 ff
42 Ed, Senart, II, p 207
43 III 141
44 *Jātakamālā*, ed, Cowell, pp 148-9
45 *Sum. Vil.*, I, 162
46 *Sūya*, I 11 13
47 III, 383 ff
48 I 66
49 *HDA*, pp 80 ff
50 Ed, Norman, III, pp 199 ff
51 Ed, Cowell and Neil, pp 143 ff
52 Rockhill, *LB*, p 80
53 *HDA*, pp 88-90
54 Rhys Davids, *DB*, I, p 74
55 *PBIP*, pp 281 ff
56 *Sum. Vil.*, I 144
57 *HDA*, p 92
58 *PBIP*, pp 282-6
59 I 11 15-16
60 *HDA*, pp 91-2
61 I, 513 ff
62 Rockhill, *LB*, pp 255 ff
63 *HDA*, p 91
64 I 12 1-14, 4 7-9, II 1 29 6 with Śīlānka's commentary
65 XV 1 with Abhayadeva's commentary
66 Section 118 120
67 *Digha*, I, 53-4 with Buddhaghosa's commentary
68 III 69
69 I 286
70 *Maṅgima*, I 231, cf I 36
71 Tr in Rockhill, *LB*
72 Trenckner's ed, 5
73 No 528
74 Cf Barua *PIBP* p 315
75 Basham, *HDA* pp 13-14
76 I 409, II 121
77 I 287
78 *Āvasyaka Cūru*, II, pp 172 ff cf *Abhūdhānarājendra* s v *Ālāvālaya*
79 *HDA*, pp 224-5
80 Rhys Davids, *DB*, I, p 75
81 I 12, cf I 6 27, II 2 79, *Uttara*, XVIII, 22-3
82 *Digha*, I, 24-8, 58, *Sum. Vil.*, I, 168
83 Cf *Mahāvagga*, I, 23-4
84 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p 35
85 Chattopadhyaya, *L*, p 518
86 *PIBP*, p 289
87 Rhys Davids *DB*, I, pp 73-4
88 I 12 1, *SBt*, XXII, p 3
89 I 2 1 1, *SBt*, XXII, p 15
90 I 2 3 5, *SBt*, XXII, pp 19-20
91 I 2 4 1, *SBt*, XXII, p 21
92 I 1 2, *SBt*, XLV, p 235
93 IX 18-62

- 94 *SBE*, XLV, pp 37-40
- 95 *Āyāra* II 15 5, *SBE*, XXII pp 208-10
- 96 II 7 1 1, *SBE*, XXII, p 171
- 97 II 1 10 11, *SBE*, XXII, p 113
- 98 *Āyāra*, II 15 1-5, *SBE*, XXII, pp 202-10
- 99 *Uvās*, 13 ff, 45 ff, *Thāna*, 290, *Samav*, 10 Besides the lesser vows (*anuvratas*) there are the additional vows (*gunavratas*) and the strengthening vows (*saksāvratas*) for the laymen

CHAPTER THREE

The Sophisticated Stage

JAINISM AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

In the *Sūyagada* the Jain attitude towards different non-Jain philosophical systems is amply reflected. We have already occasion to refer to the four principal philosophical schools—Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavāda—which were current in the days of Mahāvīra. Of these schools the following is said: "The (Kriyāvādins)¹ Śramanas and Brāhmanas understanding the world (according to their lights) speak thus: misery is produced by one's own works, not by those of somebody else (viz. fate, creator, etc.). But right knowledge and conduct lead to liberation. He who knows the tortures of beings below (i.e., in hell), who knows the influx of sin and its stoppage, who knows misery and its annihilation—he is entitled to expound the Kriyāvāda."² The Akriyāvādins³ who deny *karma* do not admit that the action (of the soul is transmitted to) the future moments. They become involved in contradiction in their own assertions, they falter in their speech and are unable to respect what is said to them. This (their opinion) has a valiant counter-opinion, this (our opinion) has no valiant counter-opinion, and *karma* has six sources. The Akriyāvādins do not understand the truth, bring forward various opinions, many men believing in them will whirl round in the endless circles of birth."⁴ The speculations of the agnostics (Ajñānavādins)⁵ cannot lead to knowledge, they cannot reach the truth by themselves, still less teach it to other men. The agnostics, though they (pretend to) be clever, reason incoherently, and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas. Ignorant (teachers) speak to ignorant (pupils) and without reflection they speak untruth."⁶ Believing truth to be untruth and calling a bad man good, the various upholders of Vinaya,⁷ ask about it, explain their tenet (viz., that *mokṣa* is arrived at through Vinaya, discipline). Without perceiving the truth they speak thus: this object (viz., *mokṣa*) is realised by us thus (viz. by Vinaya)."⁸ Although

these schools are repudiated by the Jain thinkers and commentators, it is a fact that in shaping the Jain views and ideas the contribution of these schools were by no means insignificant. Frequently the earlier Jains styled themselves as Kriyāvādins. The Jain conception of evacuating the stored action and of evading its further influx from outside might have owed its inspiration to certain tenets of Akriyāvāda. Likewise the Ajñānavādins and the Vinayavādins contributed something respectively to the growth of the Jain logical system and to the formation of their disciplinary codes.

The materialists are also criticised in the *Sūyagada*⁹ whose views are summarised thus: "Some profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements—earth, water, fire, wind and air. These five gross elements (the original causes of things), from them arises another (thing, viz., *ātman*), for on the dissolution of the (five elements) living beings cease to exist. Everybody, fool or wise, has an individual soul. These souls exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more, there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond, on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be. Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tip of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what is called) soul, or what is the same, the *ātman*. The whole soul lives, when this (body) is dead it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul) speak the truth. Those who maintain that the soul is something different from the body, cannot tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or circular or triangular or square or hexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft or heavy or light or cold or hot or smooth or rough. Those, therefore, who believe that there is and exists no soul, speak the truth. Those who maintain that the soul is something different from the body do not see the following (objections): "As a man draws a sword

from the scabbard and shows it (you, saying), Friend, this is the sword and that is the scabbard," so nobody can draw (the soul from the body) and show it (you, saying) "Friend, this is the soul and that is the body. These (*nāstika*) cannot inform you on the following points: whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or not, well done or not well done, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes to hell or not. Thus undertaking various works they engage in various pleasures and amusements for their own enjoyment."¹⁰ Thus, the argument of the materialists that consciousness or *ātman* is produced from matter by the combination of different material elements constituting the body, and after the death of the body nothing can remain as consciousness is clearly stated in the Jain Sūtras. Although the pure form of materialism is not accepted in Jainism, it is also a fact that Jainism has an inherent materialistic approach. The world of experience has not been regarded by the Jain philosophers as having only an illusory appearance. The Jain conception of atoms is evidently due to a pure materialistic understanding of the world. In fact, the growth of Indian science owes much to Jainism.

The philosophy of fate which characterised the doctrines of Gosāla has been severely criticised in the Jain texts. In the *Sūyagada*¹¹ the following is said about them: "Again some say 'It is proved that there are individual souls, they experience pleasure and pain, and (on dying) they lose their state of life. But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the soul) themselves, how could it be caused by other (agents, as time etc.)?' Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, not by others, but the individual souls experience them, it is the lot assigned them by destiny. This is what they (i.e., the fatalists) say. There are two (kinds of) men. One man admits action, another man does not admit action. Both men, he who admits action, and he who does not admit action, are alike, their case is the same, because they are actuated by the same force. An ignorant man thinks about the cause as follows: 'When I suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble, am afflicted, or undergo great pain, I have caused it, or when another man suffers, etc., (as before) he has caused it.' Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another man to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. A wise man thinks about the cause as follows: 'When I suffer, etc., I did not cause it, and when another man suffers etc., he did

not cause it. A wise man thinks thus about the cause of what he himself or another man experiences. I say this "Movable or immovable beings in all the four quarters thus (i.e., by the will of fate) comes to have a body, to undergo the vicissitudes of life, to lose their body, to arrive at some state of existence, to experience pleasure and pain."¹² Regarding the Buddhists we have also some information in the *Sūyagada*.¹³ "Some fools say that there are five Skandhas of momentary existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is not different from, nor identical with (the elements), that it is produced from a cause (i.e., the elements), nor that it is without a cause (i.e., it is eternal)."¹⁴ The Buddhist views, especially those on *ahimsā*, are vehemently criticised in the Jain texts.

So far as the Brāhmanical systems are concerned, it appears that the compilers of the *Sūyagada* were acquainted with the cosmogonical speculations of the Brāhmana and Purāṇic literature,¹⁵ with the basic features of the Sāṃkhya and also with the incipient forms of the Vedānta and the Vaiśeṣika. "We hear also of another error of some (philosophers) some say that the world has been created (or is governed) by the gods, others, by *brahman*. Some say that it has been created by the *Īsvara*, others that it was produced from chaos, etc., this world with living beings and lifeless things, with its variety of pleasure and pain. The great *ṛṣi* said, that the world has been created by Svayambhū, Māra originated *māyā*, therefore the world (appears to be) uneternal. Some Brāhmanas and Śramanas say that the universe was produced from the (primeval) egg, and He (*brahman*) created the things. These ignorant men speak untruth. Those who on arguments of their own maintain that the world has been created, do not know the truth. Nor will (the world) ever perish."¹⁶ On the Sāṃkhya,¹⁷ the following is said "When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (*ātman*) which acts or causes to act. Thus they (viz., the adherents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy) boldly proclaim."¹⁸ Regarding the Vedānta¹⁹ it is stated "And as the earth though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so the Intelligent (principle, viz., the *ātman*) appears under various forms as the universe. Here all things have the Self for their cause and their object, they are produced by the Self, they are manifested by the Self, they are intimately connected with the Self, they are bound up by the Self. As for instance, a water bubble is produced in water, grows in water, is not separate from water, but is bound up in water, so all things have the Self for their cause."²⁰

It was against the Vaiśeṣikas, especially against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of God, that the later Jain logicians directed their polemics. The rudimentary form of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, as we come across in the earlier Jain texts like the *Sūyagada*,²¹ is very significant. Indeed the Jain Sūtras help us to find out the original character of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines which was essentially materialistic. "Some say that there are five elements and that the soul as a sixth (substance), but they contend that the soul and the world (i.e., the five elements) are eternal. These (six substances) do not perish neither (without nor with a cause), the non-existent does not come into existence, but all things are eternal by their very nature. And one should know the intermixture of the elements by an enumeration of them. Earth is the first element, water the second, fire the third, wind the fourth, and air the fifth. These five elements are not created, directly or indirectly, nor made, they are not effects, nor products, they are without beginning and end, they always produce effects, are independent of a directing cause or everything else, they are eternal. Some however say that there is a Self besides the five elements. What is, does not perish, from nothing, nothing comes. All living beings, all things, the whole world consist of nothing but these (five elements). They are the primary cause of the world, even down to a blade of grass."²² Thus the earlier form of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy which was known to the earlier Jain thinkers was materialistic. In fact, the original purpose of the Vaiśeṣika (and also of the Nyāya which accepts the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika) was to offer a scientific explanation regarding the origin and nature of the world as a composite of eternal, unalterable, causeless atoms. The early philosophers of these schools confined themselves to a classification and discussion of the worldly things excluding God from their systems, while the later commentators, considering this to be a defect, supplied the omission. The fundamental textbooks of the two schools, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya* Sūtras, originally did not accept the existence of God, it was not till a subsequent period that the two systems changed to theism. Although the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the Supreme Being has been strongly refuted by the Jain logicians, the scientific formulations of Jainism derived some of their main impulses from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

It is to be remembered in this connection that in the earlier Jain texts the philosophical doctrines of the non-Jains are represented

as *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e., views of the opponents, and as such they are reproduced with sufficient distortion in their contents. Later Jain writers, however, treat the views of their opponents with greater skill and competence and also with a purely academic approach. It is due to the fact that, historically speaking, Jainism has the great fortune of being eventually represented by a galaxy of great logicians who in philosophical sophistication could easily compete with the most sophisticated of their rivals.

JAIN ATHEISM

The Jains admit the existence of numerous gods. But none of these gods are eternal. Their lives must come to an end as soon as their merit is exhausted. The Jain gods are embodied souls, just like men or animals, differing from them in degree, not in kind. Accordingly, the functions of a Supreme God, as Lord or Ruler of the world, cannot be attributed to them. Following up their theoretical views on this point, the Jains have strenuously combated, and denounced the fallacies by which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas tried to prove the existence of an eternal and omniscient God as the Creator and Ruler of all things. The essence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument, which will be elaborated later in this section, is that all things, being products, presuppose a maker who has an intimate knowledge of their material cause. The refutation of this argument is found in the *Syādvādamajñānī*, in the commentary on the *Saddarsanasamuccaya* and other similar works. The Jains also controvert the views of the Vedāntins and of the followers of the Yoga philosophy regarding *Brahman* or *Īśvara* as the Supreme Being and cause of the universe. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas seem to have been their most formidable opponents in this controversy over the existence of God.

Before dealing with Jain atheism it is necessary to have a fair idea about the historical development of Indian atheistic ideas in general. It is generally held that Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual, moving round the idea of God as the basic fact of life. But this is only a fiction. It is only in the Yoga and the Vedānta, besides the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, that God is formally acknowledged. All other systems of Indian philosophy are basically atheistic. The ancient materialists of India held that the world is a spontaneous growth promoted by the chance combination of material elements, and no

intervention of God is needed for creation. The early Mīmāṃsakas are silent about God and the later ones reject the proofs of God. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, perception, inference and scriptures do not prove God. God cannot act as the supervisor of *dharma* and *adharma* since he cannot have any knowledge of them. The universe having neither any beginning nor end does not require any creator. According to the Sāṃkhya, the assumption of God is ontologically irrelevant and logically repulsive. Buddhism in its original form does not concern itself with the problem of God. The Buddha's anti-theistic arguments are summarised by Aśvaghoṣa.²³ If the world has been made by *Īśvara*, there should be no change or destruction, no such things as sorrow and calamity, right or wrong, if he is perfect, the world should be perfect, if he is the maker, the world should obey him, if he acts with a purpose he should not be called perfect, and if he acts without a purpose, he should be called either a lunatic or a baby. According to the later Vaiśeṣikas, God is unreal. If things were his creation they would come into being at once. But in reality the effect comes into being following an evolutionary process. From the seed grows the sprout, from the sprout the leaves, after the leaves grow the stem and branches, then appears the flower and then fruit. Again, God cannot be described as creator since the effect is conditioned by space and time. Coming to the Mahāyāna, we find that Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of the world being created by God. Śāntideva in his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*²⁴ refuses to admit any omniscient and omnipotent God as creator, and his polemics are directed against the theism of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The same holds good in the case of Śāntaraksita in whose *Tattvasamgraha* we come across pointed answers to the logical grounds on which the theists, evidently the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, wanted to prove the existence of God. The Jains also launched a vigorous logical campaign against theism and the most sophisticated arguments and hair-splitting analysis are met with in the polemic of Gunaratna which was directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika probans for the inference of God.

It should be remembered in this connection that although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments in support of theism had been the main target of attack of the atheists, God had originally no place in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama and in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were independent in their origin, but in the course of history the two systems were amalgamated. Nyāya was the

science of argumentation, predominantly intellectualistic and analytical. The fact is borne out by other designations like *hetu-vidyā* or the science of causes which are sometimes applied to it. Special attention is paid in this system to the questions of formal logic. The word Vaiśeṣika is derived from *viśeṣa*, which means difference, and the doctrine is so designated because, according to it, diversity is at the root of the universe. The purpose of the original Vaiśeṣika was purely scientific, and hence materialistic, to find out the basis of substance which is the substratum of qualities and actions and the material cause of composite things. In order to understand the basis of substance the Vaiśeṣikas developed the atomic theory. The inference by which they sought to prove the existence of atoms is like this: Whatever is produced must be made up of parts. Therefore if the parts of a composite thing be separated, we shall pass from larger to smaller, from smaller to still smaller, and from there to the smallest parts which cannot be further divided in any way. This indivisible and minutest parts are called *paramāṇus* or atoms. An atom cannot be produced, because it has no parts, and to produce means to combine parts. Nor can it be destroyed for to destroy a thing is to break it up into its parts, whereas atom has no parts. Thus being neither produced nor destructible the atoms of a thing are eternal.

This is a pure scientific approach, which was originally held by the Vaiśeṣika school, and that is why the corresponding development of the science of logic by the exponents of the earlier Nyāya school, came to its close. Science and logic should go side by side. This also explains why the supposed founders of these two schools, Gautama and Kanāda, were indifferent to the question of God. It was their commentators—Vātsyāyana²⁵ and Praśastapāda²⁶—who were mainly responsible for introducing the concept of God. The cause of the admittance of God into a basically scientific and materialistic system requires some explanation. At least one of the reasons for the admission of God in the later version of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was the purely technical need of defending an essentially scientific hypothesis, namely, atomism. It is a fact that this atomic theory was formulated in the background of an underdeveloped science and technology. Its main weakness was the want of satisfactory explanation of the process of atomic combination, by which the shaping of matter and consequently that of the physical world was believed to have been possible. How could the atoms being by

definition partless, combine with each other? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas had to face this question from the challenging Buddhists, Vedāntists and Mīmāṃsakas. The real explanation of the fact of atomic combination presupposes a great deal of development in science and technology which was much beyond the scope of the knowledge of the ancient and medieval Indian philosophers. In default of such knowledge, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas wanted to solve this problem evidently in terms of the technology known to them, primitive technology of manual operation, of the potter producing the jar or weaver producing the cloth. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, the potter or the weaver is the intelligent agent without whose operation there can be no production at all. In the image of this potter or craftsman, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas conceived an intelligent agent, the God, to effect the first atomic combination. They argued that just as the potter produced the jar by combining two *kaṇḍas*, i.e., pre-fabricated parts of the jar, so did God produce the first dyad by combining two atoms. Thus was introduced God, the grand macrocosmic potter, into the atomic philosophy. The result was the growth of a mass of theology that tended to overshadow the scientific hypothesis, which it was designed to fortify.²⁷

Thus according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the world has the atoms for its material cause and God for its efficient. The atoms can act only when, prior to the beginning of creation, they are controlled by an intelligent being. God creates the world for the sake of making the beings experience the fruits of the actions of their past lives. The creation and destruction of the world follow one another in regular order. The periodic dissolution is brought about by God's desire to reabsorb the whole creation within himself. These are the natural overgrowths rising from the momentum which the conception of God acquired when admitted into the system. But the basic weakness of this conception of God is that, he does not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms. In spite of his alleged omnipotence, God is in fact helplessly obliged to work with the materials already existing. Here the actual function of God is extremely circumscribed. This basic weakness in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of God has rightly been challenged by the Mīmāṃsakas. According to Kumārila, the idea of a concrete creator cannot be established because such a conception cannot describe the condition prior to creation. Kumārila has raised the important question how God could come into existence if such was the condi-

tion that there was no world before the creation of the world. Creation cannot be possible without any material and it is impossible to conceive that there were materials of creation prior to creation. Who was the creator of these materials of creation or whence did these materials come into existence? For this we are to postulate another creator, and another, and so on *ad infinitum*, but the problem will remain all the same. The same argument may be put forward also in the case of the formulation that God created the materials out of his own body. If God is viewed as being without a body, he cannot have the desire to create, and if he is viewed as having a body, assuredly this body would not have been created by himself.²⁸

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, in order to defend the existence of God, depend on the following arguments. All composite objects of the world, formed by the combination of atoms, must have a cause because they are of the nature of effects like a pot, being made up of parts and possessed of limited dimensions. Hence there must be an intelligent cause or agent (*kartā*) without whose guidance these objects cannot be what they are, cannot attain just that order, direction and coordination which should enable them to be produced as definite effects. This intelligent cause must have a *direct knowledge* of the material causes, i.e., the atoms, *desire* to combine and reproduce them in different forms and also the *power* to accomplish the task. So he requires to be omniscient (*sarvajña*), because only an omniscient being can have direct knowledge of all these. Secondly, the differences in the lot of human beings require an explanation which must be in terms of *karma*, i.e., of good or bad deeds. This stock of merit and demerit accruing from good and bad actions is called *adrsta* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology. This *adrsta* manages to produce different consequences in the case of the individuals, but since it is an unintelligent principle, by itself incapable of leading to just that kind or degree of joy and sorrow which are due to the past actions of the individuals, it requires to be guided by some intelligent agent to produce the proper consequence. It is only such an intelligent agent, the omnipotent and omniscient God, who can control the *adrsta* of the human beings and dispense all the joys and sorrows of human life, in strict accordance with it.

Against these arguments the Mīmāṃsakas hold that, if it is said that the world is created by an intelligent being, just as the potter makes a pot, this cannot be any argument because, an ordinary

agent like a potter can produce something since he possesses a *body*, has the *will* to produce and further he puts forth the specific *effort* required for the production. None of these, however, is possible in the case of God. The production of things does not immediately follow the desire of the intelligent agent. There is no instance as such. The pot, for example, is not produced immediately after the potter desires to produce it. This being the typical example on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas rely, they cannot argue that the bodies, etc. are produced immediately after God desires to produce these. Moreover, when it is said that the atoms perform the work of creation, being guided by the will of God, the inference is clearly illegitimate, because the atoms are devoid of intelligence and it is impossible on their part to follow, even to understand the will of God. To this argument the Mīmāṃsakas further add: God cannot create out of pity because there was no being on whom compassion could be shown. If the creation is said to be for the amusement of God, then it contradicts his perfection. If the will of God is responsible for the world, then there is no room for the doctrine of *karma*. Also, the idea of the utter dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), which is a corollary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument, cannot be admitted, because this is not supported by experience. Like creation we shall have then to think of the destruction of the world in terms of the will of the Supreme Being. It is simply fantastic.²⁹

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of God has also been refuted by the Buddhists. We have already had the occasion to refer to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva, the polemics of which were directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. In Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasamgraha*,⁴⁰ and also on its commentary by Kamalaśīla we come across the refutation of the doctrine of God. Here the case of the theist as it is presented by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is given as *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e., the view of the opponent. After stating the theistic arguments in a general way Śāntarakṣita quotes certain arguments for the existence of God as actually formulated by the renowned Naiyāyikas like Aviddhakarna, Uddyotakara and others. Then he goes on to refute the views one after another. According to Aviddhakarna, things perceptible by two senses like earth, water and fire, and also the imperceptible substance, namely air, must be produced by an intelligent cause in the form of God, because *they are characterized by a peculiar arrangement of their own parts*. Secondly, the material causes of

'the body and other things are controlled by an intelligent agent, *because they are endowed with colour and other qualities*, like the yarn etc., that are observed to bring about their effects only when controlled by the intelligent weaver. As regards the first argument, Śāntaraksita says that the probans of the inference that 'because these are characterised by a peculiar arrangement of their own parts' consists in using a probans which takes for granted something that is really yet to be proved. Hence it reveals the fallacy of the *unproved*, which is technically known in Indian logic as *asiddha* or *sādhyaśama*. The fallacy of the *asiddha* occurs when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the premises, and so cannot be taken to prove the truth of the conclusion. Thus when one argues, 'The sky-lotus is fragrant because it has *lotusness* in it like the natural lotus, the middle has no *locus standi*, since the sky-lotus is non-existent, and is, therefore, *asiddha* or a merely assumed but not proved fact. The same also holds good in Aviddhakarna's argument. The expression 'being characterised by a peculiar arrangement of their own parts' means that there exists a form of conjunction (*samyoga*) among their different parts and that as a result of this conjunction they become a 'sumtotal of the component parts' a 'whole' (*avayavī*). Thus the probans takes for granted the validity of the concepts of *conjunction* and the *whole*. But both of these concepts, on which stands the probans, are basically unproved, and with the help of this unproved probans the existence of God is sought to prove. This is logically fallacious. When a certain thing is definitely recognised, *through affirmative and negative concomitance*, as being the effect of a certain cause, the perception of that effect must prove that cause. The *peculiar arrangements of parts* in such diverse things as body, mountain and the like, however, is not an effect of this kind. In these cases no such peculiar arrangement of parts distinctly indicative of an intelligent maker is actually perceived. Hence an intelligent cause of all these cannot be inferred in the way in which an intelligent builder of the temple, pot, etc. is inferred. Aviddhakarna's second argument is also refuted on the same ground. The connection between the probans of this inference 'being endowed with colour and other qualities' and the probandum 'being controlled by an intelligent agent' is *irregular*, because in the cases of the yarn etc., such a connection is although present, in those of trees etc., it is clearly absent. Mere presence of colour by itself is not invariably concomitant with the probandum. Śāntaraksita has also refuted the argument of

Uddyotakara that 'the cause of the world, like the atoms etc need a controller with superior intelligence, because their activity is 'intermittent' and that of Praśastamati that 'at the beginning of creation the behaviour of men must have been due to the teaching of some person and such a person could only be God,' and his final conclusions is that, things that are born consecutively cannot have God for their cause. It is impossible to prove logically that the creator of one particular thing is the same as that of another thing and hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one creator for all things. Śāntaraksita's arguments which are by nature very technical have been elaborated, explained and illustrated by his commentator Kamalaśīla.

It is against this background that we are to understand the historical significance of Jain atheism. Besides the *Syādvādamāñjarī* mentioned above, the *Tarkarāhasyaśīpikā* of Gunaratna, which is actually a commentary on Haribhadra's *Saddarsanasamuccaya*, is famous for its polemic against the doctrine of God, especially against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments. Gunaratna himself was a very sophisticated logician of the fifteenth century who was aware of the ways and means in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas themselves have wanted to defend their inference of God from the typical charges brought against it. Before proceeding to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference of God, Gunaratna showed how these philosophers would have themselves answered the common criticisms with which they were confronted.³¹ Gunaratna's own philosophical style is terse and technical. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has given a nice exposition of his arguments³² which is also difficult to follow by the general readers who have not sufficient training in the methods of Indian logic. Hence I prefer to give below his discussion in somewhat explanatory form.

Against the claim of the atheists that God is unreal, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that the existence of God can definitely be proved by an instrument of valid knowledge, viz, inference. The inference is as follows: *Earth etc, are caused by an intelligent agent, because these are of the nature of being effects, as for instance the jar.* They claim that the probans with which an intelligent cause of the world is sought is free from all the fallacies recognised in Indian logic. (1) This probans can not be unproved one (*asiddha*). It is not like 'the sky-lotus is fragrant because it has *lotusness* in it like natural lotus'. Here the middle has a *locus standi*. It can be proved that the earth etc are

actually of the *nature of being effects* because they are found to be *composed* in parts, not like the non-existent sky-lotus. The second inference, *composed in parts*, proves the validity of the main inference, *earth etc., are of the nature of being effects*, and there is a universal concomitance between the two, which may be exemplified by the jar. (ii) The probans for the inference of an intelligent cause of earth etc., is also free from the *viruddha* or the fallacy of contradictory middle. This fallacy occurs when the middle term, instead of proving the existence of the major in the minor, proves its non-existence therein, in other words, when it disproves the very proposition which it is meant to prove. If one argues, 'sound is eternal because it is produced,' we have this fallacy, because the middle term *produced* does not prove the *eternality* of sound, but just the reverse. But this fallacy cannot occur when it is said that in the case of jar, etc., it is seen that something which is of the nature of being effect is indicative of having an intelligent cause. Here the effect is indicative of having an intelligent cause. Here the middle term is not disproving the very proposition which it goes to prove. (iii) Likewise, the probans for the inference of an intelligent cause of earth, etc., is free from the *savyabhicāra* or *anaiikāntika* or the fallacy of irregular middle. This fallacy occurs when the ostensible middle term becomes an inconstant concomitant of the major term. If one argues, 'all knowable objects are fiery, the hill is knowable, therefore the hill is fiery', in this case the middle term *knowable* is indifferently related to both fiery objects like kitchen and fireless objects like the lake. All knowable objects being thus not fiery, we cannot argue that a hill is fiery because it is knowable. The middle term should be uniformly concomitant and universally related to the major term. It should be related both to the existence and the non-existence of the major term, that is to say, the relation between the probans and the probandum should be established both by positive and negative concomitance. Thus in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika example of the jar, etc., the presence of the nature of being an effect is definitely connected with the presence of having an intelligent cause while in the case of vacuum (*ākāśa*), etc., the absence of the nature of being an effect is definitely connected with the absence of presupposing intelligent cause. (iv) Finally, the probans under consideration is also free from the *kālāṭīta* or *vādhīta* or the fallacy of non-inferentially contradicted middle. A typical instance of this fallacy is such a proposition as 'fire is cold because it is

a substance' or 'sugar is sour, because it produces acidity'. In the first example, coldness is the *sādhya* or major term, and substance is the middle term. Here the non-existence of the major term, i.e., coldness is flatly negated by a stronger instrument of valid knowledge, namely perception, which already proves fire to be hot instead of being cold. This fallacy cannot be detected in the inference of an intelligent cause of the world.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were also aware of other objections which could be raised against their inference of God. One such objection is that their inference can at best establish only a *finite* intelligent cause of the world, which is contradictory (*viruddha*) to the infinite intelligent cause, i.e., God. In the instance of the potter making the jar, who is a finite agent, the intelligent cause that is actually inferred is non-omniscient and non-omnipotent, and this cannot lead to the conclusion of the intelligent cause's omniscience. Quite aware of this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas held that such a mode of argument would lead to the denial of any possibility of inference at all. If the concomitances are all understood in the specific senses, as the opponents like to do in the case of the jar, there remains no scope for inferential knowledge. Thus, for example, in the typical inference of fire from smoke, the corroborative instance usually cited is that of the kitchen oven, where the concomitance between smoke and fire is actually observed, but it should be understood in the wider sense of the concomitance between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general, otherwise the inference of fire in the hill from the presence of smoke therein can have no justification. The concomitance between the probans and the probandum, which serves as the basis of a legitimate inference, should therefore be viewed as a concomitance between two objects understood in their *general* senses and not in their specific senses. From this point of view the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that *what their inference establishes is simply that earth etc., have an intelligent cause in the general sense and not that these have an intelligent cause in the specific sense in which it is observed in the case of the potter*. In the case of the jar, the intelligent cause presupposed, possesses a body no doubt, but such *specific peculiarities* do not inevitably qualify the intelligent cause. The essential factors that make the intelligent cause really effective in producing a jar are the potter's knowledge, will and effort. In spite of possessing a body, a person cannot produce the jar in the absence of any of these factors. Thus, the body cannot be considered as the cause

because of its co-existence with these essential factors. Something which is merely co-existing with the real cause and never be given the status of the cause proper, just as the yellowish colour of the fire cannot be regarded, despite its co-existence, as the cause of the smoke.

Having thus established their first inference that earth, trees, etc. presuppose an intelligent cause, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas go on to establish their second inference that this intelligent cause of earth, etc. must be omniscient. They argue that just as the maker of something should have complete knowledge of the materials required for its production, so also God as the maker of every effect in the universe must possess the full knowledge of everything. Since such knowledge is evidently without any limit, God must be omniscient and one, the Supreme Agent. The variety and occasionality of the effects cannot be evidences against this oneness and eternity of God. Again, if any one argues that the proof of God is not valid because nobody ever had actually observed the production of earth, etc. by an intelligent agent as their cause, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer is that, it is definitely established by an instrument of valid knowledge, namely inference. Non-apprehension does not prove non-existence.

Thus having laid down and explaining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proofs of the existence of god as *pūrvapakṣa* or the views of the opponent, Gunaratna goes on to refute them one after another. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference, as we have seen above, is based upon the universal concomitance between 'being effect' and 'having an intelligent cause'. Gunaratna begins with the question: What is exactly meant by the term 'being effect' by which earth, etc. have been characterised? If 'being effect' means '*being composed of parts*' and is understood in the sense of (i) *the presence of the effect in the component parts*, there results, according to Gunaratna, the fallacy of the irregular (*saavyabhicāra*), because here the relation between the probans, 'being effect' and the probandum 'having an intelligent cause' has not been established, the former being present in spite of the absence of the latter. The presence of the component parts also implies the presence of universal partness (*jātitva, avayavitva*). Gunaratna argues that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the partness presupposes the *jāti* in the form of *jātitva* or partness (indicating of generic attribute common to all class, just as *manuṣyatva* or humanity is common to all mankind and hence eternal) and, as a *jāti*, this

partness must be admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas themselves as something eternal and therefore uncaused. If *being composed of part* is understood in the sense of (ii) *being produced by the component parts*, there results the fallacy of the unproved (*asiddha*), because here the probans which rest on the view that earth etc., are produced by the component parts in the forms of the atoms remains yet to be proved. If *being composed of parts* is understood in the sense of (iii) *having portions*, there results the fallacy of the irregular, because here the relation between the probans and the probandum has not been established. In the case of the vacuum (*ākāśa*), the probans, namely, 'having portions' is present, but the probandum, namely, 'having an intelligent cause' is absent because according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the vacuum is eternal and hence without any cause. If *being composed of parts* is understood in the sense of (iv) *being the object of the knowledge in the form 'It is composed of parts'*, there also results the same fallacy of the irregular.

The second possible interpretation of 'being effects,' according to Gunaratna is 'the inherence (*samavāya*) of the being (*sattā*) of the previously non-existing effects like the earth, etc., in their required causes'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas conceive *samavāya* or inherence as an eternal relation which belongs to the inseparables. If so, how can it characterise the effect? When the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas themselves view the relation of inherence as eternal, 'the inherence of the being' is also eternal, and hence uncaused. The third possible interpretation of 'being effects' as 'being the object of the knowledge in the form it is produced' clearly suffers from the fallacy of the irregular because here the probans 'being the object of the knowledge in the form it is produced' coexists along with the absence of the probandum, namely, 'having an intelligent cause'. The fourth possible meaning of 'being effect' as 'being characterised by transformation' is also fallacious because, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view itself God himself shares the nature of being an effect and is being characterised by transformation.

Thus showing the fallacies of all the possible interpretations of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika probans for the inference of God, Gunaratna proceeds to show that the doctrine of God is unsatisfactory. According to him, when God is conceived as the cause of the world, the latter is viewed as his effect. An effect is something which sometimes exists and sometimes does not exist. The word does not satisfy this condition of being an effect, because it is ever existing. (The

ains hold that the universe is without any beginning or any end)
 he world exists because nobody has any experience to the contrary Hence, if the world is everlasting, it cannot be considered as an effect If it is not an effect, it is idle to conjecture that it has a cause in the form of God If it is argued that the trees, grass, etc. belonging to the world, being only occasionally existing, are to be viewed as effects, Gunaratna replies that this line of argument will lead to the absurd position that even God and the atoms are to be viewed as effects and as such will require an ancestry of intelligent causes Even for the sake of argument, admitting that the world is an effect, it is not possible to prove that the world presupposes an intelligent cause or God If the world is viewed as an effect in the general sense of the term, it presupposes a cause, but not specifically an intelligent cause or God, because there is no universal concomitance between "being a bare effect" and "having an intelligent cause " On the other hand if the world is viewed as an effect in some specific sense, it is not also possible to prove the existence of God as an intelligent cause Even admitting the world to be an effect in the special sense in which the jar is an effect, we cannot infer any disembodied intelligent cause thereof According to Gunaratna, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas overlook the basic difference between the two types of their supposed effects Effects like the jar presuppose an intelligent cause but effects like the wild trees do not presuppose any such intelligent cause Neglecting this difference between the two types of effects, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas want us to look at all effects as belonging to the first type This viewpoint is fallacious

According to Gunaratna, the very logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas inevitably lead us to the theory that the knowledge, will, etc., of God are also to be considered as effects But are they prepared to admit that these qualities of God, being effects, presuppose an intelligent cause in the sense in which a jar does? To suggest that God himself is the intelligent cause of his knowledge etc., it virtually amounts to the surrender of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position itself This means that the probans of the inference of God is 'irregular' In order to avoid this fallacy if it is argued that the knowledge, etc. of God presuppose an intelligent cause other than God himself, such an assumption would require infinite intelligent causes of God's knowledge, will, etc. Again, what will be in the cases of such things as wild trees, plants, etc., which, in spite of being effects, are devoid

of any intelligent cause, as is proved by perception? Against this if it is argued that God being intrinsically imperceptible there is no question of perceiving him as causing the wild trees etc., Gunaratna says that in order to stick of this defence it is necessary to establish the alleged imperceptibility of God, which is not possible. The same inference which seeks to establish the existence of God cannot prove also his imperceptibility. The possibility of using the same inference for this dual purpose results in the fallacy of arguing in a circle (*cakrakadosa*). On the other hand if it is required to be proved by another inference, it is not possible, because any proof of his imperceptibility presupposes the proof of his existence. Even admitting for the sake of argument that God is actually imperceptible, the following questions may be raised. Why does God remain imperceptible? Is it because of the absence of his body? Or, is it because of the influence of some supernatural power? Or, is it because of the universal 'imperceptibility' possessed by him? Gunaratna claims that these are only possible explanations of the alleged imperceptibility of God, but none of these can be logically satisfactory.

Gunaratna says that for the sake of argument the controversy concerning the perceptibility of God can even be given up, but still it will be impossible for the theist to prove that God causes the world. There is no conceivable explanation of how actually God can cause it. If it is said that God causes the world by virtue of his mere being on existence, this logic is clearly untenable, because if existence is the only criterion, there is nothing to prevent the conception of the potter also causing the world. If it is said that God causes the world by virtue of his possession of knowledge, the yogins also may be viewed as causing the world, because they are supposed to possess great knowledge. If it is said that God causes the world by virtue of his being characterised by knowledge, will and effort, it is quite illogical because without a body he cannot be the substratum of knowledge, etc. If it is said that God causes the world by virtue of the 'functional intermediacy' (*vyāpāra*) of knowledge, etc., like the third alternative here also the vexed question regarding God's body will arise. If it is said that God causes the world by virtue of his divinity, it is also fallacious because the implication of the term divinity is not at all clear. Then again we are confronted to another question regarding the motive that leads God to create the world. If God creates the world out of purely

personal whim, it leads to the possibility of creation being at least occasionally imperceptible, because something done to satisfy a purely personal whim is not necessarily meant for public exhibition. If God creates the world under the guidance of the destiny of the individual soul, he loses his independence. If he creates the world out of compassion, everything of the world then would have been pleasant. If God creates the world for sport, and for rewarding and punishing, he is characterised by attachment and hatred. If God creates the world because of inherent nature (*svabhāva*), the unconscious world then may as well be conceived as coming to being because of inherent nature, and not because of his action.

According to Gunaratna any probans that may be cited to prove God as the cause of the world must necessarily be contradictory, because the corroborative instance will always indicate an embodied and non-omniscient cause. Any probans used to infer God as the cause of the world must also suffer from the fallacy of the 'counteracted' (*prakarana-sama* or *satpratipaksa*), i.e., the fallacy of allowing scope for a counter-inference to prove the opposite of the desired thesis. God cannot be eternal, because only by virtue of some transformation of his own nature can God be conceived as the cause of the world. His knowledge also cannot be eternal, for this is contradicted by both perception and inference. God cannot be omniscient because there is no concomitance between the varieties of worldly objects and omniscience.

The Jain attitude towards the conception of God thus finds a nice expression in the polemical but hair-splitting analysis of Gunaratna. If by God is understood a supreme personality responsible for the creation of the world, Jainism must be declared to be atheistic, since it deliberately rejects such a conception of divinity as self-discrepant. If God needs to create the world, it means that he feels a want which is inconsistent with this necessary perfection as the Supreme. So there is no God, and the world was never created. The Universe has neither any beginning nor any end, and hence any conception of God as creator is absolutely unnecessary.

JAIN LOGIC

We have already referred to the fact that Jainism has the great fortune of being eventually represented by a galaxy of great logicians who in philosophical and argumental sophistication could easily

compete with the most sophisticated of their rivals. The early Jain thinkers did not set themselves to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic. Their object was to illustrate the truth of certain principles of their religion. But with the progress of time they had to confront with various types of arguments directed against their views by eminent logicians belonging to rival creeds. Hence for the purpose of defending their own views against the onslaught of their opponents, and also for counter-attack, the Jain thinkers developed a logical system of their own which in the history of the science of reasoning could indeed make a spectacular effect. We have already had the occasion to notice the quality of their argumental sophistication and hair-split analysis while dealing with Gunaratna's polemic against the theism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

The early Jain writers who discussed definite problems of logic were Bhadrabāhu and Umāsvāu or Umāsvāmī. In his commentaries on the *Dasaveyāhya*³³ and the *Sūyagada*,³⁴ Bhadrabāhu³⁵ elaborated a syllogism consisting ten parts (*daśāvayava-vākya*) and also a principle called 'the assertion of possibilities' (*syādvāda*) or 'the seven-fold parallogism' (*saptabhaṅgī-naya*). Umāsvāu or Umāsvāmī, the celebrated author of the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*,³⁶ dealt with the doctrine of *pramāna* or right knowledge and also with the different kinds of *naya* or the 'mood of statements'. The first Jain writer on systematic logic was, however, Siddhasena Divākara of the sixth century in whose *Nyāyāvatāra*³⁷ we come across a comprehensive treatment of the valid sources of knowledge, terms of syllogism, various types of logical fallacies and the methods of judgements. Of the logicians, Siddhasena Gaṇi and Samantabhadra commented on the *Tattvārthādhigama*. The former's work is known as *Tattvārthatīkā* in which the logical principles of the sources of knowledge and the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints are fully discussed. The latter's work, known as *Āptamīmāṃsā*, consists of 115 stanzas in Sanskrit in which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *syādvāda* has been given. The great savant Akalaṅka of the eighth century wrote a commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* mentioned above under the title *Astasāli*. His independent work on logic is known as *Nyāyaviniścaya* which was the source of Māṅkya Nandī's celebrated *Parīksāmukhasūtra* in which we come across exhaustive analysis of the characteristics of valid knowledge (*pramāṇasvarūpa*), direct apprehension (*pratyakṣa*), indirect appre-

hension (*parokṣa*), object of valid knowledge (*visaya*), result of valid knowledge (*phala*) and semblances or fallacies (*ābhāsa*) Māṇikyā Nandī has also mentioned in his work the Lokāyatas, Saugatas, Sāṃkhyas, Yogas, Prābhākaras, Jaiminiyas and others. He flourished about the ninth century AD and his illustrious contemporaries were Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra. Vidyānanda wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* which is known as *Aṣṭasāhasrī* and in which the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhism are severely criticised. Another logical treatise called *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* is attributed to him. Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtanda* is a commentary on Māṇikyā Nandī's work. He was also the author of *Nyāyakumudacandrodaya* which is the commentary on the *Laghyastraya* of Akalanka.

Of other Jain logicians of the ninth and tenth centuries reference should be made to Rabhasa Nandī who wrote a commentary entitled *Sambandhodyota* on the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, Mallavādin who was the author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise *Nyāyavindutikā* called *Dharmottara-ṭṭpanaka*, Amṛtacandra Sūri who was the author of *Tattvārthasāra* and Devasena Bhattāraka who was the author of *Nayacakra*. Abhayadeva Sūri who flourished about the beginning of the eleventh century was the author of *Vādamahānava*, a treatise on logic and of a commentary on the *Sammatīrkaśūtra* called *Tattvārthabodha-vidhāyini*. His contemporaries were Laghusamantabhadra, author of a commentary on the *Aṣṭasāhasrī* of Vidyānanda called *Aṣṭasāhasrī-visamapadatātpariyatikā*, Kalyānacandra, author of *Pramāṇavārtikāṭikā*, and Anantavīrya, author of a commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyā Nandī called *Parīkṣāmukhapañjikā* or *Prameyaratnamālā* as also a commentary on Akalanka's *Nyāyaviniścaya* called *Nyāyaviniścayavṛtti*. Deva Sūri who flourished in the twelfth century was the author of the well-known treatise on logic called *Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokalāṅkāra* on which he himself wrote an elaborated commentary named *Syādvādaratnākara*. The former consists of eight chapters dealing with the determination of the nature of valid knowledge, determination of the nature of perception, determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, argumentation and inference, determination of the nature of valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony or scripture, determination of the nature of objects of knowledge, determination of the consequences and fallacies of

knowledge, determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge and determination of the right procedure of a disputant and his opponent

Deva Sūri's contemporary was the great Hemacandra who was also a keen logician. He was the author of a most important work on logic called *Pramānamimāṃsā* on which he himself wrote a commentary. Of other logicians of the twelfth century mention should be made of Candraprabha Sūri, author of *Darsanaśuddhi*, *Prameyaratnakosa* and *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, Haribhadra Sūri (there were more than one Jain scholar of the name), the celebrated author of the *Śaddarsanasamuccaya*, *Dasavaikālikaniryuktīkā*, *Nyāyapravesakasūtra* and *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, Pārśvadeva Gaṇi, author of a commentary on *Nyāyapravesa* called *Nyāyapravesapañjikā*, Śricandra, author of *Nyāyapravesatippaṇa* which is a super-commentary on the *Nyāyapravesavivṛti* of Haribhadra, Devabhadra, author of *Nyāyāvatāratippaṇa*, Candrasena Sūri, author of *Utpādasiddhiprakaraṇa*, and Ratnaprabha Sūri, author of *Syādvādaratnākārāvatāṅkā*. Of the Jain logicians flourishing between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, the following deserve special mention. Tilakācārya, author of *Āvasyakalaghuvivṛti*, Mallisena Sūri, author of *Syādvādamāñjarī* which is a commentary on Hemacandra's *Vitarāgastuti* or *Dvātrimsika*, Rājāśekhara Sūri, author of *Ratnāvatāṅkāpañjika*, Jñāna Candra, author of *Ratnākārāvatāṅkātippaṇa*, Gunaratna, the celebrated author of *Tarkarahasyaḍīpikā* which is a commentary on Haribhadra's *Saddarsanasamuccaya*, Śrutasāgara Gaṇi, author of *Tattvārthadīpikā*, Dharmabhūṣana, author of *Nyāyadīpikā*, Vinayavijaya, author of *Nayakarmikā*, and Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, author of *Nyāyapradīpa*, *Tarkabhāṣā*, *Nyāyarahasya*, *Nyāyāmṛtataranginī*, and *Nyāyakhandaḥkhāḍya*.³⁸

Jain logic begins with the dictum that every judgement expresses one aspect of reality and is therefore relative and subject to some condition. It is due to the fact that every object has innumerable characters.³⁹ Thus, a thing should be comprehended from different standpoint, and the method of such comprehension is called *naya*. In the *Bhagavatisūtra* and *Prajñāpanāsūtra*, this *naya*, which is also interpreted as partial knowledge⁴⁰ about any of the innumerable aspect of an object or judgement based on such partial knowledge, is divided into seven kinds: *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjūsūtra*, *śabda*, *saṃabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*. Umāsvatī,⁴¹ who explains these terms, instead of dividing *naya* into seven kinds, first divides it into five kinds, and then subdivides one of the five, viz ,

śabda, into three kinds. *Nāgama*, is the non-analytical method by which an object is regarded as possessing both general and specific properties. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. *Samgraha* is the collective method which takes into consideration generic properties only and ignores particular properties. *Vyavahāra* is quite its opposite which takes into account the particular only ignoring the general. *Ryūsūtra* is the method which considers only the momentary entity without any reference to time and space. *Śabda* is the method of correct nomenclature. It is of three kinds, viz., *saṃprāta*, the suitable, *śamabhrūḍha*, the subtle, and *evambhūta*, the such-like.⁴² In Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra* this classification is maintained while in Deva Sūri's *Pramānanaya-tattvalokā-lankāra*⁴³ the fallacies (*ābhāsa*) arising out of the misapplication of each of these several kinds of *naya* are elaborately discussed with the help of examples. The basis of the Jain conception of *naya* is the fact that whatever judgement we pass in daily life about any object is true only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the object considered, and in view of this the Jains insist that every *naya* should be qualified by some words like 'somehow' (*syād*), expressing conditionality.

Next, come the question of knowledge (*jñāna*, *nāya*). In the *Sthānangasūtra*,⁴⁴ knowledge is divided into *pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). *Pratyakṣa* again is subdivided into *kevala-jñāna* (entire knowledge) and *akevala-jñāna* (defective knowledge). The *akevala-jñāna* is subdivided into *avadhi* and *manah-paryāya*. The *parokṣa-jñāna* is subdivided into *abhinubodha* (*matī*) and *śruti*. This classification is also found in the *Nandisūtra*.⁴⁵ In Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, *parokṣa* or indirect knowledge is defined as that which is acquired by the soul through external agencies, while *pratyakṣa* or direct knowledge as that which is acquired without the intervention of external agencies. *Parokṣa* includes *matī*,⁴⁶ or of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind, and *śruti*,⁴⁷ or knowledge of things, of past, present and future, acquired through reasoning and study. *Pratyakṣa* includes *avadhi*, i.e., knowledge of things beyond the range of perception, *manah-paryāya*, i.e., knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others and *kevala*,⁴⁸ i.e., knowledge which is unobstructed, unconditional and absolute, which is to be attained by yoga or concentration. These

are called *pratyaksa* or direct because these are acquired not through the medium of senses. Early Jain writers like Umāsvāti confined *pratyaksa* only to the soul's immediate knowledge without any medium. Later writers like Hemacandra extended it to ordinary sense perception as well, as most other Indian logicians did.⁴⁹ In Mānikya Nandī's *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, objects of valid knowledge have been classified into general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*). The general is of two kinds, homogeneous (*tiṛyak*) and heterogeneous (*urdhvaivā*). Likewise the particular is of two kinds, relating to things and relating to action. Siddhasena divides direct knowledge (*pratyaksa*) into two categories: practical (*vyāvahārika*) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through five senses and the mind and transcendental (*paramārthika*) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of soul. According to Deva Sūri, this knowledge should come exclusively from the illumination of soul and should be opposed to the three kinds of superimposition (*samāropa*)—inversion (*viparyaya*), doubt (*samsaya*) and uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*). So long as this knowledge remains in the stage of *avadhi* and *manahpariyāya* it is defective (*vikala*), but when it is free from all faults and obstruction it becomes perfect (*sakala*). In Jain logic the terms *pratyaksa* and *parokṣa* are also applied to the understanding of *pramāṇa* or the means of valid knowledge, as we shall see below.

The term *pramāṇa* is generally understood as the means of valid knowledge which is also classified under the two traditional categories *pratyaksa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect). The latter includes, according to Umāsvāti,⁵⁰ inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), presumption (*arthapatti*), probability (*sambhava*) and non-existence (*abhāva*). It is interesting to note that in the earlier stages of the development of Jain logic, the terms *pratyaksa* and *parokṣa* were used in senses quite opposite to those in which they were used in Brahmanical, Buddhist and later Jain logic. Siddhasena Divākara divides the sources of indirect valid knowledge (*parokṣa*) into inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*). We have seen that the earlier Jain conception of *pratyaksa* had practically no bearing on its traditional sense which is suggestive of direct perception. An incipient conception of *pratyaksa* as direct perception is found in Mānikya Nandī's work in which *pramāṇa* or means of valid knowledge is classified into *direct* which rises through senses, etc. and *indirect* consisting of recollec-

tion (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), argumentation (*tarka* or *ūha*) inference (*anumāna*) and scripture (*āgama*) Deva Sūri also maintains this classification so far as the sources of indirect knowledge are concerned. Regarding the *pratyaksa* he goes another step further to invite perception. The division of direct knowledge into *paramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* was probably the first attempt to shift the area of perception from the category of *paroksa* to that of *pratyaksa*. Regarding perception in the field of practical (*vyāvahārika*) direct knowledge, Deva Sūri makes a twofold classification. Knowledge that arises through sense-organs (*indriya-nibandhana*) and that arises through the mind (*anindriyanibandhana*). Each of these passes through four stages—*avagraha* or distinction, *thā* or enquiry, *avāya* or identification and *dhāranā* or conception.

Anumāna or knowledge derived from inference is the most important aspect of logic. In the earlier Jain texts like the *Sthānānga*, the word *hetu* is used in the sense of *anumāna*, but in later works both of the terms have received their distinctive significance. Umāsvāti was the first important writer to use the term *anumāna* to denote logical inference.⁵¹ According to Siddhasena Divākara, inference or *anumāna* is the correct knowledge of the major term (*sādhya*) derived through the middle term (*hetu* or *linga*) which is inseparably connected with it. Inference is of two kinds, *svārtha* and *parārtha*. The first is deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations (cf. the concomitance of fire and smoke observed in kitchen extended to that of fire-in-general and smoke-in-general) while the second is its communication to others through words. Without inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term, inference is impossible. This has been maintained by Mānikya Nandī, Deva Sūri and all other Jain logicians.

Hetu or reason, which serves the most important purpose as the middle term in the formation of syllogism, as we have remarked above, did not acquire a definite significance in the earlier stages of the development of Jain thought. In the *Dasavaikālikaṇṇiyukti* attributed to Bhadrabāhu, has been elaborated a syllogism, consisting of ten parts (*dasāvayava-vākya*), in which the term *hetu* has been used exclusively in the sense of reason. The ten parts are as follows: *pratyñā* (proposition), *pratyñā-vibhakti* (limitation of the proposition), *hetu* (reason), *hetu-vibhakti* (limitation of the reason), *vipaksa* (counter-proposition), *vipaksa-pratisedha* (opposition to the coun-

ter proposition), *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example), *āsankā* (validity of the example), *āsankāpratishedha* (meeting of the question) and *nigamana* (conclusion) Later Jain logicians, however, consider *hetu* exclusively as the middle term In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the predicate, the major term (*sādhya*) The middle term or *hetu* is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term Thus in the proposition, 'the *hull* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term), because it is full of smoke,' *smoke* is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than *fire* which is the major term This middle term or reason (*hetu*) is divided by the Jain logicians as perceptible (*upalabdhi*) and imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*) Each of these again may occur in the form of affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*pratishedha*) The semblance of reason or fallacy of this *hetu* or middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it It is of three kinds (1) The unproved (*asiddha*) 'This is fragrant, because it is a sky-lotus,' here the middle-term, the sky-lotus, is unreal (2) The contradictory (*viruddha*) 'This is fiery, because it is a body of water,' here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established (3) The uncertain (*anaikāntika*) 'Sound is eternal, because it is always audible' Here the middle term is uncertain because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity

We have said that without an inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the major and the middle term the formation of any syllogism is impossible If the middle term and the major term exist simultaneously, the former is called *vyāpya*, pervaded or contained, and the latter, *vyāpaka*, pervader or container But if the middle term follows the major term, the former is called effect (*kārya*) and the latter cause (*kāraṇa*) The major term is called *sādhya* or that which is to be proved, and the middle is called *sādhana* or that by which it is to be proved Sometimes the major term is called *dharma* or predicate and the middle (*linga*) or sign The minor term is called *pakṣa*, the place in which the major term abides In an inference the minor term must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning may be misunderstood The fallacy of the minor term (*pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact what is yet to be proved The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta* or *udāharana*) is not Nevertheless, for the sake of explaining matters, the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) and even the applica-

tion (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*), are admitted as features of inference. The *hill* (minor) is full of *fire* (major), because it is full of *smoke* (middle), as a *kitchen* (example). The fallacies of example (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous and heterogeneous forms, from a defect in the major or middle term or both, or from doubt about them.⁵²

In view of what we have said above it is quite evident that later Jain logicians did not dissociate themselves from the general trend of Indian logical studies. They had adopted most of the terms and methods popularised especially by the Nyāya school. According to the Naiyāyikas, an inference must be stated in the form of five propositions, called its *avayavas* or members. These are *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharana*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana*.⁵³ This five-membered syllogism may thus be illustrated. Devadatta is mortal (*pratijñā*), because he is a man (*hetu*), all men are mortal, e.g., Rāma, etc. (*udāharana*), Devadatta is also a man (*upanaya*), therefore he is mortal (*nigamana*). One should not fail to recall in this connection the syllogism put forward by Deva Sūri.⁵⁴ The hill is fiery (*pakṣa-prayoga*), because it is smoky (*hetu-prayoga*), whatever is fiery is smoky, as a kitchen (*dr̥ṣṭānta*), this hill is smoky (*upanaya*), therefore this hill is fiery. The Jains also accepted the ways and means of the Nyāya school to detect the argumental fallacies. Not only the material fallacies of inference like *asiddha* (unproved middle), *viruddha* (contradictory middle), *savyabhicāra* (irregular middle), *satpratipakṣa* (inferentially contradicted middle) and *vādhita* (non-inferentially contradicted middle) were accepted, but fallacies of general nature like those of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), of recollection (*smaranābhāsa*), of recognition (*pratyabhyñānābhāsa*), of argumentation (*tarkābhāsa*), of minor term (*pakṣābhāsa*), of middle term (*hetvābhāsa*), of example (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) and of verbal testimony (*āgamābhāsa*) had as well been taken into account. Needless to say that later Jain logical conceptions derived their main impulses from the corresponding development of the Nyāya school.

But, in spite of all these, we come across an earlier stage of Jain logic which presents a different picture. The terminologies used in this earlier stage of development, although they bear an apparent similarity with the ones accepted in the history of Indian logic in general, have an altogether different significance. We have seen how the terms *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, used in connection with the theories and sources of knowledge, stood in the earlier Jain writings

for principles quite opposite to those denoted by the said terms in later Jain writings and also in other systems of Indian logic. We have also the occasion to refer to the syllogism of ten parts (*dasāvayava-vākya*), formulated by Bhadrabāhu and others, which was quite different in character from the fivefold syllogism which was later accepted universally. In fact the tradition of this earlier tenfold syllogism was upheld for a long time which is indicated in the writings of Candraprabha Sūri and Ratnaprabha Sūri who had characterised the syllogism of ten parts as the best (*uttama*), of five parts as the mediocre (*madhyama*) and of two parts as the worst (*jaghanya*). In the case of fallacies also the earlier Jain logicians mainly insisted upon those of *naya* (*nayābhāsa*) which were concerned with the *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *vyūhā* and *śabda* moods of statements. But the most important viewpoint by which the earlier stage of Jain logic was characterised is known as *syādvāda* or the doctrine of conditional proposition. The word *syād* means *may be* which signifies that everything of the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each viewpoint yields a different conclusion (*anekānta*). Every proposition is therefore conditional, and there is nothing called absolute affirmation or absolute negation. The Jains illustrate this position by means of the story of a number of blind people examining an elephant and arriving at varying conclusions regarding its form while in truth each observer gets at only a part of it.

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅganiryukti*,⁷⁷ attributed to Bhadrabāhu, it is for the first time that we come across this *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī-naya* presented in a completely theoretical set up. It is set forth as follows: (1) may be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) may be, it is not, and it is also indescribable, and (7) may be it is and it is not, and it is also indescribable.⁷⁸ In defence of this sevenfold parallogism, Siddhasena Divākara says that perfect knowledge of things can be obtained only by taking into consideration all the possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., if we take it from one or other standpoint. Through the employment only of the many-sided *nayas* may be obtained the real knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object. Elaborate discussion of the *syādvāda* is found in Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmamsā*. To illustrate the problem Samantabhadra has taken the first and second parts of the doctrine, viz.,

syād-asti (may be, it is) and *syād-nāsti* (may be, it is not) The former, he explains, in terms of *bhāva* or existence, and the latter in that of *abhāva* or non-existence Both of these conceptions, *bhāva* and *abhāva*, existence and non-existence, are relative, e g , a lump of clay becomes non-existence as soon as a jar is made out of it Here the jar is an *antecedent* non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) with reference to the lump of clay, and the lump of clay is a *subsequent* non-existence (*pradhvamsābhāva*) with reference to the jar Hence, if mere *existence* is only taken into account, and *non-existence* denied, or if *non-existence* is affirmed and *existence* denied, it becomes impossible to affirm or deny anything Again, if both the aspects are simultaneously taken into account, i e , if *existence* and *non-existence* are simultaneously ascribed to a thing, it becomes *indescribable* That is why, a thing is existent from a certain point of view, non-existent from another point of view, both existent and non-existent *in turn* from a third point of view, indescribable, i e , both existent and non-existent simultaneously, from a fourth point of view, existent and indescribable from a fifth point of view, non-existent and indescribable from a sixth point of view, and both existent and non-existent and indescribable from a seventh point of view

The Jain logicians therefore think that it is desirable for the sake of precision to qualify the judgement explicitly by a word like 'may be ' The reason, they say, is that any dogmatic claim of a particular viewpoint (*ekāntavāda*) amounts to the fallacy of exclusive predication Reality is so complex in its structure that it baffles all attempts to describe it directly and once for all Hence the limitation of a particular judgement and the possibility of other alternative judgements from other points of view must always be clearly borne in mind For example, on perceiving a black earthen jar existing in a room at a particular time, this should not be asserted unconditionally that 'The jar exists,' but should rather be said 'May be the jar exists,' which should remind us that the judgement is true only with regard to the conditions of space, time, quality, etc , under which the jar exists and prevent the possibility of the misapprehension that the pot exists at all times or in every place Again, an object may be described affirmatively by a judgement which predicates of it any of the characters it possesses, or it may be described negatively which denies of its characters belonging to other objects but absent in this But the Jain logicians insist on the conditional or relative character of both the affirmative and the negative judge-

ments If we consider the example an object A, we may say, that it is only in a sense, viz as A and not also as B Thus when we say, 'May be, it is a jar,' it is only in the sense of its existence at a particular place and time and with a particular description But owing to the indefinite nature of reality, what is now or here A, may become B sometime hence or elsewhere Thus when we say 'May be, the jar is red,' here A becomes B, being conditioned by colour and other considerations But we must remember when we posit A, that we are not stating absolutely what the nature is of the reality underlying it May be, A is B, and not B as well The redness or blackness of a jar depends on perception which is also conditioned by other factors like light and darkness May be the jar is red (if observed during the day time) and not-red (when it is observed at night) Thus every object *is* in one sense and *is not* in another sense While the opposition between the predicates *is* and *is not* is reconciled, when they are thought of as characterising an object successively, the nature of the object becomes indescribable (*avaktavya*) A jar is black when raw and red when it is baked But if one asks, what is the real colour of jar always and under all conditions, the only reply would be that the colour of the jar is indescribable In this way we come across four forms of judgements may be, S is P, is not P, is and is not P, is and is not P and also indescribable Three other forms of judgement can also be obtained by combining successively each of the first three standpoints with the fourth May be S is P and indescribable, is not P and indescribable, is and is not P and indescribable From the viewpoints of space, time, colour, shape, ingredients and so on, an indescribable existence of a jar may be affirmed, denied, and also affirmed and denied simultaneously There may be a jar but it is indescribable, so far as its colour and shape are concerned, owing to its being observed from a distance It may be said to be non-existing and indescribable when observed in darkness It may also be said to be existing, non-existing and indescribable by any one whose vision is circumscribed by eyesight, distance, light or darkness Thus, what is emphasised in Jain logic is the relative and conditional character of the judgements An object cannot be described at all if no distinction of standpoints and aspects is made This does not, however, mean that the different judgements about an object are merely subjective ideas of the object They are meant to reveal the different *real* aspects of the object, not dependent upon the *mood* of the judging mind but

upon the relational characters of the many-sided reality itself

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES COSMOLOGY

According to the Jains the universe has neither any beginning nor any end. The entire cosmos is composed of substances of different kind. These substances are possessed of some unchanging essential characters (*gunas*) and changing modes (*paryāyas*). These are broadly classified into two groups—extended (*astikāya*) and non-extended (*anastikāya*). *Astikāya* (*aitihikāya*) literally means “mass of all that is”. Every substance of this kind exists (*asti*) like a body (*kāya*) possessing extension.⁵⁷ There is only one substance, namely, time (*kāla*) which is devoid of extension, and hence falls into the *Anastikāya* group.

Astikāya substances are again divided into two kinds⁵⁸—living (*jīva*) and non-living (*ajīva*). *Jīva* is of two kinds, emancipated (*mukta*) and fettered (*baddha*). The latter is also of two kinds, moving (*trasa*) and non-moving (*sthāvāra*), e.g. those living in the bodies of earth, etc. The moving *jīvas* are again classified into five-sensed, e.g. men, four-sensed, e.g. bees, three-sensed, e.g. ants, two-sensed, e.g. worms, and one-sensed, e.g. plants. In the same way *ajīva* is divided into four categories—*ākāśa* (space), *dharmā* (conditions of movements), *adharma* (conditions of rest) and *pudgala* (matter). *Pudgala* is of two kinds—the atoms (*anu*) of earth, water, fire, air, etc. and the compounds (*samghāta*).⁵⁹

Although there is a tendency among the scholars to explain *jīva* in term of *ātman* or *purusa* of the other schools of Indian thought, etymologically it stands for ‘what lives or is animate’. The concept bears a clear mark of formulation from observing the characteristics of life and not through the search after a metaphysical principle underlying individual existence.⁶⁰ Thus the word in the original sense stood for the vital principle rather than for the soul. Later on, however, the question of consciousness was emphasised,⁶¹ and the *jīvas* were theoretically arranged in a continuous series according to the degrees of consciousness. On the top of this series were placed the perfect souls that had overcome all *karmas* and attained omniscience and at the bottom were placed imperfect soul inhabiting the bodies of earth, water, fire, air or vegetable.⁶² But this classification was actually biological, done from a purely empirical point of view on the basis of the sense organs, such as those that

have one sense, two senses and so forth ⁶⁴ But with the development of the idealistic bias, which saturated most of the philosophical systems of India, the Jain conception of *jīva* also underwent a significant change. The biological and material considerations were gradually thrown aside and the concept of *jīva* came to be looked upon as different from body, and its existence was sought to be proved in that of consciousness itself. In the first stage of this idealistic development its eternality and undergoing change of states were maintained. It was conceived as existing permanently, acting and being acted upon, as an experient (*bhoktā*) and agent (*kartā*) ⁶⁴ It was supposed to know things, perform activities, enjoy pleasure, suffer pain, illumine itself and other objects. In other words, the existence, function and behaviour of *jīva* were conceived in accordance with those of a human being. In the subsequent stage of the development of this process, the intrinsic nature of *jīva* was conceived as one of perfection and it was characterised by infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power. Attempts were also made to solve the problem of its relation with the body by postulating that during the period of its union with matter, these features are obscured, though not destroyed. Thus the *jīva* is capable of expansion and contraction according to the dimensions of the physical body with which it is associated for the time being. It becomes co-extensive with the body. Though, it has no form, it acquires, just, like a lamp which remaining the same illumines the whole of the space enclosed in a small or big room in which it happens to be placed, the size and form of the body wherein it lives ⁶⁵ It is in this way that a *jīva* though formless, is said to occupy space or possess extension, its non-spatial character thus being affected by its association with matter. Owing to the inclinations generated by its past actions a *jīva* comes to inhabit different bodies successively. Whilst the knowledge possessed by the *jīva* may be boundless, that which it actually possesses is fragmentary due to the obscuration caused by *karma*. That is why it suffers and enjoys the fruits of its deeds, and then, in consequence of its *karma* it has acquired, goes through the succession of rebirths, and finally obtains liberation through the destruction of its *karma*. So long as it feels desire, hatred and other detachments, and is fettered by *karma*, it undergoes continual incarnations. This is how the concept of *karma* is brought in relation to the normative and ethical aspects of Jainism. The classification of *jīvas* will be

dealt with in a subsequent section

Ajīva consists of the objects responding the sense-organs. It is in all respects the opposite of *jīva*. It is classified into *rūpa* (those with form, as *pudgala* or matter) and *arūpa* (those without form, as *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*). These five categories constitute the world or *loka* and beyond is the immeasurable infinite called *aloka*.⁶⁶ Space or *ākāśa* is divided into *lokākāśa* (part occupied by the world of things) and *alokākāśa* (space beyond it which is absolutely void and empty). It is in the *lokākāśa* that this universe takes up only a part. Regarding the shape of the universe the Jains have a number of conceptions. Things left together hanging in space would lead to chaos since space by itself is not a condition of motion and rest. Motion and rest are conceived of in terms of *dharma* and *adharma*, the laws by which things are bound to produce a cosmos. Both are devoid of sense-qualities, non-corporeal and co-extensive with *lokākāśa*.⁶⁷ The successive movements of the world are strung on time or *kāla*. A distinction is made between eternal time and relative time, the latter being determined by changes or motion in things. Matter or *pudgala* are figured objects existing in six different forms of different degrees of fineness and visibility and assimilating the qualities of touch, smell, colour and sound. Everything in the world except *ākāśa* is produced from matter. The physical objects apprehended by senses consists of atoms or *paramāṇus*.⁶⁸ This reminds us of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, but while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are as many kinds of atoms as there are elements, the Jains think that the homogeneous atoms produce different elements by varying combinations. There is no God necessary for creation or destruction. The substances by their interaction produce new sets of qualities.

Now let us deal with the *ajīva* categories one by one. We should begin with *kāla* or time which makes possible the continuity, modification, movement, newness and oldness of substances—*varṇanā-parīkṣā-kṛtyāḥ paratvāparatve cakāśasya*.⁶⁹ It is the fourth division of *ajīva* and falls within the *Anastukāya* group because it is not extended in space. It is an indivisible substance present everywhere at the same time.⁷⁰ In a general sense *kāla* however, bears the connotation of time and is divided and subdivided into seconds, minutes, hours, days, years, etc. It is empirical or conventional time (*vyāva-hārika kāla*, also called *samaya*).⁷¹ But in the real sense, *kāla* is indivisible, and it is that which is continually making old things new and

new things old. For example, a child grows up into a young man, and finally dies in old age, and the *jīva* is forced to inhabit afresh in the body of another infant. The *jīva* remains the same, but the power that made its covering body at one time old and then young is *kāla*. Thus the distinction between the old and the new cannot be explained without time. This is a ground on which the existence of time can be inferred. Like space, time is also inferred, though not perceived. Of other grounds of its inference, it may be said that modification or change of states cannot be conceived without time. A mango can be green or ripe at different moments of time. Without postulating time-distinctions we cannot explain this. Similarly, movement also cannot be conceived without the supposition of time. The real time or *paramārthika kāla* is formless and eternal. It cannot have the divisions of *skandha*, *desa* and *pradesa*. Some Jain thinkers do not admit time as a separate substance, but regard it as a mode (*paryāya*) of other substances.⁷²

Ākāśa is that which gives space and makes room for the existence of all extended substances. If a lamp is lighted it is the space or *ākāśa* that makes room for its beams to shine in. Likewise a wall may be the *ākāśa* for nail to be knocked, water may be the *ākāśa* for sugar to be melted, and so forth. *Ākāśa* is divided into *skandha*, *desa* and *pradesa* (explained in the next paragraph under *dharma*). It is of two kinds—*lokākāśa* or space containing the world where the *jīvas* and other substances live and *alokākāśa* which is the space beyond it. Though imperceptible, the existence of *ākāśa* is inferred on the ground that without space substances cannot be extended. Since substances are those that occupy and pervade,⁷³ they require space as a necessary condition. It is the nature of space to give room to any amount of atoms, but this applies only to the *lokākāśa*, the other part of the space being absolutely void. It is also to be observed that space is definitely singular, while *jīvas* and matter are of infinite variety.

Dharma and *adharma* produce all possible conditions of movability and its opposite.⁷⁴ *Dharma* is the principle of motion which helps the *jīva* associated with *pudgala* (matter) to progress just as water helps on the movement of a fish. *Adharma*, likewise, is the substance that helps the immobility of objects, just as the shade of a tree helps a traveller to rest. Without any movement on its part, it first attracts and then keeps motionless the one attracted. Both *dharma* and *adharma* are eternal and formless, both pervading the entire world-

space Both of them are divided into three classes *skandha*, *desa* and *pradesa* The whole is called *skandha*, a part of it is called *desa*, and a portion of that part *pradesa* *Dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāsa* do not exist in their totalities in the lower, the upper and the higher regions of the world, but only in their parts, whereas in the total world they do not exist in part, but as a whole As conditions of motion and rest both *dharma* and *adharma* are passive (*udāsina-kāraṇa*)

Matter in Jain philosophy is called *pudgala* Etymologically it means 'that which is liable to integration and disintegration' It possesses colour, smell, taste and form, and is perceptible to touch It can be consumed or destroyed and it may decay or alter its form It is characterised by five colours (black, green or blue, red, white, yellow), two smells (pleasing and unpleasing), five flavours (pungent, bitter, astringent, sour, sweet), five shapes (circular, globular, triangular, square, oblong) and eight touches (light, heavy, hot, cold, rough, smooth, wet, dry) It is divided into four classes—*skandha*, *desa*, *pradesa*, and *paramāṇu* The smallest parts of matter which cannot be further divided are called *paramāṇus* or atoms Two or more such atoms may combine together to form compounds (*samghāta*)

Our bodies and the objects of nature are such compounds of material atoms Mind, speech and breath are also products of matter ⁷⁵ The masses of matter constituting the world necessarily have to interpenetrate each other, and the units of the one must be touched by those of others In this process the units of time are included, placed on the same level with the others and considered constant Contraction and expansion of matter stand for different densities with the same number of its units We propose to discuss these points more elaborately in the section on atomism

It is therefore evident that the first and the second items of the nine fundamental categories of truth, namely, *jīva* and *ajīva*, were originally meant for a basic understanding of the cosmos Although these two bear stamps of dogmatic assertions, the *a priori* principles by which they have been characterised can easily be detected Early Jain thinkers wanted to understand and explain life and universe in terms of certain observed principles They first made a distinction between animate (*jīva*) and inanimate (*ajīva*) objects and then made a thorough classification of all such objects This was purely a scientific approach In course of this investigation the concepts of

space, time, motion, rest and matter were also taken into account and their character and qualities were analysed. Space was supposed to embrace the perceptible universe and beyond, whereas the remaining four to concern with the expansion of the world.

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES CLASSIFICATION OF JĪVA

We have seen that the early Jain thinkers in order to explain the mysteries of life and universe, first made a distinction between the animate (*jīva*) and inanimate (*ajīva*) objects. These two categories were further analysed and classified and there is reason to believe that the original classification was made from a purely scientific point of view. This was made solely on the basis of the number of sense-organs the *jīva* was supposed to possess.

Ekendriya or one-sensed *jīvas* possess only the sense of touch. They are subdivided into earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, air-bodies and vegetative-bodies. Evidently these are being connected with the aforesaid categories of elements. Early Jain observers saw the emergence of life everywhere from the elements of earth, water, fire, and air. Life manifested in the vegetative forces became a special subject of study, for it provided better scope of observation. Next we come across *dvandriya* or two-sensed *jīvas*, possessing the organs of taste and touch. To this category belong the animalculae, worms, things living in shells, leeches, earth-worms, etc. The *trindriya jīvas* have three senses. Besides the senses of touch and taste, they have the additional sense of smell. In this are various kinds of ants, moths, etc. The *caturndriya jīvas* are possessed of the four senses of touch, taste, smell and sight. To this class belong the wasps, scorpions, mosquitoes, flies, locusts, butterflies, etc. The *pañcendriya jīvas* have another extra sense, namely, that of hearing. To this category are included mainly the quadrupeds and bipeds.

The animals which possess five organs of sense are of two kinds, those which originate by generatio acquivoca (*sammucchanā*, coagulation) and those which are born from the womb. Each of these are again of three kinds—aquatic, terrestrial and aerial. Fishes, tortoises, crocodiles, *makaras* and Gangetic porpoises are the five kinds of aquatic animals. Quadrupeds and reptiles are the two kinds of terrestrial animals. The former are of four kinds—solidungular animals, as horses, etc., biungular animals like cows,

etc , multiungular animals, as elephants, etc , and animals having toes and nails as lions, etc The reptiles are of two kinds—those which walk on their arms, as lizards, etc , and those which move on their breast, as snakes, etc Both are again of many kinds Winged animals are of four kinds—those with membranous wings, those with feathered wings, those with wings in the shape of a box and those which sit on outspread wings Men are of two kinds—originating by coagulation (this is a dogmatic imposition, to this category belong the gods and other supernatural beings) and born from the womb Those who are born from the womb are of three kinds—those living in the Karmabhūmi, those living in the Akarmabhūmi, and those living in the minor continents ⁷⁶

The aforesaid classification is based upon direct observation and keen scientific approach Later on, however, owing to dogmatic influence, and specially as a means to explain and justify the theory of *karma*, we come across different types of classification, the artificial character of which can easily be detected At the first stage, the principle of observation, which is the basis of all scientific enquiries, was given up The five-sensed *jīvas* were classified into four divisions—hell-beings, lower animals, human beings and demigods Other modes of classification led to the following divisions (1) Siddha and Samsārī (male, female, neuter), (2) Nārakī (born in hell), Tiryak (lower animals), Manusya (human beings) and Devatā (spirits, gods, demons), (3) Hell-beings, male lower animals, female lower animals, male human beings, female human beings, male demigods and female demigods, (4) The five subdivisions of the one-senses *jīvas* as well as the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed *jīvas*, thus, making a total of nine classes, (5) the old aforesaid five divisions of one-sensed, etc , subdivided into two groups, *paryāpta* and *aparyāpta*, thus making a total of ten classes, (6) first four orders of the sensed *jīvas*, three subdivisions of the five-sensed *jīvas* (Nārakī, Tiryak, Manusya) and four subdivisions of the gods (Bhavanapati, Vyantara, Jyotska and Vaimānika), making a total of eleven classes, and (7) combination of all these in different ways making a total of twelve, thirteen and fourteen classes ⁷⁷

Such divisions reveal a transitional stage in which we find attempts to bridge the gulf between scientific enquiries and the demands of *a priori* dogmatic principles The latter, however, became more powerful overshadowing the former, and accordingly

the purpose of classification was also changed. In order to substantiate the doctrine of *karma*, a new-fangled principle called *lesyā* was introduced as the basis of classification. By the term *lesyā* is understood the different conditions produced in the *jīva* by the influence of different *karma*. The *lesyās* are six in number, the first three of which are bad and the remaining ones are good. An individual is always a *saleśī* because he is swayed by any of the three good or three bad *lesyās*. Only the Siddhas are free from the influence of the *lesyās*, and so they are called *aleśī*. In between the two there are six classes of *jīvas*, each of the classes being swayed respectively by the influence of black, blue, grey, red, yellow and white *lesyās*. Of the three bad *lesyās*, *kr̥ṣṇa* or black is worst of all. Its taste is as bitter as a *nīm* tree and it smells like a dead cow. So far as the touch is concerned it is rougher than a saw. *Jīvas* under the influence of this *lesyā* are of bad temper, cruel and violent. Any kind of misdeed can be performed by them. The *nīla* or blue *lesyā* tastes more pungent than pepper. Its odour and roughness are same as those of the former. *Jīvas* under the influence of this *lesyā* become envious of others, lazy, gluttonous and wanting in modesty. They think about their own happiness and prevent others from acquiring merit. The *kapota* or grey *lesyā* tastes like an unripe mango, bad in odour and touch as its predecessors. A *jīva* under its influence becomes a thief, a liar, an intriguing person who delights to expose the bad qualities of others and to conceal his own. Of the good *lesyās*, the first is *tejoh* or red, which is like a fragrant flower to smell, a ripe mango to taste and butter to touch. It removes all evil thoughts from the *jīva*. The *padma* or yellow *lesyā* is sweeter than honey so far as the taste is concerned. Through its influence a *jīva* controls anger, pride, deceit and avarice. The *sukla* or white *lesyā* is the best of all. Its taste is sweeter than sugar. Under its influence a *jīva* becomes completely stainless.⁷⁸

The classification according to the *lesyās* although applies to the *jīvas* in general, it was really meant for human beings in particular for the justification of the doctrine of *karma*. Here we have a change in the purpose of classification. According to the Jain texts the *lesyās* are not dependent on the nature of the *jīva*, but on *karma* which accompanies it. Thus the classification is based not on that of the nature or inherent qualities of the thing concerned but on an extra substance supposed to infiltrate it from outside. It is said that the alteration produced on the *jīva*, just as on a crystal by the pres-

ence of the black things, etc., is denoted by the word *lesyā*⁷⁹ Thus, according to above explanation, what produces *lesyā* is a subtle substance accompanying the *jīva* to which are attributed the qualities. The word *lesyā* appears to have been derived from *klesa*.

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES BIOLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ETC

In the *Uttarādhyayana* and the *Sūyagada* we come across the earlier Jain attempts to understand the mysteries of life from a scientific point of view. Although the results of their investigations in some cases have been superficially blended with the *a priori* principles of the doctrine of *karma*, the empiric basis has not been obscured. This basis was evidently due to the classification of living beings and things without life which was a favourite subject of study among the early Jain philosophers. The classification of living beings undoubtedly presupposed the study of biological, physiological and allied sciences.

As we have seen above, the early Jain philosophers divided all living beings into immovable and movable ones. The immovable ones are of three kinds—earth-lives, water-lives and plants. Each of these three categories is again subdivided into subtle and gross from the viewpoint of appearance and into developed and undeveloped from the viewpoint of condition. This also holds good in the case of movable beings like fire-lives or water-lives. The gross and fully developed plants are of two kinds—those having one body in common and those having their individual bodies. To the former category belong *guccha* or shrubby plants, i.e., those from the single root or bulb of which come forth many stalks, e.g. *vrntaka* or *Solanum melongena*, *gulma* or shrubs which are similar to the preceding class but which bring forth twigs or stems, instead of stalks, e.g. *navamālikā* or *Jasminum sambac*; *latā*, i.e., creepers as lotus, pandanus, etc., *vallī* or creeping plants, as gourds, piper betel, etc., and *trna* i.e., grass. Palms, plants or knotty stems or stalks, mushrooms, water-plants, annual-plants and herbs are called plants possessing severally their own bodies. Those plants of which many have one body in common are of many kinds. A list of them is given in the *Uttarādhyayana*⁸⁰. Reference has already been made to the classification of beings with organic bodies on the basis of the number of senses they possess. Animals are broadly divided into invertebrate and vertebrate, the latter being classified into aquatic, terres-

trial and aerial And finally there are men ⁸¹

As regards the origin of plant life, the *Sūyagada*⁸² refers to the seed as its material cause At the same time it is stated that the souls which on account of their *karma* are to be born as trees were previously embodied in earth whence they are transferred by their *karma* to the seed which brings forth the tree Here, however, the extraneous graft of the *karma* elements does not obscure the empiric knowledge "According to the seed and place (of growth) of these plants some beings—born in earth, originated in earth and grown in earth, having in it their birth, origin and growth, being impelled by their *karma*, and coming forth in it on account of their *karma*, growing there in particles of earth, the origin of various things—come forth as trees These living beings feed on the liquid substance of these particles of earth, the origin of various things, these beings consume earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, wind-bodies, bodies of plants, they deprive of life the bodies of manifold movable and immovable beings, the destroyed bodies which have been consumed before, or absorbed by the rind (are), digested and assimilated (by them) And the bodies of these (trees) which bring forth their different parts, are of manifold colours, smells, tastes, touches, forms and arrangement of corporeal particles ⁸³

The *Sūyagada* mentions four different kinds of seeds generated respectively at the top, bottom, knots and stem—as the source of plant life The trees sprung from shoots, sprouts, aerial roots etc , are considered as a class different from those whose offshoots they are Just as the trees themselves are originated in earth and sustained by the substances of the earth so also these parasites are born in the trees and nourished by the sap of the trees In the same way the watery plants like *avaga* (a grassy plant growing in marshy land), *panaga*, *sevāla* (the aquatic plant *Vallisneria*), *kalambuya* (*kadamba*), *kaseruya* (*Scirpus kysoor*), *kacchabhānīya*, *uppala*, *pauma*, *kumuya*, *nalina* (four varieties of lotus), *subhagasonīya*, *pondarīya*, *sayavatta*, *kalhāra*, *kokanada*, *tāmarasa* (these are all varieties of lotus) etc are born in water and sustained by the substances of water The same process also holds good in the cases of creepers, herbs, grain and so on They are all born from seeds in earth or water and developed by consuming earthly or watery substances ⁸⁴

Most of the animals come into existence by the process of generation (*gabbha-vakkanti*, *garbha-vyutkrānti*), but in a few cases we come across the process of manifestation (*uvavāya*) mentioned

above and that of coagulation (*sammucchanā*) The process of manifestation holds good in the cases of the inanimate, near-animate, animate-immovable, and essentially elementary types of beings Later on, however, this conception was revised to mean creation brought about with lightning-like suddenness, without any material basis, evidently in order to explain the origin of the gods and the hell-beings Coagulation or origination by generatio acquivoca pertains to certain beings possessed of one to five senses ⁸⁵ They grow by assimilating the materials in their surroundings Coagulation takes place spontaneously out of existing matter and in open place The beings produced in this way are generally sexless There are beings of manifold origin and both that grow on the animate or inanimate bodies of various movable or immovable creatures These beings are fed on the humours of different movables and immovables For example, the vermin are generated in filthy substances and in the skin of living animals The same holds good in the cases of different earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied and air-bodied creatures Most of the five-sensed beings, however, come into existence by the process of generation, i.e., by male-female union Thus, the aquatic animals of five organs of sense, viz., fishes, tortoises, crocodiles, *makaras* and Gangetic porpoises, are born in this way As long as they are young they feed on the mothers' humours, but when they grow older they eat plants and also movable and immovable beings In the same way come into existence the quadrupeds, terrestrial animals with five organs of sense, viz., solidungular animals, as horses, etc., biungular animals, as cows, etc., multiungular animals, as elephants, etc., and animals having toes with nails, as lions, etc. As long as they are young they feed on their mother's milk, but when they grow older they eat plants or movable and immovable beings Reptiles moving on breast are also produced by union Some of them come out of the eggs thus produced while others come out as living young ones As long as they are young, they live on wind, but when they grow older, they eat plants or movable and immovable beings Five-sensed animals, walking on their arms, viz., iguanas, ichneumons, porcupines, frogs, chamaleons, etc., and also the birds with membraneous wings, with feathered wings, with box-shaped wings and with outspread wings, are also born and sustained in the same way As long as the birds are young, they are hatched by their mother's warmth ⁸⁶

Human embryology is discussed in the first part of the *Tandulaveyāliya* which also deals with human anatomy, structure of human body, the bodily functions and so on. In scattered passages of the *Thāna* we come across the question of age limit in connection with the reproductive power of men and women, the question of miscarriage, the shape and function of the uterus, the six different ways of joining the bones, the six different kinds of the shape of the body and many other allied subjects. In the *Viyāhapannatti* we come across the description of the embryo as the product as well as the cause, the function of the sperm in the womb, the relative contributions of the father and mother to the shaping of the body of the offspring, dislocation of embryo and kindred topics. The *Pannavanā* is also a valuable treatise in which the structure of human body, bodily functions like breathing etc., sexual life, different senses and their materiality, application of the inner senses like speech, etc. have been dealt with. In the *Sūyagada*⁴⁷ we have a significant passage relating to embryology wherein it is stated that the first food an embryo takes in the womb consists in the menstrual blood of the mother together with the sperm of the father. The belief in the efficacy of the menstrual blood in the development of the embryo, has although been proved wrong with the subsequent development of the science of embryology, was once shared universally by the ancient naturalists like Aristotle or Pliny⁴⁸. In the next stage of its development the embryo absorbs the essence of the food taken by the mother since it is inextricably connected with her by two tubes, one of which is for breathing and the other for consuming substances essential for the building up of the body. This has been elaborated in the scattered passages of the *Thāna*, *Viyāhapannatti* and *Tandulaveyāliya* in which it is stated that the flesh, blood and brain come forth from the mother and the bones, marrow, hair and nails from the father and that the sperm lives in the womb from one to twelve hours. The *Sūyagada* passage in question runs as follows: "A man and a woman combine in a cunnus, which are produced by their *karma* and there they deposit their humours. Therein are born souls of different men, viz., of those born in Karmabhūmi or in Akarmabhūmi, or in the minor continents, of Āryas and barbarians, as women or men or eunuchs, according to the semen and blood of the mother and the other circumstances (contingent of their coming to existence). These beings at first feed on the menses of the mother and the semen of

the father, or both combined into an unclean, foul (substance) And afterwards they absorb with a part (of their bodies) the essence of whatever food the mothers take Gradually increasing and attaining to the proper dimensions of a foetus they come forth from the womb, some as males, some as females, some as neuters As long as they are babies, they suck the mother's milk, but when they grow older, they eat boiled rice or gruel or both movable and immovable beings ⁸⁹

Walther Schunring on the basis of the *Tandulaveyāhya*, *Pannavanā* and other canonical works has been able to reconstruct the following in regards to embryology and anatomy and to the functions of the body and sense-organs We are reproducing below the result of his researches which will appear highly interesting The margin of fertility is 55 years with the women and 75 years with the man The fruit remains in the womb for about 277½ days It has four stages of development, each of which has been characterised by the names *kalala*, *abbuya*, *pest* and *ghana* "Its weight amounts to 3 *karisa* (3/4 *pala*) in the first month, in the second it gets solid, in the third it rouses lust within the mother, in the fourth it makes the limbs swell, in the fifth its extremities and its head develop (*pañca pindiyāo*), in the sixth its gall and its blood, in the seventh its veins, muscles, vessels, nerves, pores, hairs and nails, and in the eighth the child is complete The sex depends on the preponderance of either sperm or blood, in case neither prevails sexlessness will result A sexless fruit lies in the centre of the mother, but a male on the right and a female on the left side Its position and its condition are in accordance with the mother ⁹⁰ From the *Tandulaveyāhya* (35 B), we learn that the human being has 700 veins "Starting from the navel 160 each extend upwards, downwards into the legs, downwards into the abdomen, and horizontally, 25 each contain mucus and gall, 10 contain sperm Furthermore, there are 900 snees, 500 muscles, 900 vessels, 99 millions hairpores, not counting the hair of the skull and the beard, and 33 million including the latter Some figures concerning women and hermaphrodites slightly differ in giving them 670 and 680 veins respectively and 470 and 480 muscles respectively Moreover, we learn that the male is furnished with 5 and the female with 6 inner organs (*kodha*) and with the former we find 9 and with the latter 11 apertures ⁹¹ From the same text (27b) we find that there are six different ways of joining the bones (*samghayana*), but it is only the *chevattha*-joint which pertains

to human beings. The shape of the body is also of six kinds.⁹²

As regards the bodily functions, breathing has been divided as inward and outward (Malayagiri's *Prajñāpanātikā*, 220b). The intervals of breathing vary from animal to animal (*Pannavanā*, 7). "As we learn from (*Viy*, 274b) in contrast to *Tand*, 3b, the frequency of breathing is the same with the embryo as it is with the fully developed man, and he will retain this frequency for the whole time of his life i.e., 3773 in one *muhutta*. So then, respiration (*ussāsa-nissāsa* or *pānu*) comes to be a time-measure. While the breathing of beings having two to five senses was accepted as an established fact (*jānāmo pāsāmo*), it seemed problematic with regard to elemental beings and plants, but it is explicitly stated to apply to them as well (*Viy*, 109a) and moreover, (*Viy*, 109b) continues in saying that 'breathing' embraces all possible matter (*davvāim*).⁹³ We have already had the occasion to refer to beings with different kinds of senses and their classification. The various manifestations of elements, all plants and such beings furnished with more senses than one are also listed in the *Pannavanā* in which the materiality of the sense-organs is referred to by the term *davvindiya*. We have also another conception called *bhāvindiya* denoting senses in their conditional state, meant for explaining the faculties of speech, etc.

The Jain botanical, zoological and physiological conceptions are not very different from those of other branches of Indian thinking. For the sake of comparison some aspects of these sciences as are found in the non-Jain sources may be referred to in this connection. Caraka and Suśruta have classified all the trees and plants into four groups: *Vanaspati*, which produces fruits without producing flower, *Vānaspatya*, which produces flowers as well as fruits, *Osadhi*, which dies after producing the fruits, and *Virudha*, the stems of which scatter all around. To the fourth category also belong *latā* (creepers) and *gulma* (shrubs) or cartaceous plants. Grass (*trna*) and shrubs (*avatāna*) are included in a separate category by Pīśastapāda. In Gunaratna's commentary on the *Saddarsana-samuccaya* the following aspects of plant life are recorded: infancy, gradual development, sleep and waking, response to external stimulus, catching up wounds and their healing, assimilation of food in accordance with the nature of the soil, diseases and getting out of them. Udayana also saw among the plants the facts of life and death, sleep and waking, disease and effects of drugs. According to the Jains, the generated are born either in the egg (*andaya*), or

with the chorion (*jarāyuya*) or as living young (*poṇaya*) Caraka likewise mentions four kinds of generated beings—*jarāyuya*, born from uterus, e g , men and quadrupeds, *andaṇa*, born from egg, e g , fish, reptiles and birds, *svedaṇa*, born from moisture, e g , worms, flies, mosquitoes, etc , and *udbhūṇa*, born from plant body The boneless (*anasthika*) and bloodless beings, the germs, etc belong to the asexual category Suśruta and Nāgārjuna who made extensive study of the snakes have referred to six kinds of ants, six kinds of flies, five kinds of gnats, thirty kinds of scorpion and sixteen kinds of spiders According to Caraka and Suśruta the essence of food produces semen and blood The circulation of blood within the body is performed by the heart through different types of veins A human body has seven hundred nerve-channels of which fourteen are most important The movement of the body is caused by the winds which are of five kinds The embryo in the womb is caused by the sperm of the semen through a series of chemical actions and reactions The body begins to take its shape in the third month and it gets more or less complete in the fourth month The major and connecting bones, veins, nails and hairs grow in the sixth month

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES DISEASES AND MEDICINES

The Jain investigations in this field also began with a scientific spirit although, as had happened in the case of other sciences, the doctrine of *karma* ultimately came to take the lead Thus, for instance, we may refer to the legend of Umbaradatta which is found in the *Vivāgasūṭya* This man was afflicted with all kinds of horrible diseases Explaining the cause of his getting afflicted the text says that he was a doctor in his previous existence and as a doctor he had prescribed meat-diet to a patient, thus causing the killing of numerous living creatures Hence he would be born again in worse incarnations like dog, etc , but finally he would be born as a merchant Here the cause of his illness is ascribed to the deeds he performed in his previous life

Still, the scientific spirit behind the diagnosis of diseases could not completely be stamped out "As to the causes of diseases *Thāna*, 446a lists the following nine a sedentary way of living (*accāsanā*), bad food, too much sleep, too little sleep, consupation, anuria, marching (*addhāna-gamana*), sitophobia, and addiction to sensual enjoyments (*indri'attha-vikovanayā*) The subdivision (*Thāna*, 265a)

into *varyaputtiya*, and *smbhaya*-disease and such in which different factors referred to in this connection takes a share, goes back to the all-Indian system ¹⁹⁴ In Caraka, as we have seen above, five kinds of wind (*vāyu*) have been referred to as the cause of all bodily movements. These are *prāna* which controls the mechanism of respiration and vocal cord, *apāna* which controls the digestive faculties, *vyāna* which controls the muscular actions, *samāna* which generates heat in the body and *udāna* which maintains the body in general. The eaten food becomes a pulp in the stomach, and by the action of *samāna* wind goes to the gall bladder where it is saturated by the acid coming out from the gall bladder, and thus becomes the vital fluid which ultimately transforms into blood circulated by the heart and purified by the lungs. Thus the roots of all diseases are to be sought in the functions of wind, gall bladder and heart (respiration, growth of phlegm, etc.) These views were entertained by the Jains also.

Sixteen different diseases are mentioned in the *Āyāra* ¹⁹⁵ They are boils, leprosy, consumption, sickness, blindness, stiffness, lameness, humpbackedness, dropsy, dumbness, apoplexy, eye-disease, trembling, crippledness, elephantiasis, and diabetes. A similar list is found in *Vivāgasūya*, 40b. "Here we come across physicians trying to practise their profession in many different ways. In this connection we may note that, as *Thāna*, 427 has it, the main subjects of therapeutics are the following eight: the science of children's complaints (*kumārabhīcca*), the science of internal diseases (*kāya-tigicchā*), surgery, both small and large (*salāi* and *salla-hattā*), toxicology (*jangoli*), psychotherapeutics (*bhūya-vijjā*), the science of cautery (*kharatanta*) and elixirology (*rasāyana*). They nearly conform with eight parts of the so-called *Āyurveda* ¹⁹⁶

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES ASTRONOMY

Jain studies in astronomy and astral physics are recorded mainly in the *Sūrapannatti* and also in the *Jambuddīva-pannatti*. The *Candapannatti*, which is counted as the seventh Uvanga and which deals with the astronomical theories in terms of the moon, is completely identical in all the available manuscripts with the *Sūrapannatti*. Though in its present form the former is embodied in the latter, there is reason to believe that originally the *Candapannatti* was a separate text which preceded the other one. The *Sūrapannatti* deals

with the orbits which the sun traverses during the year, with the rising and setting of the sun, with the speed of the course of the sun through each of its 184 circuits, with the measure of the shadow at various seasons, the connection of the moon with the stellar bodies, with the waxing and waning of the moon, with the velocity of different kinds of heavenly bodies, and so on. In the *Jambuddivapannatti*, we have an astronomical section, the contents of which to some extent corresponds with the *Sūrapannatti*. Besides, this work deals with the visibility, presence and temperature of the sun, circles of the stars and their mutual distances, calculations of year, months and dates, etc.

The *Sūrapannatti* is divided into 20 *pāhuda-s*. It begins with the *mandalas*, i.e. narrower and wider circles formed by the two suns around Mount Meru according to the seasons. Then it goes on to deal with the horizontal way of either sun through the quarters of the compass, their transition from one circle over to the next, the distance covered by one sun in a moment, the range illuminated by the suns and the moons, the figures formed by their light, the atoms of the *Mandara* which are impervious to the light of the sun, the time in which the power of the sun's rays remains constant, the course of sun in relation to day, night and other earthly time measures, process of the earth's temperature effected by the sun, and the length of the shadow depending on the height and the light of the sun. All these have been the subject matter from the first to the ninth *pāhuda*. In the tenth and in most of the following *pāhudas* the moon and the stars dominate. This portion was probably the original *Candapannatti* which contains the list of 28 stars, the duration of their conjunction with the moon, the moments and portions of day and night when the conjunction starts, the relationship of the stars with the months, the new-moon, the full-moon days, the numbers and shapes of individual stars, the stars as guides of the months and as the measures of the shadow cast on them by the sun, the position of the stars in course of the moon, the orbit of the moon, the division of time, the conception of *yuga*, the kinds of the years, the waxing and waning of the moon, the circles formed by the movement of the moon, the bright and dark halves of the month, the velocity of the moon, sun, stars and planets, the altitude of the stars, the innermost, outermost, topmost and lowest stars relative to Jambudvīpa, the velocity of the stars, their power, their mutual distance, their duration and relative number, the fixed stars beyond

the human world and so on ⁹⁷

It should be remembered in this connection that although the astronomical studies of the Jains included numerous subjects and categories, owing to the material difficulties and lack of technological development, the fantastic growth of the speculative and imaginative aspects could not be checked. As had happened in the case of other sciences, here too the *a priori* doctrinal principles obscured the limited scope of scientific postulations, as a result of which the suns and moons, the stars and planets, become ultimately powerful deities for serving religious purposes. But, in spite of such shortcomings and inadequacies, it can safely be asserted that the Jain thinkers at least tried to explain in their own way the facts relating to the waxing and waning of the moon, the equinoxes, the relative existence of the suns, moons and the known stars, the points of zodiac and other kindred subjects. They came to the conclusions that the astronomical events take place at fixed and regular intervals of time, that in the beginning of the ages the planets remain in the same line, that the stars and planets have a uniform linear motion but the uneven distances are responsible for the varying rates of their angular motion and that there are more than one sun and moon. It is known to all students of Indian history that as a science astronomy had a specialised growth in India which took into account even the Greek methods of calculation. Although its scope was limited owing to the technological inadequacies of the ancient and medieval period, its role was glorious. Needless to say that the Jain contribution to this branch of knowledge was by no means insignificant.

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRIES ATOMISM

We have already had the occasion to refer to some aspects of the Indian conception of atomism which was enriched mainly by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Jains. The Jains were probably the earliest thinkers in India to formulate the atomic theory. This theory was formulated in ancient Greece by Demokritos, Empedokles and others. The Sanskrit equivalent of the term atom is *anu*. The word is found in the Upanisads without any scientific significance, however. The Jain doctrine of atomism may be summarised as follows. The matter or *pudgala* has certain inalienable features, but in spite of this, the transmutation of the elements like earth, water, fire and

air is quite possible. Each of these elements has a structure, and they are divisible into atoms. The atoms are all of the same kind, but they can give rise to the infinite variety of things. Matter produced by the combination or compound of the atoms are called *skandha* to which category all perceivable objects belong. Our bodies and the objects of nature are such compounds of material atoms. Mind, speech and breath are also products of matter and hence constituted by the atoms.⁹⁸

In the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*⁹⁹ it is stated that the atom is eternal as is the substance of which it is the ultimate particle. There are two grades of atoms, smooth (*smṛgdha*) and rough (*ruksa*). One smooth atom cannot combine with another of the same grade, but it can be combined with a rough one. This, however, does not hold good in the case of rough atoms, for they can combine with each other belonging to the same grade. The number of the atoms is infinite. Their combination is revealed in the *pañnāma* or transformation into the being of an object. Aggregates come about through different processes of amalgamation. The aggregates belong to the categories of geometrical and non-geometrical formations. The atoms are arranged in two or in three dimensional order in the circular, orbicular, triangular and square formations, but in the case of linear formation they are arranged in a one dimensional order. The formation of aggregates result in the substance of a second order, i.e., the material masses called *driavya*. There are eight kinds of combination through which the substances are shaped. The qualities of touch, smell, taste or colour which characterise a material substance are possessed by the atoms and their compounds. Sound along with light, heat, shadow, darkness, union, disunion, fineness, grossness, shape etc. are produced by accidental modifications of matter and hence constituted by the atoms. Since matter is qualitatively indefinite and quantitatively undetermined, it may increase or decrease in volume without any addition or loss. When it is in subtle state, any number of its particles may occupy the space of one gross atom.

Of other systems of Indian philosophy it is in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that we come across the theory of atomism in which it is stated that all composite objects of the world are formed by the combination of atoms. There are nine kinds of substances, namely, earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The first five are called physical elements (*pañcabhūta*) since each of them possesses a spe-

cific quality which can be experienced by an external sense. Of these nine substances only earth, water, fire and air can be reduced to material atoms. These are eternal and partless. They can neither be produced nor destroyed. But the compounds made of them are non-eternal. The differences between the Jain and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika viewpoints regarding atomism may be summarised as follows. According to the Jains, the atoms are all of the same kind while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that they are different in kind. The atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas seeks to explain that part of the world which is supposed to be non-eternal. The five substances of ether, time, space, mind and soul do not come within the purview of their atomic theory, but the Jain scheme is more comprehensive which includes many other categories. The Jains also differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on the point that all composite objects of the world, formed by the combination of atoms, must have an intelligent maker.

JAIN COSMOGRAPHY

Cosmography as a general plan of the cosmos also comes within the purview of philosophy for very practical reasons. The basis of Jain cosmographical speculations was not a generally adopted theory. Widely different ideas about this problem seem to have been current. There are reasons to believe that in this field of study, the Jain ideas were greatly influenced by the contemporary Brahmanical and Buddhist ideas. It should also be pointed out that, apart from what was known about the visible world, the detailed knowledge of the structure of the universe, was generally believed by the Jains to have been reached by contemplation. The main sources of our information on this subject are the cosmographic sections of the *Thāna* and *Samavāya*, the first and second *paṭas* of the *Pannavanā*, the third section of the *Jvābhigama* with the supposed interpolated text *Divasāgarapannatti* which opens with a description of the Jambudvīpa and deals in particular with the ring continents and oceans, and the *Jambuddhivapannatti* which deals with Jambuddhiva in general, its enclosure with the gates therein, the continent of Bharaha and the remaining continents of Jambuddhiva and the trenches separating them, statistical survey of the geographical details of Jambuddhiva, visibility, presence and temperature of the suns, circles of the stars, and so on.¹⁰⁰

As we have seen above, according to Jain conception the universe is situated in the space which is divided into two parts—*lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. The latter is not properly defined in the Jain texts but is described as an absolute void impenetrable to anything, material and spiritual. The *lokākāśa* is composed of two entities or essences called *dharma* and *adharma*, the substrata of motion and rest (see above), conceived as the conditions for the presence of all existing beings. It is in this *lokākāśa* that our visible universe takes up only a part. According to Vinayavijaya's *Lokaṇṇakāśa*,¹⁰¹ the universe looks like a human being standing with feet apart and the arms akimbo. In one such conception the said form is figured as a rotating spindle which rests on the half of another bigger spindle,¹⁰² or as they describe it, three cups, of which the lowest is inverted, and the uppermost meets at its circumference the middle one.¹⁰³ In another such conception, the said form is divided into three parts, the upper, middle and lower, the lower universe having the shape of a *vetrāsana* (trapezium pyramid), the middle one that of the upper part of a standing *mrdanga* (a kind of tabor) and the upper one that of a *mrdanga*.¹⁰⁴ This has been explained as follows: "Three pyramids with rectangular base but with tops chopped off are put one above another, the smaller faces of the lower and middle ones and the bigger faces of the upper and middle ones touching together."¹⁰⁵ In the hip or according to another scheme, at the vibratory place of the spindle, the disc of the earth is placed. Below the earth are the hells and above it are the upper regions.

According to the Jain tradition, the length of the universe varies from point to point, but its height and breadth are respectively 14 and 7 *rajjus*. The *rajjū* is a linear astrophysical measure which denotes the expanse which the gods traverse in six months, their speed being 2,057,152 *yojanas* in one movement.¹ The legs of the human-shaped universe are 7 *rajjus*, the waist 1 *rajjū*, the upper portion 5 *rajjus* and the head 1 *rajjū*, and all these measure constitute 14 *rajjus*, the proposed measure of the height.¹⁰⁶ The entire area of the universe is 343 cubic *rajjus*.¹⁰⁷ The world from the ground level to the hells below rests on a layer of hard water, which again rests on a layer of thick air and so on, 20,000 *yojanas* thick. The Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions are not, however, same in regard to the description of the universe, but they are more or less similar.

Below the earth-disc are seven lower regions, containing millions

of hells, one below the other These are Ratnaprabhā Śarkarāprabhā, Vālukāprabhā, Paṅkaprabhā, Dhumraprabhā, Tamahprabhā and Mahātamahprabhā They are otherwise called Dharmā, Vamśā, Śailā, Añjanā, Aristā, Mādhayā and Mādhavī Above these seven regions is the disc of the earth with its numerous continents in concentric circles separated by rings of oceans Above the earth are situated the heavenly regions styled *vimānas* consisting of twelve *kalpas*, viz , Saudharma, Aśāna, Sanatkumāra, Mahendra, Brahmāloka, Lantaka, Mahāśukra Sahasrāra, Ānata, Pranata, Āraṇa and Acyuta, the nine *grāveyakas*, i e , the heavens forming the neck of the human shaped universe, and five *amuttaras*, viz , Vjaya, Vajrayanta Jayanta, Aparājita, and Sarvārthasiddha ¹⁰⁸ Thus there are 26 heavens placed one above the other Above the highest heaven called Sarvārthasiddha is situated Isatpragbhāra, the place which is the final resort of all the souls ¹⁰⁹

Above the seven lower regions containing millions of hells is the disc of the earth consisting of seven continents Jambudvīpa, Dhātaki, Puskara, Vārunivara, Kṣīravara, Ghrtavara and Ksudravara These are surrounded respectively by seven oceans Lavanoda, Kāloda, Puskaroda, Varunyoda, Kṣīroda, Ghrtoda, and Ksaudroda It appears that originally the Jain authors thought of only seven island continents, the number being gradually increased by later writers The *Tiloyapannatti*¹¹⁰ speaks of 16 inner and 16 outer islands forming the earth and each of them has an ocean beyond it Besides the seven island continents mentioned above the following inner islands are mentioned in the said work Nandīśvara, Arunavara, Arunabhāsa, Kundalavara, Śāṅkhavara, Rucakavara, Bhujagavara, Kuśavara, and Krauñcavara The last two names are borrowed from the Puranic lists The 16 outer islands are Manahsilā, Haritāla, Sindura, Śyāma, Añjahavara, Hingula, Rūpya, Kāñcanaka, Vajravara, Vaidurya, Nāgavara, Bhūtavara, Yakṣavara, Devavara, Ahīndravara, and Svayambhūramana In later Jain works more names were added such as Aruna, Arunavara, Arunavarābhāsa, Kundala, Kundalavara, Kundalavarābhāsa, Śāṅkha, Śāṅkhavara, Śāṅkhavarābhāsa, Rucaka, Rucakavara, Rucakavarābhāsa, Hara, Haravara, Haravarābhāsa, Kanakāvali, Kaṇakāvalivara, Kanakāvalivarābhāsa, Ratnāvali, Ratnāvalivara, Ratnavāvalivarābhāsa, Mukutāvali, Mukutāvalivara, Mukutāvalivarābhāsa, Ājina, Ājinavara, Ājinavarābhāsa, Sūrya, Sūryavara, Sūryavarābhāsa, Deva, Nāga, Yakṣa, Bhūta, Svayambhūramana and so on Note, how the number of the island

continents is arbitrarily increased by suffixing the expressions *vara* and *varāvabhāsa*

The central continent Jambudvīpa covers half of the continental ring. Its diameter is 100,000 *yojanas* and its total area 316,227 *yojanas*, 3 *gavyutas*, 128 *dhanus* and near 14 *angulas*. It is surrounded by some sort of wall, 8 *yojanas* in height. At the base it is 12 *yojanas* wide and at the pinnacle it is four. It is built by stone slabs, each 1/2 *yojana* in height, and 506 *dhanus* in breadth. This pillar is made by precious articles. The base is made of diamond, the supports of *nīsta*, the beams of gold bars, and the bolts of rubies. Beyond this pillar, is situated the paradise garden, so large and beautiful that only Indra can think of it. The wall has four gates, Vijaya, Vajrayanta, Jayanta and Aparājita the first gate being in the east. The gates are all square, 8 *yojanas* in height, width and length respectively. The eastern gate Vijaya is at the mouth of the river Śītā, while Jayanta, the western, at the mouth of the Śītodā. Each gate is protected by a semi-divine being.

The entire Jambudvīpa is divided by six mountains from which are created seven unequal divisions or zones. The mountains are called *varsaparvata* or *kulaparvata*, the designating terms being surely adopted from the Brahmanical Purāṇas. The land divisions, thus created out of the mountains, are called *varsa* or *kṣetra*. The names of the mountains, stretching from south to north, are Himavat, Śikharin, Mahāhimavat, Rukmin, Nisadha, and Nīla. The Himavat and the Śikharin are made of gold, the Mahāhimavat and the Rukmin of silver, and Nisadha and Nīla of beryl. The breadth and height of these mountains are calculated having taken the southernmost zone or *varsa* as the measuring unit. The measurements are given in details in the *Jambuddivapannatti* and in the *Trailokyaḍīpikā*. The southernmost *varsa* or zone being the first, the second is its double, the third redouble and so on. The height of the Himavat being 100 *yojanas*, that of other mountains should be calculated according to the same process.¹¹¹

Each mountain range has a number of peaks. The Himavat and the Śikharin contain eleven and the rest nine peaks each. Every mountain has its first or eastern summit a temple known as Siddhāyatana or Siddhakūta, and that of the Himavat is 50 *yojanas* long, 50 broad and 35 high, and taking this as the unit of measurement the area of other Siddhāyatanas can easily be calculated according to the process mentioned above. Every mountain has in

its middle a vast lake and that which lies in the middle of the Himavat is known as Pauma or Padma. Its length is 100 *yojanas*, breadth 500 and depth 10, the banks made of silver, the surrounding wall, of diamond-decked stone, and the bottom of gold. In the middle of the lake rises up a big lotus, one *yojana* in diameter, which is the abode of the goddess Śrī. Around it there are several lotus rings.

The Jambudvīpa is watered by 14 big rivers. Of these the Gangā, the Sindhu and the Rohita flow from the aforesaid Padma lake on mount Himavat, the Rohitāmsā and the Harikrāntā from the Mahāpadma lake on the Mahāhimavat, the Haritā and the Śītodā from the Tingiccha lake on the Nisadha, the Śītā and the Nārī from the Keśarin lake on the Nila, the Narakāntā and the Rūpyakūlā from the Mahāpundarīka lake on the Rukmin, and the Suvarnakūlā, the Raktā and the Raktodā from the Pundarīka lake on the Śikhari. The courses all the rivers are similar. The Jain writers who apparently depended on the Purāṇic conception of Jambudvīpa held that it was divided into seven *varsas* which were Bharata (not Bhārata), Airāvata, Haimavata, Hari, Hiranyavata, Rāmyaka, and Videha. Airāvata, the central town of which is Vidyādhara and which is watered by the Raktā and Raktodā, stands next to Bharata, if viewed from the southern corner of the Jambudvīpa. Haimavata, watered by the Rohitā and Rohitāmsā, lies to the north of Himavat. Its central mountain is called Śābdāpati. Hiranyavata, the central mountain of which is Malayavat or Mālavanta and which is watered by the Suvarnakūlā and Rūpyakūlā, lies to the south of the Śikhari. Hari-*varsa* also contains a mountain called Vikatāpati and it is watered by the Haritā and Harikrāntā. Likewise in the centre of the Rāmyaka *Varṣa* is situated the mountain called Gandhāpati and it is watered by the Narakāntā and Nārī. The middle most and the biggest *Varṣa* is Videha at the centre of which stands Mount Meru or Mandāra, which has 16 names. To the north of Meru, between the Gandhamādana and Malayavat is the Uttarakuru country and to the south, between the Saumanasa and Vidyutprabha is Devakuru. To the east of Meru lies Pūrva-videha and, to the west, Aparavideha. These four divisions contain a number of provinces, each having a town, a number of mountains and a few rivers. Bhāratavarṣa or India proper lies to the south of Himavat.¹¹²

THE UNFOUNDED SPECULATIONS AND THEIR ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Thus in the cosmography of the Jains we come across a pronounced departure from the spirit of scientific enquiry. Also in other cases there was infiltration of *a priori* principles and imaginative speculations, but their scope was limited both in extent and in degree. However, the fact cannot be denied that there was an intellectual conflict among the Jain philosophers themselves regarding the formation of specific principles concerning the problems of life and universe. This conflict was between objective enquiries on the one hand and fanciful imaginative contemplation on the other, and eventually it was the latter that came to dominate the entire field. In fact there was originally no difference between science and metaphysics in Jainism, but the latter ultimately emerged out as a speculative philosophy and set itself to the task of attributing the transcendental situations above and behind the physical universe. It pretended to judge the reality of things by a standard, the very existence of which was not proved.

The departure from the field of objective enquiries to that of pure imagination was facilitated by the introduction of numerous divine and semi-divine beings and the doctrine of *karma*. In all probability these two factors were co-existent with Jainism since its very inception, but at the initial stages of its development their scope was limited. The inclusion of a number of divine beings within the framework of a basically atheistic religion like Jainism has been explained in the second chapter. It was due to an unavoidable historical process. Originally they were the suppressed non-Vedic deities whose cults were naturally revived due to the anti-Vedic bias of early Jainism. In course of time they were multiplied, given a variety of names and epithets and also suitable areas in the cosmos to live in. They did not, however, create any serious problem in regard to the question of atheism, because they were no more than idealised human beings, intended to serve some ethical purpose. They were neither omniscient nor omnipotent. A great god was as subject to *karma* as an earthworm. Evil deeds would ultimately cause his fall from the world of gods, ultimately to become an animal. The insect could, by good deeds in successive births, be reborn to human and then to divine estate, though even that did not free him from the power of his further *karma*.

Thus more significant is the doctrine of *karma* which ultimately

has become the driving force of Jainism. Every being of this vast universe is guided by its own *karma*. The heavenly bodies, and even the gods, are not exceptions. Owing to the inclinations generated by its past *karma*, a *jīva* comes to inhabit different bodies successively. Trees, plants and animals come into existence owing to the *karma* or actions of their previous lives. The same also holds good in the case of human beings. Every event of the life of an individual is due to the *karma* of his previous life. Birth and death, pleasure and pain, disease and suffering, everything is dependent on this peculiar concept of *karma*. Because of good or evil *karma* a living creature would be reborn into any species, particularly suited to and measured by the action, from the vilest insect to a god. This emphasis on the doctrine of *karma* was certainly due to the corresponding emphasis on the ethical values. These values were so strongly upheld by the Jains that *pāpa* (vice) and *punya* (virtue) became two important categories of the nine fundamental truths of Jainism (*navatattva*). The conception of *karma* is, however, older than Jainism itself. Its origin may even be traced to the growth of agricultural societies. Its basis lay in the maxim: As you sow, so shall you reap. "Karma" therefore was a religious extension of an elementary concept of abstract value, independent of the individual, caste, or tribe. It could grow and ripen like a seed planted in the previous season, or mature like a debt, while it never failed to pay in exact proportion. It can be seen how this would appeal to peasants and traders, even to the Śūdra who might thus aspire to be a reborn king.¹¹⁹

THE NINE FUNDAMENTALS AND THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Before dealing with the Jain doctrine of *karma* it is necessary to have a fair idea about the nine fundamentals on which the entire Jain philosophy, evidently in its sophisticated form, rests.¹²¹ These fundamentals are closely connected with the Jain conception of *karma*. The doctrine of *karma*, as we shall see in the concluding part of this work, is common to most of the philosophical systems of India. This *a priori* doctrine has been universally accepted in Indian thought. But to the Jains it has a special significance. It is the key to the understanding of all the unexplained facts of life and universe. Ordinarily *karma* means human action and is usually conceived by the Indian philosophers as leading to the good or bad results in this

life or in another which the performer of the action is to enjoy or suffer. But in Jainism *karma* is conceived as something essentially material which gets attached to the soul just as dust gets attached to the cloth. Hence the highest goal of the Jains is to get rid of all old *karma* and to stop the influx of any new one.

Jīva and Ajīva The nine fundamentals of the Jain doctrines are Jīva, Ajīva, Punya, Pāpa, Āsrava, Samvara, Bandha, Nirjarā, and Moksa. We have already had occasion to deal with the categories of Jīva and Ajīva. *Karma* is the link between the Jīva and its empiric outfit, the body. *Karma* by its association with the Jīva soils its nature and this consequent lapse of the Jīva from its pure state is called bondage. Not to speak of the animals and plants, the Jains think that everything of the world—even the four elements—are bodies of the soul and hence can be obscured by the defilement of *karma*. The Jains make a distinction between two states of matter or *puṅgava* into subtle and gross. Things perceived consists of gross matter while the subtle matter is super-sensuous. It is this subtle matter that gets transformed into different kinds of *karma*. One of the Ajīva categories thus produces *karma* which by its influx causes defilement of the Jīva. "The defilement of the souls takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into *karma* pours into the soul (i.e., Jīva), this is called influx (*āsrava*). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passion (*kaśāya*) which acts like a viscous substance and retain the subtle matter coming into contact with the soul, the subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it, this is called binding (*bandha*) of *karma*-matter. The subtle matter 'bound' or amalgamated by the soul is transformed into eight kinds of *karma*, and form a kind of subtle body (*kāmana-śarīra*) which clings to the soul in all its migrations and future births and determines the individual state and lot of that particular soul. Now, when a particular *karma* has produced its effect in the way described, it is discharged or purged from the soul. This process of 'purging off' is called *nirjarā*. When this process goes on without interruption, *karma*-matter will, in the end, be discharged from the soul, and the latter now freed from the weight which had kept it down before the time of its liberation (for matter is heavy and *karma* is material), goes up in a straight line to the top of the universe where the liberated souls dwell."¹¹

Punya and Pāpa This conception of *karma* follows directly from

Jain ethics Meritorious actions are needed for extinguishing the existing *karma* and to stop its further influx. Abstinence from sinful acts also helps this process. The two fundamentals of *Punya* and *Pāpa* are concerned with these acts. We have already referred to the nine kinds of *Punya* and eighteen kinds of *Pāpa*.¹¹⁶ There are forty-two ways in which the reward of *Punya* can be reaped. Birth as a human being is itself a reward of merit. The higher reward one obtains when he is born of a high family. Beauty, vigour, strength, happiness, etc. are different forms of rewards. More important rewards consist in having birth in different categories of gods, but the highest reward which a man can seek is that which leads him to become a *Tirthamkara*. Likewise there are eighty-four consequences of sins. It has evil effects on knowledge, intellect, sight, slumber and so on. It effects the beings to be born in the next incarnation in many ways. It also results in personal ugliness of many kinds, in the loss of bodily strength and in various deformities in the human body. Certain sins condemn the soul that commits them to be born in the next life in the class of degraded species. Other sins prevent the soul from acquiring the full number of powers and senses that belong to the class in which it is born.

The actions of mind, speech and body continually produce certain subtle *karma* matters which pour themselves into the *Jīva* and stick thereby coming into contact with its passions. These passions are collectively called *kaṣāya*. They act like viscous substances in retaining the inpouring *karma* matter. They consist of four sins—anger, conceit, intrigue and greed (*krodha*, *māna*, *māyā* and *lobha*). Each of these four sins is taken into account from four viewpoints—*anantānubandhī* (when the sin is cherished throughout the whole life), *apratyākhyāna* (when it is cherished for a year), *pratyākhyāna* (when it is cherished only for four months) and *sañjavalāna* (when it is cherished for a while). Besides these sixteen categories of *kaṣāya* there are nine others making a total of twenty-five. These are laughter (*hāsyā*), pleasure (*rati*), disgust (*arati*), fear (*bhaya*), grief (*soka*) and four other minor faults. Such moods as laughing, pleasure, fear, grief and loathing do not, however, count among the chief passions and are called *nokaṣāya* for that reason. Sexual consciousness as man or woman or neuter has also been referred to in this connection. The *kaṣāyas* result in tying men to the cycle of rebirth. They cannot be removed except by a control of the senses. Their motives are said to be space, object and body.

They depend on impressions made by all colours, different kinds of taste and smell, and the four sensations—warm, cold, soft and rough—and these they have in common with the central offences and all other sins ¹¹⁷

In Hemacandra's *Yogasāstra*¹¹⁸ certain rules of moral behaviour are recorded under the *cantra*, or cessation from doing all that is evil, in which we have an interpretation of the celebrated five vows. Certain external rules of conduct are also included in this category—*iriyā* (precaution while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc.), *bhāsā* (to talk pleasantly), *śana* (to beg alms in proper monastic manner), *dānasamiti* (inspection of seats to avoid transgressions), *utsargasamiti* (careful movement of the body), *manogṛpti* (to remove all false thoughts), *vāggṛpti* (absolute silence), *kāyagṛpti* (steadiness of the body), etc. ¹¹⁹ Duties for householders are *digvraha* (to desist from injuring living beings), *bhogapabhogamāna* (to desist from drinking liquors, etc.), *anarthadanda* consisting of *apadhyāna*, *pāpopadesa*, *himsopakāṇḍāna* (desisting from evil, injurious and violent acts directly and indirectly), *pramādācarana* (desisting from excitement), and *sikṣāpadavratā* consisting of *sāmayikavratā* (to treat all beings equally), *desāvakāśikavratā*, *posadhavratā* (different kinds of restrictions) and *atithisamvibhāgavratā* (to make gifts to guests). No kind of asceticism (*tapas*) can be of any good until the mind is purified. When a man learns to look upon all beings with equality (*saṃatva*) he can conquer *rāga* and *dveṣa*. In order to effect this equality he should have to think the transitoriness (*anityatā*) of all things. He should think that even the gods are subject to death. The world is full of misery and men are differentiated from one another by the *karma* they acquire individually. He should think that the practice of the ten virtues of self-control (*samyama*), truthfulness (*sunṛta*), purity (*śauca*), chastity (*brahma*), greedlessness (*akīṃcanatā*), asceticism (*tapas*), forbearance (*ksānti*), mildness (*mārdava*), sincerity (*vyatā*), and emancipation (*mukti*) can alone help in the achievement of the highest goal.

Āsrava. All kinds of *jīvas*, as we have seen above, have to suffer the worldly experiences in diverse spheres of life on account of the *karma* they acquire individually. We have also seen that *karma* is the transformation of subtle matter. It is constituted by certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter. The influx of these *karma* particles into the soul is called *āsrava* in Jainism. Just as water flows into a boat through a hole in it, so also the *āśravas* represent the channels

or modes through which the *karmas* enter the soul

Āsrava is broadly classified into *bhāvāsrava* and *karmāsrava*, the former denoting thought-activities through which the *karma* particles enter the soul, and the latter, their actual entrance. The *bhāvāsravas* are generally of five kinds, namely delusion (*mithyātva*), want of control (*avirati*), inadvertence (*pramāda*), activities of body, mind and speech (*yoga*) and passions (*kaśāyas*). Each of these categories has further been subdivided. Thus *mithyātva* is of five kinds, viz, *ekānta* or false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed, *viparīta* or uncertainty in the nature of truth, *vmāya* or retention of a belief knowing it to be false, *samsaya* or doubt and *ajñāna* or ignorance. *Avirati* also is of five kinds—*himsā* or violence, *anṛta* or falsehood, *caurya* or stealing, *abrahma* or incontinence and *parigrahākāṅksā* or desire to possess things of other persons. Likewise *pramāda* is of five kinds—*vikathā* or bad conversation, *kaśāya* or passions, *indriya* or sensuality, *nidrā* or sleep and *rāga* or attachment. The subdivisions of *yoga* and *kaśāya* we have enumerated above.¹²⁰

Just as the *bhāvāsravas* are concerned with the internal aspects, so also the *dravyāsravas* are concerned with the externals. Both of these make room for *karmāsrava*, i.e., actual entrance of the *karma* matter into the *jīva*. The actual influx of *karma* affects the soul in eight ways in accordance with which it is divided into eight kinds, namely *jñānāvaranīya*, *darsanāvaranīya*, *vedanīya*, *mohanīya*, *āyu*, *nāma*, *gotra*, and *antarāya*. The influxes take place only as a result of the *bhāvāsrava* or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (*parināma*) of the *jīva*. There are forty-two ways through which the said process works out. Of these, seventeen are major which consist of five *indriyas*, four *kaśāyas*, five *avratas* and three *yogas*. The easiest way for *karma* to enter is through the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Then come the activities of the four passions or *kaśāyas*, namely, anger, conceit, deceit and avarice. Again, through not taking the five great vows evil *karma* may flow in five ways (*pañca-avratas*). Lastly, *karma* will also flow into any soul which allows mind, speech and body to become entangled with material objects. Besides these seventeen major ways, there are twenty-five minor ways by which *karma* is acquired.

Samvara. The way in which the influx of *karma* can be checked is called *samvara*, "As a large tank, when its supply of water has been stopped, gradually dries up by the consumption of water and by evaporation, so the *karma* of a monk, which he acquired in millions

of births, is annihilated by austerities, if there is no influx of bad *karma*.¹²¹ The ideal of liberation can thus be realised only by the stoppage and shedding of *karma*. *Samvara* is that which stops. By it the channels through which *karma* finds entrance into the soul can be blocked. Corresponding to the two modes of influx of *karmas* (*bhāvāsrava* and *dravyāsrava*) are two kinds of control, opposing this influx, and they are respectively called *bhāvasamvara* and *dravyasamvara*.¹²² To the former category belong (1) the five vows, (2) the *samitis* consisting of the avoidance of the killing of the insects (*ṛjā*), gentle and holy talk (*bhāsā*), receiving proper alms (*esanā*) etc., (3) *guṇtis* or restraints of body, speech and mind, (4) *dharma*s consisting of the ten virtues, (5) *anupreksā* consisting of meditations of various forms, (6) *parisahājaya* consisting of conquering all kinds of external conditions, and (7) *cantra* or right conduct. The total number of all these restraints is fifty-seven. Besides the three kinds of *samiti* mentioned above we have two more belonging to this category—*ādānaniksepana* (careful use of material objects) and *paritihāpana* (careful disposal of the extras). *Parisahā* is of twenty-two kinds which demand endurance of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, lack of garments, and so on. We have already referred to the ten virtues consisting of self-control, truthfulness, purity, chastity, greedlessness, asceticism, forbearance, mildness, sincerity and spirit of liberation. *Cantra* is of five kinds—to give up evil conduct (*sāmāyika*), to believe in repentance (*chedopasthāpana*), to practise non-violence and other virtues (*parihāravisuddha*), to control passions (*sūkṣmasamparyāya*) and to follow the five rules of conduct (*yathākhyāta*). The Jain texts are not unanimous in the interpretation of all these. There are twelve kinds of *anupreksā* or *bhāvanā*, i.e., meditation—*anitya* (all things are transient), *asarana* (there is no shelter for anyone), *samsāra* (the cycle of rebirth), *ekatva* (every one is unaccompanied), *anyatva* (reality of the soul as separate from the body), *asauca* (the body should be despised), *āsrava* (thinking about evil influence of passions), *samvara* (reflecting on the way to stop the influx of *karma*), *nirjarā* (thinking about performing austerities), *loka* (thinking about the universe), *bodhi* (belief in the possibility of getting better) and *dharma* (belief in the truth of the creed).¹²³

Bandha. The seventh principle of the Jain philosophy deals with the bondage of the soul to *karma*. It is what binds the soul to the body. It is caused by the union of the soul with *pudgala*. There are

four ways in which such bondage takes place. These ways have been classified according to their nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga*) and mass (*pradesa*). The states of thought which condition the accumulation of *karma* are called *bhāvabandha* and the actual bondage of the soul is technically called *dravyabandha*. It is on account of the former that the actual connection between *karma* and the *jīva* takes place.¹²⁴ The real connection of the *karma* with the *jīva* is like the sucking of the dust on an oily cloth. If oil is spilled on a cloth, dust will easily adhere. The cloth represents the *jīva*, the oil the passions, transgressions and activities (*kaṣāya*, *pramāda*, *avṛata*, *yoga*), and the dust, the *puḍgala*. Thus *bandha* is caused by wrong belief (*mūhyādarsana*), non-renunciation (*avivṛati*), carelessness (*pramāda*), passions (*kaṣāya*) and vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body and speech (*yoga*).¹²⁵

Nirjarā It is the purging off of the *karmanas*, and of two kinds *bhāva* and *dravya*, the former meaning the change in the soul by virtue of which the *karma* particles are destroyed, and the latter, the actual destruction of the *karma* particles either by the reaping of their effects or by penances before their time of fruition, called *saṃpāka* and *avipāka nirjarā*s respectively.¹²⁶ One of the chief ways of annihilating the *karma* is the practice of austerities which are of two kinds—exterior (*bāhya*) and interior (*abhyantara*). There are six exterior austerities—*anasana* (to take a vow to fast), *unodaṇī* (partial fasting, i.e., to take food a mouthful less every day, thus gradually decreasing the quantity), *vṛttisankśepa* (limiting the food that one eats), *rasatyāga* (abstinence from taking tasteful food), *kāyāklesa* (physical suffering), and *samlīnatā* (avoidance of temptation by control). Likewise the interior austerities are *prāyaschitta* (penance), *vinaya* (reverence), *vaiyāvaccā* (service to others), *svādhyāya* (study), *dhyāna* (meditation), and *utsarga* (absolute indifference to the body and its needs). These austerities remind us of the *gunasthānas*, to be treated in a subsequent section.

Mokṣa When the *jīva* is freed from the all bondage to *karma* and has passed for ever beyond the possibility of rebirth, it is said to have attained *mokṣa* or liberation. This is the last of the nine Jain fundamentals. It is the state of pure happiness (*anantasukha*), pure and infinite knowledge (*ananta-jñāna*) and infinite perception (*ananta-darsana*).¹²⁷ It is the state of freedom from action and desire, of utter and absolute quiescence, of rest that knows no change or ending and of peace which is passionless and ineffable. Every

jīva has the potentialities of liberation, but the state is achieved by faith, knowledge and conduct ¹²⁸ "The liberated is not long or small nor black, nor blue, nor bitter, nor pungent, neither cold nor hot without body, without rebirth he perceives, he knows, but there is no analogy (whereby we can know the nature of the liberated soul), its essence is without form, there is no condition of the unconditioned" ¹²⁹ Though the *karma* of man is constantly determining him in various ways, yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action (*anantavīrya*) It is thus by an exercise of this power that man can overcome all *karma* and become finally liberated Liberation is an eternal upward movement (*nityordhvagamanam mukti*)

A being who has attained *moksa* is called a *siddha* or perfected one, and only a human being can directly be a *siddha* A *siddha* is a being without caste, unaffected by smell, without the sense of taste, without feeling, without form, without hunger, without pain, without sorrow, without joy, without birth, without old age, without death, without body, without *karma*, enjoying an endless and unbroken calm According to the *Tattvārthādhigama*, ¹³⁰ *siddha* souls are of five kinds (1) The Tīrthamkaras or the liberated who preached Jainism in the embodied condition (2) The *arhats* or the perfect souls who await the attainment of *moksa* after shedding the *kārmanasarīra*, (3) the *ācāryas*, or heads of ascetic groups, (4) the *upādhyāyas*, or teaching saints, and (5) *sādhus*, a class which includes the rest ¹³¹

CLASSIFICATION OF KARMA AND THE GUNASTHĀNAS

We have thus seen that the doctrine of *karma* was the basic driving force behind the nine or seven fundamentals of Jain teachings We have already had the occasion to deal with the different aspects of the Jain doctrine of *karma* In the present section we like to give a brief summary of what we have been able to derive from the preceding discussions regarding the nature and function of the very important concept of *karma* which has characterised the Jain system as a whole

Karma has four sources, as we have seen above It springs from (1) *anrahi* or attachment to worldly pleasures, (2) *kasāya* or passions in the form of anger, pride, deceit and greed, (3) *yoga* or the employment of body, mind and speech to material and sensual

things, and (4) *mithyātva* or false belief. There are eight kinds of *karma* which the Jains classify broadly under two groups—*ghātin* and *aghātin*. Each of the groups are further subdivided into four categories. To the former belong *jñānāvaranīya*, *darsanāvaranīya*, *mohanīya* and *ānatrāya* while to the latter *vedanīya*, *āyu*, *nāma*, and *gotra*. Besides there are three tenses—*sattā*, *bandha* and *udaya*—and two types—*nikācata* and *sithūla*—of *karma*.

Jñānāvaranīya hides all aspects of knowledge from us. It is concerned with the five well-known sources of Jain knowledge—*mati*, *sruti*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya*, and *kevala*. That which hinders *mati* prevents our making the right use of conscience and intellect. It is subdivided into *ulpātiki* which hinders the power of spontaneous thought, *varṇayaki* which prevents our getting what is known as inherited knowledge, *pārnāmiki* which obstructs our having knowledge from experience, and *kāmiki* which impedes our obtaining any intellectual stimulus. That which hinders *sruti* prevents us from getting any knowledge from scripture. Likewise those hindering *manahparyāya*, *avadhi* and *kevala* never allow us to know what is passing in the minds of others, what is happening at a distance and what is the right way of attaining liberation. Apart from these five obstructions which cover up the sources of knowledge, there are *mati-ajñāna* and *sruti-ajñāna*, occurring from misuse of intellect and misunderstanding of scriptures, and also *vibhanga-jñāna* which falsify all spiritual insight. *Darsanāvaranīya* prevents our beholding the faith, *vedanīya* causes us to experience the pleasure of happiness and pains of misery, and *mohanīya* generates worldly attachments and passions. Each of these has several subdivisions.

Of the *karman*s belonging to the *aghātin* group, *āyu* determines the length of time which a *jīva* must spend in the form with which his *karma* has endowed him. It is subdivided into *Deva*, *Manuṣya*, *Tiryak* and *Naraka*, each concerning respectively with gods, human beings, animals and hell-beings. The conditions by which these beings are governed are collectively known as *nāma*. Their country, caste etc., determining the specific conditions are likewise known as *gotra*. Individual differences are due to *antarāya*. The *karma* accumulated in past life is called *sattā*, that which is being accumulated in the present life is named *bandha*; and that which will concern the future life is *udaya*. The *karma* which has already been stored up is known as *nikācata*, and that, the influx of which may be evaded, is called *sithūla*.

There are fourteen steps to liberation from *karma*. These steps are known as the *gunasthānas* and conceived like a ladder by which a *jīva* may mount to Liberation. The first is known as *mūhyāṭva* on which the *jīva* is completely under the influence of *karma*, knowing nothing about what is real and what is false. The second step is known as *svāsvāsadana* climbing on which a *jīva* begins to distinguish a little between what is real and what is false. But this sense of distinction does not produce any standing effect in him. On the third step which is known as *mūṣa* he is still in the uncertain condition, still tormented by hopes and doubts. This disbalance, however, ceases to continue when he reaches the fourth step which is known as *avratasamyagdṛṣṭi*. He feels the urge within himself to control anger, pride and greed, but he cannot free himself completely from their influence. From the fifth step, known as *desavirati*, a qualitative change takes place. The *jīva* now realizes the great importance of conduct and becomes mentally prepared to follow the twelve prescribed vows of right conduct. At this stage, too, anger, deceit, pride and greed are not completely controlled. On the sixth step of the ladder, which is known as *pramatta*, slight passions are controlled but negligences remain. At the seventh stage, known as *apramatta*, anger is practically controlled but pride, deceit and greed remain in a slight degree. The process continues at the next higher stage known as *apūrvakarana* in which pride is controlled and the fetters of *karma* tends to become loose. The ninth step is known as *anīyatibādṛa*. At this stage deceit disappears while greed persists until the *jīva* reaches the tenth step which is known as *sūksmasaṃparyāya*. But complete annihilation of greed requires two more stages—*upasāntamoha* and *ksīnamoha*—after which the *jīva* becomes entirely free from all *kaṣāyas*. The last two stages are known respectively as *sayogikevalī* and *ayogikevalī* through which all *karma* is purged away.

A REVIEW OF THE JAIN METAPHYSICS

In view of what we have seen above in the preceding sections it appears that Jainism in its sophisticated stage represents a curious blend of scientific notions and ethico-religious ideals. Rather, we may say that in its earlier stages Jainism wanted to base itself on physical sciences, but its later exponents developed numerous abstractions on the basis of *a priori* principles. It offers us an empirical

classification of things in the universe. Its scheme of the universe is said to be based on logic and experience. In its metaphysics, Jainism reveals a sense of realism. In logic, it takes its stand on the relativity of knowledge. Jainism does not take up the question of origins. It also repudiates the theory of an extra-cosmic God as the creator or intelligent cause of the world.

The Jain metaphysics is practically an inextricable admixture of science and ethico-religious principles. The whole universe of being, as we have seen above, is traced to the two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing but independent categories of *jīva* and *ajīva*. A *jīva* is whatever is living, whatever is not mechanical. It is a concrete unity, a compound substance, a combination of materiality, knowledge and consciousness. The difference between the *jīva* and the *ajīva* is not like that between spirit and matter or soul and matter or consciousness and matter. Rather, both of these aspects are combined in the *jīva*. The *ajīva* is that which is devoid of three kinds of consciousness. It is an object which can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt. It consists of motion, rest, space, time and matter. Space, motion and rest are the necessary conditions for the subsistence of all things. Space affords them room to subsist, motion and rest make it possible for them to move or to be moved. The successive movements of the world are strung on time which is a process of persistence, an enduring from the past to the present. It is sometimes regarded as a quasi-substance. Matter is conceived in terms of the four well-known elements viz., earth, water, fire and air and their ultimate constituents are said to be atomic. The atoms are conceived as viscous or dry when one is viscous and the other dry, or when the two have different degrees of viscosity and dryness, combination of them takes place and such compounds combine with others.

Anything which has origin, existence and destruction is a substance. A substance (*dravya*) is possessed of some unchanging essential characters (*gunas*) and changing modes (*pariāyas*). Substance and quality are inseparable. Qualities (existence, enjoyability, substantiveness, knowability, specific characters and capability of possessing forms) adhere in substances and they cannot exist by themselves. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements (1) that some collocation of qualities appear to remain unchanged, (2) that some new qualities are generated, and (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. The permanent unit is called *dharmā*, the

accession of new qualities *utpāda* and the loss of some old qualities *vyaya*. The nature of a thing is thus neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. That is why Jainism holds that nothing can be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations are true only under certain conditions and limitations.

A *dravya*, by which we generally understand substance, is that which is capable of becoming this or that. The different senses of the word *dravya* are but different ways of conveying the aforesaid idea. In Jainism the word *dravya* is used differently. The *Tattvārtha-sūtra*¹³² divides the *niksepas* into *dravya*, *nāma bhāva*, *sthāpana*, etc., the *nayas* into *dravyārthika* and *pariyāyārthika*, and so on. The *Bhagavatisūtra*¹³³ speaks of aspects like *dravya*, *ksetra*, *kāla*, *bhāva*, etc. In other places we come across such expressions as *dravyakarma*, *dravyācārya*, etc. In all the cases, however, notwithstanding their functional significance, the term conveys the idea of its capability to become this or that. In Jain metaphysics the word *dravya* is normally used in the sense of the basic types of entities found in the universe. For example, *jīva*, *Pudgala*, etc. are six *dravyas*. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy¹³⁴ the word *dravya* stands for the substratum of qualities and actions. Thus earth, etc. are nine *dravyas* according to this system. In this very sense the old Āgamas like the *Uttarādhyana*¹³⁵ put forward the Jain thesis on six *dravyas*. The word *dravya* is variously interpreted in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. According to one of these interpretations a *dravya* is defined as that whose basic character remains unimpaired even in the midst of the emergence of newer and newer qualities. This interpretation is particularly suited to the Jain line of thought.

The term *pariyāya* denoting changing modes in Jainism is also very old. But the technical meaning attributed to this word in Jain philosophy is to be found in no other system. The properties, peculiarities and states of a substance which originate and perish, undergo changes, are called *pariyāyas*. Hemacandra has used the word *pariyāya* in the sense of all the properties like qualities, actions, etc. of a substance or *dravya*. In the Jain texts both the words *guṇa* and *pariyāya* are used sometimes in identical and sometimes in different meaning. Kundakunda, Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda believe that the two words have clearly distinct meanings, while Akalanka maintains that there is an identity as well as distinction between the meanings of the words *guṇa* and *pariyāya*, a position followed by

Amrtacandra as also by Siddhasena in his commentary on the *Tattvārthabhāṣya*. Haribhadra too accepted the thesis of identity of meaning between the words *guṇa* and *pariyāya*. It appears that in the earlier Jain works the two words were used indiscriminately, but the latter writers wanted to make their positions clear and started a discussion as to whether the two words were identical or different in meaning and defended their own standpoints on the question.

Likewise the Jain writers debated on the question as to whether *guṇa* and *pariyāya* on the one hand and *dravya* on the other are identical with or different from one another. The systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. are of the view that the qualities of a substance are different from the substance itself while systems like the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, etc. are in favour of their identity. The Jains maintain the relation of identity-cum-difference between *dravya* and *pariyāya* or *guṇa*. They hold that substance and quality are inseparable, and as such the latter cannot exist in itself. Here the relation is of pure identity, but there is also an element of difference in the nature of a substance, in its acquiring new qualities, leaving the old ones and maintaining some permanent qualities. There are two kinds of characters found in every substance, essential and accidental. The essential characters of a substance remain in the substance as long as the substance remains, and it is through the accidental characters that a substance undergoes change or modification.

The Jain metaphysics, as we have remarked many times, during the course of its growth, has been inextricably blended with ethico-religious principles. In accordance with the principles mentioned above, the Jīva is conceived as a substance whose essential character is consciousness and accidental characters are desire, volition, pleasure and pain which undergo change and modification. Jain metaphysics eventually came to explain how transcendental bondage and release take place, how the doer of an action enjoys the fruits of his action, how performance of meritorious acts and resort to religious practices lead to transcendental release, and so on. *karma* in Jainism is of material nature (*paudgalika*), matter in a subtle form capable of filling all cosmic space. It is the link of union between Jīva and Ajīva. The cause of the soul's embodiment is the presence in it of *karmic* matter. This matter acts in eight different ways, and is accordingly divided into eight classes as we have already noticed. It is this that spoils the natural qualities of the soul, knowl-

edge and intuition. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into *karma* pours into the soul. As each particular *karma* is caused by some act, good, bad or indifferent, so it in its turn produces certain painful or pleasant consequences. According as good or bad *karma* matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured. The production, fruition and destruction of *karma* together with Jiva and Ajiva are the principles or *tattvas* in Jainism. The influx of *karma* particles into the soul (*āsrava*) can be checked (*samvara*), discharged and purged off (*nirjarā*) from the soul. But while some *karma* matter is being purged off, other *karma* matter continues to pour in. The simultaneous purging and binding processes force the soul to continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration and rebirth. By proper efforts, however, *karma* may be prevented from taking effect. When the stored *karma* is completely purged off and its further accumulation is strongly checked, the attainment of liberation takes place. If deliverance is to be achieved, certain moral codes are to be followed to bring about the reformation of man's nature and prevent the formation of new *karma*. This requires faith in the *jina*, knowledge of his doctrine and right conduct.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Jainism admits five kinds of knowledge: (1) *mati* or ordinary cognition obtained by means of sense-perception, (2) *śruti* or testimony derived from scriptures, teachings, etc., (3) *avadhi* or knowledge by clairvoyance, (4) *manahpariyāya* or telepathic knowledge of other's minds, and (5) *kevala* or perfect knowledge which is independent of senses. Such a classification is evidently due to dogmatic influence. The fourth and fifth kinds are characterised as *pratyakṣa* or direct knowledge which cannot be wrong, while the first two or three are *parokṣa* or indirect knowledge and hence liable to error. We have already noticed that the earlier Jain conception of *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa* was just the reverse of the traditional Indian conception. The two manifestations of consciousness are perception (*darsana*) and intelligence (*jñāna*). In the former we have simple apprehension, perception of the generalities (*sāmānya*) of things, while in the latter we have conceptual knowledge. In this case relation between knowledge and object of knowledge is very intimate. The Jains believe that external objects exist and they are knowable. Cognition is a generated phenomenon which is capable of being

perceived and inferred. It is self-revelatory. Knowledge of a thing as it is in itself is *pramāṇa* and knowledge of a thing in its relation is *naya*. In conformity with the logical tradition of India, the Jains treat *pramāṇa*, both as valid cognition and as instrument of valid cognition. It is the right determination of objects. The effect of a *pramāṇa* is partly distinct and partly non-distinct. According to Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, the immediate effect of a *pramāṇa* is removal of ignorance but the remote effect should possibly be the decision to accept or reject or ignore the object. The doctrine of *nayas* or standpoints, which is divided into seven categories, is a peculiar feature of Jain logic. The *nayas* are also distinguished into *dravyārthika* from the viewpoint of substance and *pariyāyārthika* from that of modification or condition. The most important use of these standpoints is of course *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgī*, the seven different ways of judgements which hold that we cannot affirm or deny absolutely of any object. Accordingly, reality is viewed not as of a permanent and unalterable nature. Its character can consist only with relative or conditional predication.

In the earlier Jain classification, as we have seen above, knowledge is divided into *mat*, *śruti* etc. Although it was said that *matijñāna* should come under *indriya-pratyakṣa* or sense-perception and *śrutajñāna* under verbal testimony, the Jain authors were constantly faced with the question as to whether *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogy), *arthāpatti* (implication), etc. which the other traditions accept as *pramāṇa* should be regarded as valid or not. It was Umāsvāti who for the first time clearly suggested that *anumāna* etc., which were *pramāṇas* according to the other traditions, should fall under the category of *parokṣa* or non-perceptual *pramāṇa*. It was accepted also by Pūjyapāda.¹⁵⁶ The author of the *Nandisūtra* made a twofold classification of knowledge into *pratyakṣa*, the former being subdivided into two types, one covering the transcendental perception and the other the sense-perception.¹⁵⁷ The author of the *Nyāyavatāra* brought the whole problem in close relation to the logical tradition followed by the non-Jain thinkers and made a thorough analysis of inferential knowledge according to the Jain way of looking at things. The final, definite and clear-cut classification is, however, found in the *Laghyastraya*¹⁵⁸ of Akalanka who maintains that *parokṣa-pramāṇa* consists of five sub-species—*anumāna* or inference, *pratyabhijñā* or recognition, *smarana* or memory, *tarka* or knowledge of invariable concomitance and *āgama* or verbal testimony.

There are various views as to the technique of presenting an inference or *anumāna*. According to the Buddhist logicians, two steps, viz *hetu* and *drstānta*, are sufficient. The Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā are for three or four steps while the Naiyāyikas admit the necessity of five steps. The Jains are of the view that the number of steps should not be fixed and that they may be more or less according to their requirements. Some of them may require two steps, viz *pratyñā* and *hetu*, some three, viz , *pratyñā*, *hetu* and *drstānta*, some four, viz , *pratyñā*, *hetu*, *drstānta* and *upanaya*, and some five, viz , *pratyñā*, *hetu*, *drstānta*, *upanaya* and *naigamana*. Regarding the aspects of the nature of a probans, the types of a probans, pseudo-probans, nature of the terms, the fallacies and other allied problems of inference, the Jain logicians hold different views from others and they have differences among themselves. The Jains hold that *pratyabhijñā* or recognition is a subspecies of *matyñāna* and an independent *pramāna*. Likewise *smarana* or memory ought to be treated as *pramāna* because it is true of facts. In the section on Psychology we shall have the occasion to deal with all these more elaborately. Akalanka seems to be the first to determine the nature, object and utility of *tarka* and he has been followed by all later Jain logicians. The Jain tradition is one with the Mīmāṃsaka in treating *tarka* as a cognition of the nature of *pramāna*. It stands for cognition of a relation of invariable concomitance.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INGREDIENTS

The importance of sense-organs is recognised in Jainism because they can give a correct sketch of external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. The sense-organs are distinguished into *dravya-indriyas* or physical sense-organs and *bhāva-indriyas* or their psychological counterparts.¹³⁹ Sense perception is the result of the contact between the sense-organ and the object, but it is simply a mechanical contact. Knowledge of external objects by perception is certainly gained through the senses, but the process of external perception does not involve the exercise of any separate or distinct sense, through the rise of the sense-organ, such as the eye. The senses have no existence apart from the Jīva. When the soul is said to occupy the whole body, it means that they are the physical counterparts of one entity. The sense-organs are like windows for the soul to look out, but they cannot modify the sense-knowledge

which rises in the soul by inward determination, because it is already existent in it

Since the sense-organs are the only outwardly instruments of the *jīva*, the elements which render the enjoyment of all objects possible exist in the constitution of the *jīva* itself. The *Tattvārthadhigama*¹⁴⁰ employs the term *upayoga* to denote the functioning of the sense and their reactions. The quickest to react is vision, followed by hearing, smell, taste and feeling. They are unequally distributed among the beings, and that is why the latter are divided into one to five senses. A good deal of psychological analysis is met with in the divisions of colour into five kinds, sound into seven, smell into two, taste into five and touch into eight. Next to the sense-organs, we come across the conception of inward sense, called *anīndriya* by Umāsvāu¹⁴¹ and equated with *manas*,¹⁴² which is without any organ. Emotions or instincts are sometimes called *samyñā* and sometimes *ābhoga* which are concerned with nourishment, fear, sex, splendour, anger, pride, deceit, greed, worldliness and carnal desires. Imagination may depend on the activity of the five outward senses or on that of the inward sense, but it surely proceeds from the primary perception over the will to cognition and ascertainment to the act of imprinting the perception in the mind.¹⁴³ The primary perception is technically called *avagraha*, the will to cognition *ihā*, the ascertainment *avāya*, and the act of imprinting *dhārana*. These are the four stages of perception.

We have seen that the Jain tradition consider memory or *smṛti* to be a *pramāṇa*. It cognizes what has already been cognized. Its function lies in making us apprehend something that was grasped by an earlier piece of non-mnemonic cognition. Likewise recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) has also been regarded as of the nature of *pramāṇa*. It is a process of mind. The Jains do not agree with the Buddhists in maintaining that recognition is a combination of two independent pieces of cognition, namely, memory and perception. Nor do they agree with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas etc. in regarding recognition as but a variety of sense perception. They hold that in the wake of sense perception and memory there arises a mental cognition of a different quality that takes cognizance of two entities as somehow related to each other. It is this mental cognition which may be called *pratyabhijñā* or recognition. The function of mind by which all these are determined is to produce qualities like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc. It has also a part to play in the generation of cognition

through an external sense-organ, like the cognition of colour etc., as also in the generation of cognition without an external sense-organ, like the cognition of desire etc. According to the Jain tradition *manas* or mind is medium-sized and a produced entity. It is born of extremely subtle physical substance called *manovarganā*. Like body it undergoes change every moment. This is what they called *paudgalika* or material mind. They have also another conception of mind known as *bhāva-manas*, which is of the nature of cognitive potency and cognition and born of the conscious substance. The Jain conception of mind is not, however, well defined.

THE NON-ABSOLUTIST STANDPOINT

The first and foremost of the Jain contributions to Indian thought is the systematic exposition of *pramāna-sāstra* or logic. We have seen that Jain logic rests on two basic principles—*anekāntavāda* or doctrine of non-absolutism and *nayavāda* or doctrine of partial truths. We find in the field of Indian philosophical speculations a number of mutually antagonistic views and systems arising out of the fundamental standpoints of particularity and generality. These views and systems made it their prime concern to attack one another without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system. Since from all these nothing transpires, the Jain logicians from their non-absolutist standpoint hold that all particular theories based on logic are true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view and that all cognition, be it of identity or of diversity, is valid to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. Thus a cognition is valid in relation to its own object but invalid when it discards its contradictory cognition as unreal. The seemingly contradictory cognitions should reveal in their respective way the nature of reality. This may be exemplified in terms of forest and trees. One may take note of the trees one by one in the form of particular entities while another may take note of the forest in general. Neither of these two cognitions can be regarded as solely true, i.e., true at the cost of the other, but both are partly true within their respective spheres.

From the aforesaid viewpoint the Jains attempt to reconcile the special controversy between eternalism and momentarism which has characterised the history of Indian philosophy by postulating that a thing is eternal insofar as it is of the form of a continuous flow and momentary in so far as it undergoes a change or a new modifi-

cation (*paryāya*) every moment. This may be exemplified by the total life activity of a tree. Right from the beginning until the time of its fructification it is in the form of a continuous flow. At the same time, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements, its life activity is momentary which undergoes changes and modifications every moment.

This non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrines of definability and of indefinability by postulating that the gross entities of medium duration and extension are capable of definition while the innumerable subtle aspects of an entity's nature are not. Again, a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits or solely through its negative traits. Thus it is not self-contradictory to view a thing as positive entity and also as a negative. The opposition between the doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause and that of absolute absence of the effect in the cause can also be eliminated from the non-absolutist point of view, for it holds that the effect may be present and also may be absent in the material cause. For example in the case of a gold-bangle, the gold itself has the capacity to turn into a bangle, and from this viewpoint the effect can be said to be present even before it is actually produced. But since this effect is not there to be seen, because of the absence of necessary accessories, it is absent before its actual production. In the same way the Jain non-absolutist standpoint bridges the gulf between the Buddhist doctrine of conglomeration of atoms and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of an altogether novel composition.

Thus the Jain standpoint attempts in many cases to bridge the gulf between the two extremities. According to the Jain philosophers, the formulation of thoughts and views concerning the nature of an entity is accomplished from various stands determined by a multiplicity of factors. The Jain texts speak of two types of judgements, *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*, the former denoting that line of thought which takes substance into account in terms of what is general, common, non-distinct or unitary about things. The latter is the name of that line of thought which takes modes or *paryāyas* into account. When the two views are sought to be synthesised and as such judgements are formed to give expression of the positive as well as negative aspects of the subject matter in question the result is the complex sevenfold judgement, of which we have already had occasion to refer.¹⁴⁴ •

REFERENCES

- 1 I 12 11-21, cf I 2 24
- 2 *SBE*, XLV, pp 317-19
- 3 I 12 4-10
- 4 *SBE*, XLV, pp 316-17
- 5 I 2 17, 12 2
- 6 *SBE*, XLV, pp 241, 315-16
- 7 I 3 14, 12 3-4
- 8 *SBE*, XLV, p 316
- 9 I 1 7-8, 11-12, II 1 15-17
- 10 *SBE*, XLV, pp 236-7, 339-41
- 11 I 2 13, 3 11-12, II 1 30-4
- 12 *SBE*, XLV, pp 239-40, 345-7
- 13 I 1 17 2 25-8, II 6 26-9
- 14 *SBE*, XLV, p 238
- 15 I 3 5-9
- 16 *SBE*, XLV, pp 244-5
- 17 I 1 13
- 18 *SBE*, XLV, p 237
- 19 I 1 9, II 1 15-28
- 20 *SBL*, XLV, pp 237, 343-5
- 21 I 1 15-16, II 1 20-4
- 22 *SBE*, XLV, pp 237-8, 342-3
- 23 *Buddhacarita*, XVI 18 ff
- 24 IX 119 ff
- 25 *NSB*, I 1 21
- 26 *VSB*, 48-9
- 27 Chattopadhyaya, *IA*, pp 254-7
- 28 See my *HICL*, pp 66 ff
- 29 *SV*, 43-113, Jha's trans, pp 355-68
- 30 46-93, also Kamalaśīla's *Pañcāṅga* on these
- 31 *TRD*, 115 ff
- 32 *IA*, pp 167-201
- 33 Ed Leumann p 649, NSP edn, p 74
- 34 I 12 NSP edn, p 448
- 35 For the Bhadrabāhu problem cf *supra*, also Klau in *IA*, XI, p 247, Peterson's *Fourth Rep*, LXXXIV, Jacobi's *KSB*, intro, pp 11-15, Bhandarkar, *Rep*, p 138
- 36 Eng trans, J L Jamī, cf Hoernle in *IA*, XX, pp 341 ff
- 37 Ed and trans, S C Vidyabhusana
- 38 See Peterson's *Fourth and Fifth Rep* A good number of the manuscripts of these texts were collected and ed by S C Vidyabhusana and a few of them were published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta For details see Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp 172-220
- 39 *SDSC*, 55
- 40 *NVT*, 29, *NVT-murti*, 29
- 41 *TTDS* (BI), 32 ff
- 42 For illustrations see, Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp 170-71
- 43 *YVS*
- 44 Chapter 6
- 45 Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, p 161
- 46 *TTDS*, I 13-14
- 47 *Ibid*, I 20
- 48 *Ibid*, I 9 12 21-9
- 49 Cf Gunaratna's commentary on *SDSC*, 55
- 50 *TTDS*, I 12
- 51 *Ibid*
- 52 For details see Vidyabhusana, *HIL*, pp 157-224
- 53 *TBH*, 48-9
- 54 *PN7L*, III
- 55 I 12
- 56 *SDS*, III, Cowell's trans, p 55
- 57 *DS*, 24, *Uttara*, XXVIII, XXXVI, *SBE*, XLV, pp 152-7, 206 ff
- 58 *SDS*, III, 33, *PTSMS*, 129-32
- 59 Schubring, *Dj*, pp 126 ff
- 60 Jacobi in *SBE*, XXII, 3n
- 61 Cf *TTDS*, II 8, Gunaratna on *SDSC* 47
- 62 *TTDS*, II 22-3
- 63 Cf Gunaratna on *SDSC*, 49
- 64 *NVT*, 31, *DS*, 2
- 65 *SVDM*, 8, *TTDS*, p 16
- 66 *PTSMS*, 3
- 67 *VMP*, XVI, 29, *PTSMS*, 85 ff
- 68 *PTSMS*, 80-85
- 69 *TTDS*, V 22
- 70 Gunaratna on *SDSC* 49 (p 163)
- 71 *DS*, 21
- 72 *SDSC*, 49 (p 162)
- 73 Gunaratna on *ibid*
- 74 *TTDS*, V 17-18
- 75 *Ibid*, 19-24
- 76 *Uttara*, XXXVI, 171 ff, *SBE*, XLV, pp

- 206 ff
 77 Ibid
 78 *Uttara*, XXXIV, *SBE*, XLV, pp 196-203
 79 *Kṛṣṇādīdravyasācayāt parināmo ya ātmanah, Sphatikasyeva tatrayam eśyāsadbah pravartate*
 80 XXXVI, 93-106
 81 Ibid, 171-202
 82 II 3
 83 *SBE*, XLV, pp 388-9
 84 *Sūya*, II 3 3 20
 85 *Pannavanā*, 44 ff
 86 *Sūya*, II 3 22-36
 87 III 2 21
 88 Thomson, *SAGS*, I, p 209, Bhattacharyya, *IPR*, pp 5 ff
 89 *SBE*, XLV, p 393
 90 *DJ*, pp 141 ff
 91 Ibid, 142
 92 Ibid, p 143
 93 Ibid, p 145
 94 Ibid, p 151
 95 I 6 1
 96 Schubring, *DJ*, p 149
 97 Ibid, pp 101-03
 98 *TTDS*, V 19
 99 V 4 ff
 100 Kurfel, *KI*, pp 208-339, Schubring, *DJ*, 204-46
 101 XII 3 4
 102 Kurfel, *KI*, p 210
 103 Colebrooke, *ME*, II, p 198
 104 *Tiloyapannatti*, I 137-8
 105 Sircar, *CGEIL*, p 46
 106 Kurfel, *KI*, p 211
 107 Dugar, *ABS*, III, pp 226 ff
 108 Jacobi in *ZDMG*, LX
 109 *Uttara*, XXXVI, 57-62
 110 V 11-16
 111 Kurfel, *KI*, pp 253-61
 112 Ibid, pp 214-42
 113 Kosambi, *JSIH*, p 159
 114 *PTSMS*, 116, *DS*, 22 ff
 115 Jacobi in *ERT*, VII, pp 468-9
 116 See Chapter Two
 117 The effects of the *kasāyas* are given in details in *Dasav* VIII 37-9 cf *Sūya*, I 1 4 11 ff, I 2 2 29 9 11 They are also recorded in the scattered passages of other *Angas*
 118 Ed Windisch in *ZDMG* 1874
 119 Cf *DS* (*Vṛti*), 35
 120 *DS*, 29-30 also *Vṛti*
 121 *SBE*, XLV, p 174
 122 *DS* (*Vṛti*) 35, *VP* XVI 67-8
 123 Cf *SBE*, XLV, pp 9 ff, 190 ff, 186, 276 ff, 330
 124 *DS* (*Vṛti*), 30 ff, *VP*, XVI 44
 125 *TTDS*, VII 1
 126 Ibid, IX 47
 127 *PTSMS*, 28
 128 *DS*, 39-40
 129 *SBF*, XXII, p 52
 130 X 8
 131 Cf *DS*, 50-54
 132 I 5, V 31
 133 III 19
 134 VS, I 1 15
 135 XXVIII 6
 136 *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I 12, *Sarvārtha siddhi*, I 12
 137 *Nandi*, III
 138 III 1
 139 *TTDS*, II 19
 140 II 18
 141 Ibid, I 14, II 22
 142 Ibid, II 25
 143 *TTDS*, I 15
 144 Sanghvi, *ASILM*, pp 15-28

CHAPTER FOUR

A Comparative Study

JAINISM AND VEDIC TRADITION

Buddhism and Jainism, as is known to all, are by nature anti-Vedic. In the Vedic tradition itself, recorded in the Brahmanical compositions, both these systems are classed as belonging to the Nāstika group. Both these systems were originated among peoples living outside the pale of rigid Brahmanical influence. Both these systems are marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices and against the sacrificial cult itself. Both these systems reject the authority of the Vedas and the supremacy of the Brāhmanas. "The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices."¹

Although Jainism and Buddhism appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brāhmanas, they could not but be influenced by some of the fundamental principles which had already found some sort of expression in the Vedic texts, especially in the earlier Upanisads. The sum and substance of the teaching of the Upanisads is involved in the equation of *ātman* and *brahman*, the individual soul and the universal soul. *Brahman* is the ultimate essence of the universe while *ātman* the inmost essence of man. The universe is in *brahman* but the *brahman* is in *ātman*. The following passages of the *Chāndogya Upanisad* will explain the whole thing. "The self (*ātman*) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cognitions are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired, he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self."² Again, "this my *ātman* in my inmost heart is smaller than a

grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a mustard seed, or a millet grain This my *ātman* in my inmost heart is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heavens, greater than all spheres In him are all actions, all wishes, all smells, all tastes, he holds this *All* enclosed within himself, he speaks not, he troubles about nothing, this my *ātman* in my inmost heart is this *brahman*. With him when I depart out of this life, shall I be united "³

The problem of the Vedic or early Brahmanical speculations was to define the relation between the *ātman* and the external world A painful world, full of hunger and thirst, sorrow and confusion, old age and death, when equated with the all-perfect, all-pervading and the all-beautiful *ātman* would naturally give birth to absolute pessimism, the conception of metempsychosis, the endless cycles of births and deaths, and finally the doctrine of *karma* as the power predetermining the course of the migration of the soul from one state of being to another Even the reward of good action is impermanent which arises out of some kind of desire, and hence the doctrine of deliverance gradually came to be based upon the conquest of all desire through the right knowledge And this is what is taught by the Buddha and Mahāvīra One should not fail to recall in this connection that the contemporaries of the Buddha and Mahāvīra—Gosāla, Ajita, Sañjaya, Pūrana, and Pakudha—based their doctrines on the same premises, though their conclusions were different

Karma and its fruits are meant in the Vedas to be the sacrificial acts and their results—not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was not the goal Knowledge to these earlier authorities meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas It was not taken in its widest and most universal sense These were the points on which Jainism and Buddhism had a significant departure from the Vedic line An advance in the new line had, however, begun in the Upaniṣads which had anticipated some of the characteristics upheld by Buddhism and Jainism In quest of true knowledge Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions and reached at last to the doctrine of absolute momentariness Jainism also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but instead of carrying this idea to that of absolute momentariness, it accepted the doctrine of permanence in a rela-

tive sense. The Jain philosophers held that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken. Thus, according to Jainism, not only the happening of the events is conditional, but even all our judgements are true only in a limited sense. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappear, new qualities come in, and a part remains permanent.

The ideas of the Vedic tradition by which certain fundamentals of Jainism and Buddhism are said to be inspired were chiefly concerned with the doctrine of *karma*, transmigration of soul and rebirth, and liberation. In the early Vedic ideas *karma* denotes sacrifice, but in the later Vedic texts, especially in the Upanisads, it reveals the agricultural maxim, we reap what we sow. Long ago, Jacobi had pointed out that the *karma* doctrine in its agricultural sense was evolved among the non-Vedic peoples and it was able to find a place in the Upanisads. There is evidently some truth in this hypothesis. In the Upanisads, the doctrine of *karma* is presented in two forms—simple and sophisticated. The simple form of this doctrine is that just as the good seeds bring a good harvest and bad seeds bad, so also a man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad deeds. Its ethics is that every deed must produce its natural effect in the world, and as such also leaves an impression on the mind. It is this impression or *samskāra* that inclines one to repeat the deed one has once done. A man can not escape the deeds but can control them, and by self-discipline can strengthen the good impulses and weaken the bad ones. In the sophisticated level, however, *karma* is regarded as a blind unconscious principle, governing the whole universe. It is not a subject to the control even of God.¹

It appears that the Jain doctrine of *karma* had derived its main impulses from the sophisticated form mentioned above. *Karma* is conceived in Jainism, unlike other systems, as being material and permeating the *jīvas* through and weighing them down to the mundane level. Through the actions of body, speech and mind, *karma* is formed as a subtle matter. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts the *karma* matter, which thus pouring into the soul and sucking to it, gradually ripens and exhausts itself in accordance with the suffering and enjoyment of the individual. While some *karma* matter is being expanded in this way, other *karma* matters are being accumulated at the same time. If through proper self-discipline all *karma* is worked out, the *jīva* becomes free. The Jain conception of *jīva* that suffers pain and enjoys pleasure

owing to the amount of *karma* it acquires appears also to have been influenced by the Upaniṣadic ideas. The word is derived from the root *jīu*, which means 'to continue breathing'. The Upaniṣads use two other terms for the soul, viz., *bhoktā* or experient and *kartā* or agent.⁵ Every soul is conditioned by these two principles throughout its empirical existence.

The doctrine of *karma* is inextricably blended with that of transmigration of soul and rebirth. Like the generality of Indian systems, Jainism also believes in soul's transmigration, but its conception of *karma*, the governing principle of transmigration, is unlike that of any other, as we have seen above. The *karma* matter accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called *karmasarīra*, which encircles the soul as it passes from birth to birth. In the *Rgvedic* eschatology there is no direct reference to the soul's transmigration or to the doctrine of rebirth in any form. In the Brāhmaṇa literature, however, we come across the idea of repeated births and deaths, but this idea has not been established in a theoretical set up. It is only the Upaniṣads that we come across a clear development of the theory of the transmigration of soul in three distinct stages. In the first stage the earlier Vedic idea of heaven or the abode of Yama has been replaced by the conception of *yāna* or way, of the fathers (*pitṛ*) or of the gods (*deva*). In the second stage the doctrine of transmigration is presented without any reference to the idea of *karma* or reaping the fruits of deeds. In the final stage, however, we have a complete presentation of the transmigration of soul strictly in terms of the doctrine of *karma*. According to the merits or demerits, a man earns through his actions, he will have to take birth again and again in this world. Good deeds in one life secure a better future for the next life, and this process works out until one achieves the final salvation.⁶ Needless to say that Jainism, and also Buddhism, drew much from this Upaniṣadic conception. One thing that deserves special notice in this connection is that the transmigrating soul of the Jains are supposed to have various shapes and sizes. It is of the same size as the *jīva*. In the incipient stages, when it enters the *jīva*, it is very small, but having entered once it expands itself so as to fill up the *jīva* entirely. Again when it is about to leave the body of the *jīva* it resorts to a process of contraction and comes out of the body as a minute particle. This conception of the shape and size of the souls bears a stamp of primitive animistic beliefs.

Like the transmigration and *karma* theories the Jain and Buddhist conceptions of liberation have something to do with the Upaniṣadic ideas. The Jains believe that liberation of the soul is possible only when it is free from the bondage of *karma*. In the early Vedic texts the idea of liberation is absent. Emancipation or *mukta* means in the Upaniṣads the state of infiniteness that a man attains when he knows his own self and thus becomes *brahman*. The world is full in misery and suffering, so birth and rebirth are to be avoided. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know ourselves. Man holds within himself the five constituents of the gross body (*annamaya kośa*), the vital functions (*prāṇamaya kośa*) of life, the will and desire (*manomaya*) and the thoughts and ideas (*vijñānamaya*) and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, he suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, his true self manifests itself in him which is a state of pure intelligence, pure being and pure blessedness. Evidently such ideas had some bearing on the Jain conception of *mokṣa* or liberation. Since knowledge has been regarded as constituting the very essence of *jīva*, the latter can therefore know everything directly and exactly. But this knowledge remains fragmentary owing to the obscuration caused by *karma* which interferes with its power of perception. The culmination of enlightenment is reached when the obstacles are removed. The individual *jīva* then becomes omniscient. This is *kevalajñāna* or absolute apprehension without media and doubt. When this is achieved the soul enters into a blessedness that has no end.

JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

Elsewhere we have argued that Jainism and Buddhism, although they differ in specific points, have a common basis. In their incipient stages, though not in the sophisticated, they stood for same or similar principles. Both these systems deny the existence of an intelligent first cause, adore deified saints, insist upon moral values, right conduct and self-discipline, oppose the authority of the Vedas and the supremacy of the Brāhmanas, and think it sinful to take life of the animals. Both these systems use more or less similar terminology to denote their religious concepts. That is why there was

once a tendency among some of the nineteenth century European scholars to treat Jainism as an offshoot of Buddhism or the latter as that of the former ⁷

But in spite of their common basis, Buddhism and Jainism in the religious history of India became rival creeds. In the Buddhist texts there are numerous references to the Jains and their doctrines, just as in the Jain texts we have references to Buddhism. In the *Anguttaranikāya*⁸ we come across a reference to Mahāvīra as one who knows and sees all things and claim perfect knowledge and faith and also to Jainism which teaches the annihilation by austerities of the old *karma* and the prevention by inactivity of new *karma*. It is further stated that according to Jainism, when *karma* ceases, misery ceases, when misery ceases, perception ceases, when perception ceases all sufferings come to an end and a man is saved by pure annihilation of sin. In the *Mahāvagga*⁹ it is stated that one Siha, a general of the Licchavis, was a lay disciple of Mahāvīra, and that he was dissuaded by him when he tried to pay a visit to the Buddha. The story of Upālī's conversion from Jainism to Buddhism is mentioned in the *Majjhimanikāya*. The *Anguttara* records some practices of the Jain laymen. Buddhaghōṣa in his commentary on the *Dīghanikāya*¹⁰ mentions the differences between Jainism and Ājīvikaism and also treats the famous *Sāmaññaphalasutta* passage¹¹ of the same text which mistakenly ascribe the four vows of Pārśva to Mahāvīra. Likewise in the earlier Jain works like the *Sūyagada*¹² the Buddhists are described as fools believing in the doctrine of the five *skandhas* (*rūpa* or substances and their qualities, *vedanā* or feelings as pleasure and pain, *viññāna* or perceptions of the qualities of things, *saṃjñā* or perception and knowledge and *samskāra* or merit and demerit—Śīlānka's interpretation) of momentary existence. It is also stated that the Buddhists do not believe in the doctrine of soul or that it is eternal.

In the later philosophical literature of the Buddhists and of the Jains we come across, instead of mutual slandering, real philosophical debate on special issues. The basic theoretical differences between Buddhism and Jainism was on the question of momentariness. The Buddhists regarded all changes as being due to the assemblage of conditions absolutely momentary (*ksanika*) in character, and went so far as to deny the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions and held that, since no ultimate and abso-

lute view of things could not logically be taken, the reality of the permanence of the world, at least some of the fundamentals must be acknowledged side by side with the question of change. The Buddhists hold that the changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. The common example of clay and jar can be cited here. A thing such as clay is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes in the forms of jar, pan, etc. But in spite of these changes the clay itself remains permanent. The changes occur only qualitatively. The Buddhists hold that what we perceive as clay is a specific quality and what we perceive as jar is also another quality. Since we cannot perceive any substance apart from quality, and since all the changes are by nature qualitative, the conception of any permanent and unchangeable substance is a mere fiction of ignorance. The Jains on the other hand hold that it is not true as the Buddhists say that there is no permanent substance, but merely the change of passing qualities. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappear, new qualities come in, and something remains permanent. Thus in the case of the jar, the clay has become lost in some form, generated itself in another and remains permanent in another form.

Thus according to Jains, those who hold that there is nothing really permanent in the universe and that everything changes from moment to moment are one-sided because change and permanence are both real. Reality consists of three factors: permanence, origin and decay—*utpāda-vyaya-drauṇvyayuktaṃ sat*.¹³ As against the doctrine of momentariness the Jains hold that, if everything is taken to be momentary, it will be impossible to explain memory, recognition, the immediate feeling of personal identity, etc. Accordingly the concept of liberation will not be able to stand in the absence of any permanent soul to be liberated. If everything be momentary no moral life would be possible then, since it is impossible for a momentary person, to make any attempt for attaining any end. The consequences of one's own action will have then no meaning. Momentariness cannot explain the constitution of any individual series, because without something permanent behind the changing modes (*pariyāyas*), the changing states cannot be held together to form a continuity in the individual. The doctrine of momentariness cannot also be proved by perception or inference. These valid sources of knowledge do not reveal the existence of

anything in the world in which there is only change and no element of continuity ¹⁴

So far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the Jains do not contribute to the Buddhist view that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate. The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the question of perception lies in this that, according to the Jains, perception reveals the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc. Objects are not mere forms of knowledge, as the Vijñānavādin Buddhists think, but are actually existing. Ignorance like a veil covers the self, and this veil is removed by perception which is determinate. The Jains, contrary to the Buddhists, deny the existence of any indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) stage preceding to the determinate (*svavikalpa*) stage of perception. The Buddhists on the other hand regard that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials is the only valid part of perception and that the indeterminate sense materials is the only valid part of perception and that the determinate stage is the result of the application of mental categories like imagination, memory, etc., not truly revealing the presentative part ¹⁵

The Jains reject the Buddhist view that reality consists in casual efficiency, i.e., an object is real if it is capable of causing any effect. The Jains reject this approach because according to it, even an illusory snake must be called real as it can cause effects like fear, etc. In fact production of effect is with the Buddhists, the only definition of existence. Each unit of effect is different from any other such unit, but a succession of the different units of effect reveals a succession of new substances every moment, and that is why all things are momentary. The Jains refute this view on the following grounds. We can only assert that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. The Buddhist view that each unit of effect produced is not exactly the same at each new point of time and that therefore all things are momentary is fallacious, because experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment. To take an example, gold in a gold ornament is found to remain permanent while its forms like earrings or bangles are seen to undergo change. In the face of such an experience it is impossible to assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each suc-

ceeding moment. According to the Jains, this baseless analysis has given birth to the curious *arthakryākāntva* doctrine of Buddhists leading them to unfounded nihilism. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world. The rise of knowledge through experience can be parallel to certain objective collocation of things.

The Buddhists began with a sense of realism, but the two schools of Mahāyāna, viz., Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda, shifted themselves to absolute idealism which considered the empirical world as completely unreal, as false as the beauty of the daughter of a barren woman. In course of its philosophical history, Jainism also developed some idealistic tendencies, but the realistic nature of Jain standpoint remained unaltered in essence. It rejects Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda because they do not accept the competence of the sense-organs. The Buddhist theory of dependent origination conceives in its own distinctive manner the series of qualities and attributes that originate or perish, but it posits no permanent atomic substance in the form of the substrate of these qualities and attributes. But Jainism posits over and above the perceptible world an infinite number of two utterly distinct types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious. The gross world is according to it only the effect (*kārya*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of the subtle physical elements.

Of the problems of knowledge in general, the Jains are in agreement with the Buddhists belonging to the Vijñānavāda school on the point of the self-revelatory character of cognition, but while the Vijñānavādins hold that there exist no objects apart from cognition, and a particular piece of cognition is possessed of a particular form, the Jains posit the existence of external objects and treat cognition as a generated phenomenon. So far as the question of *pramāṇa*, meaning both valid cognition and the instrument of valid cognition, is concerned, the Buddhist logicians introduced the idea of self-cognition or self-revelatoriness,¹⁶ which had influenced the earlier Jain logicians like Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. As to the problem whether the validity or invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic, the Buddhist viewpoint, as upheld by Śāntaraksita, is that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition can well be intrinsic in one case and extrinsic in another. Thus in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa-dasā*) the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition ought to be treated as

intrinsic while in the case of first acquaintance (*anabhyāsa-dasā*) they both ought to be treated as extrinsic. The Jain position also exactly tallies with the Buddhist case as presented by Śāntarakṣita. As to the nature of the effects of a *pramāṇa*, the Buddhist tradition holds two views (1) that it consists in cognition of an object and (ii) that it consists in self-cognition. According to the Jain tradition, the immediate effect of *pramāṇa* is the removal of ignorance, but the remote effect can possibly be the decision to accept or reject or ignore the object. The Jains consider memory (*smṛti*) to be a *pramāṇa* and class it under non-perceptual knowledge, but the Buddhists do not contribute to this idea.

We shall conclude this section with a brief note on Buddhist atomism, the conception of which is basically different from that of the Jains. It is only in the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism that we come across the doctrine of atomism. According to the Jains the atoms are eternal, but the atoms of Buddhism are not so, because Buddhism dogmatically asserts the impermanence of all things. According to the Buddhists, the atoms have only a functional role which may be compared with a focus of energy.¹⁷ The atoms of the four elements, and also their molecules, are related to the five senses. The four elements have distinctive attributes and functions, e.g., solidity and supporting in the case of earth, moisture and cohesion in that of water, heat and ripening in that of fire, motion and expansion in that of air.¹⁸ The atoms constitute molecules which must include at least one atom of all four elements, and acquire their characteristics according to the atoms predominantly composing them. Such conceptions are basically different from the Jain formulations which are closer rather to those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

JAINISM AND ĀJĪVIKISM

It is evident from the Jain tradition that Mahāvīra in the beginning of his career as an ascetic came in close touch with Gosāla, the leader of the Ājīvikas. Although the association of Gosāla and Mahāvīra was not permanent and although a relation of bitter hostility developed between the two teachers in the subsequent course of their religious career, it is clear from what we get in the Buddhist and Jain texts, in absence of any religious literature of the Ājīvikas, that early Jainism owed something to the doctrines upheld and

preached by Gosāla. The frequent confusion of the terms *nirgrantha* and *ājīvika* in the Buddhist texts also points in the same direction. The general outcome of Ājīvikism is the doctrine of *niyati* or fate which has, however, nothing to do with Jainism. But so far as the particulars are concerned, Jainism and Ājīvikism have many points in common.

For example, the Ājīvika conception of *abhyāti*,¹⁹ or six classes of mankind, has evidently some bearing on the Jain classification of beings and the Jain conception of *Leśyā*. The grouping is made on a supposed attribution of colour to different classes of beings. The highest or milk-white group contains the followers of Gosāla and his two predecessors. Below this is the category of white which contains other groups of the Ājīvikas. Below this is green to which belong the Acelakas. Below this is red consisting of the Niganthas wearing a single garment. Then comes blue in which category belong the Bhikkhus who live as thieves and also believers in *karma*. The lowest class is marked black which contains thieves, hunters and others who live by violence.

Regarding the relationship between Jainism and Ājīvikism, it is better to begin with the observation of Jacobi: "The greatest influence on the development of Mahāvīra's doctrines, I believe, must be ascribed to Gosāla, the son of Makkhali. A history of his life, contained in the *Bhagavati*, XV has been briefly translated by Hoernle in the Appendix to his translation of the *Uvāsagadasāo*. It is there recorded that Gosāla lived six years together with Mahāvīra as his disciple, practising asceticism, but afterwards separated from him, started a Law of his own, and set up as a *jina*, the leader of the Ājīvikas. The Buddhist records, however, speak of him as the successor of Nanda Vacca and Kisa Samkicca and of his sect, the Acelaka Paribbājakas, as a long established order of monks. We have no reason to doubt the statement of the Jains, that Mahāvīra and Gosāla for some time practised austerities together, but the relation between them probably was different from what the Jains would have believed. I suppose, and shall now bring forward some arguments in favour of my opinion, that Mahāvīra and Gosāla associated with the intention of combining their sects and fusing them into one. The fact that these two teachers lived together for a long period, presupposes, it would appear some similarity between their opinions. The expression *sabbe sattā sabbe pānā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā* is common to both Gosāla and the Jains and from the commen-

tary we learn that the division of animals into *ekendriyas*, *dvīndriyas*, etc., which is so common in Jain texts, was also used by Gosāla. The curious and almost paradoxical Jain doctrine of the six *Leśyās* closely resembles, as Prof. Leumann was the first to perceive, Gosāla's division of mankind into six classes, but in this particular I am inclined to believe that the Jains borrowed the idea from the Ājīvikas and altered it so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of their own doctrines. With regard to the rules of conduct the collective evidence obtainable is such as to amount nearly to proof that Mahāvīra borrowed the more rigid rules from Gosāla.²⁰

Basham has found out a number of Ājīvika terms and concepts from the Buddhist and Jain texts and their commentaries bearing on the doctrines of the Ājīvikas.²¹ We shall refer to them in brief which will show the nature of influence which Ājīvikism exerted on Jainism and also the latter on the former. It is impossible to enter into a discussion owing to the fragmentary nature of the data we possess at the present state of our knowledge. In the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* of the Buddhist *Dīghanikāya* and Buddhaghosa's *Suman-galavilāsinī* which is a commentary on it, in the *Anguttara-nikāya* and in the Jain *Bhagavatisūtra* we come across the Ājīvika concepts like *yonī-pamukha*, womb or birth, *karma*, their number and classification, *paṭipadā*, paths (Cf. *maṃḥima-paṭipadā* of the Buddhists), *antara-kappa*, ages of the world, *abhyāsa* or classes of men, *pūrasabhūmi*, stages of human existence, *manda*, stupid stage, *khuddā*, pleasure, *vīmamsā*, investigation, *ujjagata*, upright walking, *sekha*, learning, *samana*, monkhood, *jina*, enlightenment and *pañña*, the stage of the highest cognition (cf. Jain *gunasthāna*), *aṇḍa*, *paribbājaka*, *nāgāvāsa*, region of serpents, *indriya*, senses, 2000 in number, *niraya* purgatories, *raja-dhātu* (cf. *Rajas* of the Sāmkhya), *saññi-gabbha*, the types of sentient births, such as camels, oxen, etc., *asaññi-gabbha*, types of unconscious births, such as rice, wheat, barley, etc., *nigantugabbha* types of birth from knots like sugarcane, bamboo, reed, etc., *deva*, gods of seven classes, *mānusa*, men (?), souls (?), heavens (?), stages of birth (?), *pesāca*, goblins, *sara* or lakes, *paṭuvā*, *paṭā*, precipices, *supna*, dream, *mahākappa*, great aeons, etc.

A few other Ājīvika categories²² are found in the Jain *Bhagavatisūtra* which include the four *pāṇagāṃ* and the four *apāṇagāṃ* rules governing the conduct of the ascetic in his last penance, eight *carṃmāṃ* or finalities and six *anāṃkamanijjāṃ* or inevitable (*lābha*,

gain, *alābha*, loss, *suha*, joy, *dukkha*, sorrow, *jīvyā*, life, and *marana*, death) The Ājīvikas believed in the existence of seven elemental categories—earth, water, air, fire, joy, sorrow and life (cf. the doctrine of Pakudha mentioned in chapter Two) The seven elements are described as unmanufactured, barren and firm, neither moving, nor developing, nor affecting one another The southern Ājīvikas developed a theory of atomism, which is proved by the evidence furnished by the *Manimekalā*, *Nilakeśa* and *Civaññāna-cittiyar* The atoms move and combine and may come together densely or loosely to form things of different kinds The combination of atoms occurs in fixed ratios The soul and also pleasure and pain are conceived in terms of atomic combination The conception of soul's size and colour which had characterised Ājīvikism has something to do with the Jain conception of soul "The evidence of the Jain commentators shows that the Ājīvikas has their own epistemology and logic which had much in common with that of the Jain sect of Tīrārāsikas The distinctive characteristic of the Ājīvika system of epistemology, like that of the Tīrārāsika Jains, was the division of propositions into three categories, in contrast with the orthodox Jain system, which allowed seven"²¹

JAINISM AND MATERIALISM

In the *Sūyagada*²¹ as we have already seen in the second part of this book, two materialistic theories are spoken of According to the first theory, the body and the soul are regarded as one and the same thing The second theory is concerned with the doctrine of five eternal elements constituting everything The philosophical views of Pūrāṇa, Pakudha and Ajita, who were contemporaries of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, must have contributed to the growth of a purely materialistic philosophy which later came to be known as the Cārvāka system

In its sophisticated stage, Jainism had to come into conflict with the Cārvāka system It was due to the fact that in accepting non-perceptual sources of knowledge like inference and testimony, the Jain philosophers felt it necessary to justify their view by refuting the Cārvāka theory that perception is the only source of valid knowledge²² Thus, the Jains point out that if the possibility of obtaining correct knowledge through inference and testimony be rejected altogether, the validity of perception then also can be chal-

lenged on the ground that in many cases perception proves illusory. They agree with the Cārvākas on the point that perception reveals the reality of material substances, composed of the four kinds of elements. But they add that for the establishment of the concepts of space and time and also of motion and rest inferential knowledge is necessary. They point out that in some cases even the Cārvākas have to depend on inferential knowledge, e.g., when they say that consciousness is due to the combination of material substances. We can perceive the qualities of a fruit like its colour, shape, smell, etc. We can as well perceive internally pleasure, pain and other qualities of the soul. But we cannot perceive how the combination of material substances is generating consciousness. In establishing this absolute the Cārvākas evidently depend on inferential knowledge. Moreover, when the Cārvākas deny the existence of non-perceptible objects like life-after-death, they go beyond perception and infer the non-existence of the objects from the fact of their non-perception.

It is however interesting to note that this Jain criticism of the Cārvākas was directed mainly against their theory of knowledge. In other fields the Jain philosophers preferred to keep themselves silent. It is probably due to the fact that Jainism itself has a materialistic tendency. As Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi has observed quite correctly "Starting with an analysis (of the real) into different substances (*dravya*) the system no doubt goes to the length of analysing even the subtlest modes (*pariyāya*), but in spite of its accepting the reality of the modes that are the final resultants in this analytic process the Jain does not reject the reality of permanent substances as will do the Buddhist. Likewise, starting with the synthesis of the modes and the substances, the Jain system ultimately arrives at the one principle of reality (*sat-tattva*), but it does not deny in the manner of Brahmvāda reality to the diversity of substances and to the modes that are the resultants in the analytic process. All this was possible because Jainism relatively acknowledge the equal competence (*tulya-bala*) and equal truth (*samāna-satya*) of two standpoints, viz., the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika drsti*) and the standpoint of modes (*pariyāyārthika drsti*). Consequently, we do not find in it either extreme analysis as we do in Buddhism or extreme synthesis as we do in Vedānta. And this, in turn, is why the realistic nature of the Jain standpoint remained unaltered in essence."²⁶

According to the Cārvākas, there is no soul. This conclusion is based upon the following arguments. There is no soul apart from the body. Thus, the soul is nothing but the living body itself with the quality of consciousness. But this consciousness is not the quality of any unperceived non-material or spiritual entity. It exists in the perceptible living body composed of the material elements and hence it must be a quality of the body itself. Just as the quality of intoxication emerges in the wine through the mixing up of certain ingredients, not intoxicant by themselves, required for its production, so also what is called consciousness is nothing but epiphenomenon or by-product of matter, which has no existence independent of the body. But the Jains are not ready to admit that there is no soul apart from the body or that consciousness is the effect of matter, resulting out of the combination of material elements that constitute the body. If that be the case, there will be no absence of consciousness so long as the body exists. Loss of consciousness in sleep, fainting or in a dead body will then be impossible. Moreover, there is no concomitance between the body and consciousness, the development and decay in the former are not invariably followed by corresponding changes in the latter.

Jain atheism has some common features with that of the Cārvākas. The supposition of God as a creator is unnecessary, according to the Cārvākas, since the world comes into existence by the spontaneous combination of material elements. It is by the nature and laws inherent in the material elements that they combine together to form the world. According to the Jains, neither perception nor inference can prove God. The substances by their interaction produce new set of qualities. The diversities of the world are due to cooperative conditions inherent in the nature of things. If things can function only in obedience to the will of God, there is no reason why they should be endowed with distinct attributes. Such arguments have something in common with the Cārvāka theory which tries to explain the world as a mere mechanical or fortuitous combination of elements.²⁷

JAINISM AND SĀMKHYA

It is not unlikely that Jainism and Buddhism borrowed some of their philosophical characteristics from the Sāmkhya which is probably the oldest of all the philosophical speculations of India. But despite

its hoary antiquity, which has been proved by numerous references to the Sāmkhya in ancient literature, we know practically nothing of its original form in the absence of any authoritative early Sāmkhya text. Apart from the medieval and late medieval commentaries, what we are concretely left with are only two treatises—the *Sāmkhyākārikā* of about AD 500 and the *Sāmkhyasūtra* of about AD 1400. These works and also their commentaries are burdened with Vedāntic elements, and hence absolutely undependable for the understanding of the real nature and original contents of the Sāmkhya. Its non-Vedic origin may be substantiated by the fact that (i) the Sāmkhya conception of *prakṛti* as the material cause of the universe is incompatible with the Vedāntic conception of *brahman*, that (ii) greatest care is taken in the *Brahmasūtra* to refute the Sāmkhya philosophy which is looked upon as the most important challenge to the Vedic system and that (iii) there had always been a conscious attempt to revise and fabricate the Sāmkhya in the light of the Vedānta.⁴⁸

Gai be seems to be perfectly right when he says that "the origin of the Sāmkhya system appears in the proper light only when we understand that in those regions of India which were little influenced by Brahmanism the first attempt had been made to explain the riddles of the world and of our existence merely by means of reason. For the Sāmkhya philosophy is in its essence, not only atheistic but also inimical to Veda. All appeal to Śruti in the Sāmkhya texts lying before us are subsequent additions. We may altogether remove the Vedic elements grafted upon the system, and it will not in the least be affected thereby. The Sāmkhya philosophy had been originally, and has remained up to the present day, in its real contents, un-Vedic and independent of Brahmanical tradition."⁴⁹

Essentially the non-Vedic Sāmkhya is the doctrine of the *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* (Female Principle), but within it has a place for the *purusa* (Male Principle), and the place is highly anomalous. *Prakṛti* is the chief principle and all in all *Purusa* is subordinate, inactive and nothing but a passive spectator. We have already traced the origin of the anomalous position of *purusa* to the anomalous position of the males in the primitive matriarchal societies.⁵⁰ *Prakṛti* is the primordial matter, conceived as the Female Principle from which everything of the world is produced. *Prakṛti* is characterised by the equilibrium of the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The first quality gives rise to happiness and love, tranquillity and modesty, health and lightness of body, patience and forgive-

ness, courage, magnanimity, self-restraint and illumination of knowledge, the second to wrath, greed, egotism, worldly activity and boastfulness, and the third to drowsiness, sloth, stupidity, ignorance and carelessness. *Puruṣa* is characterised by passivity and indifference, but somehow comes to be influenced by the three qualities of *prakṛti*. It is only by the cooperation of the "blind *prakṛti* and lame *puruṣa*" that the creation starts out. The whole of the cosmos exists in a subtle (*sūkṣma*) form in *prakṛti* and becomes manifest in creation. It is impossible for an entity to come into existence out of non-entity.³¹

When the equilibrium of *prakṛti* is 'disturbed' through the presence of *puruṣa*, then from the former is developed *mahān* or *buddhi*, the thinking substance. Out of *mahān* emerges the principle of egoity (*ahamkāra*), which in its turn produces mind (*manas*) the five organs of sense (*buddhindriya*), the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), and the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*). The last combining with one another, form the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) space, fire, wind, water and earth. *Mahān* or *buddhi*, the basis of intelligence of the individual, is the first product of the evolution of *prakṛti*. It exists as a seed-force in *prakṛti* when its functions are not manifested. It is never failing and contains all *samśkāras*.³² *Ahamkāra* or the principle of egoity which rises after *buddhi* is conceived as the material cause of substances through which the *puruṣa* identifies itself with the acts of *prakṛti*, thus helping in the formation of concepts and decisions. *Ahamkāra* may be dominated by any of the three *gunas*.³³ (It is difficult to say how *ahamkāra* is derived from *mahān* or *buddhi*.) When it is dominated by the *sattva* it produces the mind (*manas*), the five organs of perception (*buddhindriya*), the five of action (*karmendriya*) and five subtle elements (*tanmātra*). *Manas* is the organ synthesising the sense-data into precepts.³⁴ The five organs of perception are the functions of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch produced from *ahamkāra*.³⁵ They are the means of observing the subtle and gross elements.³⁶ The world as an object of perception has the five *tanmātras* or subtle elements. The essence of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell conceived as physical principles, corresponding to five sense-organs. The gross elements arise from the compounding of the subtle elements by process of accumulation. These are earth, water, fire, air and space collectively called *mahābhūtas*. The stages of evolution from *prakṛti* to five gross elements number twenty-four,

and *purusa* is said to be the twenty-fifth principle of the Sāmkhya system

According to Jacobi, in the primitive strata of Jain metaphysics the category of quality had not been clearly and distinctly conceived, and it was just evolving as if out of the category of substance. Things which could be recognised as qualities were constantly mistaken for and mixed up with substances. In the Sāmkhya we also come across relics of such a stage. "In the Sāmkhya the nature of *purusa* or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light, and the three *gunas* are described as goodness, energy and delusion, or light, colour and darkness, yet these *gunas* are not qualities in our sense of the word, but as Prof. Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Jain texts usually speak only of substances, *dravyas*, and their developement of modifications, *pariāyas*, and when they mention *gunas*, qualities, besides, which, however, is done but rarely in the Sūtras, and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus."³⁷

However, the similarities between the essentials of the Sāmkhya and those of Jainism can hardly be overlooked. The Sāmkhya wants to explain the world in terms of two basic categories namely, Purusa and Prakṛti, just as Jainism wants to explain everything in terms of Jīva and Ajīva. The Sāmkhya concepts of Purusa and Prakṛti are very primitive. In the earlier phases of the evolution of the Sāmkhya thought these concepts evidently stood for the male and female principles of creation. This is also proved by the evidence furnished by the later Sāmkhya treatises. In the subsequent stages of the development of the Sāmkhya thought Purusa or the male principle came to denote living being and finally soul and Prakṛti or the female principle, the primordial substance, the inanimate matter. The same holds good in the case of Jain Jīva and Ajīva, living and non-living, which later came to denote soul and inanimate substance, the latter being further subdivided into *puṭgala* (matter), *ākāśa* (space), *kāla* (time), *dharma* (motion), and *adharma* (rest). As in the Sāmkhya, so in Jainism the souls are infinite in number.

The evolution of the world has its starting point, in the Sāmkhya, in the contact (*saṃyoga*) between *purusa* or the self and *prakṛti* or

primal matter. This contact does not however mean any kind of ordinary conjunction, but a sort of effective relation through which *prakṛti* is influenced by the presence of *puruṣa*, more or less in the same way as the Jīva attracts *pudgala* in Jainism. There can be no evolution unless the two become *somehow* related to each other. The Jain conception, which is under different conditions blended with the doctrine of *karma*, regarding the union of soul and matter, is basically the same. A soul acquires the body that it inwardly craves for. The *karma* or the sum of the past life of a soul generates in it certain blind cravings and passion. These cravings in the soul attract to it particular sorts of matter particles and organize them into the body unconsciously desired.

But there are also some differences between the Jain and Sāṃkhya conceptions of soul. According to the Jains the soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (*ananta-darsana*), infinite knowledge (*ananta-jñāna*) and infinite power (*ananta-vīrya*). It is all perfect. The souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. According to the Sāṃkhya, although the souls are many, they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand in accordance with their occupation of smaller and larger bodies but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. Unlike the Jain soul possessing infinite knowledge, power and perception, the Sāṃkhya soul is described as being devoid of such characteristics. In Jainism the soul is veiled by *karma* matter, and every act of knowledge means only the partial removal of the veil. But the Sāṃkhya says that the soul is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. Knowledge revelation is not the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the soul, as the Jains suppose.

The whole course of evolution from *prakṛti* to the gross physical elements is distinguished in the Sāṃkhya into two stages, the psychological and the physical, the former including the developments of *prakṛti* as *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and the eleven sense-motor organs, and the latter constituting the evolution of five subtle physical essences (*tanmātra*), the gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) and their products. The *tanmātras* or physical essences are devoid of specific perceptible character and hence called *avisesa*. The gross elements and their products are possessed of specific characters and so they are designated as *visesa*. The gross body which is composed of five gross

elements is the support of the subtle body in so far as the intellect, the ego and the senses cannot function without some physical basis. This metaphysics rests mainly on its theory of causation which is known as Satkāryavāda. This theory has two different forms, namely Parināmavāda and Vivartavāda. The latter, which is accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins, holds that the change of the cause into the effect is merely apparent, but according to the former, which is especially held by the Sāṃkhya, there is a real transformation (*parināma*) of the cause into effect, e.g., the production of curd from milk. "Coming to the Jain system, we find that it posits over and above the perceptible world an infinite number of two utterly distinct types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious. The gross world is according to it only an effect (*kārya*) or modification (*parināma*) of the subtle physical elements. The subtle physical elements of the Jain system are atomic in nature but they are far subtler than the atoms posited in the Ārambhavāda. Even though an atomist, the Jain conceives the atoms as constantly undergoing change of Parināmavāda, and the gross world is according to him but a transformation (*rūpāntara*) or modification (*parināma*) of these very atoms. Really speaking, the Jaina is a Parināmavādin. However, there is a difference between the Parināmavāda as advocated by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, old Vedānta, etc. and the same as advocated by the Jain. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system Parināmavāda has been applied to the physical elements alone while the unconscious elements have been left untouched thereby, on the other hand, in *Bhāṭṭi-prapañca* etc. Parināmavāda has been applied to the conscious elements alone. As contrasted with these two, in Jainism Parināmavāda has been applied to the physical as well as conscious, gross as well as subtle, in one word, the Jain Parināmavāda may be called as all comprehensive (*sarva-vyāpaka*) Parināmavāda."⁴⁴

The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge, in its basic principles, has much in common with that of the Jains, since it accepts all the three independent sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), viz., perception, inference and testimony. Jainism also shares with the Sāṃkhya the two kinds of perception, namely, *nirvikalpa* or indeterminate, arising at the first moment of contact between a sense and its object, and *svavikalpa* or determinate which is the result of the analysis, synthesis and interpretation of sense-data. A distinction between empirical and transcendental perception is maintained both in the Sāṃkhya and in Jainism. The Sāṃkhya also seems to

have contributed to the Jain tradition that transcendental perception is of both sorts, indeterminate as well as determinate. According to the Sāmkhya, the material cause of sense-organs is *abhīmāna* which is kind of subtle-substance (*sūkṣma-dravya*) born of *prakṛti*.³⁹ Jainism likewise maintains that the material cause of sense-organs is a particular kind of *puṅgava*, i.e., a particular kind of physical substance (*jada-dravya-viśeṣa*). Over and above the five usual sense-organs, a sixth one of the form of an internal sense-organ has been accepted by all the systems under the name *manas*. According to the Sāmkhya, *manas* is not atomic, but it is quite small in size, born out of the evolution of material *prakṛti*. The Jains also hold that mind is a material entity (*puṅgalika*) originating from an extremely subtle physical substance called *manovarganā*. Like body it undergoes change every moment. They also have a conception of *bhāva-manas* which is of the nature of cognitive potency and cognition, and this comes out of a conscious substance (*cetana-dravya-janya*). The Jains, however, criticise the Sāmkhya view that just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things, so the material principle of intellect, being transparent and bright, reflects the consciousness of the self and illuminates or cognises the objects of knowledge. In refuting some of the points of the Sāmkhya theory of perception, to which the Jains do not like to subscribe, they have followed similar arguments laid down by the Nyāya school. With regard to the classification of inference, the Sāmkhya adopts the Nyāya view, although in a slightly different form. Also as regards the logical forms of inference, the Sāmkhyas admit, like the Naiyāyikas, that the five-membered syllogism is the most convincing form of inferential proof. In the Jain tradition, the first mention of the three types of inference is found in the *Anuyogadāra*⁴⁰ and the words by which the three types are here designated are literally the same as in the Nyāya system. We have elsewhere the occasion to deal elaborately with the problems of Jain syllogisms and their bearing on the Nyāya system.⁴¹

The Jain conception of *mokṣa* and the Buddhist conception of *nirvāṇa* appear to have derived their main impulses from the Sāmkhya idea of liberation. World is full of suffering and to get rid of (*mukṭi*) all suffering is the *summun bonum* of our life (*apavarga* or *mukṭi*). These two Sāmkhya ideas must have contributed something to the development of the corresponding Buddhist and Jain ideas. In the Sāmkhya the cause of suffering is attributed to ignorance,

and hence freedom from suffering is to be attained through right knowledge of reality, which comes from the knowledge of distinction (*vivekajñāna*) between the self and the not-self.⁴² All pleasures and pains belong to the mind-body complex, which acts or causes to act. The soul is quite different from this complex, a passive spectator, a transcendent subject whose very nature is pure consciousness, freedom, eternity and immortality. The attainment of liberation means the clear recognition of the self as a reality which is beyond time and space, mind and body, and hence essentially free, eternal and immortal.⁴³

Likewise Jain atheism also seems to have been substantiated by Sāmkhya atheism. According to the Sāmkhya, God as an eternal and immutable self cannot be the cause of the world. God cannot guide or control *prakṛti*. To create the world or to control *prakṛti* cannot be the end of God's own, because a perfect being cannot have any unfulfilled desires and unattained ends. The belief in God is inconsistent with the distinctive reality and immortality of individual selves. Perception and inference do not prove God.⁴⁴ The Sāmkhya proceeds on the principle that the product is none other than the material cause in a definite stage of evolution and that the preceding stages are to be inferred from that which lies open before us. By this means a first principle is finally reached, which is of the nature of cause only. This is *prakṛti*, the primordial matter, from which the universe is evolved in a regular course. The primordial matter moved by the laws of motion inherent within it transforms itself into the world. Hence it is redundant to admit the existence of God. The assumption of God is thus ontologically irrelevant and logically repulsive because it is unproved.

JAINISM AND YOGA

The twenty-five principles of the Sāmkhya are accepted by the Yoga. Patañjali systematised the conceptions of the Yoga under the framework of the metaphysics of the Sāmkhya. Excepting for the admission of God, Yoga is practically the same as the later Sāmkhya. Yoga is thus called "Sāmkhya with God". The Sāmkhya affirms that the existence of an eternal God cannot be established by proof. The eternal existence of the *puruṣas* is inconsistent with the infinity and creatorship of God. *Prakṛti* evolves into the world by coming into relationship with *puruṣa*, but the Sāmkhya does not clearly and

categorically explain how this relationship is brought about. The Yoga school says that this is brought about by the agency of God.⁴⁵ The concept of God is thus an extraneous graft on the Yoga system.

Frankly speaking, although included in the six systems of Indian philosophy, the Yoga has nothing to do with the philosophical speculations. It is logical to look upon Yoga as essentially as certain ancient practices rather than any specific philosophy. The practices are in fact immensely old. These take us back to the primitive times, in the ecstatic rites and magical practices of the prehistoric peoples for acquiring supernatural powers through the most strenuous methods. That these were prevalent as early as the third millennium B.C. has been proved by the Harappan stone-statues and pictures depicted on the seals. In course of time these practices became the floating possessions, as it were, of all sorts of religious sects and even philosophical systems. This primitive inheritance was moulded in accordance with subsequent religious doctrines and philosophical conceptions. As for the methods and means of yoga, the *Yogasūtra* mentions the following eight *yogāṅgas*: *yama* (restraint), *niyama* (discipline), *āsana* (sitting posture), *prāṇāyāma* (breath-control), *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the senses), *dhāraṇa* (attention), *dhyāna* (meditation), and *samādhi* (concentration). The supposed experience resulting from these yoga practices was able to influence the adherents of different religio-philosophical schools.

In Jain tradition it is said that lord Mahāvīra devoted himself for long twelve years chiefly to the yogic practices, and the canonical works of Jainism attach great importance to the *yogāṅgas*, i.e., the components of yoga. The Jain doctrine of *karma* has something common with its yoga conception. *Karma* in yoga is divided into four classes: (1) *sukla* or white (*puṇya*, those that produce happiness), (2) *kṛṣṇa* or black (*pāpa*, those that produce sorrow), (3) *sukla-kṛṣṇa* (ordinary actions, partly virtuous and partly vicious), and (4) *asukla-kṛṣṇa* (those inner acts of self-abnegation and meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures and pains). All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the world and avoid taking the lives of insects.⁴⁶ All *karmanas* proceed from the fivefold afflictions (*klesas*), namely, *avidyā*, *asmittā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa*. The *karmanas* performed in the present life generally accumulate and make it possible for an individual to suffer and enjoy the fruits thereof. The *karma* of the present life deter-

mines the particular kind of future birth, the period of life and the painful and joyful experiences destined for that life. The influence of some form of Yoga system on the disciplinary codes of the Jains has been suggested by Jacobi.⁴⁷ He has shown that a few *sūtras* of Umāsvāti⁴⁸ are directly inspired from similar verses occurring in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*. In connection with *samvara* or stoppage we come across the Jain insistence on the *gutti* or control of the mind, speech and body.⁴⁹ This is possible by refraining from *samrambha*, *samārambha* and *ārambha*.⁵⁰ These denote the stages of the preparation and the performance of forbidden thinking, speaking and acting. The tenfold monastic morality (*dharma*) and the twelve pessimistic reflections, conceived by Umāsvāti,⁵¹ have a close bearing on the yoga precepts. Details of Jain yogic practices are furnished by Schubring⁵² by which the aspirant can withdraw himself from his surrounding, reach the state of indifference towards all that the five senses offer, suppress the four passions, avoid displeasing and promote pleasing activities of the inner sense, speech and body and finally raise himself to the resting-place secluded from all worldly dealings and temptations.

The influence of yoga on Jain philosophy can also clearly be observed in the conception of transcendental perception. This transcendental perception is named differently in different systems. In the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist systems it is known as *yogī-pratyakṣa* (i.e. yogic perception) or *yogī-jñāna* (i.e. yogic knowledge) and is supposed to be born as a result of competence acquired through yogic practices. In Jain philosophy, the Āgamic, i.e. earlier or canonical, tradition insists transcendental perception alone should be treated as direct perception to which category it places the *avadhi*, *manahpariyāya* and *kevala-jñāna*s. Later Jain logicians however attempted to bring empirical perception under the category of *Pratyakṣa*. In any case, the conception of yogic perception, indeterminate as well as determinate, has some bearing on the Jain *avadhi-darsana* and *kevala-darsana* which posit a type of cognition arising independently of sense-object contact on account of yoga or special competence of soul (*visiṣṭa-ātma-sakti*).

JAINISM AND MĪMĀMSĀ

The Mīmāṃsā occupies a unique position in Indian philosophical systems. Like the Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā is also in inheritance of primi-

tive culture, of primitive rituals and ceremonies designed to influence the course of nature in favour of a fruitful and happy human existence. The aim of the Mīmāṃsaka philosophers was to revive the undifferentiated pre-class collective life as the precondition for the development and efficacy of primitive magical beliefs and rituals. That is why it upholds the aspects of Vedic ritualism, supplies a philosophical justification of the beliefs on which this ritualism depended and gives a methodology of interpretation with the help of which these could be properly performed. The Mīmāṃsaka insistence on the infallibility and authority of the Vedas is in fact nothing but a wholehearted regard to the inherited traditional knowledge of the past of which the Vedas are the symbol.

It appears that the original purpose of the Mīmāṃsā as well as of Jainism and Buddhism was the same—to revive the primitive way of life,—simple, unsophisticated and collective,—as the way out of the crisis of class society. But while Jainism and Buddhism, being disgusted with the corrupt practices of the advanced and sophisticated sacrificial cults and rituals made a total denunciation of all these, the Mīmāṃsā attempted to revive their original form and connect them with the original values and purposes for which they stood in the days of yore. Unfortunately most of the modern scholars—even great scholars like Max Muller, Keith or Radhakrishnan—have missed this point, as a result of which they have been baffled with the inherent puzzles of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine.

The greatest puzzle is Mīmāṃsā atheism which is in common with Jainism and Buddhism. How can a system which has based itself on the Vedas become atheistic? The Mīmāṃsakas themselves answer this question by saying that they are only concerned with the rituals of the Vedas to be performed according to the proper rules which contain eternal truth and not with why other motive. The primitive magical basis of the Vedic rituals is sufficiently clear which has been demonstrated by all competent Vedic scholars. This magical basis, in spite of the grafting upon the primitive rituals the later class-interest of the priests, has not been completely stamped out. In primitive magic there is no room for a supreme being, an omniscient and omnipotent God. It rests on the notion that by creating an illusion of the reality you can control the reality. By performing rituals, mainly in the form of the act of miming, nature can be so influenced as to serve your purpose. No supernatural intervention is needed.⁵³ The clue to everything about

Mīmāṃsā, including its atheism, is therefore to be sought in the facts underlying primitive magic

The premises of Jain atheism are broadly the same as those of Mīmāṃsā atheism Śābara's argument for the rejection of God is simply that there is no evidence of his existence Sense-perception does not reveal God and the other sources of knowledge are after all based upon sense-perception ⁵⁴ In spite of all their differences, both Kumārila⁵⁵ and Prabhākara,⁵⁶ argue that the conception of God is ontologically irrelevant and logically repulsive While dealing with Jain atheism we have already had the occasion to refer to the antitheistic argument of the Mīmāṃsakas, and there is no need of repeating them once again Kumārila made a delightful fun of the internal inconsistencies involved in the theistic position A disembodied soul cannot create anything, so God needs to have a body which will be supplied by another God whose body will again be supplied by another, so on *ad infinitum* Since a fool even does not do anything without a purpose, what can be the purpose of an omnipotent and all-merciful God creating such a world full of pain and misery? Like that of the Jains, the target of the Mīmāṃsaka attack was the theistic conception of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas But Kumārila also extended his arguments even against the conception of creation as advanced by the Vedānta If the world is produced from *brahman* who is free from all defects then the world should also be defectless, but it is not so Likewise *māyā* or *avyāyā* can not be at the root of creation because there was no entity other than *brahman* on the eve of creation This cannot be said that *brahman*, the only reality, has induced the unreal dreamlike *māyā* to create

The task of the Mīmāṃsakas was to defend logically the efficacy of the magical rites In the course of doing so they developed their own theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics and theology Like the Jains, and the adherents of most other schools, the Mīmāṃsakas admit the validity of determinate and indeterminate perception But the Mīmāṃsakas do not share with the Jains the idea of transcendental perception So far as the non-perceptual sources of knowledge are concerned, besides inference and testimony, they admit three other sources—comparison (*upamāna*), postulation (*arthāpatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*)—a position somewhat different from the Jain standpoint The Mīmāṃsakas depend on the validity of sense-perception They believe in the reality of the perceived world and of other objects Here we find their agreement

with the Jains. The Mīmāṃsakas, in accordance with their belief in the reality of the world, reject the Buddhist theories of voidness and momentariness, as well as the Advaita Vedānta theory of the unreality of the phenomenal world. The souls, according to the Mīmāṃsā, are permanent eternal substances, and so also are the material elements by the combination of which the earth is made. The soul has the capacity for consciousness, but it is not the essence of soul. This is a point on which the Mīmāṃsakas differ from the Jains. The law of *karma* guides the formation of objects. The soul survives death to be able to reap the consequences of its *karma*. Repeated births are caused by *karma*. It is only by disinterested performance of duties and by the knowledge of the self that the *karman*s accumulated in the past are gradually worn out. Being free from all *karma*-ties liberation is achieved. Conceptually these ideas about liberation are not basically different from those of the Jains.

On the question of transcendental perception, as we have remarked above, the Mīmāṃsā differs significantly from Jainism and other philosophical systems. While dealing with the relation between Jainism and Yoga we have seen that there developed a tendency among the adherents of different systems to defend their philosophies on the strength of the experience resulting from yogic practices. Even Buddhist logicians like Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara insisted on yogic perception. Such claims were also put forward by representatives of other philosophies. But the Mīmāṃsakas deny such claim for yogic experience or transcendental perception and hold that the so-called unique experience yielded by yoga is nothing but a subjective fancy and as such quite useless in determining the validity of any philosophical view. Their sole insistence upon pure empirical perception and flat denial of transcendental perception have been criticised by the Jain logicians like Akalanka, Abhayadeva, Hemacandra, etc.

JAINISM AND NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

While dealing with Jain atheism and Jain logic we have dealt with the relation between Jainism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. We have seen that Jain atheism rests on the refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism. In this field, the main target of Jain attack was the theistic standpoint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But so far as logic was concerned, Jainism drew heavily from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Again, the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of atomism appears to have been influenced by the same conception developed among the early Jain thinkers. The Jain philosophical literature testifies to a gradually developing clarity in regard to the descriptions (*vyākhyā*), definitions (*lakṣana*), and logical justification (*upapatti*) of the categories (*padārtha*) like 'organ of valid knowledge,' (*pramāṇa*), 'object of valid knowledge' (*prameya*), etc., in accordance with the corresponding developments of such ideas in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. Later Jain logicians like Yaśovijaya have even employed the refined Navya Nyāya technique in their further analysis of the Jain descriptions and definitions.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *padārtha* is defined as a knowable or valid and cognizable thing. Kanāda mentions six *padārthas* or broad categories under which everything known can be classified. These are (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) activity (*karma*), (4) universality (*sāmānya*), (5) ultimate particularity (*viśeṣa*), and (6) the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, add a seventh, *abhāva* or non-existence.

Of these, the most important is substance (*dravya*). In Jainism, substances are classified into two broad groups—non-extended (to which belong time) and extended (to which belong the categories of Jīva and Ajīva and their sub-groups). In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika substances are nine in number—earth (*prthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), sky (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dāk*), self (*ātman*), and mind (*manas*). The first five are called *bhūtas* or substances having some special quality that can be perceived by one or other of the external senses. This corresponds with the Jain conception of *pudgala*. *Dāk* and *ākāśa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika correspond to the *ākāśa* or space of the Jains. *Ākāśa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a form of substance. The conception is also shared by the Jains who hold that substances are those that occupy or pervade, and space is that which is occupied and pervaded.⁵⁷ But while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that *ākāśa* is partless, the Jains hold that it consists of two parts *loka* and *āloka*.

The first four *bhūtas*, i.e. earth, etc. are conceived in two varieties, eternal and non-eternal. By the eternal variety of earth, etc. is meant their atoms while by the non-eternal variety the products of these atoms. Matter or *pudgala* of the Jains is also of the nature of compounds of atoms. The qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour by which the *pudgala* is characterised are possessed by atoms.

and also by their products. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, all the atoms are not homogeneous in quality. For example, earth atoms are qualitatively different from the water atoms, etc., the water atoms from the earth atoms etc., and so on. This is one of the important points on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atomism differs from that of the Jains who conceive all the atoms as homogeneous in quality.

Guna or quality is recognised in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a distinct category of reals. In Jainism, *guna* is the essential character of the substance. A substance is possessed of some unchanging essential characters (*gunas*) as well as changing modes (*pariyāya*)⁵⁸. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *gunas* are conceived as inhering in substance and dependent upon substance. At the same time they are also conceived as distinct from substance, because they can by themselves be known and are thus independent realities. *Karma* or actions in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like the *gunas*, are conceived as inhering in the substance, but they are also understood as independent realities. Here action has been equated with motion of which five types are enumerated. This reminds us of the Jain conception of *dharma* and *adharma*, conceived as the principle of motion and rest. The *sāmānya* or universality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is equivalent to *jāti* and is understood to stand for a generic feature, while *vīśeṣa* or particularity is conceived as the differentia of impatite things. The Jain classification of the living and non-living beings follows these principles, but they are not separately treated in Jainism. The same holds good in the case of *samavāya* or inherence.

The Jains are advocates of the self-revelatory character of cognitions. Each cognition whether acquired through perception, inference or testimony notices its own nature by way of direct observation while it is called 'inferential,' 'verbal,' etc., owing to the nature of the object grasped. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regard cognition not as self-revelatory in the sense of being perceptually cognizable by something than itself. As regards perception the Jains share with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the ideas of indeterminate and determinate perceptions. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the material cause of the sense-organs are the five *bhūtas* like earth, etc., which are all physical substances. The Jains also maintain that the material cause of sense-organs is a particular kind of *pudgala*⁵⁹. The Jains, admitting that different qualities are perceived by different sense-organs, argue that since a quality is non-distinct from the substance of which it is a quality, all the sense-organs are competent to per-

ceive qualities as well as substances. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the visual sense-organ and the tactile sense-organ are alone competent to perceive substance. The mental qualities like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc. and the experience of these qualities are traced in both the systems to the soul or self. The soul or self, i.e., *ātman* is associated with the atoms in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and with *karmic*-atoms (*karmānu*) in Jainism.

Regarding the technique of presenting an inference, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admit the necessity of establishing a five-membered syllogism.⁶⁰ Although the Jain logicians adopt this in practice, in conformity with their non-absolutistic standpoint they hold that the number of steps in an inference is not fixed but may be more or less. As to the aspects of the nature of a probans, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas advocate for its fivefold nature: presence in the subject of the thesis sought to be established (*pakṣa-sattva*), presence in a homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*), absence from heterologues (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*), absence of cancellation-of-the-thesis (*avādhuta-viśayatva*) and absence of a counterbalancing probans (*asatpratī-pakṣatva*). The Jain tradition maintains that a probans has but unitary nature, namely 'absence in the absence of the probandum' (*avnābhāva*), but it is possible to draw a conclusive inference even in the absence of some of the aforesaid aspects. The classification of probantia into types that we find in the Jain texts is mainly based upon the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*,⁶¹ which mentions five types of probantia, namely, probans (1) that is an effect (*kārya*) of the probandum, (2) that is a cause (*kāraṇa*) of the probandum, (3) that is a conjunction (*samyoga*) with the probandum, (4) that residing by inherence (*samavāya*) in the probandum, and (5) that is contradictory (*virodhī*) of the probandum. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Jains agree in holding that an effect is a proper probans and that a probans is valid when it is free from all heterologues, irrespective of whether or not it is present in a homologue. This position has been defended in great details by the Naiyāyikas and Jains alike.

JAINISM AND VEDĀNTA

Except the ideas of bondage and liberation Jainism has practically nothing in common with the Vedānta. Even these ideas have different significance and implication in the two systems, and the similarity is only terminological. In fact Jainism and Vedānta stand

in virtual opposition to each other. Their relation is like that between oil and water. Philosophically Jainism may be designated as pluralistic realism, but Vedānta is nothing but monistic idealism of a violent type. To the Jains, knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*karma*) are complementary to each other. To the Vedāntist the two are diametrically opposite. The Jains depend on all possible sources of normal knowledge. Perception of internal or external objects through the senses has special value in Jainism. The Vedāntists deny all possible sources for normal knowledge and have only dreams and sense illusions to fall back upon. The Jains believe in the law of causation. The gross world according to Jainism is only an effect (*kārya*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of the subtle physical elements. To the Vedāntist the cause alone is real, and what appears as the effect is only an illusion. The Jains accept a plurality of conscious elements. They believe in the principle of a plurality of conscious souls. The Vedāntists on the other hand believe in one supreme soul. To them *brahman* or the self is the only reality, and its modification in the form of the world is only illusory. To the Jains the world is eternal, without any beginning or end, and hence it cannot be the modification of any imaginary principle like the *brahman*. According to the Vedānta the world is a mere appearance like an object in a dream or illusion. The Jains frankly repudiate this idea as absolutely rubbish.

It is against this background that we are to take into account Śāṅkara's and Rāmānuja's attempts to refute Jainism on philosophical grounds. They had taken up the case very seriously because the difference between Jainism and Vedānta is real and not apparent like that existing between Vedānta and Buddhism, especially the Mādhyamika (Śūnyavāda) and Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) forms of the latter. Śāṅkara's criticism of Jainism occurs in his commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras*.⁶² Having given a brief sketch of the seven Jain categories and the doctrine of Syādvāda as *pūrvapakṣa*, he says that on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes in one thing the Jain doctrine cannot be accepted. According to him, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing. A thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time. The cognition that a thing is of more than one nature can not be definite and hence it can not be a source of true knowledge. The doctrine of Syādvāda shows that the means of knowledge, the ob-

ject of knowledge, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite. If that be the case, the Tirthamkara can not teach with any claim to authority and his followers can not act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate. Again, if the Jain reasoning be applied to the doctrine of categories, from one viewpoint they have a fixed number, from another unfixed. Since the categories have been described, to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.

Regarding the conception of the non-universality of the self, Śāṅkara refutes the Jain view that the soul has the same size as the body on the ground that as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man—which is of the size of the human body—when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant, would not be able to fill the whole of it. The same difficulty would moreover arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence—infancy, youth and old age. If it be said that the soul consists of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing compression in a small body and dilation in a big one, the question will arise whether the countless particles of the soul may occupy the same place or not. If the former is admitted it follows that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of limited dimensions, and if the latter is admitted, it follows that since the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle only, and hence the soul must be of minute size. Nor can the doctrine of soul having the same size as the body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of the particles, which involves the soul's undergoing changes and the like. This would mean that the soul is non-permanent, like the skin or similar substances by which it is impossible to establish its states of bondage and release. If it be said that the soul consists of some permanently remaining parts, it would be impossible to determine which are the permanent and which are the temporary parts. Since the soul is immaterial, it cannot spring from material elements and re-enter the elements. According to the Jain logic itself the soul is of indefinite nature and also the size of the particles and departing is itself indefinite.

In Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras*⁶³ the following is said against Jainism. Contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing

Since the substance (*dravya*) and its qualifying states (*paryāyas*) are different, the former can not be connected with opposite attributes. Time is only an attribute of substance and not an independent substance, and hence the question of its being and non-being cannot arise. Since Jainism holds everything to be of an ambiguous nature, it cannot therefore be said that each of the substances has its own qualifying states and its own nature. If the souls abide in numberless places, each soul having the same size as the body which it animates, then the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant will not be able to enter in the next stage of its existence into the body of an ant. This difficulty cannot be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilation. The final size of the soul, i.e., the size it has in the state of its release, is considered in Jainism as permanent. From this, it follows that the ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul.

A SUBJECTWISE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SYSTEMS

In view of what we have discussed in the preceding sections, we are now in a position to evaluate the Jain standpoint in terms of a subjectwise comparative analysis of the contents of different philosophical systems of India. It is possible to divide Indian philosophical systems into two main classes—idealistic and non-idealistic. To the former class belong the Advaita Vedānta and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools of Buddhism which treat the external perceptible world and everything that is apprehended by the empirical organs of knowledge as unreal, like the beauty of the daughter of a barren woman. The non-idealistic group is formed by the Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya and also by the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism. Of these, the Cārvāka system is purely materialistic, while the other systems are materialistic from the viewpoint of their origin, but in the course of their historical growth they have developed certain idealistic tendency. Jainism also falls within this group since it views the gross world which is apprehended by the empirical organs of knowledge as real. Again, of all these systems, idealistic and non-idealistic, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Yoga are theistic, while others are frankly atheistic.

The Advaita Vedāntists believe in the doctrine of absolute per-

manence (*kevala-nityatva*, because, according to them, all changes are mere appearances having no reality of their own. The Buddhists on the other hand believe in the doctrine of absolute change (*kevala-anityatva*), because according to them, everything has a momentary existence. The idea of impermanence, so much emphasised by the Buddha was developed into an all-comprehensive metaphysical doctrine, and the rival doctrines sought to refute it by establishing their respective positions. The main attack came from the Jains and the Vedāntists. The Buddhists defended their position by arguing that if *ātman* is regarded as permanent it becomes impossible either to account for transcendental bondage and release or to demonstrate how the doer of action is also the enjoyer of the fruits of action. The Jains speak against both the doctrine of absolute permanence and the doctrine of absolute impermanence and try to show that a real entity is a substance as well as its modes, something existent as well as non-existent, something permanent as well as transient. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, etc. hold that certain entities are absolutely permanent and certain others are absolutely changing, and hence their views are called the doctrine of the changing and permanent (*nityānitya-ubhaya*). Systems like the Sāṃkhya maintain that everything apart from the conscious elements is a changing permanent (*parānāmānityatva*). The Jain system is called the doctrine of permanence coupled with change (*nityānityātmaka*) since it holds everything as permanent as well as changing. The last three doctrines are not basically different so far as the question of permanence and change is concerned.

The idea of a self is found in most of the systems, but it is not very clear-cut and well defined, what we have is only an impression of the idea of self and nothing more. The common term to denote this self is *ātman* which is often equated with soul, both material and immaterial. The term *ātman* is also used by the Jains in a restricted sense of the self, its technical name being *puruṣa* in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and *nāma* in Buddhism. *Ātman*, while in transmigratory stage, is in a peculiar way associated with *prakṛti* according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, with atoms according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, with *avdyā* or *māyā* according to Vedānta, with *rūpa* according to Buddhism and with *karmic-atoms* (*karmāṇu*) according to the Jains. While there is a general agreement with regard to the existence of the self, there is a wide divergence of opinion about its nature. The Cārvākas identify the self with the gross body. The Buddhist con-

ception is ambiguous but they appear to identify the self with the stream of consciousness. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and a group of the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the self is an unconscious substance which may acquire the attribute of consciousness under certain conditions, while another group of the Mīmāṃsakas holds that the self is a conscious entity which is partially hidden by ignorance. The Advaita Vedānta holds that the self is pure eternal consciousness which is one in all bodies. According to the Sāṃkhya the self is a conscious spirit which is always the subject of knowledge and can never become the object of any knowledge. All of these systems posit this *ātman* or self apart from the physical entities like body etc., as the casual factor responsible for transmigration. This self may be ubiquitous or non-ubiquitous, momentary or eternal, material or immaterial, but there is no dispute among the systems with regard to its connection with the casual factor—*ajñāna*, *avidyā*, *karma* or whatever be the name given to it—responsible for transmigration. The self of the Jains is inherently perfect. Infinite knowledge, faith, power and bliss can all be attained by the self if it can only remove from within itself all obstacles that stand in the way. The obstacles are constituted by matter-particles which infect the self and overpower its natural qualities. This self is *non-self-revelatory* when it is blinded by passions and *self-revelatory* when it is free from them.

According to the Cārvākas, sense-perception is the sole organ of knowledge. Inference or testimony is not valid unless their findings are confirmed by sense-perception. The followers of the Advaita Vedānta and Buddhist Śūnyavāda (Mādhyamika) and Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) advocate the sole competence of non-sensuous organs—namely, *manas*, the organ of empiric introspection, *citta*, the organ of transcendental realization and *ātman*, the ultimate principle of consciousness—to generate true knowledge. The advocates of equal competence of sense-organs and non-sensuous organs are the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism. The non-sensuous organ which is expected to substantiate the knowledge acquired through the sense-organs is *antahkarana*, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and *manas* according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. The Jains also belong to this group since they maintain that sense-organs which are competent to generate true knowledge and add that each of the two non-sensuous

organs—*manas* and *ātman*—capable of independently generating true knowledge

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā subscribe to the doctrine of Ārambhavāda or novel creation according to which there is a distinction between cause and effect, the latter being a new creation, non-existent before its emergence. The atoms constituting the gross physical world are by themselves beginningless, endless and changeless as the cause, but the effect produced by them is of a totally different character having beginning, end and change. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga insists upon Parināmavāda which is just the reverse of the former. Here effect is conceived as the modification of the cause. There is no distinction between cause and effect. A particular effect exists in its cause. The gross world is nothing but the perceptible modification of a material cause. The Buddhists believe in the Pratītya-samutpādvāda, or the theory of dependent origination which conceives in its own distinctive manner the series of qualities and attributes that originate and perish, but it posits no permanent cause in the form of the substrata of these qualities and attributes. The Vedāntists believe in the doctrine of Vivartavāda, the theory of illusory modification of the eternal *brahman*, according to which the cause is only real and the effect unreal or imaginary, a mere illusory appearance. The Jain tendency is towards Parināmavāda in which an intimate relation between the cause and the effect is emphasised.

So far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the Jains alongwith the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, Vedāntists and the Buddhist followers of Vijñānavāda are advocates of the self-revelatory character of cognition. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers and also the Kumārila-Mīmāṃsakas on the other hand regard cognition as not-self-revelatory. They hold that cognition is by nature perceptible but not self-perceptible. As to the nature of the effect of a *pramāṇa*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsakas treat the effect of a *pramāṇa* as absolutely distinct from it while the Buddhists treat the two as absolutely non-distinct. The Jains from their non-absolutistic viewpoint treat a *pramāṇa* and its effect as partly distinct and partly non-distinct. On the question whether or not memory is *pramāṇa*, the Jains consider it to be a *pramāṇa* and classes it under non-perceptual category. All other schools of Indian thought do not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsakas treat continuous cognition as

pramāṇa but they adopt two different lines of defence. The Buddhists do not lay much emphasis on this point. According to the Jain tradition, continuous cognition is a *pramāṇa*, but some of the Jain philosophers want to accept it in a restricted sense by taking into account specialities like moments, etc. As to the nature of recognition, the Buddhists hold it to be a combination of two pieces of cognition, namely memory and perception. Systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā etc. maintain that, recognition is one single piece of cognition of the nature of perception. Jain logicians disagree with both the tradition and regard recognition as but a variety of sense-perception.

Barring the Cārvākas, all of the philosophical schools, including Jainism, directly or indirectly, divide perception into two kinds, empirical and transcendental. According to the Buddhist logicians and the adherents of Advaita-Vedānta, transcendental perception is exclusively indeterminate, while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Jains it is both determinate and indeterminate. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā systems the determinant of perception is the fact of having been born of a contact (*sannikarsa*). More or less a similar view is shared by the Jains. The earlier Jain tradition attributes this contact to the soul while the later tradition attributes it to the sense-organ and the *manas*. All advocates of indeterminate cognition hold that it has bare existence (*sattāmātra*) for its object. This existence in Buddhist tradition stands for the capacity to perform a function and can belong to momentary particular, in Vedānta for the indivisible ubiquitous *brahman*, and in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā for mere being. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jainism this existence is neither confirmed to a momentary particular nor is of the nature of *brahman*. It is of the nature of origin-cum-destruction-cum-permanence (*utpāda-vyayadhrāvya-svarūpa*).

In view of what we have stated above it is now clear that no system of Indian philosophy allows any purely isolated treatment. The development of each is largely conditioned by its interconnections and contradictions with the others. There are some common characters of all the Indian systems. The common character is due to the influx of some special religio-ethical ideas from outside which later became part and parcel of the systems themselves. It is due to the influence of such ideas that philosophy which was originally the science of perception (*darsana*) came to be regarded as the science

of liberation (*moksa*) The ethico-religious ideas which were grafted on all philosophical systems came in the form of the conception of *apūrvā* in the Mīmāṃsā, which is the law that guarantees the future enjoyment of the fruits of rituals, and in that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of *adrsta*, which is the stock of merit and demerit accruing from good or bad actions But the general conception of *karma* eventually took the lead It means that all actions, good or bad, produce their proper consequences in the life of the individual The law of *karma* is accepted by the six orthodox schools and also by the Buddhists and Jains Some systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believe that the law of *karma* is under the guidance and control of God In the Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist and Jain systems the law of *karma* is autonomous Another common view is that ignorance of reality is the cause of bondage, and liberation is the state of perfectness which can be achieved through knowledge, self-control and meditation The Sāṃkhya, Advaita-Vedānta, Buddhism and Jainism hold that liberation can be attained even in this life All Indian systems, excepting the Cārvākas, hold that liberation is a total destruction of sufferings which life in this world brings about

On the basis of such common characters most of the writers on Indian philosophy want to lay emphasis on the synthetic outlook of our ancient philosophers But this is evidently an exaggerated notion Rather it will be logical to say that it was the *contradictions* that constituted the moving force of development in the field of Indian philosophy The very manner of our philosophical writings is to expound one's own views by way of a critical rejection of the ideas opposed to it In the section dealing with Jain atheism we have seen how the philosophers of different schools defended their own positions by refuting the views of the others The clash of ideas was not confined to philosophical writings alone It frequently found expression in open or public debates Such debates were often arranged with great pomp in the presence of the king or any high-rank person, and the defeated or discredited philosophers had to face a miserable lot In the history of western philosophy different schools came into existence successively, one being replaced by another In India, different schools flourish together till today with their respective bands of adherents Of the surviving schools we may refer to the Jains and the Vedāntists who have their own organisations, disciplinary codes, etc There are even a few monasteries for the followers of the Sāṃkhya The basis of the so-called synthetic out-

look was formulated as early as the late-medieval period with the purpose of giving Vedānta a lead. Thus Vijañānabhikṣu and others fabricated the Sāmkhya in light of Vedānta, and following this tradition, great scholars like M. M. Jogendranath Tarkasāmkhya Vedānta-tīrtha or Candrakānta Tarkālankāra did not hesitate to say that "the different philosophical streams got mingled in a perfect homogeneity after reaching the great ocean of the one non-dual *brahman*" or "there is no reason to imagine that the philosophical tenets of the Nyāya, etc. are really opposed to those of Vedānta, rather, we may say that the Vedānta view is what they really intended to imply." More or less a similar view is shared by Radhakrishnan. The barrenness of such formulations can be detected at once if one takes the trouble of going to a Sāmkhya monastery and ask what the followers of the doctrine themselves think about all these Sāmkhya-monasteries are indeed very few, but there is one in the village of Chandrahati, near Tribeni in the Hooghly district of West Bengal, in which the monks with their distinctive sectarian symbols, study and teach the Sāmkhya. In spite of the scholars' synthetic claims, they believe that their system has nothing to do with Vedānta. Thus it is impossible to overlook the basic differences among various philosophical schools and their followers, especially when such important philosophical systems as the Vedānta or Sāmkhya or Jainism are still living creeds of the country. The great Jain writer Gunaratna did not even fail to observe the sectarian marks, rituals etc., distinctive of different systems. According to him the Nyāya philosophers, after their morning oblations, thrice smeared their bodies with ashes, they were generally married, but better among them were without a wife.⁶¹ Exponents of each systems considered their own views as truth which formed the basis of their refutation of rival creeds. Notwithstanding all the twists of textual interpretation, displayed by the champions of the synthetic theory, it is impossible to conceal the real clash of ideas.

REFERENCES

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1 Dasgupta, <i>HIP</i> , I, p. 210 | 14 1, VII 1 6 et seq., <i>Maṭrāyaṇi</i> , |
| 2 <i>Chāndogya</i> , VIII 7 1 | III 2 et seq., <i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka</i> , III 2 13 |
| 3 Ibid., III 14, Winternutz, <i>HIL</i> , I, p. 250 | IV 4 5 et seq. |
| 4 For the Upanisadic references to <i>karmasee</i> , <i>Isā</i> , II, <i>Chāndogya</i> , III 1 10, | 5 Cf. <i>Praśna</i> , IV 9, <i>Kaṭha</i> , I 3 4 |
| | 6 For Upanisadic theories of transmigration see, <i>Chāndogya</i> , V 10, <i>Bṛha-</i> |

- dāranyaka*, IV 4, *Mundaka*, III 2
 et seq
 7 Cf Barth, *RI*, pp 148–50, Cole-
 brooke *MF*, II, p 276
 8 III 74
 9 VI 91
 10 *Sum Vil*, 119, 168
 11 *Ibid* 57
 12 I 17
 13 *TTDS*, V 90
 14 Gunaratna on *SDSC*, 52
 15 *PKM*, 8–11
 16 *PSM*, I 10, *PMV*, II 1, Stcherbatsky,
BI, I, p 12
 17 Keith, *BP*, p 161
 18 McGovern, *MBP*, I, p 115
 19 *Anguttara*, III 983, *Sum Vil* 162
 20 *SBL*, XLV intro, xxix–xxx
 21 *HDA*, pp 240 ff
 22 *Ibid*, pp 254 ff
 23 *Ibid*, pp 262 ff, 274
 24 II 1 15, 21 ff
 25 *PKM* II, *SVD*, 20
 26 *ASIM*, p 3
 27 See Chapter Three
 28 See my *IMG*, pp 273–75
 29 Garbe, *ACOPVMCS*, XX–XXI
 30 See Chapter Three, Bhattacharyya,
IMG, pp 267 ff *HICI*, pp 50 ff
 31 *SPS*, V 52 ff
 32 *SPB*, II 41–42
 33 *SPS*, I 63
 34 Cf *SK*, XXXV
 35 *SPS*, II 20
 36 *SK*, XXIV
 37 *SBL*, XLV, intro, xxiv
 38 Sanghvi, *ASIM*, p 12
 39 *SK*, XXV
 40 *Anu*, 212 A
 41 See Chapter Three
 42 *SSV*, III 23–4, *SK* and Kaumudi,
 XLIV, LXIII
 43 *SSV*, V 74–83
 44 *SPS*, I 92, V 10
 45 *BV*, I 24, *YV*, I 24
 46 *VB* and *TVS*, IV 7
 47 *SBE*, XXII, intro, xxx ff
 48 *TTDS*, VII 4–7
 49 *Ibid* IX
 50 *Uttara*, XXIV 19 ff
 51 *TTDS*, IX 6–7
 52 *DJ*, 277 ff
 53 Frazer, *GB* passim
 54 Sabara on *MS* I 1 5
 55 *SLV*, 41–116, Jha's tr, pp 355 ff
 56 Jha, *PSPM*, pp 85 ff, Keith, *KM*, pp
 62 ff
 57 Gunaratna on *SDSC*, 49
 58 *TTDS*, V 38
 59 *NS*, I 1 12
 60 *Ibid*, I 1 32
 61 IX 2 1, cf *NV*, II 12
 62 II 2 93–96
 63 II 2 91–95
 64 *IRD*, 49

Appendix

JAIN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Among the twelve (actually eleven) Śvetāmbara canonical texts of the Anga category, the *Ācāra*, a considerable portion of the *Sūtrakṛta*, *Jñātrdharmakathā*, *Upāsakadasāka*, *Antakṛddasāka*, *Anuttrapapātka*, and *Vipākasūtra* have little to do with proper philosophical speculations. These are mainly concerned with the rules of discipline for the monks, religious preachings as well as anecdotes calculated to carry moral conviction, religious codes for the householders, accounts of saints who had gone to the highest heaven after enduring intense persecution and the concept of virtue and vice. Part of *Sūtrakṛta* deals with the views of various philosophical school current in the days of Lord Mahāvira for the sole purpose of establishing the excellence of Jainism. The *Sthānāṅga* lists in numerical order the categories of knowledge pertaining to the realities of nature. The *Samavāya* classifies objects in accordance with similarities of time, place, number and so on. The *Vyākhyāprayñapti* or *Bhagavati* explains the realities of life and nature while parts of the *Prasnavyākaraṇa* contain accounts and episodes for the refutation of opposite views.¹

The twelfth Anga, the *Dśtrivāda*, is lost for ever. According to the Jain tradition, the lost text had five divisions known as Parikarmāṇi, Sūtrāṇi, Pūrvāgata, Anuyoga, and Cūlikā. The Pūrvāgata section is said to have been consisted of several subdivisions. Whether or not these supposed divisions and subdivisions formed the subject-matter of the lost text is a different question but the fact is that these constitute the basic categories of the Jain thought complex. Parikarmāṇi deals with cosmology, Sūtrāṇi with contemporary philosophical schools, Anuyoga with facts of remote antiquity, Pūrvāgata with the problems of birth, death and continuity, Utpāda with substances, Agrayanī with exposition of nature, Vīryānu-pravāda with potentialities of soul and other substances, Astunāsti-pravāda with substances of nature from the viewpoints of infinite qualities and forms, Jñānapravāda with epistemology, Satyapravāda

with expiatory rites, Vidyānūvāda with the exposition of various sciences, Kalyāṇavāda with astrology, omens and portents, Prānavāda with physical and medical sciences, Kriyāviśāla with seventy-two fine arts, Lokavindusāra with worldly professions and Cūlikā with charms and magic

The twelve Upāṅgas, ten Prakīrṇas, six Chedasūtras, four Mūla-sūtras and two Cūlikāsūtras of the Śvetāmbaras contain mainly ascetic practices and as such essentially didactic in nature dominated by supreme ethical considerations. These texts are not totally devoid of abstruse philosophical concepts (e.g., *Uttarādhyayana* contains brilliant philosophical discourses and the *Nandisūtra* gives details of Jain epistemology) which have been occasionally interpreted in the commentarial literature such as the *Niryuktis*, *Bhāṣyas*, *Cūṛṇis* and *Tikās*. Ten works of the *Niryukti* class are known, the earliest of these being those attributed to Bhadrabāhu who may be distinguished from his namesake, the celebrated author of the *Kalpasūtra*. These are on *Āvaśyaka*, *Dasavaikālika*, *Uttarādhyayana*, *Ācārāṅga*, *Dasasrutaskandha*, *Brhatkalpa*, *Vyavahāra*, *Sūryaprajñāpti*, and *Rsihbāṣita*. Eleven *Bhāṣya* texts have hitherto been available of which the elaborate *Bhāṣya* on the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* is attributed to Jinabhadra and that on the *Kalpasūtra* to Saṅghadāsagaṇi. The *Cūṛṇis*, all ascribed to Jinadāsagaṇi, the available texts of which are twenty in number, are prose glosses with a curious admixture of Prākṛta and Sanskrit. The last strata of the commentarial literature consist of *Tikās*. These are explanatory works spread over a period of more than one thousand years. These are written in Sanskrit. Besides there are other forms of commentarial literature called *Dīpikās*, *Vṛttas* and *Avacūṛṇis*.²

Though the Digambaras do not regard the Śvetāmbara canon as authoritative, they believe in the traditional classification of Jain scriptures into 14 lost Pūrvas and 12 Angas and accept certain aspects of the contents of the latter, such as the description of the moon, the sun, Jambudvīpa, and other islands and seas as well as living beings and non-living matters, as described in the Upāṅga texts like *Candraprajñāpti*, *Sūryaprajñāpti* and *Jambudvīpaprajñāpti* which they believe to have formed part of the Parikarmāṇi section of the lost *Drstivāda* as well as of the *Karāṇānuyoga* category of the 'secondary' or 'substitute' canon which they prefer to call 'the four Vedas'. They are also interested in the *Angabāhya* or *Angabāhira* texts, 'those which stand outside the Angas'. The first four works of

this category—*Sāmāyikā*, *Catavimsatistava*, *Vandana*, and *Pratikramana*—correspond to the sections of the *Āvasyaka*, the second Mūla-sūtra which has come down to us along with its Niryukti. Other works held by the Digambaras as belonging to the Angabāhya category are *Dasavaikālika*, *Uttarādhyayana* and *Kalpavyavahāra*. These works which are common to both sects, probably represent an earlier stage of the sacred writings of the Jains. The Digambara 'Vedas' are classified into four groups—Prathamānuyoga pertaining to legendary works, Karanānuyoga pertaining to cosmological works, Dravyānuyoga pertaining to philosophical works and Caranānuyoga pertaining to rituals.

The *Satkhandāgama* also known as *Karmaṣṭrābhṛta* of Puspadanta and Bhūtabali is the earliest and most authoritative work on Jain philosophy. According to Hiralal Jain the lost texts of *Drstivāda* are the basis of the Prākṛta Sūtras of this work as also of the *Kasāya-prābhṛta* which have come down to us with huge Prākṛta-Sanskrit commentaries, their contents indicating that the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras once had a common literature. The earliest available commentary on the *Ṣatkhandāgama* is the *Dhavalā* of Vīrasena composed about AD 816. Vīrasena has described himself as a disciple of Āryanandin and a grand-disciple of Candrasena of the Pañcastūpānvaya and who studied the Siddhānta under Elācārya. According to Vīrasena, after the death of Lohācārya when the knowledge of the Śāstra became extinct, only the saint Dharasena of Gīrinagara still held the knowledge to whom Puspadanta and Bhūtabali were sent as learners. These two monks composed the *Satkhandāgama* about the second century AD. Puspadanta composed the first 20 basic sūtras and the rest, running to 6000 sūtras, was completed by Bhūtabali. Its six sections are Jīvasthāna, Ksudrakabandha, Bandhasvāmitva, Vedanā, Varganā, and Mahābandha. The last of these is almost an independent work and is popularly known as *Mahādha-valā* which gives a very systematic and thorough exposition of the doctrine of *karma*. The commentary written by Vīrasena is based, according to his own statement, on the earlier commentaries including the one written by Kundakunda. A number of earlier commentaries on it are also mentioned in Indranandin's *Srutāvatāra*.³

The *Kasāyaṣṭrābhṛta* or *Kasāyapāhuda* of Gunadharācārya is devoted to the Jain doctrine of *karma*. It is also a work of the second century AD. It is composed in 233 *gāthā-sūtras* which have been elaborated in the *Cūṛṇasūtras* of Yatuvrsabha who probably flour-

ished in the last quarter of the sixth century AD Yativijñabha followed the commentary of Ārya Mankhu and Nāgahastin Afterwards, according to Indranandi two other commentaries were written on it Finally the great *Jayadhavalā* was composed on it during the ninth century by Virasena and Jinasena ¹ During the tenth century the subject-matter of the said works was condensed by Nemiscandra in his *Gommaṣasāra* (Jīvakāṇḍa and Karmakāṇḍa), the *Labdhisāra* and the *Kṣaṇasāra* There are other works on *karma* doctrine, more or less compiling the traditional matter, such as *Kammapayadi* of Śivasarman, *Pañcasamgraha* of Candarṣi, etc

The *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvāmin, who was called Umāsvāti by the Śvetāmbaras, is one of the most original works on Jain philosophy in particular and Indian philosophy in general It is written in Sanskrit and epitomizes the whole Jain creed in about 375 *sūtras* arranged in ten chapters The work occupies an unique position in Jain literature as it is recognized as authoritative equally by the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras The meaning of the title is "The Manual for the True Nature of Things" Logic, psychology, cosmography, ontology, biology, and ethics of the Jains are treated in these *sūtras* and in the commentary appended by the author himself The commentary which still serves as an excellent summary of Jain dogmatics is not always in harmony with the views of the Digambaras, as also with those of the Śvetāmbaras, proving that Umāsvāmin belonged to a period at which there was not yet so wide a gulf between the two sects as was the case later Both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara traditions present a great deal of controversy regarding the date of Umāsvāmin Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana assigns him to the first century AD Umāsvāmin belonged to the Uccanāgarī *sākhā* which was popular in the Mathura region He was a Brāhmana of the Kaubhisani *gotra* and a resident of Kusumapura or Pāṭaliputra His parents were Svāti and Vātsi, preceptor Ghosanandi Kṣamāśramana and grand-preceptor Vācakanukhya Śivastī According to the Digambara tradition he belonged to the Sarasvatī *garha* and succeeded Kundakunda in AD 44 But it is doubtful whether in any way he was connected with Kundakunda A large number of commentaries which have been written on the *Tattvārthādhigama*² by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, bear witness to its significance and popularity The commentaries on *Tattvārtha* include Siddhasena Divākara's *Tattvānusānni Tattvārthatikā*, Pūyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*,

Akalanka's *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, etc

While Umāsvāmin wrote in Sanskrit, Kundakunda's works are all in Prākṛta. The date of Kundakunda cannot be affirmed with certainty. He may be placed between the first and the fourth century AD. Tradition ascribes to him a large number of works of which more than a dozen texts called *pāhudas* (*prābhrtas*) are now available. They are on the subjects of Darśana, Caritra, Sūtra, Bodha Bhāva, Mokṣa, Linga, Śīla, Ratna, Dvādaśānupreksā, Niyamasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, and Samayasāra. *Pañcatthiyāsāra* (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*) or *Pravayanasāra Pañcatthiyasamgraha* (*Pravacanasāra Pañcāstikāya-samgraha*) consists of two parts, which are really independent works. The first and the longer section contains the doctrine of the five *astikāyas* or groups of existence: souls (*jīva*), non-souls (*pudgala*), principles of motion and rest (*dharma* and *adharma*) and space (*ākāśa*). The second section treats of the path of liberation. This work together with *Pravacanasāra* and *Samayasāra* forms a trilogy (*prābhrtatraya* or *nātakatraya*). The *Pañcāstikāya* is preserved in two recensions, one by Amrtacandra which has 173 verses and the other by Jayasena which has 181 verses. The *Pravacanasāra* has 275 *gāthās* according to Amrtacandra and 311 according to Jayasena. Likewise *Samayasāra* has 415 verses according to Amrtacandra and 439 according to Jayasena. The *Pravacanasāra* is much a prized work on Jain dogmatics, psychology and ethics, on *Samayasāra* there are commentaries of Prabhācandra and Amrtacandra. *Niyamasāra* is a work on Jain discipline which is commented on by Padmaprabha. To Kundakunda is also ascribed Chappāhuda (*satprābhṛta*), 'six chapters on Jain doctrine' but this attribution is doubtful.¹⁴

On Jain ethics the earliest work amongst the Digambaras is the *Mūlārāadhanā* or *Bhagavatī Ārāadhanā* of Śivārya which contains 2166 Prākṛta verses giving an exposition to the four devotions, namely, faith, knowledge, conduct and austerities, but at the same time dealing with practically all the aspects of Jainism. Narrative and descriptive elements to the colophon of the work, studied the *Mūlasūtras* under Ārya Śivagupta and Ārya Mitranandi. It is therefore natural that the *Mūlārāadhanā* should have close affinities with the *Mūlācāra* of Vattakera as well as with the Āgama texts of the Śvetāmbaras. It was commented upon by Aparājita and Āsādhara. It is probably in one of the early centuries of the Christian era that Vattakera wrote his Prākṛta works *Mūlācāra* and *Trivarnācāra*. The *Mūlācāra* prescribes, in a thoroughly systematic manner in about

1250 Prākṛta verses, the duties, practices and observances of the ascetics. Apart from the rules of moral conduct, the text contains doctrinal aspects as well. The text is divided into 12 *adhikāras*. Some of the rules are directly taken from the Śvetāmbara canon. There is a commentary named *Ācāravṛtti* on the *Mūlācāra* written by Vasunandin who observes by way of introduction that Vattakera intended to give in his work a brief summary of the *Ācārāṅga*. Kārttukeya Svāmīn's *Kārttukeyānupreksā* treats in 12 chapters of the 12 *anupreksās* or meditation required for checking the influx of *karma* and purging off what has already been stored.⁷

Like Umāsvāmīn Siddhasena Divākara is also regarded by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras as one of their own. It appears that he flourished in the Gupta period since he is mentioned by Pūjyapāda in his grammar. His *Tattvārthatīkā*, commentary on Umāsvāmīn's *Tattvārthādhigama* is quoted by Siddhasena II who flourished about AD 600. He is also mentioned in the *Āvasyakacūṛṇi* of Jinadāsa and also by Haribhadra. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition he was originally a Digambara thinker from Karnataka and afterwards was defeated and converted by Vṛddhavādīn. According to another tradition he performed a miracle in the Mahākāla temple of Ujjayini. He is said to have written 32 different works on logic, 21 of which are known. His *Nyāyāvatāra* which deals with the theories of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the methods of comprehending things from a multiple viewpoint (*naya*, *anekāntavāda*) in 32 Sanskrit verses is a fundamental work on Jain logic which forms a part of *Dvātriṃśad-Dvātriṃśikā*. His *Sammattīrktasūtra* is a general work on philosophy which also deals with logic. Its commentary *Tattvabodhinī* was made by Abhayadeva. His *Kalyāṇamandirastotra* also deserves mention in this connection.⁸

Samantabhadra who was a great exponent of the Jain doctrine of Syādvāda also belonged to the Gupta or early post-Gupta period. He was the son of a king of Uragapura. In the *Kathākośa* of Prabhācandra Samantabhadra is described as hailing from Kanchi. He is also stated to have been the preceptor of Śivārya or Śivakoṭi, the author of *Mūlārādhana*. Samantabhadra wrote a commentary on *Tattvārthādhigama*. Its introduction is known as *Āptamīmāṃsā* or *Devāgamastotra* in which the Jain doctrine of Syādvāda has been explained. It is in 114 verses replete with discussions on logical principles, besides a review of cotemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Vedānta. The work was known to the philosophers

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra The latter cited it in explaining Śaṅkara's criticism of the Syādvāda The earliest commentators on *Āptamīmāṃsā* was Akalaṅka who was followed by Vidyānanda and others Several commentaries on it exists in the southern languages which testify the philosophical importance of this work Among other works of Samantabhadra, the *Yuktyānusāsana* is a poem of 64 verses which has a Sanskrit commentary by Vidyānanda Another philosophical work by Samantabhadra *Ratnakārandasrāvākācāra*, also called *Upāsakādhyayana*, is a manual of morals for the lay adherents, in 150 Sanskrit verses The only available Sanskrit commentary on it is that of Prabhācandra (there are more than one author of this name) Among other available works of Samantabhadra mention may be made of the *Svayambhūstotra*, a poem containing 143 verses in praise of the Tīrthamkaras, which is also commented upon by Prabhācandra The fourth work of Samantabhadra is *Jinastuṣṣataka* which has 116 verses and a commentary by Narasimha Bhaṭṭa⁹

Pūjyapāda, also known as Devanandī, who flourished in the fifth century, was a grammarian and a philosopher, whose *Sarvārthasiddhi* was one of the earliest commentaries on the *Tattvārthādhigama* According to Prabhācandra he was also the author of the Sanskrit *Dasabhakti*¹⁰ The great Jain logician Akalaṅka lived in the eighth century Prabhācandra in his *Kathākosa* says that he was the son of the minister of King Subhatunga of Mānyakheta Later writers refer to his debating skill and victory over the Buddhists He was known to both Haribhadra and Jinasena I His *Tattvārthārājavārttika* is a commentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama* of Umāsvāmin and Astasati on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra The logical treatises composed by Akalaṅka are *Nyāyavṛṇiscaya*, *Laghyastraya* and *Svarūpa-sambodhana* His views were opposed by Kumārila belonging to the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsakas and defended by Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra A treatise on expiatory rites, *Prāyaścattagrantha* or *Prāyaścattavidhi* is ascribed to Akalaṅka, but his authorship of this work is extremely doubtful The *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*, a work on logic in 87 *kāṇkās* and another work called *Siddhivṛṇiscaya* are also attributed to him¹¹

The great eighth century philosopher Haribhadra belonged to the Śvetāmbara school, but he had no special sectarian bias who had the candour to say that he had no special fondness for Mahāvīra or hatred for Kapila and others who were not Jains Being a Brāhmana by birth he was thoroughly acquainted with the

Brahmanical philosophical systems as is attested to in his masterly work *Saddarśanasamuccaya*, a summary of six philosophical systems, namely Buddhist, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. Though he has not dealt with the Yoga and the Vedānta systems, there is a short section on Cārvāka philosophy in this work. His another work *Lokatattvanirmaya*, a philosophical text in Sanskrit, investigates the true nature of the world and it has no bearing on any particular system. Like the Brahmanical systems, he was also well-versed in Buddhism. His well-known commentary on Dinnāga's *Nyāyapraveśa* is a classic in this field. Because of this commentary this great work of Dinnāga could survive. The earliest writer who quotes from Haribhadra is the Buddhist Śāntarakṣita. Udyotanasuri in his *Kuvalayamālā* says that he had learnt logic from Haribhadra. In his *Anekāntajayapatākā*, composed in four chapters, he has refuted the doctrines of the Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophical schools. Other works of Haribhadra such as the *Yogavindu* and *Yogadrstisamuccaya* contain presentation of the Jain doctrines. The former, composed in 526 verses, deal more with the disciplinary aspects while the latter is more philosophical in nature. The *Dharmavindu* is a manual of practical morals and asceticism in three sections, the first of which treats of the duties of the laymen, the second of the rules for the monks and the third of the bliss of the saint in *nirvāṇa*. In *Sāstravārtīsamuccaya* which deals with doctrinal matters he has also referred to the views of the Buddhist logicians. Among his other works are the *Dhuttākkhāṇa*, *Samarācchakahā*, and *Upadesapada*.¹²

The Jain logician Mallavādīn who has been referred to in Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* and in the Śvetāmbara tradition as the nephew of the last Śīlāditya of Valabhi wrote a commentary called *Dharmottaraṭṭhapanaka*¹³ on the *Nyāyavindu* of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. He may also be identified with his namesake mentioned in the Surat plates of Karka dated AD 821. Vidyānanda who lived in the ninth century and was also known as Pātrakesarin wrote *Aṣṭasāhasrī*,¹⁴ a commentary on Akalanka's *Astasāfi*. He was also the author of *Tattvārtha-slohavārtika*,¹⁵ a commentary on Umāsvāmin's work, *Āptaparīkṣā* and *Pātraparīkṣā*,¹⁶ *Pramāṇasūtrnaya*, and *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*.¹⁷ He was a resident of Pāṭaliputra and mentioned by Jināsena I in his *Ādipurāṇa*. In his *Aṣṭasāhasrī* he refers to the help he received from a saint named Kumārasena. This work is an elaborate exposition of Jain logic in which the views of Samantabhadra

and Akalaṅka have been treated. The *Āptaparīkṣā* consists of 124 verses. The *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* is written in Sanskrit prose. His other works include *Satyasāsanaparīkṣā* and *Vidyānandamahodaya*. In the former he has made an examination of Indian philosophical systems.¹⁸

Among other ninth century authors Māṇikyanandi (whose date varies in Jain tradition) wrote a famous work on logic known as *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*.¹⁹ Composed in 207 *sūtras*, it is based on Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniscaya*. Prabhācandra's commentary on it is known as *Prameyakamalamārtanda*.²⁰ which is a well-known work on logic. It refers to a number of Buddhist authors including Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. The same author wrote another work on logic known as *Nyāyakumudacandrodaya*. Since there are no less than 20 Prabhācandras in Jain tradition there is the problem of their chronological fixation, identification with specific works and separating legendary accounts and literary references clustered around them. In the epilogue of the first work it is said that Prabhācandra, the disciple of Padmanandi Siddhānta composed it in Dhara during the reign of King Bhoja (AD 1019–60). In the introduction to the second work Prabhācandra says that he is the pupil of Akalaṅka and that he also wrote the *Prameyakamalamārtanda* the first work. Both the accounts are contradictory. If we insist on the first he lived in the eleventh century and if we stick to the second he must have belonged to the eighth-ninth century. Among other ninth-century authors mention may be made of Śubhacandra whose philosophical treatise in Sanskrit verse is entitled *Jñānārnava*, 'the ocean of knowledge' which is otherwise known as *Yogaṣṭadīpādīkā*.²¹

In the beginning of the tenth century AD Amṛtacandra composed *Purusārthasiddhyupāya*.²² or *Jñānapravacanarahasyakosa Tattvārthasāra*,²³ *Tattvadīpikā* and *Ātmakhyātī*.²⁴ The first work is in 226 Sanskrit verses. The *Tattvārthasāra* has 618 verses and is divided into nine chapters. The seven *padārthas* are discussed in this work. The *Ātmakhyātī* is the author's commentary on *Samayasāra* of Kundakunda. Devasena belonging to the middle of the tenth century, wrote a few manuals in Prakṛta on philosophy, worship and rules from Digambara point of view which are known as *Darsanasāra*,²⁵ *Śrāvākācāra*, *Ārādhanaśāra*.²⁶ and *Tattvasāra*.²⁷ Nemicaṇḍra who lived at the close of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century, who bore the epithet Siddhānta-Cakravartī, was the author of the celebrated treatise *Dravyasamgraha* in Prakṛta which means 'compendium of sub-

stances' In 58 verses it deals not only with the substances but also with Jain dogmas with emphasis on the importance of meditation ²⁸ His *Gommatasāra* or *Pañcasamgraha* consists of two parts, the *Jīvakāṇḍa* dealing with the classification of beings, their origin and nature in *Prākṛta* verses and the *karmakāṇḍa* dealing with the nature of *karma* and its relationship with soul in 972 verses ²⁹ His *Labdhisāra*, the essence of attainment of the things which lead to perfection and *Kṣāpanasāra*, the essence of annihilation of the *kaśāyas* or sinful passions which are connected with each other form a sequel to *Gommatasāra* ³⁰ His *Trīlokaśāra*, essence of the three world, is a work on cosmology ³¹

The celebrated commentator Abhayadeva who flourished in the eleventh century was also a great logician who has been described as the lion that roared at ease in the wild forest of works on logic His *Vedamahārṇava* is not, however, available His commentary on Siddhasena Divakara's *Sammattīrtakasūtra*, is known as *Tattva-bodhinī* ³² Jinacandra Ganin's *Navatattva-prakaraṇa* is a treatise on the nine fundamentals of Jainism The work consists of 14 *Prākṛta gāthās* on which Abhayadeva and Yaśodeva wrote commentaries ³³ Another eleventh century author was Śānti Suri whose *Jīvaucāra* in 51 *Prākṛta Āryā* verses makes a detailed classification of beings ³⁴ In the twelfth century Abhayadeva's pupil Maladhārī Hemacandra Suri wrote commentaries on the *Anuyogadvārā*, Haribhadra's *Āvasyakavṛtti* and Jinabhadra's commentary on the *Āvasyakasūtra* His independent work *Bhavabhāvanā* in 531 *Prākṛta gāthās* came out in AD 1113 The great Hemacandra was the author of a philosophical work *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* dealing with the Jain theories of valid knowledge ³⁵

Mallisena's *Syādvādamāñjarī*, written in collaboration with Jinaprabhasuri in the thirteenth century is a philosophical treatise in which, besides the establishment of the Jain viewpoint, the Buddhist Śūnyavāda has been criticised ³⁶ Actually it is a commentary on Hemacandra's *Anuyogavyavacchedikā* Āśadhara's *Dharmāmṛta* ³⁷ is a book on ethics on which the author himself wrote a commentary in AD 1243 Devandra Suri of the same century composed five of the six *Karmagranthas* which cover all aspects of the Jain *karma* doctrine These are *Karmavipākā*, *Karmastava*, *Bandhasvāmīva*, *Sadasūikā*, *Sataka*, and *Saptasūikā* ³⁸ The sixth book was written by Candramahattara who was also the author of *Pañcasamgraha*, a compendium of the *karma* doctrine ³⁹ On the *karma* doctrine another

book was written by Śivarāma Suri in 475 *gāthās* under the title *Karmaprakṛti* ¹⁰ All these works on *karma* trace their source to the Dṛṣṭivāda tradition and are commented upon by Malayagiri. Gunaratna's *Tantrarahasyadīpikā* is also a product of this period which is a commentary on Haribhadra's *Saddarsanasamuccaya* and regarded as a world-classic in the field of logical studies because of its highly sophisticated approach and insistence on hair-splitting analysis ¹¹ Works of the subsequent period have been mentioned in the chapter of Jain logic.

The tradition of the Jain philosophical and doctrinal writings was continued in the subsequent centuries by such stalwarts as Sakalakīrti, Śrutasāgara, Vinayavijaya, Yaśovijaya and others. Apart from ethical, ritualistic, dogmatic and philosophical works the Jain scholars have contributed to the development of secular sciences in the field of grammar, lexicography, poetics, mathematics and even the science of politics. The Jains have in their credit a vast narrative literature containing stories to which aspect of the Jain contribution to the world literature the late J. C. Jain has drawn our attention in his numerous works, some of which have been edited by the present author. The Jain philosophical authors were often compelled to write in Sanskrit which became essential for higher metaphysical expressions, but wherever it was possible they depended mostly on living Prakṛta languages of the people, and not on a clerical language which was favoured by the Buddhists. The Apabhraṃśa literature was of Jain inspiration. They were also the first to write their religious and philosophical texts in northern and southern regional languages which had received much improvement in their hands. A typical example of this improvement may be illustrated with reference to Cāmuṇḍa Rāya's Kannada commentary on the *Goṃmatasāra*.

REFERENCES

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 The Sanskritized names of the texts are given here. For the original Prakṛta names see chapter One. 2 <i>Ācāra</i> Niryuku by Bhadrabāhu and Cūṛṇi by Jinadāsaganī, Ratlam, 1944. <i>Vṛtu</i> by Śilāṅka, Agamodaya, 1935. <i>Anuyogadvāra</i> Cūṛṇi by Jinadāsa and <i>Tikā</i> by Haribhadra, | <p>Ratlam, 1928, by Maladhārī Hemacandra, Bhavnagar, 1935, <i>Āvaśyaka</i> Niryuku by Bhadrabāhu, Bhāṣya by Jinabhadra and Cūṛṇi by Jinadāsa, Ratlam, 1928, <i>Tikā</i> by Haribhadra, Agamodaya, 1916-17, by Malayagiri, 1928-36, <i>Pradesavyākhyā</i> by Maladhārī Hemacandra, Bombay,</p> |
|--|---|

- 1920, *Niryukudīpikā* by Māṇikyāśekhara, Surat, 1939, *Bṛhathkalpa Bhāṣya* by Saṅghadāsagaṇi and Tīkā by Malayagiri and Kṣemakīrti, Bhavnagar, 1933–42, *Dasavasthāka Niryuku* by Bhadrabāhu and Cūṛṇi by Jinadāsa, Ratlam, 1933, Tīkā by Haribhadra, Bombay, 1918, *Jambudvīpaprāṇāpti* Tīkā by Sānucandra, Bombay, 1920, *Kalpasūtra* Tīkā by Samayasundara, Bombay, 1939, ed by Muni Punyaviṇaya with Kalpaniryuku, Kalpacūṛṇi and Prthvīcandra's Tippanaka, Ahmedabad, 1952, *Jñātādharmaśāhā* Tīkā by Abhayadeva, Agamodaya, Bombay 1939, *Nisitha Bhāṣya* and Cūṛṇi by Muni Kavi Amar and Muni Kanhaiyalal Kamal, Agra, 1957–60, *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, with Dhavalā com by Virasena, ed by Hiralal Jain, 16 vols., Amraoti 1939–59, *Samavāya* Tīkā by Abhayadeva, Ahmedabad, 1938, *Śihānāṅgu* Tīkā by Abhayadeva, Ahmedabad, 1937, *Uttarādhyaṇa Niryuku* by Bhadrabāhu and Cūṛṇi by Jinadāsa Ratlam, 1933, Tīkā by Vādivetāla Sanusuri, Bombay, 1916–17, and by Devendragani Bombay, 1937, *Bhagavāṇor Vyākhyā prajnapṭi* Tīkā by Abhayadeva, Agamodaya, 1918–21 *Vyavahāra Niryuku*, Bhāṣya and Malayagiri's Vivaraṇa, Bhavnagar, 1926–28
- 3 The *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama* has been ed in 16 vols by Hiralal Jain, Amraoti, 1939–59
- 4 The *Kaśyāprābhṛta* has been ed with the Cūṛṇi of Yauvraṇa by Hiralal Jain, Calcutta, 1955
- 5 *Tattvārthādhigama* was ed with the commentary of the author himself by K.P. Mody in *Bib Ind* together with a few minor works of Umāsvāmin, Calcutta, 1903–05, with a com in Hindi in Rayacandra Series, Bombay, 1906, with intro., trans., notes and commentary in English by J.L. Jain in *SBJ*, vol II, Arrah, 1920; German trans. by H. Jacob in *ZDMG*, 60, 1906, 287 ff., 572 ff
- 6 *Pañcāstakāya* with Amṛtacandra's and Jayasena's Sanskrit commentaries and Hemaraja Pande's *Balīva bodhabhāṣāśīkā* and Hindi trans by Manoharlal, RJS, Bombay, 1904 Eng trans by A. Chakravarty in *SBJ*, Arrah, 1920 *Pravacanasāra* with Amṛtacandra's and Jayasena's Sanskrit commentaries and H. Pande's Tīkā, ed and Eng trans by A.N. Upadhye, RJS, Bombay, 1935 *Dasabhāṭi*, included in the *Kundakunda-prābhṛtasamgraha* (Collection of Kundakunda's *pāhudas*) ed by K.C. Jain Siddhantasāstri, JJC, Sholapur, 1960
- 7 *Mūlārādhana*, published with Pandit Sadasukha's *Bhāṣāvacanikā* in Muni Anantakīrti Digambara Jain Granthamālā, vs 1989, with com of Aparājita and Āśadhara, Sholapur 1935, with Aparājita's com *Vidyodaya*, Karanja, 1935, with Hindi trans and intro by Pandit Kailash Chandra Jain Siddhantasāstri, Sholapur, 1977 Vattakera's *Mūlācāra*, published in MDJC, in two parts, in vs 1977, 1980 *Kārikāṣṭha nupreksā* (*Kūṭigeyanupreksā*), was published with a Hindi com., Bombay, 1904
- 8 The *Nyāyavivara* was ed with commentary and Eng trans by S.C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa, Calcutta, 1909 The *Sammattatīkāśūtra* was published with Abhayadeva's com in SJG, no 13 *Dvātrīṅśika* containing *Nyāyavivara* and other works were ed by A.N. Upadhye in Jain Sahitya Vikas Maṇḍal, Bombay, 1971 *Kāyāna mandrasūtra*, ed and German trans by H. Jacob was published in *Indische Studien*, XIV, pp 976 ff
- 9 *Āptamīmāṃsā* ed in Jain Grantha Ratnakara and Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā Bombay, 1905 *Yuktānusāsana*, ed in SJG, vol I, Bombay, 1905 and with Vidyā-

- nanda's com in MDJG, no 15
Ratnākarandśamīvakīrti, text with
 Eng trans by C R. Jain, Arrah, 1917,
 also in MDJG, no 24
- 10 *Sarvārthasiddhi*, ed, Kolhapur, 1904,
Dasabhaṭṭa, Karanja, 1956
- 11 *Īti-vārthanīyavāntika* is published in
 SJG Varanasi, 1915 and *Astasālī* with
Āptamīmāṃsā itself in SJG, 10,
 Varanasi, 1914 *Laghyastraya* and
Svarūpasambodhana are ed in MDJG,
 no 1 For *Nyāyaviviscaya* see, *Īnaratn*
nakosa, 221 *Prīyasallā* together with
 other three treatises on the same
 subject is ed in *Prīyasallāsaṅgraha*
 MDJG, no 18 *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* is
 published in SJG, Ahmedabad,
 1939 For *Siddhiviviscaya* see,
Īnaratn *nakosa* 441
- 12 *Śaddarsanasamuccaya*, ed with
 Gunaratna's com by L Suali, *Bib*
Ind, Calcutta, 1906, in Atmananda
 Granthamala Bhavnagar 1917, with
Astakaprakaraṇa, Surat, 1918
Lokātattvanirmaya, ed by L Suali in
 GSAI, XVIII 263 ff text, Bhavnagar,
 1902, *Nyāyapraveśa*, ed by A B
 Dhruva, GOS Baroda, 1930
Anekāntaparyāyapālakā sp in no 40,
Yogavindu, ed with com by L Suali,
 Bhavnagar, 1911, *Yogadrśisamuc-*
caya, ed by L Suali, Bombay, 1912
Dharmavindu, ed with Italian trans
 by L Suali in GSAI, XXI, 223 ff with
 Muncandra's com, *Bib Ind*, Cal-
 cutta 1912 *Sāstravārtīśasamuccaya*,
 Bombay, 1913, *Dhūlīkkhāṇa* ed by
 A N Upadhye, Bombay, 1944,
Samarīścakahā ed by H Jacobi,
 Calcutta, 1926, *Upadesapada*,
 Baroda, 1923-25
- 13 Ed by Th Sicherbatsky St Peters-
 burg, 1909
- 14 Fd in Gandhinatharanga Series,
 Bombay, 1915
- 15 Ibid, 1918
- 16 Fd in Saratana Jaina Granthamala,
 Benares, 1913, *Āptaparīkṣā* also in
 Digambara Jaina Granthabhandara,
 Kāśī
- 17 Ed in SJG, 10, 1914
- 18 See *Īnaratn* *nakosa*, 355, 412
- 19 Ed in SJG, I, Bombay, 1905
- 20 Published along with the Bombay
 edn of the *Parīkṣāmukha*, 1905,
 Varanasi edn, 1928
- 21 Ed in Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala,
 Bombay, 1907
- 22 Ibid, in 1905 and in SJG, I, Bom-
 bay, 1906
- 23 Ed in SJG I, Bombay, 1906, also in
 Digambara Jaina Granthamala, Kāśī
 where we have also his philosophi-
 cal poem *Nāīkasaṃayāsārakalasāh*
- 24 See *Īnaratn* *nakosa*, 26
- 25 Ed by N Premi, Bombay, 1920
- 26 Ed with com in MDJG, no 6, Bom-
 bay, 1916
- 27 Ed in MDJG, no 13
- 28 Published with a commentary by
 Brahmadeva and ed with intro,
 trans, notes and an original com-
 mentary in English by S C Ghoshal
 in *SBJ*, vol I, Arrah, 1917
- 29 Fd with intro trans in Sanskrit and
 English and with a commentary in
 English by J L Jaini in *SBJ*, vols V
 and VI, Lucknow, 1927
- 30 The two works, ed together with
 Sanskrit and Hindi commentaries,
 have been published in Gandhi-
 Haribhai Series no 5 Calcutta
- 31 S C Ghoshal in *SBJ*, vol I
- 32 Published in YJG no 13
- 33 Ed with two coms in Atmananda
 Series, no 10 Bhavnagar, 1912
- 34 Ed with Pathaka Ratnakara's com,
 Ahmedabad, 1915
- 35 Fd with author's own commentary,
 Poona, 1925 Its trans was made by
 Satkari Mookherjee and Nathmal
 Taua under the title *Critique of Or-*
gan of Knowledge which was pub-
 lished by Jain Cultural Research
 Society Varanasi
- 36 Ed in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,
 Benares, 1900, with an Eng trans
 and intro by A B Dhruva, Bombay,
 1933, Hindi trans by J C Jain, Bom-
 bay, 1935, third edn, 1970, F W

- Thomas, *The Flower spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine*, Berlin, 1960
- 37 With his own commentary in MDJC, 11, 1972
- 38 Ed. in vol IV of *Prakaranaratnākara*, Bombay, 1880
- 39 Ed. with Malayagiri's com. by Hiralal Hamsaraj, Jamnagar, 1909
- 40 Ed. with Malayagiri's com., Bhavnagar, 1922
- 41 Ed. by Mahendra Kumar Jain, Varanasi, 1970

Bibliography*

- Ayyangar, R., and Seshagiri, B., *Studies on South Indian Jainism*, Madras, 1922
- Barth, A., *The Religions of India*, London, 1882, rep., Varanasi, 1963
- Barua, B M., *A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921, rep., Delhi, 1970
- , *The Ājīvikas*, Calcutta, 1920
- Basham, A L., *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, London, 1951
- Bastian, A., *Kosmogonien und Theogonien indischer religion philosophien besonders der jaina*, Berlin, 1892
- Belvalkar, S K., and Ranade, R D., *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol II, *The Creative Period*, Poona, 1927, rep., New Delhi, 1997
- Benarasi Dass, *A Lecture on Jainism*, Agra, 1902
- Beni Prasad, *World Problem and Jain Ethics*, Lahore, 1945
- Bhandarkar, R G., *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency, during the year 1883–84*, Bombay, 1887
- Bhargava, D N., *Jain Ethics*, Delhi, 1968
- Bhattacharyya, B C., *Jain Iconography*, Lahore, 1939
- Bhattacharyya, H., *The Jain Prayer*, Calcutta, 1974
- Bhattacharyya, N N., *History of Indian Cosmogonical Ideas*, New Delhi, 1971
- , *Indian Mother Goddess*, sec. edn., New Delhi, 1977
- , *Indian Puberty Rites*, sec. edn., New Delhi, 1980
- , *History of the Śākta Religion*, sec. edn., New Delhi, 1996
- , *History of Tantric Religion*, New Delhi, 1982
- , *A Glossary of Indian Religious Terms and Concepts*, New Delhi, 1990
- , *Indian Religious Historiography*, New Delhi, 1996
- Bloomfield, M., *Pārsvanātha Caritam: The Life and Stories of the Jain Saviour Pārsvanātha*, Baltimore, 1919

*The notes mention simply the name of the author when only one of his works is included in the Bibliography. In other cases the initials of the works are added to the names of the authors. The word 'in' is put between the name of the contribution and the initials of the reference works or journals when the notes refer to such contribution.

- Bool Chand, *Jain Cultural Studies*, Bombay, 1946
 ———, *Lord Mahāvīra: A Study in Historical Perspective*, Benares, 1948
 ———, *Jainism in Indian History*, Benares, 1951
 Bothra, Pushpa, *Jaina Theory of Perception*, Delhi, 1995
 Brown, P, *Indian Architecture*, Bombay, 1942, rep, Delhi, 1970
 Bruhn, K., *The Jina Images of Deogarh*, Leiden, 1969
 Buhler, G, *On the Indian Sect of the Jains*, London, 1903
 Caillat, Collete, *Atonement in Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks*, Ahmedabad, 1975
 Chakravarti, A, *Jain Literature in Tamil*, Arrah, 1941
 Chandra, K, *Prakrit Studies*, Ahmedabad, 1978
 Chatterjee, A K, *A Comprehensive History of Jainism*, vol I, Calcutta, 1978, vol II, Calcutta, 1984
 Chatterjee, S C, and Datta, D M, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1968
 Chattopadhyaya, D P, *Lokāyata*, New Delhi, 1959
 ———, *Indian Atheism*, Calcutta, 1970
 ———, *Indian Philosophy A Popular Introduction*, New Delhi, 1972
 Childe, V G, *New Light of the Most Ancient East*, London, 1954
 Colebrooke, H T, *Miscellaneous Essays*, rep, Delhi, 1972
 Coomaraswamy, A K, *The Yakshas*, rep, New Delhi, 1971
 Cousens, H, *Somnath and Other Medieval Temples of Kathiawar*, Archaeological Survey of India, New Imperial Series, XLV, New Delhi
 Cowell, E B, and Gough, A E, *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, Eng trans, Calcutta and London, 1899, rep, Varanasi, 1961
 Crooke, W, *Tribes and Castes of the North Western Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896
 Cunningham, A, *Archaeological Survey of India Reports*, rep, New Delhi, 1960–73
 Dasgupta, D C, *Jain System of Education*, Calcutta, 1942
 Dasgupta, S N, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol I, Cambridge, 1922, rep, Delhi, 1963
 Deo, S B, *History of Jaina Monachism from Inscriptions and Literature*, Poona, 1956
 ———, *Jain Monastic Jurisprudence*, Benares, 1960
 Desai, P B, *Jainism in South India and Some Jain Epigraphs*, Sholapur, 1957
 Desai, S M, *Hanbhadra's Yoga Works and Psychosynthesis*, Ahmedabad, 1983

- Dikshit, K.K , *Jaina Ontology*, Ahmedabad, 1971
 ———, *Early Jainism*, Ahmedabad, 1987
 Dutt, N , *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Calcutta, 1960
 Dwivedi, R C , *Contribution of Jainism to Indian Culture*, Varanasi, 1973
 Edgerton, F , *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1965
 Enthoven, R E , *Tribes and Castes of Bombay Presidency*, Bombay, 1920–22
 Feigussan, J , *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, vol II, rep , New Delhi, 1971
 Fischer, K , *Caves and Temples of the Jains*, Aliganj, 1956
 Frazer, J G , *The Golden Bough* (abridged edn), London, 1949
 Gandhi, V R , *The Karma Philosophy*, Bombay, 1913
 ———, *The Systems of Indian Philosophy*, rep , Bombay, 1970
 Garbe, R , *Aniruddha's Commentary of the Original Parts on Vedāntin Mahādeva's Commentary on the Sāṅkhyā Sūtras*, Calcutta, 1892
 ———, *The Sāṅkhyā Pravacana Bhāṣya*, HOS, Cambridge (Mass), 1895
 Ghosh, A , ed , *Jaina Art and Architecture*, 3 vols , New Delhi, 1974
 Glasenapp, H V , *Der Jainismus*, Berlin, 1926
 ———, *Die Lehre vom Karman in der Philosophie der Jainas*, Leipzig, 1915
 ———, Eng tr , *The Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy*, Bombay, 1942
 Gopalan, S , *Outlines of Jainism*, New Delhi, 1973
 Guerinot, A , *Essai de Bibliographie Jaina*, Paris, 1906
 ———, *Reportoire d'Épigraphie Jaina*, Paris, 1908
 ———, *La religion de Jaina*, Paris, 1926
 Gupta, R S , *Iconography of the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains*, Bombay, 1972
 Guseva, N R , *Jainism*, trans from Russian by YS Redkar, Bombay, 1971
 Handiqui, K K , *Yasastilakacampu and Indian Culture*, Sholapur, 1949
 Hassan, A , *Castes and Tribes of Nizam's Dominions*
 Hertel, J , *On the Literature of the Svetāmbaras of Gujarat*, Leipzig, 1922
 Hingorani, R P , *Jaina Iconography*, New Delhi, 1979
 Huiyanna, M , *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1956
 Hopkins, E W , *The Religions of India*, London, 1885, rep , New

Delhi, 1970

- Jacobi, H , *Jaina Sūtras*, Eng trans, in *SBE Series*, vols XXII, XLV, Oxford, 1890, rep , Delhi, 1966
- , *Studies in Jainism*, ed by Jinavijaya Muni, Ahmedabad, 1946
- , *Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jains*
- Jain, B C , *Jainism in Buddhist Literature*, Nagpur, 1972
- Jain, C R , *The Practical Path*, Arrah, 1917
- , *What is Jainism*, Arrah, 1919
- , *Key to the Knowledge*, Arrah, 1919
- , *Peep behind the Veil of Karma*, Arrah, 1920
- , *The Jaina Law*, Madras, 1926
- Jain, J C , *Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jaina Canon and Commentaries*, New Delhi, 1984
- , *Prakrit Narrative Literature Origin and Growth*, New Delhi, 1981
- , *Studies in Early Jainism*, New Delhi, 1992
- Jain, J P , *Jainism The Oldest Religion*, Varanasi, 1951
- , *The Jaina Sources of the History of India*, New Delhi, 1964
- Jain, K.P , *Jainism in Rajasthan*, Sholapur, 1913
- , *Some Historical Jain Kings and Heroes*, Delhi, 1941
- Jain, M C , *Life of Mahāvīra*, Allahabad, 1908
- Jain Muni, U K , *Jaina Sects and Schools*, New Delhi, 1975
- Jaini, J I , *Outline of Jainism*, ed , F W Thomas, Cambridge, 1916
- , *Bright Ones in Jainism*, Allahabad, 1916
- , *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, Eng trans , *Bib Ind* , Calcutta
- Jaini, P S , *The Jain Path of Purification*, Berkeley, 1977
- James, E O , *Prehistoric Religion*, New York, 1957
- Jha, G N , *The Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, Allahabad, 1911
- , *Slokavārtika*, Eng trans , Calcutta, 1907
- Jhaveri, M B , *Historical Facts about Jainism*, Bombay, 1925
- , *Comparative and Critical Study of the Mantrasāstra*, Ahmedabad, 1944
- Joshi, L M , *Facets of Jaina Religiousness in Comparative Light*, Ahmedabad, 1981
- Kalghatgi, T G , *Jain View of Life*, Sholapur 1967
- , *Some Problems in Jain Psychology*, Dharwad, 1961
- Kapadia, H R , *History of the Canonical Literature of the Jains*, Bombay, 1947
- , *Jain Religion and Literature*, Lahore, 1944
- Keith, A B , *The Karma Mīmāṃsā*, London, 1921, rep , New Delhi, 1978

- , *Indian Logic and Atomism*, Oxford, 1921, rep., New Delhi, 1997
- , *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1923, rep., New Delhi, 1979
- Khadabadi, S K, *Voddhārādhana A Study*, Dharwad, 1979
- Kosambi, D D, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, Bombay, 1956
- Krause, Charlotte, *An Introduction to Jain Ethics*, Benares, 1929
- , *Ancient Jain Hymns*, Ujjain, 1952
- Lalana, H, *The Six Dravyas of the Jain Philosophy*, Bombay, 1914
- Lalwani, K.C, *Bhagavati Sūtra*, trans., in 4 vols., Calcutta, 1980
- Law, B C, *India as Depicted in the Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism*, London, 1941
- , *Mahāvīra His Life and Teachings*, London, 1937
- , *Historical Gleanings*, Calcutta, 1922
- Luders, H, *A List of Brahmi Inscriptions from the Earliest Times to about AD 400*, App to EI, X
- Majumdar, R C, ed., *History of Bengal*, vol I, Dacca University, Calcutta, 1943
- , ed., *History and Culture of the Indian People*, vols I–V, Bombay, 1951 ff
- Malvania, D, *Jain Darsana kā Adhikāra*, Ahmedabad, 1980
- , and Shah, M J, ed., *Studies in Indian Philosophy*, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi Commemoration Volume, Ahmedabad, 1981
- Marshall, J, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization*, 3 vols., London, 1931
- Matilal, B K, *Central Philosophy of Jainism*, Ahmedabad, 1981
- Max Muller, F, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, rep., Varanasi, 1971
- McGovern, W M, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, London, 1923
- Mehta, M L, *Outline of Jain Philosophy*, Bangalore, 1954
- , *Jain Culture*, Varanasi, 1969
- , *Jain Philosophy*, Varanasi, 1971
- , and Chandia, K R, *Dictionary of Prakrit Proper Names*, 2 vols., Ahmedabad, 1970–72
- Mookherjee, Satkari *Jain Philosophy of Non-Absolutism*, Calcutta, 1944
- Moti Chandra, *Jain Miniature Paintings from Western India*, Ahmedabad, 1949
- , *Stone Sculptures of Prince of Wales Museum*, Bombay, 1974

- Murty, S C , *Jain Vestiges in Andhra*, Hyderabad, 1963
- Nahar, P C , *Jainalekhasamgraha*, pt I, Calcutta, 1918, pt II, Calcutta, 1927, pt III, Calcutta, 1929
- , and Ghosh, K C , *An Eptome of Jainism, being a Critical Study of its Metaphysics, Ethics and History, etc , in Relation to Modern Thought*, Calcutta, 1917
- Nanjundayya, H V , and Iyer, A K , *Mysore Tribes and Castes*, 6 vols , Mysore, 1930
- Narasimhachar, R , *Inscriptions at Śravana Belgola*, Bangalore, 1923
- Norman, H C , *Dhammapada Commentary*, London, 1905–06
- Ohira, Suzuko, *A Study on Tattvārthasūtra with Bhāṣya*, Ahmedabad, 1982
- Oldenberg, H , *Buddha*, Calcutta, 1927, rep , Delhi, 1971
- Padmarajaya, YJ , *A Comparative Study of the Jain Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, Bombay, rep , Delhi, 1986
- Pande, G C , *Sramana Tradition Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture*, Ahmedabad, 1978
- Peterson, P , *Reports on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts*, six reports in *JBBRAS*, XVI–XVIII, Bombay, 1882–99
- Piggott, S , *Prehistoric India*, London, 1950
- Ramachandran, T N , *Jain Monuments and Places of First Class Importance*, Calcutta
- Rangacharya, V , *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency*, Madras, 1909
- Rapson, E J , ed , *Cambridge History of India*, vol I, Cambridge, 1922, rep , New Delhi, 1972
- Raychaudhuri, P C , *Jainism in Bihar*, Patna, 1956
- Rhys Davids, T W , *Dialogues of the Buddha*, 3 vols , London, 1899, 1910, 1921
- , Carpenter, J E , and Stede, W , *Sumangalavilāsinī*, London, 1886–1932
- Rice, B L , *Mysore and Coorg from Inscriptions*, London, 1909
- Rockhill, W W , *Life of Buddha*, London, 1884
- Russell, R V , and Hira Lal, *Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916
- Sahu, L N , *Orissa men Jain Dharma* (in Hindi), Aligarh, 1959
- Saletore, B A , *Medieval Jainism*, Bombay, 1938
- Samsukha, P K , *Lord Mahāvīra His Life and Doctrne*, Calcutta, 1957
- Sangave, V A , *Jain Community A Social Survey*, Bombay, 1959
- Sanghvi, Sukhlal, *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, Calcutta, 1961

- , *Tattvārthasāra*, Eng trans by K.K. Dikshit, Ahmedabad, 1974
- Sankalia, H D , *Archaeology of Gujarat*, Bombay, 1941
- Schubring, W , *Die Jainas*, Tübingen, 1927
- , *Worte Mahāvīras*, Göttingen, 1927
- , *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Eng trans , *Doctrine of the Jains* by W Beurlen, Delhi, 1972
- Sen, A C , *Schools and Sects in Jain Literature*, Calcutta, 1932
- Sen, M , and Rao, M B , *Das Kapital Centenary Volume*, New Delhi, 1968
- Sen, Madhu, *Cultural Study of Nisitha Cūrnī*, Delhi, 1975
- Settar, S , *Inviting Death*, Dharwad, 1986
- Shah, C J , *Jainism in Northern India*, London, 1932
- Shah, N J , *Akalanka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*, Ahmedabad, 1966, ed , *Jain Philosophical Tracts*, Ahmedabad, 1974
- Shah, U P , *Studies in Jain Art*, Benares, 1955
- , ed , *Treasures of Jain Bhandāras*, Ahmedabad, 1978
- Shah, U P , and Dhaky, M , ed , *Aspects of Jain Art and Architecture* Ahmedabad, 1975
- Sharma, S B , *Jainism and Karnataka Culture*, Dharwad, 1940
- Sheth, C B , *Jainism in Gujarat*, Bombay, 1953
- Shriyan, Ratna, *A Cultural Study of the Mahāpurāṇa of Puṣpadanta*, Ahmedabad, 1970
- Sikdar, J C , *Studies in the Bhagavatī Sūtra*, Muzaffarpur, 1964
- Singh, R B Prasad, *Jainism in Early Medieval Karnataka*, Delhi, 1973
- Sinha, J N , *History of Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta
- Sircar, D C , *Cosmography and Geography in Early Indian Literature*, Calcutta, 1970
- Sivaramamurti, C , *Panorama of Jain Art in South India*, Delhi, 1983
- Smith, V A , *Jain Stūpas and Other Antiquities of Mathura*, ASI, Allahabad, 1901, rep , Delhi, 1969
- Sogani, K C , *Ethical Doctrines in Jainism*, Sholapur, 1967
- Stcherbatsky, Th , *Buddhist Logic*, Leningrad, 1932, rep , New Delhi, 1996
- Stevenson, J , *The Kalpasūtra and Navatattva*, rep , Varanasi, 1972
- Stevenson, S , *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Surat, 1910
- , *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915, rep , New Delhi, 1971
- Suri, Virarajendra, *Abhūdhanarājendra*, Ratlam, 1913-25
- Tank, Umrao S , *Jain Historical Studies*, Delhi, 1914
- Taua, Nathmal, *Studies in Jain Philosophy*, Varanasi, 1951
- Thakur, Upendra, *Studies in Jainism and Buddhism in Mithila*,

- Varanasi, 1964
- Thomas, F W , *The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine*, Eng trans of Mallisena's *Syādvādamāñjarī*, Berlin, 1960
- Thomson, G , *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, vol I, London, 1949
- Thurston, E , and Rangachari, K., *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Madras, 1909
- Tukol, T K , *Sallekhanā is not Suicide*, Ahmedabad, 1976
- Upadhyaya, S C , *Jain Iconography*, Delhi, 1969
- Upadhye, A N et al , ed , *Mahāvīra and His Teachings*, Bombay, 1977
- Velankar, H D , *Jīnaratnakosa*, Poona, 1944
- Vidyabhusana, S C , *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1921
- , *Nyāyāvātāra*, ed , *Bib Ind* , Calcutta
- Vijayalakshmi, R , *A Study of Cīvakaśīntāmanī*, Ahmedabad, 1981
- Vogel, J Ph , *Mathura Museum Catalogue*, Allahabad, 1910
- Warren, H *Jainism in Western Garb*, Arrah, 1916
- , *Jainism not Atheism*, Arrah, 1920
- William, R , *Jaina Yoga*, London, 1963
- Winternitz, M , *History of Indian Literature*, vol II, Calcutta, 1933, rep , New Delhi, 1972

Index

- Abhayacandra 43
 Abhayadeva 9, 43 44, 70, 134, 216, 235, 239
abhyāsa 200, 201
 Abhinandana 76
 Abu, Jain temples on 53, 55
 Ācanna 32
ācāryas 67, 176
 Acelaka 200
adharmā 22, 119, 144, 152, 153, 164, 207, principle of rest 147–48, 218
 Adhiccasaṃuppannika 90, 93
 Ādinātha 44, 50–52, 54, 61, 76
 Advaita Vedānta 209, 216, 223–25
 Aggala 27
ahimsā 33, 38, 86, 108, 116, economic significance of 82–83
 Aṅgar, S K 71n, 75
 Ajātaśatru 39 63, 84, 94, 101
 Ajita Kesakambalin 16, 20, 91, 103
 Ajitanātha 32, 50, 54, 76
ajīva, non-living entities 144–48, 170–71, 179
 Ājīvika 17, 18, 24, 56, 63, 83, 85, 95, 97–101, 199, 200–202
 Ajñānavada 16, 89, 91, 93, 113
 Akalanka 14 21 42 59 133 134, 180, 183, 184, 216, 238
ākāśa space 126, 129, 144–48
 Akola hoard 51
 Akṛyāvāda 16 89 91 92, 113, 114
alokākāśa 146, 147, 164
 Alsdorf, L 13
 Amaracandra 43
 Amarakīrtigaṇī 45
 Amarāvikkhepika 90, 92 102
 Ambika, image of 52, 54
 Amṛtagaṇī 13, 43
 Amṛtacandra 42, 134, 181, 234, 238
 Anantanātha 76
 Anantavīrya 134, 176
anastikāya 17, 144, 146
 Anekāntavāda 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 34, 186
 Aṅga texts 10, 37–38, 65, 230–31
 Anukavādins 92
 Antānanuka 90
anuvratas 5, 109
 Apabhraṃsa 5, 10, 12, 13 31, 33, 42–47
 Aparājita 165, 166, 234
 Aparānta-kappika 89–91 93
apavarga 210
apūrvā, doctrine of 227
 Ārambhavāda 209, 225
 Aranātha 49 76
arhat 4, 40 56–59, 176
 Aristanemi 76
 Aristotle 155
arthakriyākāritva 198
 Āśādhara 44
 Asaga 43
 Asaññivāda 90
 Asiga 47
āsrava 19, 22, 29 170 172 174, 182
astikāya (*asthikāya*) 17, 144
 astronomy 159–61
 Āśvaghōṣa 119
 Āśvasena 61
 atheism, Jain 20–22, 118, 125, 168, 204, 211, 215 216 227
ātman 30, 114–16 144, 217 219 223–25, doctrine of 92, Jain critique of 116, basic concept of 190–92
 atomism 21, 120, 148 161–63, 199, 202, 217, 218
 Avacūrnīs 12, 41
 Aviddhakarna 123, 124
 Badami, Jain caves of 51
 Bagchi, P C 20
 Bāhubali 33, 47
bals 1
bandha 19, 170, 175, 177
 Bandhuvārma 32, 33
 Bappabhaṇṇu 42

- Barnett, L D 11, 17
 Barodia, U N 10, 17, 67n
 Barua, B N 18, 20, 21
 Basavaradhya, N 33
 Basham, A L 18, 201
 Bastian, A 16
 Basu, Ram Chandra 16
 Belloni-Filippi, F 13
 Beni Prasad 26
 Beurlen 72
 Bhadrabāhu 7, 9, 11, 21, 37, 52, 55,
 65, 66, syllogism of ten parts 138–
 39, on *syādvāda* 141–42, Nirayukus
 231
 Bhairava 4
 Bhandarkar, D R 13, 18
 Bhāndārī, Nemicandra 47
 Bhargava, D 31
 Bhāskara 47
 Bhaṭṭa, Mariyappa 32
 Bhatta, Narasiṃha 236
 Bhattacharyya, H 23, 31
 Bhavadeva 12, 44
Bhavanapatis gods 4
 Bhayani, H C 32
 Bhūtabali 42
 Bhuvaneshwar 48, 50, 56
 Bloomfield, M 12, 20
 Bohn 17
 Bommarasa 32, 47
 Bool Chand 26, 27
 Bothra, Puspa 34
brahman 81, 88, 116 190 191, 194,
 205, 215, 220, 225, 226, 228
 Buddha 16, 18, 21, 37, 63, 77, 89–
 90, 92, 94, 96, 99, 101–3, 107,
 119, 191, 195, 202, 223
 Buddhaghosa 90, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102,
 195, 201
 Buddhism 6, 7, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25,
 31–33, 59, 78–80, 82, 87–88 *passim*,
 vis-a-vis Jainism 195–200
 Bühler, G 8–10, 16, 18
 Burgess, J 12
 Cātyañāyaka 4
 Cāmunḍa Rāya 53, 60, 240
 Candragupta 37, 52, 55, 58, 65
 Candrakīru 90
 Candrasena 135
 Cārvāka 91, 202–4, 222–24, 226, 227
 Cetaḥ 62, 64, 84, 101
 Chakravartu, A 25
 Chanda, R P 30, 77
 Chandra, K R 31
 Charpenier, J 11, 12, 17, 23
 Chatterjee, A K 36
 Chattopadhyaya, D P 125
 Chausa bronzes 49
 Chedasūtras (Cheyasuttas) 40, 231
 cognuon 182, Buddhist and Jain con-
 trasted 198, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 219,
 Vedāntas 220, 225
 Colebrooke, H T 7
 cosmography 163, 168
 cosmology 24, 35, 144
 Dalal, C D 13
 Dasgupta, S N 22
 Demokritos 161
 Deo, S B 28, 29
 Deogarh Jain temples of 50 53, 54
 Derāvāsī 1
 Desai, M D 27
 Desai, P B 28
 Desai, S M 34
 Devabhadra 42, 44, 135
 Devacandra 44
 Devanandā 62
 Devaprabha 43, 44
 Devardhi 38, 41, 61, 67
 Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka 134
 Devendra Ganin 12, 41, 43
 Devirappa, H 32
 Dhāhila 43
 Dhanapāla 42
 Dhanañjaya 43
 Dhaneśvara 8, 44
 Dharasena 232
 Dharmabhūṣaṇa 135
 Dharmadāsa 13, 43
 Dharmakīru 134, 216
 Dharmanātha 47, 76
 Dharmavardhana 44
 Dhundiyā 1
 Digambara 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14,
 16–18, 22–24, 37, 41, 53–55, 57,
 split with the Śvetāmbaras 66, sacred
 text of 42, 231–32
 Dikshit, K.K. 30, 32, 34, 36

- Dinanatha, R C 13
 Dinnāga 15, 216
 Dinnaśuri 66
 Dīpikas 231
 Dīḥhadhanimanībānavāda 90
dravya 4, 30 162, 175, 179–81, 203,
 207, 217, 222
Drṣṭivāda (Dṛṣṭivāda) 39
 Dvivedi, R C 33

 Edgerton, F 20
 Ēkaccasassatavāda 90
 Ekkavādins 92
 Flācārya 292
 Ellora, Jain caves of 51
 Empedokles 98, 161

 Female Principle 79, 81, 205
 Fergusson 74n
 Fick, R 12
 Fifford, B 25
 First Principles 17, 89, 92
 Fleet, J F 55
 Franklin, W B

gaccha 1, 28, 61, 65
gana 1, 28, 57 61, 65, 108
 Gandhī V R 19
 Ganēśa 4, 50
 Gangā inscription 58
 Gaube 205, 207
 Gati B L 20
 Gautama 65, 119, 120
 Ghatotkaca 78
 Chatage 69, 73, 74
 Ghosh, K C 19
 Ghoshal, S C 15
 Glasenapp, H V 23, 25
 Gommatēśvara 52
 Gopinath Rao, T A 70
 Gosāla Mankhaliputta 17, 20, 63, 99
 Govindacharya, A 18
 Goyāma 24, 99, 62
 Grierson 74
 Gueriot, A 7 15, 23
 Gujarat, Jain antiquities of 53
 Gumanapantī 1
guna 30 180, 181, 218
 Guṇabhadra 12, 42
 Guṇaratna 21, 95, 119, 125, 128–33,
 135, 157, 228
gunasthānas 20, 175, 178
 Guṇavarma 27, 46, 47
 Gunc, P D 13
 Gupta, S D 68

 Handiqui, K K 26
 Hanumān 4
 Harappa civilization 48, 80
 Haribhadra 13, 14, 21, 34, 40–42,
 44, 45
 Harinegamesi 49, 62
 Hasumalla 43, 58
 Hemacandra 7, 9, 12, 13, 29, 30 41,
 43–45, 47, 55 56, 216
 Hendi, B B 33
 Hertel, J 12, 13, 70
 Hira Lal 68
 Hiremath, R C 33
 Hoernle, A F R 9–11, 17 18 73 75 99
 188, 200
 Holzmann 12
 Hultzsch, F 70 71
 Huttemann W 11, 69 73

 Indrabhūti Gautama 65
 Indradinna 66

 Jacobi, H 8–14, 16 17 26 61, 67–70
 72–74
 Jain, B C 32 37, 73
 Jain B D 12
 Jain, C R 19, 20, 23 67, 72
 Jain, H L 67 70, 72, 74
 Jain, J C 26, 31, 32, 36, 37 67, 73
 Jain, J P 31
 Jain, K P 25, 67, 71, 72
 Jain, Lalaram 12
 Jain, Muni U K 33
 Jaini, J L 14, 19, 23 71 72
 Jamālī 23, 63, 66
 Jambusvāmī 65
 Janna 47
 Javalegauda D 32
 Jayakīru 44
 Jhaveri, Indulekha 30
 Jhaveri, M B 23, 26
 Jhaveri, M L 17
jina 3, 12, 23, 24, 26, 48–54, 56, 58,
 63, 200, 201

- Jinabhadra 11, 40
 Jinadāsaganī 231, 235
 Jināsena 12, 42, 43, 59
 Jinavijaya 16, 68, 69, 72, 74
 Jīnesvara 44
jīva/Jīva 144–53, 170, 179, 192, 194,
 classification of 148–51
 Joindu 42
 Joshi, L M 36
 Jyotiṣka gods 4, 150

 Kabandhi Kālyāyana 97
 Kadamba inscriptions 59, 60
kāla 22, 89, 92, 144, 146, 147, 180,
 207, 217
 Kalghatgi T C 29
 Kalyānacandra 134
 Kamalabhaya 47
 Kamaśīla 123, 125, 188
 Kampuz, K V 11
kanāda 119, 120, 217
 Kanakamara 43
 Kanakasena 43
 Kannada 27, 33, 46, 47, 73
 kapadia, I I R 10, 26, 67, 68, 73
karma 6, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29,
 39, 44, 64, 86, 92, 93, 100, 113,
 122, 123 *passim*
 Karpapārya 27, 47
 Kārtikeya Svāmī 42
hasaya 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 178,
 189
 Keith, A B 21, 214, 229
 Ken 61, 62
 Khāravēla 48, 56, 57
 Kurfel W 11, 69, 189
 Kirurāja 45
 Klatt, J 8, 9, 13, 74, 188
 knowledge, theories of 135–40, 181–84,
 196–98, 208–10, 224–27
 Konguvelir 46
 Konow S 75
 Kotesvara 47
 Krause, C 13, 22, 27, 72
 Krishna Rao, B V 71
 Kriyavāda 16, 21, 89, 91, 92, 113
kula 1, 57, 65
 Kulkarni, B S 33
 Kumar, R 35
 Kumārapala 44, 53
 Kumārasena 237
 Kumārila 121, 215, 225
 Kundakunda 13, 14, 41, 42, 180
 Kunthunātha 76

 Laghusamantabhadra 134
 Lakṣmanadeva 45
 Lassen, C 8
 Lauhe, A B 17
 Law, B C 20, 24, 25, 75
 laymen, duties of 5
leśyā, concept and classification 150–52
 Leumann, E 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 70, 71,
 74, 188, 201
 liberation 176–77, 210–11
 Loarini, E 13
 Lohācārya 232
lokhākāśa 146, 147, 164

 Mackenzie, C 7
 Mahābala 33
 Mahagiri 66
 Mahāsena 44
 Mahāvīra *passim*
mahāvratas 5
 Mahāyāna 198
 Maladhari Hemacandra 44
 Malayagiri 41
 Mallinātha 76
 Malvania, D 34
 Mānatunga 42, 43
 Mandiramārgī 4
 Mangarasa 47
 Manikyacandra 44
 Mānikyanandin 14
 Marshall, J 74, 80, 110
 materialism 103, 202
 Mathura 24, 48–50, 57, 58
 Maulai, B K 34
mātrkāś 79
 Max Muller 214
 Mehta, M L 27, 31
 Meruunga 13, 45, 46
 Meyer 12, 69
 Mīmāṃsakas 119, 121–23, 214–16,
 224, 225
 Mironov, N D 13, 70
 Mitranandavijaya 32
 Mitranandi 234
 Modi, M C 32

- Moggallāna 102
mokṣa 19, 22, 25, 28, 66, 108, 113,
 175, 176, 194, 210, 227
 Montgomery, A J 20
 Mookherjee, S 26, 30
 Moor, E 8, 67
 Mother Goddesses 78
mukta 172, 176, 194, 210
Mūlasuttas 11, 24, 38, 40, 74
Mūrupūjaka 1
 Mūmicandra 44
 Munisuvrata 76

 Nāgacandra 33, 46
 Nāgārjuna 90, 119, 158
 Nāgavarma 27, 33
 Nahar, P C 19, 72, 75
 Naigameṣa 62
 Naminātha 76
 Nandisena 43
 Nandivardhana 63
 Narasimhachar 27, 32, 33, 55, 73, 75
 Na-saṇṭi-paralokavādins 92, 93
 Nayasena 27
 Nemi-jineśa 47
 Nemicaṇḍra 15, 32, 42, 47
 Neminātha 3, 43, 45, 50, 54, 58, 76
Nevaśāññināśāññivāda 90, 91
 nine fundamentals 169, 170
netṛyārā 19, 22, 170, 174, 175, 182
netṛyuktis 41
Niyatvāda 21, Jain critique of 115
 Niyavādins 92
 non-absolutism 26, 186
 non-violence 85, 86, 108, 174
 Nrpatunga 46
 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas 21, 34, 117–19, 121–
 23, 125, 127–30, 133, 161, 163, 185,
 199, 207, 215–19, 224, 226

 Odeyadeva Vādibhasiṃha 43
 Ohira, S 36
 Oldenberg, H 111

 Pabhosa cave inscription 48
 Padmakīrti 43, 45
 Padmaprabha 76
 Padmarajah, Y J 34
 Paharpur, C P 50, 58
 Pannas 24, 38, 39, 73, 74

 Pakudha Kaccāyana 18, 20, 92, 96
 98, 103
 Pampa 33, 46
 Pampa II *See* Nāgacandra
 Pande, G C 36
 Pandita, S B 32
pāpa 19, 98, 110, 169, 212
parameṣṭhin 3
Parināmavāda 209, 225
 Pārsvadeva Gaṇi 135
 Pārśvanātha 3, 6, 20, 48, 50–52, 54,
 58, 61, 69, 76
 Pārśvapandita 32
paryāya 144, 147, 179–81, 187, 196
 203, 207, 218, 222
 Paryūṣana 4
 pastoral religion 82, 87
 Pāṭaliptura Council 38, 65
 Patañjali 180, 211, 213
 Paterson 8, 13
 Pathak, K B 18, 74
 Paul, P L 72
 Pavolini 12, 70
 Phalatanc, L A 72
 Phattelalji 72
 philosophical texts 37
 pilgrimage 5, 20, 28, 60
 Pischel, R 10, 70
 Pliny 155
 Ponna 46
 Prabhācandra 42, 55, 134
 Prabhākara 215
 Prabhava 65
 Prabhāvatī 62
prakṛti 81, 175, 205–8, 210, 211, 223
 Prakīrṇas (Painnas) 39–40
 Prasad Singh, R B 32
 Praśastamau 125
 Praśastapāda 120, 157
 Pūbbanta-kappika (Pūrvanta-kalpika)
 89–91
pudgala 22, 144, 146–148, 161, 170, 174,
 175, 207, 208, 210, 217, 218
 Puṣerā 1
 Pūjyapāda 42, 70, 180, 183
 Pulle, L 8, 68, 70
punya 19, 169
 Pūrana Kassapa 18, 20, 92, 94, 95,
 101, 103
puruṣa 81, 90, 144, 205–7, 223

- Puṣpadanta 27, 31, 42, 43, 47, 70
 quality 22, 32, 133 142, 163, 179, 181,
 185, 196, 204 205, 207, 217, 218
 Rabhasa Nandī 134
 Radhakrishnan, S 22, 29, 214, 228
 Rājasekhara 135
rāksasas 78
 Rāmacandra 43
 Rāmānuja 220, 221
 Ramanuja Iyengar M A 27
 Ramaswami Ayyangar M S 22, 25
 Raina 32 46
 Rāstrakūta inscription 59–60
 Ratnacandra, Muni 15
 Ratnasekhara 46
 Ravisena 42
 Ray, Dhanapau 8
 Raychaudhuri, P C 28
 Rhys Davids T W 111
 Rice F P 72
 Rockhill, W W 111
 Sabara 215 229
 sacrificial cults 88 214
sadhus 4, 40, 176
 Sadhumargi 1
 Sakalakīrī 240
vākhās 1–2, 57, 61, 65
 Sāktism 80, 81
 Saleore, B A 25, 59, 74, 75
 Sātibhadra 47
 Samayāpanthī 1
 Samantabhadra 14, 21, 42, 133, 134,
 141, 183, 198
 Sambhavanātha 49, 51, 76
 Sambhūtavijaya 65
 Samgha-s 1, 55, 61, 86, 88, 107
 Samghadāsa 41
 Sāmkhya 77, 80, 81 95, 97, 116
 119, 134, 181, 184, 201, 204, 205,
 207–211, 213, 222–25, 227, 228
 Samprau 55, 56
 Samucchedavādins 92, 93
samvara 19, 24, 86, 170, 173, 174,
 182, 213
 Sāndilya 65, 67
 Sangave, V A 28, 67
 Sanghvi S 27, 29
 Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta 20 91 102
 Sankalia, H D 74 75
 Sankara 19, 81, 220, 221
 Sannaya B S 33
 Saññivāda 90
 Śāntudeva 119 123
 Śāntukīrī 47
 Śāntunātha 32, 47 51 54, 60 76
 Sarasvatī 49 50 61
 Sariputta 102
 Sarvānanda 45
sāsanadevata 4, 23, 50 79
 Sassatavada 90
 Sastri, Kuppuswamy 69
 Sātkāryavāda 209
 Sayambhava 65
 Schrader, F O 16, 18 111
 Schubring, W 9–12 24 38, 73 188,
 189, 213
 Seidenstucker 12
 Sen, A C 18 24, 69
 sense organs 90 144
 Sesha Iyengar, H 27 32
 Seshagiri Rao B 22 25
 Settar S 35, 73
 Shah C J 24
 Shah, N J 32, 34
 Shah, U P 26 30, 36
 Shamasasury, R 11
 Shamrao, T S 32
 Sharma, H M 13
 Sharma, R S 85
 Sharma, S R 25
 Shriyan, R 31
 Siddhārtha 62
 Siddhasena 11, 14, 21, 41 70, 133
 136–138, 141, 181, 183
 Siddhasena Divākara 14, 21 133 137
 138, 141
 Sikdar, J C 31
 Śīlānka 41, 92, 97, 111, 195
 Simha 1, 8, 18, 45 61
 Simhagiri 66
 Simhanandī 58
 Singh, R 34
 Śīalanātha 76
 Śīvakotyācārya 33, 46
 Skanda 4
 Skandila 65
 Smith 75

- Śobhana 42
 Sogan, K.C 31
 Somaçandra 46
 Somacariuragan 45
 Somaprabha 13, 44
 Siavana Belgolā 5, 35, 52
 Śreyāṃsanātha 76
 Sricandra 44, 45, 135
 Sridhara 45
 Sripūjya 65
 Śrutasaṅgāra 195
 Steinthal, P 11, 69, 73
 Stevenson, J 8, 67
 Sthānakavāsī 1, 4, 17, 24
 Sthūlabhadra 37, 98, 56, 65, 66
 Suah L 14, 70, 71
 Sudharman 65, 92
 Suhasan 56, 66
 Sumatnātha 44
 Sunavala, A.J 72
 Sūnyavāda 198, 220, 224
 Suparvanātha 76
 Suri, Mahesvara 43
 Suri, Mānukya 43 69
 Suri, Ratnaprabha 135, 141
 Suri, Śāntu 15, 44
 Suri, Vijayarajendra 15
 Suri, Vināla 12
 Susthita 66
 Suvidhinātha 76
 Svabhāvavādin 95
 Svayambhū 70, 116
 Svetāmbara 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 14, 15, 22-24
syādvāda 19, 22, 32, 93, 193, 141, 183, 220
 syllogism 21, 133, 138-41, 210, 219

 Tamil Jain works 46
 Tank, U.S 18
 Tantrism 26, 32, 80
tārādevī 79
 Taranapanthī 1, 4
 Taua N.M 27, 30
 Tawney, C.H 13, 69
 Terapanthī 1
 Tessitori, L.P 13, 74
 Thakur, U 31
 Thibaut 11
 Tilakācārya 135
 Tīrthakkatheva 46
 Totāpanthī 1
 transcendental 168, 181, 183, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 223, 224 226
 transmigration 77, 182, 192-94, 224, 228
 Trisalā 62
 Tukol T.K 35

 Ucchedavāda 90
 Udayagiri 48, 56, 58
 Uddyotakara 123, 125
 Uddyotana 1, 61
 Umāsvāmin (Umāsvāu) 14
 Upadhye, A.N 36, 70, 74
 Uvargas 11, 24, 98, 39, 73

 Vādirāja 43, 70
 Vaidya, P.L 11, 27, 69, 70, 73, 74
Vaimānsika gods 4 150
 Vajjian confederacy 84
 Vajrasena 47, 65-67
 Vajravāmin 66
 Vāmā 62
 Vāmanācāryar 46
 Vardhamāna 22, 43, 57, 63
 Vātsyāyana 120
 Vajrakera 42
 Vedānta 116, 118, 134 181 203, 205, 209, 215, 216, 219, 220, 222-24, 226, 228
 Vedic religion 77 79 tradition 190 192
 Velankar, H 68, 74
 Venkata Rao, A 27
 Vidyabhusana, S.C 14, 71, 188
udyādevī 79
 Vidyānanda 14, 42, 134
 Vidudabha 84
 Vijalākshmy, R. 96
 Vijayasena 47
 Viṇānavāda 198, 220, 224, 225
 Viṇānavādin 197, 198
 Vimalanātha 76
 Vinayavāda 16, 90, 93, 113
 Vinayavijaya 135, 164
 Vivartavāda 209, 225
 Vyantara gods 150

 Warren, H 19

Weber, A 8-13, 17, 68, 73
 Williams, R. 31
 Wilson, H. H. 8
 Windisch, E. 13, 68, 189
 Winternitz, M. 10, 228
 women, position of 28
 worship, system of 3

yadrcchā 89-92
Yajñika, N. D. 27

yakṣas 4, 53, 78
śasodā 63
Yasovijaya 16, 70, 71, 135, 217
Yatuvrābha 42
Yogicandra Muni 45
yoginīs 79
 Zachariae 70
 zodiac 161

